Bates vs California State Department of Human Resources, et al.

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

sponsors the program. (TAC, ¶ 1.) NIA is the third-party administrator for the Program and operates Nationwide ProAccount (“ProAccount”), “a fee-based, managed account service that creates and maintains a personalized retirement investment strategy” for participants in the Program. (TAC, ¶ 2.)

Plaintiff is a previous employee of the State of California. (TAC, ¶¶ 5, 44.) On May 12, 2016, Plaintiff joined the Program, including by rolling over a prior 401K, into a non-managed account invested in a Target Date Fund for members born in 1960. (TAC, ¶ 5.) On January 23, 2017, Plaintiff enrolled his account with ProAccount. (TAC, ¶ 5.) Plaintiff completed and signed a Participant Risk Tolerance Questionnaire (“PRTQ”), which Plaintiff alleges formed a contract and provides instructions to NIA regarding Plaintiff’s psychology, desired objectives, and approach to investments. (TAC, ¶ 6.)

Based on the questionnaire, Plaintiff was enrolled as an aggressive risk profile investor. (TAC, ¶ 6.) On June 14, 2019, Plaintiff updated his PRTQ, which updated his profile to a Moderate Investor profile. (TAC, ¶ 7.) In August 23, 2019, without any additional input, Plaintiff’s profile was updated to Moderate Growth, which remained consistent with Plaintiff’s objectives. (TAC, ¶ 7.) In March 2020, Plaintiff again modified his risk profile to a Conservative Investor. (TAC, ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff further alleges that, on October 7, 2021, without Plaintiff having updated a PRTQ, NIA sent a letter indicating Plaintiff’s account was changed to an Aggressive Growth Model. (TAC, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff discovered the letter and the change on or around February 6, 2022. (TAC, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff contends that the reassignment was done after Plaintiff changed his age from 60 to 61 using the “My Interactive Retirement Planning Tool,” triggering a review of his account by Wilshire. (TAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges the reassignment resulted in an avoidable loss of approximately 20% by the first quarter of 2022. (TAC, ¶ 8.)

The TAC names California Department of Human Resources (“CalHR”) and NIA as defendants (collectively “Defendants”) and, in sum, alleges Defendants breached various contractual and fiduciary duties by ignoring Plaintiff’s expressed statements indicating Plaintiff’s primary goal was to conserve the initial investment, permitting Plaintiff’s account to be improperly reassigned to aggressive based on an algorithm rather than Plaintiff’s instructions, and failing to provide complete and accurate information necessary to understand the management of the Plaintiff’s account. (TAC, ¶¶ 9-41.) The TAC also alleges that the reassignment constitutes age discrimination because it has a negative effect on persons over the age of 40 near retirement. (TAC, ¶¶ 42-45.)

Plaintiff’s TAC asserts the following seven causes of action against CalHR and NIA: (1) “Breach of Fiduciary Duty of Prudence and Care and Malfeasance” (2) “Breach of Contract and Failure

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

to Fully Disclose Malfeasance/Misfeasance” (3) “Breach of Contract and Failure to Disclose malfeasance/Misfeasance” (4) “Conflict of Interest Self-Enrichment of a Fiduciary Malfeasance, Misfeasance, Nonfeasance” (5) Fiduciary Failure to Disclose, Malfeasance” (6) “Failure to Perform Contracted Services, Malfeasance” and (7) Age Discrimination Malfeasance Govt. Code § 12940(a)”.

On August 23, 2024, this Court (Hon. Richard C. Miadich) ruled on Defendants’ demurrer to the TAC. (See August 23, 2024, Minute Order.) Specifically, this Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend as to each cause of action brought against CalHR. (Ibid.) This Court further sustained, without leave to amend, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for conflict of interest and seventh cause of action for age discrimination brought against NIA. (Ibid.) Accordingly, the only remaining causes of action are the first, second, third, fifth and sixth causes of action against NIA.

NIA now “moves this Court for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication.” (Notice of motion at 2:5-6.)

NIA also states in its Notice of Motion:

NIA now moves as to Plaintiff’s remaining First, Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action asserted in the Third Amended Complaint, which fail as a matter of law for the following reasons. First, there is no contractual provision or fiduciary duty that was breached. Second, there was no failure to disclose regarding Plaintiff’s portfolio allocation or the My Interactive Retirement Planning online tool. Third, the allocation of Plaintiff’s portfolio to the aggressive growth model was appropriate.

Fourth, Plaintiff has not suffered any damages and is not entitled to any relief. Fifth, Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to change his portfolio allocation but repeatedly has elected to continue with the aggressive growth model. Thus, NIA moves for summary judgment in favor of NIA and against Plaintiff; or, in the alternative, for a summary adjudication that there is no merit to the remaining First, Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action asserted against NIA in the Third Amended Complaint.

