Singleton vs. Santa Ana Unified School District

Based on its interpretation of the CPRA, the court held the first two of the trial court's declarations, which concerned the defendant's responses to public records requests involving police bodycam footage, addressed contested issues regarding the defendant's handling of records requests that were sufficiently likely to recur. The court explained in these circumstances, declaratory relief was appropriate to help guide the parties' future conduct and inform their rights and responsibilities under the CPRA. (Gilroy, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 54.) The court declined to address the third declaration, which declared the city’s response to one request was untimely, and whether it would have supported an action for declaratory relief if raised in isolation. (Id. at p. 56.)

The court also expressly declined to consider whether declaratory relief is available in response to merely technical violations of the CPRA such as a delayed initial response because, “while future cases may present that question, . . . [the court] need not interpret the statute so expansively in order to resolve the case before [it].” (Gilroy, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 62.) The court confirmed its holding was narrower: “that the statute allows for declaratory relief at least when it functions to address an ongoing dispute and guide the parties’ future conduct with respect to the parties’ rights and responsibilities under the CPRA”. (Ibid.)

Here, the second cause of action seeks five declarations, at least one of which concerns an ongoing dispute likely to recur. Plaintiff seeks a declaration Defendant “violated and continues to violate the CPRA by . . . delaying, withholding, or failing to produce nonexempt records responsive to the requests at issue[]” (Petition, ¶ 73) and prays for a declaratory judgment that Defendant violated the CPRA by “unlawfully withholding records through unreasonable delay and incomplete production[]” (Petition, ¶ 82(d)). This declaration is based partly on Plaintiff’s allegations Defendant’s practice of routing public records requests to outside legal counsel rather

than processing them through ordinary administrative channels resulting in delay. (See Petition, ¶¶ 38-47.) The dispute therefore concerns a continuing practice that will affect future requests. Accordingly, Plaintiff has stated a cause of action for declaratory relief under the CPRA.

Because a general demurrer does not lie to only portion of a cause of action, the court declines to address Defendant’s arguments regarding the remaining declarations sought in the second cause of action. (See Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1167.)

The demurrer to the second cause of action is OVERRULED.

Third Cause of Action: Injunctive Relief

Under California law, injunctive relief is a remedy, not a cause of action. (City of South Pasadena v. Department of Transportation (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1293.)

The demurrer to the third cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Motion to Strike Portions of Writ of Mandate

Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.

Defendant moves to strike irrelevant matter and the prayer for attorney’s fees from the petition.

Irrelevant Matter

Defendant argues paragraphs 38 through 47 of the Petition (constituting the sections titled “Prior Public Records Requests (Background),” “District Policies Confirm Electronic Communications Are District Records,” and “District Practice of Routing Public Records Requests to Legal Counsel Resulting in Delay”) are irrelevant matter not essential to any cause of action. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 431.10, subd. (b)(1), 436, subd. (a).) Defendant also argues the paragraphs serve only to manufacture the factual predicate for a Gilroy “ongoing dispute” that the Petition cannot otherwise establish.

The court disagrees for the reasons stated in its ruling on Defendant’s demurrer.

Attorney Fees

Defendant moves to strike the prayer for attorney fees on the grounds that Plaintiff is not entitled to recover attorney fees because he is a self-represented litigant.

Plaintiff concedes this point but argues he may recover fees incurred in consultations with a retained attorney.

Plaintiff is correct. (See Mix v. Tumanjan Development Corp. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1324.)

Defendant is ORDERED to file an answer within 10 days.

Clerk to give notice.

10 Wang vs. Demurrer to Complaint Mayenne Medical Defendants Mayenne Medical dba Skinspire Laser & Skin 30-2025- Clinic, Dai Xiaoxiao, Liang Ma, and Hyunseok Kim’s 01532205-CU- demurrer to Plaintiffs Yisha Wang and Willie Hungyi Wei’s MM-CJC complaint is OVERRULED.

First, third, and fourth causes of action for battery and breach of fiduciary duty

Redundancy of a cause of action is not grounds for sustaining a demurrer. (See Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858, 889-890.)

Fifth cause of action for fraud

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a cause of action for fraud. (Compl. ¶¶ 77-88.)

Motion to Strike Complaint

Defendants Mayenne Medical dba Skinspire Laser & Skin Clinic, Dai Xiaoxiao, Liang Ma, and Hyunseok Kim’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ complaint is GRANTED.

Plaintiffs’ allegations are directly related to the manner in which Defendants provided professional medical services. (See Central Pathology Service Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 181, 191-192.) As such, Plaintiffs were required to obtain an order from the Court allowing them to seek punitive damages pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.13.

The Court ORDERS Defendants Mayenne Mefdical dba Skinspire Laser & Skin Clinic, Dai Xiaoxiao, Liang Ma, and Hyunseok Kim to file an answer within 10 days.

Clerk to give notice.

11 Young vs. Ford Motion for Summary Adjudication Motor Company