Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc.

Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. *** EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G.

34-2022-00331719-CU-PO-GDS: Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET IN SACRAMENTO, CA 95814. ALL HEARINGS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING

Although the notice of motion provides notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06, the notice does not comply with that rule. More specifically, while Local Rule 1.05 pertains to those limited matters which are heard by the Presiding Judge in Department 17A, Local Rule 1.06 pertains to matters that are to be heard in this Court’s various law & motion departments. Most notably, the procedures and requirements of each rule are different. Moving counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith and advise him/her of Local Rule 1.06 and the tentative ruling procedures set forth therein, along with the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing in person, by Zoom or by telephone.

Defendant Turning Point Community Programs’ (“TPCP”) motion for summary judgment on the entirety of plaintiffs Catherine Moseley Jackson, et al.’s operative Fourth Amended Complaint (“4AC”) or in the alternative, summary adjudication of each of the four individual causes of action alleged therein is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties are directed to notify the clerk and opposing counsel at the time of the request which of moving defendant’s 31 Undisputed Material Facts, which of plaintiffs’ own 21 Additional Material Facts, and/or which of the parties’ written objections to evidence will be addressed at the hearing. The parties should be prepared to point to specific admissible evidence already in the record which is claimed to show the existence or nonexistence of a triable issue of material fact. The parties are also reminded that pursuant to local Court rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion matters. ***

Both moving and opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(g), requiring a single volume of evidence (including declarations) with a table of contents when the evidence exceeds 25 pages.

The Court notes that filed in support of and opposition to this present motion are a number of Ms. Moseley’s (unredacted) medical records which contain a variety of

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information fairly characterized as personal and private, all of which are now viewable by the public via the Court’s current electronic records system. Should any party now desire to limit the public’s access to such personal and private information, a noticed motion to seal same should be promptly filed and served and proposed redacted versions of each document containing unredacted medical records should be concurrently lodged (not filed) with the Court.

Factual Background

This action arises out of the April 2022 death of Blair Moseley following an involuntary psychiatric “5150” hold at Sierra Vista Hospital and subsequent transferal to defendant TPCP’s “Crisis Residential Program” (“CRP”). Ms. Moseley left this CRP facility (“Henrietta House” or “CRP-Henrietta”) on the evening of 4/23/2023 and was later struck by a motor vehicle, suffering fatal injuries. The original complaint was filed on 12/21/2022 and the operative 4AC filed on 12/4/2024 alleges against several defendants a total of five causes of action for medical malpractice/wrongful death, negligence, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (“EADACPA”).

However, following defendant TPCP’s demurrer to the Third Amended Complaint, the negligence cause of action is no longer alleged against TPCP. Trial is currently set to commence on 11/16/2026.

Moving Papers. Defendant TPCP now moves for summary judgment on the entirety of the 4AC on the grounds “Plaintiffs’ claims are insufficient to establish liability against [TPCP]” and “the undisputed material facts establish that Defendant [TPCP] did not violate the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to any injury to Plaintiffs.” (Mov. MPA, p.6:15-17.) As support for summary judgment on such grounds, defendant TPCP advances Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) Nos. 1-31. (Mov. Sep. Stm., pp.2- 11.) In the alternative, defendant TPCP seeks summary adjudication of each of the four causes of action alleged against it in the 4AC (i.e., medical malpractice/wrongful death, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, violation of the EADACPA) on the following grounds:

“The undisputed evidence establishes that TPCC [sic] appropriately refused to release Blair Moseley’s private and personal health information and that no act or omission by TPCC [sic] caused any injury to Plaintiffs.” (Not. of Mot., p.2:4-25; Mov. Sep. Stm., pp.11-12.)

Notably, as support for summary adjudication on each of these four causes of action, defendant TPCP cites the exact same 31 UMFs which are offered as support for the

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alternative motion for summary judgment. (See, Mov. Sep. Stm., pp.11-12.) As such, in the event defendant TPCP is found to have failed to carry its initial burden of production with respect to any one of these 31 UMFs or plaintiffs are found to have met their burden of demonstrating a triable issue of material fact relative to any one of these 31 UMFs, then the entirety of the present motion for summary judgment/adjudication must be denied as a matter of law.

Although several of the 31 UMFs listed in defendant TPCP’s moving separate statement cite as support a declaration by Jennifer Cardenas, no such declaration was actually included with the moving papers filed with the Court on 5/15/2026 and it appears no such declaration was at that time served on the parties to this action, including plaintiffs. Indeed, according to the Amended Notice of Errata filed by defendant TPCP on 6/26/2026, the Cardenas Declaration was not only inadvertently omitted from the moving papers which were filed and served on 5/15/2026 but also was not actually served on plaintiffs until 6/25/2026, despite Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(2)’s express requirement that all papers supporting a summary judgment/adjudication motion be served at least 81 days prior to the scheduled hearing date.