(Id., at 2:10-20.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

Plaintiff opposes. Trial is currently set for September 8, 2026.

II.

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court engages in a three-step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.

The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.) Indeed, it has often been noted that “[i]t would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [defendant’s] summary judgment motion by allowing them to present a “moving target” unbounded by the pleadings.” (Melican v.

Regents of University of California, (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176-177.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [quoting Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2)].) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v.

Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780-781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854-855, n.23; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.)

Finally, in ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

III. Evidentiary Rulings

Plaintiff’s objections to the declaration of Steven A. Jesenko are ruled upon as follows:

Overruled: Objection Nos. 3, 4

The Court need not address Plaintiff’s remaining objections filed in support of his opposition, nor does the Court need to address NIA’s objections filed in reply, as these objections are not relevant to the disposition of the motion.

IV.

Discussion

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff has filed two separate versions of his opposition brief. Plaintiff later represented to the Court that the 38-page filing, filed on May 8, 2026 is the operative filing. (See Plaintiff’s Amended Ex Parte Application filed on May 13, 2026.) NIA is correct that this filing exceeds the 20-page limit and that Plaintiff failed to obtain leave of Court to file an oversized opposition brief. Plaintiff is admonished for his duplicate, and excessive filings. While the Court has considered the entirety of the May 8, 2026, filing, Plaintiff is warned that the Court may disregard future filings by Plaintiff that exceed the page limit if Plaintiff fails to obtain leave of Court.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

A. Scope of NIA’s Motion

As discussed above, NIA’s notice of motion indicates that it seeks summary judgment on five grounds. It then states that it moves “ in the alternative, for a summary adjudication that there is no merit to the remaining First, Second, Third, Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action asserted against NIA in the Third Amended Complaint.” However, NIA’s notice of motion does not state any “issues” on which it seeks summary adjudication. In its separate statement, NIA presents the same five grounds for summary judgment, but this time labels these grounds as “Issue No. 1,” “Issue No. 2,” etc., with certain Undisputed Material Facts (“UMF”) listed below each “issue.” Yet, in NIA’s moving memorandum of points and authorities, NIA argues that summary judgment is appropriate on the same five grounds as listed in the notice of motion. (See Moving MPA at 11:12-15:12.)

In regard to its alternative request for summary adjudication, NIA states: “[if] the Court does not grant summary judgment in favor of NIA, it should enter summary adjudication with respect to any claims or damages that can be resolved as a matter of law.” (Id., at15:15-17.)

“The language in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f) makes it clear that a motion for summary adjudication cannot be considered by the court unless the party bringing the motion duly gives notice that summary adjudication is being sought.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1545-1546.) “If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).) A movant’s failure to comply with the requirements of a separate statement, in the Court’s discretion, may constitute a sufficient ground for denying the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(b)(1).)

The Court finds that NIA has failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b). NIA’s notice of motion, while purportedly seeking summary adjudication, does not state any issues for summary adjudication. Rather, the notice of motion provides only five grounds for summary judgment. NIA’s memorandum of points of authorities further argues that summary judgment is appropriate on the same five grounds as listed in the notice of motion. Again, while NIA’s memorandum of points and authorities purports to seek summary adjudication in the alternative, NIA still fails to identify any issues for adjudication, and NIA’s moving MPA invites the Court to identify any claims or damages “that can be resolved as a matter of law.” Because NIA’s notice of motion and its points and authorities consistently characterize the instant motion as one for summary judgment on five separate grounds, the Court construes the motion as one solely seeking

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

summary judgment.

To the extent NIA contends it intended to seek summary adjudication, any such motion is DENIED given that NIA has failed to state any issues for summary adjudication in its notice of motion, much less repeat any of these issues verbatim in its separate statement.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

NIA’s Initial Burden. The threshold question here is whether the moving papers are sufficient to satisfy NIA’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p)(2) with respect to the grounds advanced for summary judgment. As indicated earlier, in a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, a moving party must meet its initial burden regardless of whether the opposing party disputes any material fact. (See Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087 [moving party on summary judgment must meet his initial burden even if the motion is unopposed].)

Here, NIA’s separate statement includes 36 asserted UMFs in support of its request for summary judgment.[1] As will be explained, the Court finds that NIA has failed to meet its initial burden by failing to support at least three asserted UMFs with sufficient evidence which thereby constitute multiple and independent grounds each warranting denial of NIA’s motion.

