State of California v. Parkwood Mart, LLC

In addition, plaintiff argues that defendants are bound by a 2017 judgment entered in an earlier condemnation action between the State and the prior owner of the 6

subject property, which settled all claims for damages arising out of the taking of the property in the prior action. (See State of California v. DSS, LP, Fresno Sup. Ct. case no. 15CECG01025.) Therefore, plaintiff concludes that defendants cannot seek any damages related to the construction of the High-Speed Rail project other than those directly related to the subject TCE. In support of its argument that the judgment in the previous action binds the defendants in the present case and prevents them from seeking damages that are not related to the subject TCE, the State argues that the lis pendens recorded in the prior case placed the defendants on notice of the pending litigation and resulted in the new property owners being bound by the judgment. “A lis pendens provides constructive notice of the litigation, such that any judgment later obtained in the action relates back to the filing of the lis pendens.

A lis pendens clouds title until the litigation is resolved or the lis pendens is expunged, and any party acquiring an interest in the property after the action is filed will be bound by the judgment. Even after judgment, a lis pendens remains effectively on the record unless a statutory ground for expungement is established.” (Slintak v. Buckeye Retirement Co., L.L.C., Ltd. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 575, 586–587, citations omitted.) Here, the State recorded a lis pendens on the property on May 20, 2015 when the prior action was filed. (Exhibit 2 to State’s Request for Judicial Notice.)

A final judgment was entered in the prior action on April 18, 2017. (Exhibit 1 to Request for Judicial Notice.) The judgment states that, “[t]hese payments shall be in full payment for all of these defendants' claims of just compensation arising out of the condemnation of Parcels MF- 10-0070-1; MF-10-0070-2 and MF-100180-1, including, without limitation, defendants' claims for the fair market value of the real and personal property taken, severance damages, loss of rents, loss of business goodwill, precondemnation damages, and all damages of every kind and nature suffered or to be suffered by reason of plaintiff's acquisition of Parcels MF-10-0070-1; MF-10-0070-2 and MF-10-0180-1, and the construction and use of the project in the manner proposed by plaintiff.” (Id. at p. 3, lines 6-12.)

The Final Order in Condemnation resolving the prior case was filed on June 22, 2017 and recorded on June 27, 2017. (Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit 8.) Defendant Parkwood Mart purchased the property in July of 2017, with the grant deed recorded on July 28, 2017. (Request for Judicial Notice, Exhibit 3.) Thus, the State concludes that the recorded lis pendens placed Parkwood on notice of the judgment entered in the prior case, and therefore Parkwood is bound by its terms, including that any claims for damages related to the High-Speed Rail project have been settled.

However, under the terms of the Final Order in Condemnation filed in the prior action, the lis pendens was withdrawn when the order was entered. “IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Notice of Pendency of Action recordedin this action on May 20, 2015, as Document No. 15-0062199-00, of the Official Records of Fresno County, California is hereby withdrawn.” (Exhibit 8 to Request for Judicial Notice, Final Order in Condemnation, p. 5, lines 25-27.) The Final Order was signed by Judge Hamilton on June 22, 2017 and entered the same day. (Id. at p. 6.)

Therefore, the lis pendens was withdrawn on June 22, 2017, and it was no longer in effect at the time of the sale to Parkwood in July of 2017. Consequently, the fact that the State recorded a lis pendens in 2015 does not mean that Parkwood was bound by the judgment and order entered in April and June of 2017.

The State also argues that the Grant Deed conveying the property to Parkwood stated that the conveyance was subject to the Final Order in Condemnation recorded June 27, 2017, and thus defendants were on notice of the Final Order and its terms when they purchased the property. (Exhibit 3 to Request for Judicial Notice, Grant Deed, Exhibit A, p. 3, fifth paragraph.) However, while the Grant Deed does state that the conveyance is subject to the Final Order of Condemnation, which gave a portion of the property to the State for “rail purposes”, the language of the Grant Deed says nothing about the fact that the parties to the prior action agreed to settle all claims related to the condemnation as part of the judgment.

The recorded Final Order in Condemnation itself also says nothing about the previous property owner, DSS LP, settling all claims related to the project as part of the resolution of the case. (Exhibit 8 to Request for Judicial Notice.) Thus, the State has not shown that Parkwood was bound by the judgment in the prior action simply because the Grant Deed stated that the property was being conveyed subject to the Final Order in Condemnation. The State argues that the defendants have already been fully compensated for any claims that they might bring related to the taking of their property, as stated in the final judgment entered in the prior action.

However, there is no evidence that the present property owner, Parkwood Mart, was a party to the prior action. The judgment in the prior action only names the State Department of Public Works, DSS, LP, DSS Hotels, Inc. Wilshire Bank, and Does 1 to 50 as parties. (Exhibit 1 to Request for Judicial Notice.) The State and DSS were the only parties to the stipulated judgment. (Ibid.) Parkwood’s CEO, Chanranjit Singh, denies that Parkwood is affiliated with DSS, LP in any way, and claims that they are wholly separate entities. (Singh decl., ¶ 8.)

There is no evidence that Parkwood was involved in the settlement of the prior action or that it received any funds as a result of the settlement. Thus, the State has not shown that Parkwood agreed to be bound by the terms of the settlement, or that it has been compensated for any damages related to the taking of its property. In its reply, the State argues for the first time that defendants are barred from bringing their claims for additional severance and other damages by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because they are bound by the judgment entered in the prior action.