The Court notes that defendant TPCP could have, at the time this inadvertent omission was discovered on 6/25/2026 and still well before opposition papers were due, potentially sought and obtained a continuance of the hearing on this motion for summary judgment/adjudication in order to provide plaintiffs with the requisite minimum 81 days’ notice, TPCP did not do so and as explained below, it is now too late for such relief.

While the Amended Notice of Errata filed by defendant TPCP on 6/26/2026 further suggests that the hearing on this motion for summary judgment/adjudication could be continued to 9/8/2026 to be heard concurrently with another defendant’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication, such 9/8/2026 hearing date would still occur less than the minimum 81 days after defendant TPCP’s 6/25/2026 service of the Cardenas Declaration which was inadvertently omitted from the original moving papers. Regardless, since plaintiffs have already (1) filed and served their opposition to this motion for summary judgment/adjudication, (2) included with their opposition a timely objection to TPCP’s belated filing and service of the Cardenas Declaration and (3) been denied the full minimum statutory period for notice of this motion and for filing their opposition, the Court’s granting of a continuance of the hearing date on this motion at this late juncture would not retroactively cure defendant TPCP’s admitted noncompliance with the mandatory 81-day service requirements of Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(2).

Finally, even assuming arguendo that defendant TPCP could re-notice and re-serve this motion for summary judgment/adjudication without running afoul of the express

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00331719-CU-PO-GDS: Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(4) and §437c(f)(2), such a renoticed and re-served motion could not (in the absence of a timely finding of “good cause”) be timely heard in compliance with §437c(a)(3)’s 30-day pre-trial deadline given the current trial date of 11/16/2026.

Opposition. Plaintiffs oppose, generally arguing that while this motion is premised on defendant TPCP’s compliance with “the applicable standard of care while treating Blair Moseley,” the evidence here actually shows that TPCP’s “staff observed and documented a deterioration of Ms. Moseley’s psychiatric symptoms concerning for catatonia, a psychiatric emergency, yet the clinical record reflects no corresponding escalation, notification to a supervising clinician or psychiatrist, or any coordination of care.” (Opp., p.5:2-10.)

According to the opposition, “This case is not about whether [TPCP] could legally prevent Ms. Moseley from leaving a voluntary [CRP]” or about whether her family members “should have controlled her medical decisions simply because they disagreed with [TPCP’s] treatment” but instead, this case concerns “whether mental health professionals entrusted with the care of a vulnerable young woman with schizophrenia and catatonia, a recent involuntary psychiatric hospitalization, (following multiple hospitalizations spanning just 5 months prior) and a documented history of dangerous psychiatric decompensation complied with the professional standard of care by recognizing, documenting, reassessing, communicating, and responding to her progressive psychiatric deterioration while she remained under their care,” as well as whether TPCP “followed its own written policies requiring reassessment when a client’s mental status changed, whether it complied with Sierra Vista Hospital’s discharge instructions directing that Blair be returned if her psychiatric symptoms worsened, whether it properly evaluated mounting warning signs of a psychiatric emergency, and whether those failures were substantial factors leading to Blair Moseley’s death. (Id., at p.5:13-p.6:2.)

In support of the opposition, plaintiffs offer the declarations of a psychiatric expert and licensed clinical social work expert who “unequivocally conclude that [TPCP] breached the applicable standard of care and that its failures substantially contributed to Blair Moseley’s death. (Id., at p.6:2-7.)

In the opposing separate statement, plaintiffs contend that more than two-thirds of the 31 UMFs offered by defendant TPCP are “disputed” at least in part. Plaintiffs also offer 21 Additional Material Facts of their own in an attempt to establish the existence of triable issues of fact which mandate denial of summary judgment/adjudication.

Reply. Defendant TPCP filed a reply brief in which it maintains that “Plaintiffs’ claims are insufficient to establish liability against this moving Defendant” and “the undisputed material facts establish that Defendant [TPCP] did not violate the standard of care and did not cause or contribute to any injury to Plaintiffs.” (Reply, p.2:2-4.) Also filed in

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support of the reply are two additional declarations, one by the “Regional Director” of TPCP, Leslie Springer, as well a “supplemental” declaration by Jennifer Cardenas (whose moving declaration was inadvertently omitted from the moving papers filed and served on 5/15/2026). Notably, Ms. Springer avers in Paragraph 3 that this declaration is being offered “in order to correct certain factual misstatements, inaccuracies, and assumptions” found in the declarations filed in opposition, while Ms. Cardenas states in Paragraph 4 that this “supplemental” declaration is made “to set forth my opinions on the issues concerning the applicable standard of care and causation, as well as clarify factual inaccuracies advanced by Plaintiffs.”