UMFs 15 and 17 are identical and state that “[t]he IFE recommended a change to the aggressive growth portfolio not simply because of the retirement age change made by Plaintiff, but also because Plaintiff had been making significant withdrawals from his account.” To support this assertion, NIA cites to, in part, the declaration Steven A. Jesenko (the Compliance Consultant with Nationwide Financial, which is an affiliate of NIA) at paragraphs 4(i), and (k) in which Mr. Jesenko declares that:

(i) On October 4, 2021, Plaintiff logged into his account and used the My Interactive Retirement Planner ('MIRP') online tool to change his retirement age from 60 to 61. This triggered a review of Plaintiffs account by the IFE. The IFE determined that, due to significant withdrawals from Plaintiffs account, he would not meet the 80% probability goal of his current income lasting to age 90 under the “conservative” portfolio allocation. Accordingly, Wilshire determined that the “aggressive growth” allocation was necessary to achieve a higher probability for

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

Plaintiff’s retirement income to last.

(k) In February 2022, Plaintiff called and spoke with Nationwide representative Jordan Drinkhouse. In a February 15, 2022 email, Mr. Drinkhouse explained to Plaintiff why the change to his portfolio allocation was made, offered Plaintiff the opportunity to 'select your own risk tolerance,' and offered to 'assist [Plaintiff] with implementation.' Plaintiff did not take advantage of this opportunity. A true and accurate copy of Mr. Drinkhouse's February 15, 2022 email is attached as Exhibit 1-H (Ex. H to my October 13, 2022 letter).

(NIA’s Index of Exhibits [“NIA’s IOE”] at Declaration of Steven A. Jesenko [“Jesenko Decl.”] at ¶4(i),(k).)

Thus, Mr. Jesenko declares that Plaintiff’s use of the MIRP tool to change his retirement age from 60 to 61 simply triggered a review of Plaintiff’s account by the IFE. This contradicts the UMF’s assertion that the IFE recommended a change on some respect due to Plaintiff’s use of the MIRP tool to increase his retirement age by one year. Stated differently, Mr. Jesenko’s declaration presents evidence that the IFE only undertook a review of Plaintiff’s account because of the change in retirement age via the MIRP tool.

It does not indicate that the change of retirement age factored into the IFE’s determination, conducted after the review was triggered that a change in Plaintiff’s portfolio allocation was necessary. It is unclear why NIA has purposefully injected this characterization of the IFE’s decision to recommend a change in Plaintiff’s portfolio allocation as constituting a material fact upon which NIA’s motion for summary judgment is based. Indeed, if NIA believed that this description of the IFE’s recommendation was not material to obtaining summary judgment, NIA should not have included it in its asserted UMFs. (See California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2) [separate statement to include “only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion”]; Beltran v.

Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 875-876 [paragraphs in separate statement should be limited to facts that address elements of cause of action or affirmative defense].) But in any event, because NIA has purposefully included such asserted material facts, NIA cannot now be heard to assert that its failure to establish such facts is somehow inconsequential to granting summary judgment. Under Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not. (See also, Insalaco v.

Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.) Thus, the Court finds that NIA fails to support UMFs 15 and 17 with adequate evidence and, consequently did not satisfy its initial burden with respect to this UMF.[2] UMF 21 asserts that “Plaintiff has no evidence, whether medical, expert or otherwise,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

demonstrating that NIA is somehow responsible for his alleged ailments.” In support of this UMF, NIA cites to excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition. However, none of the cited deposition testimony indicates that Plaintiff has no evidence demonstrating NIA is responsible for his ailments. Rather, when asked if Dr. David Linder, whom Plaintiff testified he has been seeing for help with “anger,” would be providing Plaintiff with any expert reports or opinions in this case, Plaintiff responded:

A I believe that would be privileged information.

Q Why would that be?

A I'm sorry?

Q Why would that be?

A That's my work product that I would probably discuss with my retained representative if it comes to that.

Q Who's your retained representative?

A That is work in progress.

(NIA’s Index of Exhibits [“NIA’s IOE”] Exhibit 4, at 72:16-24.)

NIA also cites to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that, while he believes NIA is responsible for his prostate issues, Plaintiff does not have a “medical professional that has told [Plaintiff] there’s a connection.” (Id., Exhibit 4 76:13-19.) Such evidence is insufficient to support the UMF’s broad assertion that Plaintiff has no evidence demonstrating NIA is responsible for his ailments. Accordingly, the Court finds that NIA also fails to support UMF 21 with adequate evidence.

It is worth repeating that to the extent NIA may argue that any of the facts as asserted in UMFs 15, 17, and 21 are not truly material to its motion, inclusion of the facts concedes materiality. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at 252.) Indeed, in Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th 506, the First District Court of Appeal addressed this point directly. The court noted that the moving party “enumerated purportedly undisputed material facts in its separate statement, some of which [opposing party] disputed.” (Id. at 521.) The moving party convinced the trial court that despite

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

their inclusion in the moving party's separate statement, those facts were not actually material and succeeded on summary judgment. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed, concluding that summary judgment was improper “[b]ecause a dispute as to any one of these facts means there was a dispute as to a concededly material fact.” (Id. at 522 [emphasis added].)

