Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services

34-2022-00328643-CU-OE-GDS: Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services 05/14/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 53

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

Defendant California Department of General Services’ (“Defendant”) Demurrer to Plaintiff Vanessa Singh’s (“Plaintiff”) Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) is ruled upon as follows.

Defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice in support of the motion is granted for the purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d); see also Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein].)

Factual Background

In the TAC, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for retaliation in violation of FEHA, discrimination in violation of FEHA, failure to prevent in violation of FEHA, retaliation in violation of Labor Code § 1102.5, and constructive discharge. The TAC arises from Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant.

In support of her “FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION (Constructive Discharge),” Plaintiff alleges that a hiring manager was given permission to by-pass her managers and go directly to the State Printer and the director for hiring approval, and ultimately, the hiring manager hired a “younger, far less qualified candidate” than Plaintiff (FAC ¶¶ 67-68.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “knowingly permitted working conditions to exist that were so intolerable that a reasonable person in [Plaintiff’s] position would have no reasonable alternative to resign”, including obstruction of Plaintiff’s career path. (FAC ¶ 69.) Plaintiff asserts conduct from 2019 through 2024 within this Cause of Action. (FAC ¶¶ 65-76.)

Defendant demurs to the Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for constructive discharge on the grounds that (1) government entities cannot be held liable for common law theories of liability, and (2) Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies as to such a claim. Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

34-2022-00328643-CU-OE-GDS: Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services 05/14/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 53

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc. §452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111- 1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1612, 1616, fn. 2.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . . we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.)

Discussion

Government Immunity to Common Law Claims

Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action on the grounds that the state is immune to common law claims, such as constructive termination. Plaintiff, in opposition, argues that her claim for constructive discharge “is a type of adverse action,” not a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328643-CU-OE-GDS: Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services 05/14/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 53

common law claim in violation of public policy. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that this is an element of other causes of action—namely, to establish an “adverse action”—but that it is not being brought as a common law claim.

While Plaintiff asserts in her Opposition that her cause of action for “constructive discharge” is not actually a cause of action, the FAC expressly states this is her “FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION.” As pled, this claim is a wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim based on the Plaintiffs resignation, known as a Tameny claim. (See Ross v San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1513-1514 [treating a constructive discharge claim the same as a wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim].)

The constructive discharge claim is not cognizable against a public agency such as Defendant. Under Government Code section 815, a public entity is immune from suit for a common law violation of public policy claim. (See Miklosy v. Regents of the University of California (2008) 444 Cal.4th 876, 899 agreeing with Palmer v. Regents of University of California (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 899, 910, fn. 11, and holding that “[b]ecause the 'classic Tameny cause of action' is a common law, judicially created tort ... and not authorized by statute, it is not properly asserted against” a public entity.)

Plaintiff does not substantively address whether a Tameny claim would be authorized in this case, as she asserts she is not bringing such a cause of action. The Court construes this as a concession on the merits of the demurrer based on this statutory immunity. (See, e.g., D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 723, 728, n.4.) Accordingly, the demurrer on this ground is sustained.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is SUSTAINED.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendant next argues that Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action also fails because she failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a government tort claim. In opposition, Plaintiff argues, again, that “constructive discharge” refers to an element of a cause of action and that there is no government claims requirement “for a FEHA claim of discrimination or retaliation,” as such a claim is statutory. (Opposition, p. 4:17-23.)

Pursuant to the Government Claims Act, a claimant must present a civil complaint for money damages to the Government Claims Board before filing a lawsuit against a public entity or public employee, including a judicial officer. (Gov't Code §§ 810.2, 811.2, 811.4, 911.2, 945.4, and 950.2.) A claim relating to a cause of action for death or injury to a person or to personal property or growing crops must be presented to the public entity no later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action, and a claim

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328643-CU-OE-GDS: Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services 05/14/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 53

relating to any other cause of action must be presented no later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action. (Govt. Code § 911.2(a).) Failure to allege compliance with the presentation requirements of the Act and that the claim has been rejected is fatal to a cause of action. (State v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1240-1241.)

Plaintiff alleges that she filed Government Tort Claims on September 10, 2020 (TAC, ¶ 78), March 18, 2024 (TAC, ¶ 79), and August 9, 2024. (TAC, ¶ 80.) Plaintiff further alleges that she received a right to sue letter from the DFEH on October 19, 2022. (TAC, ¶ 77.) Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges retaliation which occurred in July- August of 2019, September of 2019, and February of 2024. Plaintiff’s Government Claims from 2024 both contain allegations pertaining to her 2024 alleged constructive termination.

As discussed above, wrongful constructive discharge in violation of public policy cause of action is a common law claim. Plaintiff has failed to identify any statutory grounds for the fifth cause of action, and does not allege that the constructive termination claim is based in FEHA discrimination or retaliation. As such, Plaintiff was required to file a government claim prior to bringing the instant action.

However, Plaintiff’s government claims from 2024 allege facts pertaining to her constructive termination in that year. This is sufficient to survive the demurrer stage.

Therefore, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Leave to Amend

Leave to amend is granted as the Court is not yet convinced Plaintiff will be unable to allege sufficient facts. Further, based on the representations in her Opposition, it appears Plaintiff does not seek to press a separate cause of action for “constructive discharge” but rather to incorporate these allegations in support of other causes of action that have “adverse action” allegations.

Plaintiff may file and serve an amended complaint no later than May 26, 2025. Although not required by statute or court rule, Plaintiff is directed to present the clerk a copy of this ruling at the time of filing the Fourth Amended Complaint. Defendant may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of the Fourth Amended Complaint, 35 days if served by mail.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00328643-CU-OE-GDS: Vanessa Singh vs. State of California, Department of General Services 05/14/2025 Hearing on Demurrer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 53