Standards for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication, the Court engages in a threestep process. First, the issues framed by the pleadings must be identified since the pleadings themselves define the scope of what may be addressed via a motion for summary judgment/adjudication (FPI Development Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382) and the evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The Court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment/adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to such a motion may not create triable issues beyond the scope of the pleadings, nor are they a substitute for filing amended pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its initial burden of production. A defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850; Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1301.) This burden may be met by establishing either that one or more elements of a cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2).) A defendant cannot successfully shift the burden to a plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that the latter cannot prove his/her case but must make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) If a plaintiff pleads several theories of liability against the defendant, then the latter has the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on any of them. A moving defendant whose evidence omits facts as to any theory of liability effectively permits that portion of the complaint to be unchallenged and even where no opposition is presented, a moving defendant must still make a showing sufficient to eliminate all triable issues of

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fact. (Wright v. Stang Manufacturing Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1228; see also Juarez v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 377, 397.)

A plaintiff opposing summary judgment has no evidentiary burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840; see also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1151-1152; Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1085-1086.) If a moving defendant has met its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a material factual issue as to the cause of action alleged or the defense to it. (Code Civ.

Proc. §437c(p)(2); see also, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.) Only where the moving defendant makes the requisite initial showing does a court need to examine the opposition papers to determine if the latter demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 840.) The opposing party must present admissible evidence and may not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleading. (Id.)

In ruling on the motion, a court must construe the evidence of the opposing party liberally and that of the moving party strictly, resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (Miller v. Bechtel Corp. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 868, 874; Cortez v. Vogt (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 925-926; see also, Salazar v. Southern Cal. Gas Co. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376; Brown v. FSR Brokerage, Inc. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. CRC Rule 3.1350(b) explicitly mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure §437c(f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for [punitive] damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim

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34-2022-00331719-CU-PO-GDS: Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

for [punitive] damages, or an issue of duty. (Underline added for emphasis.)

Finally, before turning to the specific issues raised by this motion, the Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment/adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See, Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 (italics in original).) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Nazir, at 252 (citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1); see also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.)

That said, the Court now turns to the specific contentions advanced in support of and opposition to this motion for summary judgment/adjudication.

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant TPCP’s Request for Judicial Notice of plaintiffs’ 4AC; the Court’s order sustaining without leave to amend defendant TPCP’s demurrer to the second cause of action for negligence; defendant TPCP’s Answer to the 4AC; the Court’s order dismissing Brandon Moseley Williams as a plaintiff in this action; and defendant TPCP’s licensure with the California Department of Social Services is GRANTED but is limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice. (See, Evid. Code §451(a), §452(b)-(d); see also, Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 757, 768 [court may take judicial notice of the existence of court documents but not to the truth of the statements contained therein]; Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 145-148; Sosinsky v. Grant (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1569-70.)

Plaintiffs’ Request for Judicial Notice of their own 4AC is also GRANTED but is likewise limited to only those purposes appropriate for judicial notice based on the authorities cited in the preceding paragraph.

Objections to Evidence

Plaintiffs’ Objections. Plaintiffs filed with their original opposition papers on 7/14/2026 two (2) written objections to evidence. The first objection is to the moving Cardenas Declaration which was inadvertently omitted from the moving papers filed and served on 5/15/2026 and which was not actually served on plaintiffs until 6/25/2026, less than 81

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00331719-CU-PO-GDS: Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

days prior to the scheduled hearing date for this motion. This objection is sustained and as explained above, defendant TPCP’s suggestion that the hearing on this motion for summary judgment/adjudication be continued to 9/8/2026 (to be heard concurrently with another defendant’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication) would still occur less than the minimum 81 days after defendant TPCP’s 6/25/2026 service of the Cardenas Declaration inadvertently omitted from the original moving papers. Additionally, as explained above, because plaintiffs have already (1) filed and served their opposition to this motion for summary judgment/adjudication, (2) included with their opposition a timely objection to TPCP’s belated filing and service of the Cardenas Declaration and (3) been denied the full minimum statutory period for notice of this motion and for filing their opposition, the Court’s granting of a continuance of the hearing date on this motion at this late juncture would not retroactively cure defendant TPCP’s admitted noncompliance with the mandatory 81-day service requirements of Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(2).

