Jennifer Harris v. FCA US, LLC et al.

At issue is FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Harris opposes the motion. FCA’s motion also requests that the court strike language related to punitive damages from the complaint.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for judgment on the pleadings “is equivalent to a belated general demurrer.” (Sprague v. County of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 119, 127.) It has the same function as a general demurrer, but it is made after the time for demurrer has expired. Except as provided by statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 438), the rules governing demurrers apply. As with a demurrer, in ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings the court accepts as true all properly pleaded material factual allegations, but does not accept as true contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 243, 253 (Valero).) Extrinsic evidence cannot be considered.

The court has considered the declaration from FCA’s counsel only to the extent it addresses FCA’s meet and confer efforts. The efforts were inadequate. Sending an email does not comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 439, subdivision (a), which requires a moving party to meet and confer “in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” (Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.) But FCA’s failure to adequately meet and confer is not, by itself, a basis for denying the motion. (§ 439, subd. (a)(4).)

DISCUSSION

FCA challenges each cause of action in the complaint on the grounds that they are timebarred and that they fail to state sufficient facts. FCA cannot challenge the fifth cause of action because it is alleged against San Leandro only.

First and Second Cause of Action 22

FCA’s notice challenges the first through third causes of action as time-barred. (Notice, p. 2:7-9.) But FCA’s memorandum of points and authorities challenges only the first and second causes of action. The court limits its discussion to whether the first and second causes of action are sufficiently pleaded. (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach) [“When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”])

Assembly Bill No. 1755 added chapter 12 to title 10 of part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The bill added sections 871.20 through 871.28. The bill was signed by the Governor in September 2024 and became effective on January 1, 2025. (Stats. 2024, ch. 938.) It initially applied to all actions seeking restitution, vehicle replacement, or civil penalties under Civil Code sections 1793.2, 1793.22, and 1794, regardless of the vehicle manufacturer. (Former section 871.20; stats. 2024, ch. 938, § 1.)

Section 871.21 includes two statutes of repose. Section 871.21, subdivision (a) provides that an action governed by “Section 871.20 shall be commenced within one year after the expiration of the applicable express warranty.” Section 871.21 states, “Notwithstanding subdivision (a), an action covered by Section 871.20 shall not be brought later than six years after the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle.”

The Legislature amended chapter 12 with Senate Bill No. 26, urgency legislation that became effective upon the Governor’s signature on April 2, 2025. (Stats. 2025, ch. 1.) Senate Bill No. 26 amended sections 871.20 and 871.24. It also added sections 871.29 and 871.30. Senate Bill No. 26 amended chapter 12 in a fundamental way by making its provisions applicable only to vehicle manufacturers who opt in to its requirements. Section 871.20, subdivision (a), now provides that chapter 12 applies to actions “brought against a manufacturer who has elected under section 871.29 to proceed under this chapter.”

Section 871.30, subdivision (a), provides: “Within 30 days of the effective date of the act adding this section, a manufacturer may elect to be governed by this chapter for all actions described in subdivision (a) of Section 871.20 with respect to all of its motor vehicles sold in the year 2025 and in all prior years by providing written notice of that election to the Arbitration Certification Program within the Department of Consumer Affairs.” That section continues that if a manufacturer fails to opt in, chapter 12 will not apply to actions against that manufacturer filed between January 2025 and April 2025. (§ 871.30, subd. (c).)

Thus, to rely on sections 871.20 and 871.21, FCA needed to “elect to be governed by this chapter for all actions described in subdivision (a) of Section 871.20 with respect to all of its motor vehicles.” (§§ 871.29, subd. (b), 871.30, subd. (c).) It is not apparent from Harris’s February 2025 complaint that FCA opted in to chapter 12, and FCA makes no such showing in its moving papers. And while Harris provides a website indicating that FCA opted in on April 25, 2025, Harris has not requested judicial notice of that fact. (Opposition, p. 1:24-27.) FCA fails to demonstrate that either section 871.20 or 871.21 applies to this action.

Even assuming that FCA opted in on April 25, 2025, the court would nonetheless conclude that sections 871.20 and 871.21 do not apply to Harris’s first and second causes of action.

