NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Nordstrom, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) has filed four discovery motions on today’s calendar against Defendant in pro per Alex Emer (“Defendant”): (1) motion to compel Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production, Set One; (2) motion to compel Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories, Set One and Special Interrogatories, Set One; (3) motion to compel Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission, Set One; and (4) motion to compel Defendant to appear and testify at his deposition. Defendant has filed a single consolidated opposition, and Plaintiff has similarly filed a single consolidated reply. Since the motions present many overlapping issues, the Court addresses all four motions in this single comprehensive ruling.

Background

Plaintiff filed this action on September 30, 2025. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has engaged in “years-long efforts to exploit and defraud” Plaintiff by improperly attempting to pursue arbitration with Plaintiff over various disputes and by engaging in “return fraud” wherein

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV023298: NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER 01/26/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Alex Emer to Respond to Requests for Production in Department 28

Defendant sought to obtain refunds from Plaintiff by shipping products to Plaintiff that Plaintiff had not sold. (Complaint, ¶¶ 1-2.) Plaintiff seeks damages and injunctive relief.

On October 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proof of service stating that Defendant was personally served with the Summons and Complaint on October 3, 2025. In the interim, on October 6, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to quash service of summons, which is scheduled for hearing on March 16, 2026. Since October, Defendant has also filed several other documents. This includes a filing on October 14, 2025 that is titled, “Defendant’s Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission (Set One).” Within the document, Defendant declares, “Due to disability-related limitations and restricted access to postal services, Defendant requests that all service and communication be conducted via email pursuant to Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 1.100, and consistent with Gov. Code § 11135 (prohibiting disability-based discrimination in any program receiving state funds).” (Defendant’s Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission (Set One), filed 10/14/2025, p. 8:14-18, emphasis in original.) Defendant provided a preferred service email and asked “that the Court and Plaintiff honor this accommodation as necessary for meaningful access to the judicial process.” (Id. at p. 8:20-21.) According to Plaintiff’s counsel, Defendant had also served these interrogatories and requests via email on October 7, 2025. (Milstead Decl., ¶ 2.)

Defendant served responses on November 10, 2025. (Milstead Decl., ¶ 4.)

Also on November 10, Plaintiff served Defendant with a notice to take Defendant’s deposition as well as requests for admission, special interrogatories, form interrogatories, and requests for production. (Milstead Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7.) These documents were served on Defendant electronically at the email address provided in Defendant’s October 14, 2025 filing. The documents were also served via mail to two addresses: (1) an address in Folsom where Defendant was personally served with the Summons and Complaint, per Plaintiff’s proof of service filed on October 7, 2025; and (2) an address in San Diego that Defendant has listed on his filings in this matter. (See Milstead Decl., Exh. 6.)

On November 11, 2025, Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s counsel objecting to the service of the discovery requests and stating that he would not respond on the basis that he had not consented to electronic service. (Milstead Decl., Exh. 7.) Later that same day, Defendant emailed Plaintiff’s counsel again stating that he would not appear for his deposition because he was unavailable on the scheduled date. (Milstead Decl., Exh. 8.) Defendant also stated that he had reserved a hearing for a motion for a protective order to stay all discovery and asserted that all discovery, including the deposition, should be stayed pending the Court’s ruling on the motion. (Milstead Decl., Exh. 8.) Over the next several days, Defendant reiterated that he would not respond to the discovery and would not appear for his deposition and declined to meet and confer. (Milstead Decl., ¶¶ 14- 17, Exhs. 9-10.)

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25CV023298: NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER 01/26/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Alex Emer to Respond to Requests for Production in Department 28

On November 17, 2025, Defendant filed a motion titled, “Motion for Protective Order Staying All Discovery Pending Resolution of Threshold Jurisdictional and Sanctions Issues.” The motion is scheduled for hearing on December 2, 2026.

On November 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present motions.

On December 31, 2025, Defendant filed a consolidated opposition asking the Court to deny Plaintiffs motions, issue a protective order staying all discovery pending resolution of Defendant’s motion to quash (i.e., grant Defendant’s motion for protective order), and impose monetary sanctions on Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.7 and 2023.030 and the Court’s inherent authority. Defendant declares, among other things, that he served responses to the written discovery on December 7, 2025. (See Emer Decl., ¶ 6.)

Defendant appears to maintain the position that the discovery was improperly served electronically and that he need not respond given the pending motion to quash. Defendant also appears to suggest that service on him via mail at the address in Folsom was improper because he did not reside there, but Defendant does not address the mail service at the address in San Diego. Defendant also contends that the written discovery is objectionable under the Discovery Act. Regarding the deposition notice, Defendant contends it is invalid because it seeks to depose him at a location outside the permissible geographic limits.