The State argues that Parkwood and DSS were in privity with each other as a result of the purchase agreement for the property, and thus Parkwood is bound by the settlement and judgment in the prior action. “As generally understood, ‘[t]he doctrine of res judicata gives certain conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same controversy.’ The doctrine ‘has a double aspect.’ ‘In its primary aspect,’ commonly known as claim preclusion, it ‘operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit between the same parties on the same cause of action.’ ‘In its secondary aspect,’ commonly known as collateral estoppel, ‘[t]he prior judgment ... “operates”’ in ‘a second suit ... based on a different cause of action ... “as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action as were actually litigated and determined in the first action.”’ ‘The prerequisite elements for applying the doctrine to either an entire cause of action or one or more issues are the same: (1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding.’” (People v.

Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 252–253, citations and italics omitted.) 8

In the present case, the State has not shown that Parkwood was either a party to the prior action or in privity with a party to the prior action at any time up to the entry of the judgment. The only parties to the action who entered into the stipulated judgment were the State and DSS, not Parkwood. Nor is there any evidence that Parkwood had any type of relationship with DSS during the pendency of the prior action, which terminated in June of 2017. Parkwood did not purchase the property from DSS until July of 2017, about a month after the judgment between the State and DSS was entered.

Thus, there is no basis for applying the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel to bind Parkwood to the terms of the judgment in the DSS action, as Parkwood was not a party or in privity with a party to that action at the time of the judgment. As a result, the court intends to deny the State’s motion to the extent that it seeks a determination that Parkwood is bound by the terms of the judgment in the DSS case. Next, the State argues that, since it did not conduct any construction activities on defendants’ property and did not remove any improvements during the 36 months that the TCE was in effect, defendants are not entitled to any severance or constructionrelated damages arising from the TCE.

In order to support a claim for severance damages, a property owner must provide evidence that the taking interfered with the owner’s actual intended use of the property. (Metropolitan Water Dist. of So. California v. Campus Crusade for Christ, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 954, 975.) For example, “If [the owner] had sold the property during the construction period and if the ongoing construction had temporarily lowered the sales price of the property, it would appear that [the owner] would be entitled to recover that loss from [the government agency].” (Ibid, citations omitted, italics in original.)

In addition, the property owner may be entitled to damages where the project results in substantial but temporary interference with the property owner’s rights of possession or access. (Ibid, citing People v. Ayon (1960) 54 Cal.2d 217, 229.) Here, the State contends that Parkwood cannot show that it suffered any damages due to the 36-month TCE because no construction activities occurred on the property and no improvements were removed. The State argues that the court should exclude any portions of defendants’ expert’s appraisal regarding severance damages, as the expert has simply assumed that the State had the exclusive right to access and possess the parcel, that defendants were unable to access the parcel, and that the State removed of all improvements from the property.

The State contends that there is no factual basis for any of the expert’s assumptions, and that the evidence actually shows that the State did not exclusively occupy the parcel, conduct any construction on the parcel, or remove any improvements. (Abouzedan decl., ¶¶ 11-16.)1 However, according to defendant’s CEO, the State used the TCE to park vehicles, and it denied access to the site by blocking the driveways into Parkway’s property. (Singh decl., ¶¶ 3, 5.) Singh claims that the driveways were rendered unusable for a period of about six weeks from August 2025 to September 2025. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

Currently, the smaller driveway is usable, but the northern driveway is still closed and blocked by orange, water-filled K-rails. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Also, Singh claims that the State removed and

1 Defendants have objected to plaintiff’s counsel Gregory Rinehart’s declaration in support of

the motion. The court intends to overrule objections 1-3, and sustain objections 4-12 (legal conclusions, hearsay, and lack of personal knowledge).

replaced a water line, a power line, and a sprinkler line in the vicinity of the TCE area. (Id. at ¶ 4.) Thus, there is conflicting evidence with regard to the issue of whether the State used the TCE for construction purposes, excluded defendants from accessing and using the parcel, and removed any improvements from the parcel. At this point, it would be premature to make any final determination of whether the State’s use of the TCE caused actual damage to defendants’ actual intended use of the property that would warrant awarding severance damages or other damages for lost improvements, construction noise and vibration, etc.

Therefore, the court intends to deny the motion to exclude defendants’ expert’s opinions regarding severance and other damages resulting from use of the TCE. Finally, the State moves to exclude the defendants’ experts’ valuation because it is allegedly based on the false assumption that the property is 1.42 acres with 200 feet of frontage. The State contends that the property is now 0.03 acres smaller due to its acquisition of the parcels at issue in the prior DSS action, so the expert’s valuation is based on incorrect data and should be excluded.

The State also contends that the expert’s valuation fails to take into account the existing construction activities that were ongoing as early as 2017, and for which defendants were already compensated by the judgment in the DSS action. However, as discussed above, the State has not shown that Parkwood actually received any of the compensation from the prior action. Parkwood was not a party to the DSS action, nor is there any evidence that it was in privity with DSS at the time the judgment was entered in that action.

As a result, the State has not established that Parkwood cannot seek damages related to any construction activities on the new TCE. Also, to the extent that the State argues that defendants’ expert’s valuation is based on an incorrect assumption about the size of the affected parcel, defendants’ expert has stated in his declaration in opposition to the motion that the difference in parcel size is insignificant and does not affect his estimate of damages. (Mason decl., ¶¶ 7.) The court agrees that the difference of 0.03 acres is too small to make a substantial difference in the valuation.

Such a minor difference does not warrant excluding the expert’s valuation at trial. Therefore, the court intends to deny the motion to exclude the valuation.

Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), and Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5, subdivision (a), no further written order is necessary. The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will serve as the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Tentative Ruling

Issued By: KCK on 08/03/26. (Judge’s initials) (Date)

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