There is a general presumption against retroactive application of new statutes “in the absence of a clear indication of a contrary legislative intent, such as express language of retroactivity.” (Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 955 (Quarry).) But legislation that “shortens a limitations period is considered procedural and is applied retroactively to preexisting causes of action, so long as parties are given a reasonable time in which to sue.” (Coachella Valley Mosquito & Vector Control Dist. v.

California Public Employment Relations Bd. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1091-1092.) “When necessary to provide a reasonable time to sue, a shortened limitations period may be applied prospectively so that it commences on the effective date of the statute, rather than on the date the cause of action accrued.” (Id. at p. 1092.) If a “period has been legislatively shortened, constitutional and substantive issues will arise concerning retrospective application if: ‘[I]n a given case, that retrospective application may violate due process by in effect eliminating the plaintiff’s right.

If the time left to file suit is reasonable, no such constitutional violation occurs, and the statute is applied as enacted. If no time is left, or only an unreasonably short time remains, then the statute cannot be applied at all.’ ” (Sznyter v. Malone (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162.) Whether a party has a reasonable time after a change in law to file an action is a question of law. (Ibid.)

If the court applied the statute of repose, Harris would have had to file suit by February 2023, which was more than a year before Assembly Bill No. 1755 was signed. It is unreasonable to conclude that Harris was required to comply with a deadline almost two years before the effective date of the law creating the deadline.

On rebuttal, FCA contests Harris’s claim that FCA seeks to apply sections 871.20 and 871.21 retroactively. FCA argues the sections do not apply retroactively, but instead have retroactive effect in eliminating causes of action based on Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivisions (b) and (d). (Reply, p. 2:12-16.) FCA identifies no language in the statute supporting this interpretation. (Public Employment Relations Bd. v. Bellflower Unified School Dist. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 927, 939 [“The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.”].)

FCA also provides no authority for its proposition that “retrospective effect is not the same as retroactive application.” (Reply, p. 2:12-13.) In Kizer v. Hanna (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1, 7, a case FCA cites, the Court defined a statute as retroactive where it substantially changes the legal effect of past events. The Kizer Court then concluded a statute did not have a retroactive effect due to the absence of such a substantial change. (Id. at p. 8.) To the extent FCA seeks to impose the limitations of Section 871.21, the imposition would be retroactive. (See Quarry, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 956 [a law has retroactive effect when it substantially affects existing rights and obligations].)

FCA argues for the first time in its reply that due process is not implicated because a statutorily created cause of action is not a vested right. (Reply, p. 2:19-28.) FCA forfeited that argument by not raising it in until the reply. (Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 [points raised for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited].) Even if the court considered the argument, it is unpersuasive. FCA cites Bouley v. Long Beach Memorial Medical Center (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 601, 609, which reiterated that the retroactive application of a law is unconstitutional if it deprives an individual of a vested right without due process of law.

It is true that statutory causes of action are not a vested right (id. at p. 610, fn. 5), and that such rights may be altered. (Yoshioka v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 972, 982.) But alteration is forbidden when the party is deprived of every reasonable method of securing just compensation. (Ibid.; Aronson v. Superior Court (1987) 24

191 Cal.App.3d 294, 297 [“retrospective application of a shortened limitations period is permissible provided the party has a reasonable time to avail himself of his remedy before the statute cuts off his right.”].) Applying sections 871.20 and 871.21 to Harris’s first and second causes of action would deprive her any possibility of remedy. As noted above, it is unreasonable to expect Harris to have filed this action two years before the statute came into effect. Harris’s first and second causes of action are not time-barred under sections 871.20 and 871.21.

The court denies FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first and second causes of action because they are not time-barred under sections 871.20 or 871.21.

Third Cause of Action

FCA asserts that Harris’s third cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3) is inadequately pleaded.

Civil Code section 1793.2, subdivision (a)(3) requires manufacturers to make available to authorized service and repair facilities sufficient service literature and replacement parts to effect repairs during the express warranty period. Statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity. (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.)

Here, the third cause of action largely restates the language of the statute. (Complaint, ¶ 52.) It does not include any allegations specific to Harris’s case. It is not pleaded with the particularity required of statutory causes of action. FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action is granted.

A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that an amendment would cure the defect identified on demurrer. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Shaeffer v. Califia Farms, LLC (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1145 [“The onus is on the plaintiff to articulate the ‘specifi[c] ways’ to cure the identified defect, and absent such an articulation, a trial or appellate court may grant leave to amend ‘only if a potentially effective amendment [is] both apparent and consistent with the plaintiff’s theory of the case.’ ”].) Harris’s opposition does not meet this burden The court will nonetheless grant leave to amend because this is the first pleading challenge to be heard in this action.

Fourth Cause of Action

FCA argues that the fourth cause of action for breach of implied warranty is timebarred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations.

“Under the implied merchantability warranty, ‘every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.’ ” (Brand v. Hyundai Motor America (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1545, quoting Civ. Code, § 1792.) “The warranty ‘ “arises by operation of law” ’ and therefore applies despite its omission from a purchase contract.” (Ibid.) “Merchantability, as pertinent here, means that the goods ‘[p]ass without objection in the trade under the contract description,’ and are ‘fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Civ. Code, § 1791.1, subd. (a).) To properly assert a claim for breach of implied warranty, a plaintiff must allege breach of a warranty, occurring while the warranty 25

is valid, and must bring suit within the limitations period. (Mexia v. Rinker Boat Co., Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1297, 1306 (Mexia).) The “implied warranty of merchantability may be breached by a latent defect undiscoverable at the time of sale.” (Id. at p. 1304.) Thus, if a product is sold with a latent defect, the implied warranty is breached “by the existence of the unseen defect, not by its subsequent discovery.” (Id. at p. 1305.)

The statute of limitations for the fourth cause of action is four years. (Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (1).) The cause of action accrues “when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach.” (Com. Code, § 2725, subd. (2).) The duration provision in the Song-Beverly Act provides that the duration “shall be coextensive in duration with an express warranty which accompanies the consumer goods... in no event shall such implied warranty have a duration of less than 60 days nor more than one year following the sale.” (Mexia, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at 1304, citing Civ. Code, § 1791.1, subd. (c).)

Here, the complaint alleges that the Subject Vehicle was purchased on February 23, 2017. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) The complaint was filed nearly eight years later. While the complaint alleges various rules and doctrines that purportedly toll the applicable statutes of limitation, those allegations are so generic and conclusory that they cannot be accepted as true for purposes of this motion. (Complaint, ¶ 37.) The complaint alleges no facts in support of those theories, rendering the allegations deficient. (Valero, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 253.)

When a plaintiff relies on a theory of fraudulent concealment, delayed accrual, equitable tolling, or estoppel to save a cause of action that otherwise appears on its face to be time-barred, he or she must specifically plead facts which, if proved, would support the theory.” (Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal App 4th 625, 641.) FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth cause of action is granted.

Harris’s opposition does not meet the burden to demonstrate that an amendment would cure the defect identified on demurrer. But because this is the first pleading challenge, the court will grant leave to amend.

Sixth Cause of Action

FCA contends that the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment fails to allege sufficient facts with the requisite specificity and is time-barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations.

Specificity of the Allegations

The elements of fraud are (1) a misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of its falsity; (3) intent to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage. (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 838-839 (Dhital).) Fraudulent inducement is a subset of fraud that occurs when a promisor knows what he or she is signing but his or her consent is induced by fraud. (Id. at p. 839.) Although it is a general rule that each element in a fraud cause of action must be pleaded with specificity (Lazar v. Super. Ct. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645), this pleading requirement is relaxed in claims for concealment. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Imp. System & Planning Ass’n., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384 (Alfaro) [“How does one show ‘how’ and ‘by what means’ something didn’t happen, or ‘when’ it never happened, or ‘where’ it never happened?”].)

The complaint satisfies the pleading requirements for a fraud cause of action. It alleges a direct contractual relationship (and duty to disclose) between Harris and FCA in the form of an express written warranty. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) The complaint alleges that the Subject Vehicle exhibited various defects. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-17.) Harris alleges that FCA knew that her vehicle had those defects, but failed to disclose them when she purchased the vehicle. (Id. at ¶¶ 18, 66.) Harris further alleges that FCA intentionally concealed those defects to defraud Harris. (See id. at ¶¶ 68-69.)

Harris alleges that had she known about the defects, she would not have purchased the Subject Vehicle. (Id. at ¶ 69.) At least one appellate court has found similar allegations sufficient to support a cause of action for fraudulent inducement by concealment. (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at pp. 843-844.) Although the Supreme Court initially granted review in Dhital, it subsequently dismissed review, which means Dhital is precedential authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(2)).) Further, Harris need not plead the identity of individuals at FCA who allegedly concealed facts about defects in the Subject Vehicle, as that information would be uniquely within FCA’s knowledge. (Alfaro, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384.)

FCA relies on two federal district court cases to contend Harris insufficiently pleads the nature of the defect, FCA’s exclusive knowledge of the defect, and Harris’s reliance on FCA materials or advertisements. (Motion at pp. 9:11-10:3, 10:21-11:13.) Those case are not binding on this court. (People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 875.) And the complaint sufficiently alleges a fraud cause of action. (Complaint, ¶¶ 16, 19, 21; see Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 844.)

FCA also contends that Harris fails to allege FCA’s intent to defraud through affirmative statements or a failure to disclose any alleged facts. (Motion, p. 11:19-20.) FCA overlooks paragraphs 68-69 of the complaint, which allege FCA failed to disclose engine defects. To the extent FCA asserts a lack of specificity in alleging intent, a general allegation of intent is sufficient. (See Beckwith v. Dahl (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1060 [false promise sufficiently pleaded with a general allegation that the promise was made without an intent to perform].)

FCA argues in a footnote that the cause of action “should likely also be dismissed” because it is barred by the economic loss rule. (Motion, p. 9:5, fn. 1.) FCA risked forfeiting that argument by raising it in a footnote. The argument is also without merit because “the economic loss rule does not apply to limit recovery for intentional tort claims like fraud.” (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 38.) More specifically, the economic loss rule does not apply to fraudulent inducement of a contract. (Erlich v.

Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 552 (Erlich); Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 989-990 (Robinson); County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 292, 328-329 [“The analysis [in Robinson] suggested that fraud itself is immune from application of the economic loss rule because fraud is particularly blameworthy and therefore unlike both contract causes of action and products liability causes of action.”], internal citation omitted.)

Statute of Limitations

The statute of limitations applicable to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement through concealment is the three-year statute set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d). A claim for fraud accrues on the date of “discovery, by the 27

aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 338, subd. (d); Britton v. Girardi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 721, 734.) “‘Although the statute does not expressly provide that the claim will accrue based upon either actual or inquiry notice of the claimant, California courts have long construed it in such a fashion.’ As our Supreme Court has long held, under Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d), a ‘plaintiff must affirmatively excuse his [or her] failure to discover the fraud [or mistake] within three years after it took place, by establishing facts showing that he [or she] was not negligent in failing to make the discovery sooner and that he [or she] had no actual or presumptive knowledge of facts sufficient to put him [or her] on inquiry.’” (Krolikowski v.

San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 537, 561-562, internal citations omitted.)

Here, the facts constituting the fraud here are the sale of the Subject Vehicle to Harris in February 2017 without disclosure of the engine defect allegedly known to FCA. The complaint was filed more than seven years later. The complaint’s vague and conclusory allegations of tolling do not satisfy the standard for tolling or delayed discovery. (Complaint, ¶ 37.) Similarly, the allegation that Harris discovered the alleged fraud “shortly before” filing the complaint is insufficient. (Id. at ¶ 38.)

The complaint alleges no facts that affirmatively excuse the failure to discover the alleged fraud within three years of purchasing the Subject Vehicle. The complaint also does not allege enough information about the class action that purportedly tolled the statute of limitations. (Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah (1974) 414 U.S. 538, 554 [“[T]he commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action.”])

FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement through concealment on statute of limitations grounds is granted with leave to amend. Because the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth cause of action is granted with leave to amend, the motion to strike punitive damages is denied as moot.

CONCLUSION

FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the first and second causes of action on statute of limitations grounds is denied. FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the sixth cause of action on the ground of a failure to state sufficient facts is denied.

FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the third cause of action for failure to state sufficient facts is granted with leave to amend. FCA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the fourth and sixth causes of action on statute of limitations grounds is granted with leave to amend. The court does not grant leave to add any new parties or causes of action. (Zakk v. Diesel (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 431, 456.) The motion to strike is denied as moot.

Any amended pleading must be filed and served no later than September 11, 2026.

The court will prepare the order.

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