In reply, Plaintiff argues that its motions are not rendered premature by Defendant’s pending motion to quash because Plaintiff is entitled to conduct jurisdictional discovery. Additionally, Plaintiff confirms that Defendant served responses to Plaintiff’s written discovery on December 7, 2025 via email. (Milstead Decl. ISO Reply, ¶ 12, Exh. A.) Nonetheless, Plaintiff contends that the belated responses to not moot their motions. Plaintiff also contends that the responses are not properly verified. Thus, Plaintiff argues that the Court should grant its motion to compel responses, or, alternatively, should find that Defendant’s responses are deficient and issue an order compelling Defendant to serve further responses. Finally, Plaintiff contends Defendant has not presented a valid objection to justify his refusal to sit for his deposition.

Discussion

Electronic Service

At the outset, regarding Defendant’s argument that he has not agreed to electronic service, the Court disagrees, as Defendant expressly consented to electronic service in his discovery requests, and filed his consent with the Court. More importantly, Plaintiff also served the discovery via mail at the address listed on Defendant’s filings in this case. Thus, service of the discovery

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requests was effective.

Whether Plaintiff’s Discovery Is Premature Pending Resolution of Defendant’s Motion to Quash

A plaintiff may propound written discovery to a defendant without leave of court “at any time that is 10 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, that party, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.020(b) [interrogatories]; see also §§ 2031.020(b) [document requests] and 2033.020(b) [requests for admission].) A plaintiff may serve a deposition notice without leave of court “on any date that is 20 days after the service of summons on, or appearance by, any defendant.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.210(b).)

Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that discovery is stayed by the filing of a motion to quash service of summons. Defendant relies on three cases to support his argument: (1) Britts v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1112; (2) Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222 (Ziller); and (3) Preciado v. Freightliner Custom Chassis Corp. (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 964. All of these cases are inapposite. Britts involved the automatic stay of discovery upon the filing of an anti-SLAPP motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 and did not mention motions to quash. (Britts, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1125-1129.)

In Ziller, the defendant filed a motion to quash service of summons based both on ineffective service of process and on lack of minimum contacts to confer personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion on ineffective service of process grounds, but, in the same ruling, found against the defendant on the minimum contacts issue. The plaintiff then served the defendant again, and the defendant filed a second motion to quash, arguing a lack of minimum contacts based on a more detailed factual showing.

The trial court denied the second motion on the grounds that the minimum contacts issue had already been determined against the defendant in the ruling on the first motion to quash. The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate vacating the order denying the second motion to quash and directing the trial court to reconsider and determine the minimum contacts issue on the merits. Defendant’s purpose in citing this case is not entirely clear, as the page cited by Defendant contains no discussion of discovery stays. (See Ziller, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1232.)

The Court assumes Defendant relies on the following passage:

Nothing in this discussion should be construed to preclude [the trial court] from considering (to the extent permitted by applicable rules of evidence) the declarations submitted by plaintiff in opposition to the first motion to quash. Nor should this disposition be interpreted to preclude plaintiff from conducting discovery limited to the issue of minimum contacts to enable it to meet its burden of proof.

(Ziller, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1235, emphasis added.)

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This passage confirms that a plaintiff is permitted to conduct discovery while a motion to quash is pending. Indeed, it is well-settled that “[a] plaintiff is generally entitled to conduct discovery with regard to a jurisdictional issue before a court rules on a motion to quash.” (Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 911.) This issue was presented in Preciado, the third case cited by Defendant. (See Preciado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 972-974.) Nothing in Preciado stands for the proposition that a motion to quash stays discovery.

Nor does Preciado hold that a plaintiff’s right to discovery is limited solely to jurisdictional issues while a motion to quash is pending. Instead, the issue in Preciado (and several cases cited therein) was whether the plaintiff had made the requisite showing to obtain a continuance of the hearing date for the motion to quash to conduct jurisdictional discovery. (Ibid.) This is distinct from whether a plaintiff has a right to conduct discovery at all while a motion to quash is pending. In sum, Defendant has not shown that his filing of a motion to quash for lack of effective service overcomes Plaintiff’s right to conduct discovery within the timeframes provided in the Civil Discovery Act.

Moreover, even if Defendant had made such a showing, Plaintiff’s discovery requests include jurisdictional questions, which are certainly permitted.