In sum, the Court finds that NIA has failed to support at least three asserted UMFs put forth in support of its motion for summary judgment and thus NIA has not met its initial burden to demonstrate that it is entitled to summary judgment. Again, any one of these failures would warrant denial of NIA’s motion, but in this case, there are multiple unsupported UMFs providing multiple and independent grounds for denial. Accordingly, the burden never shifted to Plaintiffs to create a triable issue of material fact.

While the Court need not continue, the Court does so to demonstrate an alternative reason why this motion must be denied at least as to the first ground on which NIA moves. Recall that NIA’s first ground for summary judgment is that “there was no breach of any contractual or fiduciary duty.” However, NIA makes no effort to identify any fiduciary duty which it contends was not breached. Rather, NIA summarily argues that Plaintiff’s remaining causes of action all are for breach of contract and/or breach of fiduciary duty and that where, as here, the causes of action are based on the same alleged conduct and relationship, both causes of action can be analyzed together. (See Moving MPA at 11:13-23.)

Still, assuming, without deciding, that these causes of action can be analyzed together, NIA fails to meet its initial burden on this ground when there is no argument, much less any UMFs, which identify any fiduciary duty existed or which indicate that any such duty was not breached. Accordingly, even if NIA had adequately supported all of its purported UMFs with evidence, the Court would still be unable to grant summary judgment on this ground due to NIA’s failure to meet its initial burden.

Triable Issues of Material Fact. Since the Court has already found that the moving papers are not sufficient to satisfy NIA’s initial burden, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiff’s opposition includes evidence which is sufficient to establish the existence of any triable issue of material fact. However, even assuming NIA had carried its initial burden and successfully shifted the burden to Plaintiff (which, to be clear, they did not and so it did not), NIA’s motion for summary judgment would still be denied because Plaintiff has raised at least one triable issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment in favor of NIA.

Specifically, UMF 35 provides that “Plaintiff still never changed his allocation back to ‘conservative’ or any other allocation. Instead, for more than four years now, Plaintiff has elected to remain in the aggressive growth allocation.” However, in opposition, Plaintiff argues that he “has not ‘elected’ to remain in Aggressive Growth in any meaningful legal sense. Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

has reasonably refrained from triggering further rebalances during ongoing market volatility while this litigation is pending.” (Plaintiff’s Opposing Separate Statement at 22:6-9.) In support of his opposition, Plaintiff declares that:

21. On May 25, 2022, I responded to Ms. Murphy by email. A true and correct copy of my May 25, 2022 email to Ms. Murphy is attached as Exhibit 6 to this declaration. In that email, I wrote:

“I should also add that at this time I am questioning if it is wise to change my investment strategy/risk tolerance and sell out of positions when the market is a bottom and all indicators are reflecting a bear market with inflation and interest rates rising. I am really concerned that this could exacerbate the losses I’ve already experienced.”

(Declaration of Thomas M. Bates, ¶ 21.)

Given that, as discussed, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, the Court finds that the evidence presented by Plaintiff in opposition is sufficient to raise a triable issue of material fact as to UMF 35 to the extent this material fact asserts or implies that Plaintiff “elected to remain in the aggressive growth allocation” for more than four years now.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that even if the burden had shifted for Plaintiff to raise a dispute of material fact, Plaintiff has met that burden, which precludes summary judgment in favor of NIA.

VI.

Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, NIA’s motion for summary judgment, or alternatively, summary adjudication, is DENIED in its entirety.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Plaintiff shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g).

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

[1] While NIA’s separate statement purports to identify certain UMFs beneath specific

“issues,” NIA has failed to make a proper motion for summary adjudication. Accordingly, the Court disregards the purported “issues” stated in the NIA’s separate statement. [2] The Court further notes that UMF 13 asserts that “Plaintiff’s use of the MIRP online

planning tool triggered an updated review by the IFE and resulted in a change to his investment portfolio to an ‘aggressive growth’ model.” NIA cites to the same evidence to support UMF 13 as it does to support UMFs 15 and 17. The same evidence cannot be said to support both the assertion that Plaintiff’s use of the MIRP tool simply “triggered” a review by the IFE, and to also support the assertion that the IFE recommended a change to the aggressive growth portfolio based on Plaintiff’s use of the MIRP planning tool.

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-cagov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

23CV000245: BATES vs CALIFORNIA STATE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, et al. 08/06/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16C

referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-servicestranscripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 54 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16C OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ***