August 11, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 27 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

2:00 PM LINE 10 25-UDL-00283 HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR DEUTSCHE ALT-A SECURITIES MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2007-OA5, ET AL. VS. FERMIN ANIEL, ET AL.

HSBC BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE FOR DEUTSCHE WILLIAM R. JARRELL ALT-A SECURITIES MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST, SERIES 2007-OA5 FERMIN ANIEL

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 437 & 1170.7)

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff HSBC Bank USA, N.A.’s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. With the court’s permission, plaintiff has brought a second motion for summary judgment.

As a preliminary matter, there are multiple procedural defects in the motion. First, the exhibits submitted in support of the motion have not been electronically bookmarked, in violation of the California Rules of Court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(f)(4).) Second, the request for judicial notice has not been made in a separate document. (See id., at rule 3.113(l).) Third, the evidence in support of the motion, which exceeds twenty-five pages, is not separately bound nor does it include a table of contents. (See id., at rule 3.1350(g).) Despite these defects, the motion has been considered on the merits. All parties are advised that further violations of the California Rules of Court are subject to sanction. (See id., at rule 2.30.)

Plaintiff HSBC Bank USA, N.A.’s Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to exhibit A, but only as to its existence as a recorded document and its legal effect, and GRANTED as to exhibits B–D, but only as to their existence as court records and not for the truth of any matter stated therein.

A. Legal Standard on Summary Judgment

“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding.” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(1).) Summary judgment will only be granted “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Id., at subd. (c).)

Cited authorities

Extracting citations from the ruling text…

Verify against the source PDF — LLM extraction may miss or mis-normalize citations.

Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities

Ask about this ruling

Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”

Answers reference only this ruling's text. Not legal advice — always verify against the source PDF.

Find similar rulings

Other rulings by Nancy L. Fineman Judge Nancy L. Fineman dossier Other Motion for Summary Judgment in SANMATEO All SANMATEO County rulings Other Forcible Detainer cases Other denied rulings in SANMATEO

Source

Print-friendly view

A plaintiff moving for summary judgment has an initial burden of proving each element of the cause of action entitling him or her to judgment on that cause of action. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1); Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 241.) Once the initial burden has been carried, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as at least one of the elements of the cause of action or as to each element of a defense thereto. (Ibid.; Consumer Cause v. SmileCare (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 454, 467.)

August 11, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 28 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

The moving party’s ultimate burden of persuasion that there are no issues of triable fact, however, never shifts to the opposing party. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) This burden is unaffected by the strength or weakness of the showing in opposition to the motion (Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519), and summary judgment must be denied—despite deficiencies in the opposition—if the burden has not been carried (Kojababian v. Genuine Home Loans, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 408, 416).

Because summary judgment deprives an adverse party of the right to a trial, any doubts are resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion. (Huynh v. Ingersoll-Rand (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 825, 830; See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 900.) Thus, “[t]he moving party’s affidavits are to be strictly construed, and ... all conflicts in the affidavits are to be resolved in favor of the opposing party and all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of that party as well.” (Hufft v. Horowitz (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 8, 20.)

The Complaint asserts a single cause of action for forcible detainer. (Feb. 18, 2025 Complaint, passim.) Forcible detainer may be committed by unlawfully maintaining possession of real property after entering it either by force or by stealth. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1160, subd. (a).) The Complaint alleges the latter, and thus HSBC must prove the following elements: (1) Erlinda unlawfully entered the Property during “night-time[] or during the absence of the occupant” of the Property, and (2) she failed to surrender possession of the Property to the former occupant within five days of a demand to do so. (Id., at subd. (a)(2).)

For purposes of the forcible detainer statute, an “occupant” is one who, “within five days preceding such unlawful entry, was in the peaceable and undisturbed possession” of the property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1160, subd. (b); Barlow v. Burns (1870) 40 Cal. 351, 354 [“remedy (of summary forcible detainer proceeding) is only given to those who are in actual possession, and cannot be sustained by merely showing ... a right of possession”]; but see Giddings v. 76 Land & Water Co. (1890) 83 Cal. 96, 99 [plaintiff need not prove “actual, personal presence on the land for five days continuously preceding the unlawful entry”].)

However, in lieu of establishing that the plaintiff meets the statutory definition of “occupant” at trial, the plaintiff may instead show only that he or she “was entitled to the possession at the time of the forcible detainer.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1172; see White v. Pfieffer (1913) 165 Cal. 740, 742.)

HSBC presents evidence that it obtained a judgment for possession of the Property against Erlinda on August 7, 2023. (Jun. 25, 2026 Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”), pp. 24–26, 31–45.) The writ was executed by the sheriff on July 24, 2024, placing HSBC in possession of the Property. (Id., at pp. 28–29.) Notably, none of these facts are alleged in the Complaint. (See Complaint, passim.) That aside, this evidence is sufficient to establish a prima facie case that HSBC was took possession and was at least entitled to possession at that time.

However, like the prior motion for summary judgment, there is no evidence showing that Erlinda entered the Property “in the night-time[] or during the absence of the occupant” so as to constitute

August 11, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 29 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ a forcible detainer. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1160, subd. (a)(2).) The relevant evidence pertaining to Erlinda’s alleged entry onto the Property consists of two declarations from HSBC’s agents and an August 14, 2024 letter from Erlinda.

The first declaration states that HSBC’s counsel received the letter from Erlinda, that the letter admits Erlinda entered the Property sometime after July 24, 2024, and that Erlinda re-entered the Property without a right to do so. (Motion, p. 47, ¶¶ 7–8, p. 48, ¶ 9.) The second declaration states that the Property has remained occupied by unidentified persons from at least February 10, 2025, through September 9, 2025, and that “unauthorized” occupants remain in possession of the Property, also without specifying whether Erlinda is one of the occupants. (Id., at p. 84, ¶ 2, p. 85, ¶¶ 3–4.) The letter itself, though listing the Property as the return address, does not actually say, admit, or otherwise show that Erlinda had reentered the Property. (Id., at pp. 70–71.)

Construed strictly as required on a motion for summary judgment, this evidence fails to show that Erlinda’s entry onto the Property was either during the night or during the temporary absence of HSBC or its agents. This is a necessary element of the cause of action—to conclude otherwise would render the statute’s text superfluous. If merely showing an unlawful entry were sufficient, the Legislature would not have included the clause “in the night-time, or during the absence of the occupant of any lands.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1160, subd. (a)(2).) Forcible detainer is a specific statutory remedy, intended to prevent breaches of the peace and not as a substitute for an action for ejectment. (See Hodgkins v. Jordan (1866) 29 Cal. 577, 578.) As such, it was originally only available when the defendant in fact used or threatened force. (Ibid.) The subdivision upon which HSBC relies is a limited exception to this requirement, and HSBC has not shown its case falls within this exception.

HSBC has thus failed to carry its initial burden of production of establishing each element of its cause of action for forcible detainer. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, Defendant Erlinda Aniel shall prepare, for the court’s signature, a written order consistent with this ruling, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and shall provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and by the California Rules of Court.