Motions to Compel Responses to Written Discovery

While the Court rejects Defendant’s argument that he was excused from participating in discovery pending the motion to quash,[1] the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motions to compel Defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s written discovery were filed prematurely. A party who is served with written discovery has 30 days to serve responses. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.260(a) [interrogatories], 2031.260(a), 2033.250(a).) Here, Plaintiff filed its motions on November 25, 2025, just 15 days after serving the discovery on November 10.

Defendant then served responses on December 7, 2025, within the 30-day time limit. The Court recognizes that Defendant had previously indicated that he would not respond to the discovery. Even so, that does not preclude Defendant from serving responses within the 30-day time limit, even though the motions to compel had already been filed. In reply, Plaintiff notes that it had already obtained ex parte relief to advance the hearing date for the motions before Defendant served his responses. It is unclear how this is relevant; the Court’s order advancing the hearing pursuant to an ex parte application has no bearing on the merits of the motions, and it does not constitute implicit approval of Plaintiff’s premature motions.

Thus, the Court deems Defendant’s responses served on December 7, 2025 as timely. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motions to compel Defendant to serve responses are DENIED.

Regarding whether Defendant’s responses are properly verified, the Court declines to address this issue at this time. Defendant’s responses are sufficient to preserve his objections and moot

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Plaintiff’s motions to compel responses, whether they are properly verified or not.

The Court also declines to treat Plaintiff’s motions as motions to compel further responses and address the merits of Defendant’s responses.

Motion to Compel Deposition

“If, after service of a deposition notice, a party to the action[,] without having served a valid objection under Section 2025.410, fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it, the party giving notice may move for an order compelling the deponent’s attendance and testimony.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.450(a).)

Here, as noted above, Plaintiff properly served Defendant with a deposition notice on November 10, 2025. The deposition was scheduled for December 17, 2025 and was to be conducted in person at 180 Promenade Circle, Suite 305, Sacramento, CA 95834. (See Milstead Decl., Exh. 1.) Both before and after Plaintiff filed its motions, Defendant stated that he would not appear for his deposition. (See Milstead Decl. ISO Reply, ¶ 14.)

Defendant contends that the deposition notice is facially invalid because it lists the place of the deposition as a location more than 75 miles from Defendant’s residence. Defendant declares that he resides in San Diego County.[2] (Emer Decl., ¶ 2.) A deposition of a natural person “shall be taken at a place that is, at the option of the party giving notice of the deposition, either within 75 miles of the deponent’s residence, or within the county where the action is pending and within 150 miles of the deponent’s residence.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.250(a).) “A party desiring to take the deposition of a natural person who is a party to the action may make a motion for an order that the deponent attend for deposition at a place that is more distant than that permitted under Section 2025.250.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.260(a).)

On the record before it, the Court agrees with Defendant that the deposition is facially invalid in that it seeks to depose Plaintiff at a location beyond the geographical limits of Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.250. Plaintiff asserts that the location is within 75 miles of the address in Folsom where Defendant was personally served with the Summons. (Milstead Decl. ISO Reply, ¶ 6.) However, Defendant denies ever having resided at the Folsom address and declares that he lives in San Diego County. (See Emer Decl., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff’s only apparent evidence to dispute this assertion is the proof of service of the Summons. Even if Defendant was properly served at the Folsom address as evidenced by the proof of service, that does not establish that he resides at that address and thus does not overcome Defendant’s statement in his declaration that he resides in San Diego.

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25CV023298: NORDSTROM, INC. vs EMER 01/26/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel Alex Emer to Respond to Requests for Production in Department 28

The Court declines to construe Plaintiff’s motion as a motion under section 2025.260. Indeed, Plaintiff does not argue for an order that Defendant attend his deposition at a location beyond the limits of section 2025.250 and does not cite section 2025.260.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel Defendant’s deposition is DENIED.

Defendant’s Sanctions Requests

Defendant requests monetary and nonmonetary sanctions under various statutory authorities, specifically Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.7, 2023.030, and 2025.420. The requests are DENIED. A request for sanctions under section 128.7 must be made via separate motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 128.7(c)(1); Martorana v. Marlin & Saltzman (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 685, 699.) Section 2025.420 governs a motion for protective order and thus is not applicable here. Finally, the Court is not persuaded that sanctions are warranted under section 2023.030.

[1] As noted above, Defendant has a pending motion to stay discovery pending resolution of jurisdictional issues on

calendar on December 2, 2026. The Court expresses no opinion on the validity of that motion at this time. [2] Defendant raised this issue in an email to Plaintiff’s counsel on December 8, 2025, which was after the present

motions were filed but before the deadline for Defendant to object to the deposition notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.410(a).)