Plaintiffs’ second objection is directed at “Defendant [TPCP’s] Separate Statement [UMF] No. 22, to the extent it relies upon the Sacramento Police Report (Exhibit I) and California Highway Patrol Report (Exhibit J). To the extent this objection is directed at TPCP’s UMF No. 22 itself, it is overruled because objections are properly directed at evidence only. (See, CRC Rules 3.1352, 3.1354.) To the extent this objection is directed at the evidence cited as support for UMF No. 22 (i.e., Sacramento Police Report (Exhibit I); California Highway Patrol Report (Exhibit J)); this objection is overruled because plaintiffs failed to quote or set forth the objectionable material claimed to be inadmissible as expressly required by CRC Rule 3.1354(b)(3).

This Court need not and does not expend its finite resources to search out the evidence to which these objections are directed in order to rule on the admissibility of such evidence, when Rule 3.1354 sets forth explicit requirements for objections to evidence and plaintiffs have failed to comply with same.

Plaintiffs filed on 7/28/2026 additional objections to evidence which objections are specifically directed at evidence offered by defendant TPCP in support of its reply and in particular, the Springer Declaration and the “supplemental” Cardenas Declaration. The general objections to this evidence offered in reply are sustained. The general rule in California is that new evidence presented for the first time on reply is not permitted because the opposing party had no opportunity to address such new evidence in the opposition papers. (See, e.g., Carbajal v.

CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 241; Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537; Tyler v. Children’s Home Society (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 511, 526, n.8.) In light of the foregoing, the Court need not address plaintiffs’ specific objections which are directed at certain portions of the Springer Declaration and the “supplemental” Cardenas Declaration but the Court notes

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that these specific objections again fail to comply with CRC Rule 3.1354(b)(3), requiring the objecting party to quote or set forth the objectionable material claimed to be inadmissible so the Court need not expend its finite resources to search out the evidence objected to in order to rule on the admissibility of such evidence.

To the extent plaintiffs’ opposing separate statement may be construed asserting objections to several of TPCP’s 31 UMFs, such objections to the UMFs are overruled because objections are properly directed at evidence only. (See, CRC Rules 3.1352, 3.1354.)

Defendant’s Objections. Defendant TPCP filed with its reply papers on 7/23/2026 a total of 19 separate written objections to the evidence offered in opposition to this motion. These objections to evidence, like most of plaintiffs’ own objections, fail to comply with the expressly requirements of CRC Rule 3.1354(b)(3), mandating that the objecting party quote or set forth the objectionable material claimed to be inadmissible so that this Court need not expend its finite resources searching for the evidence to which these objections are directed simply to rule on the admissibility of such evidence.

Discussion

At the outset, as noted above, defendant TPCP’s motion for summary adjudication of each of the four causes of action alleged against it is based on the exact same 31 UMFs which are offered as support for the alternative motion for summary judgment on the entirety of the 4AC. (See, Mov. Sep. Stm., pp.11-12.) Consequently, if defendant TPCP is found to have fallen short in its initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) or if plaintiffs have produced evidence sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact relative to any one of these 31 UMFs, then the entirety of this motion for summary judgment/adjudication must be denied as a matter of law.

A. Defendant TPCP Failed to Meet Initial Burden of Production. The threshold question here is whether the moving papers here are sufficient to satisfy defendant TPCP’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) and as will now be shown, the Court finds that the moving papers are not sufficient to carry defendant TPCP’s initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2).

Defendant TPCP’s moving separate statement advances UMF Nos. 1-31 as support for both summary judgment and summary adjudication and according to the moving separate statement, 21 of the 31 UMFs rely at least in part on a declaration by Jennifer Cardenas. However, defendant TPCP concedes in its Amended Notice of Errata filed on 6/26/2026 that this Cardenas Declaration was not only inadvertently omitted from the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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moving papers filed and served on 5/15/2026 but also was not actually served on plaintiffs until 6/25/2026. Although defendant TPCP could have, at the time this inadvertent omission was discovered on 6/25/2026, potentially sought and obtained a continuance of this motion for summary judgment/adjudication in order to provide plaintiffs with the requisite 81 days’ notice, TPCP did not do so and as explained below, it is now too late for such relief.

Because plaintiffs have timely filed a written objection to the Cardenas Declaration on the ground that this evidence was not filed and served at least 81 days prior to the scheduled 8/4/2026 hearing date and because this objection has been sustained for the reasons explained above, this Court holds that defendant TPCP has failed to satisfy its initial burden of production under §437c(p)(2) with respect to UMF Nos. 3, 9, 10, 12-18, 21 and 24-31, with the latter six UMFs relying exclusively on the omitted Cardenas Declaration. Therefore, both summary judgment and summary adjudication must as a matter of law be denied regardless of whether the opposition includes evidence sufficient to establish the existence of any triable issue of material fact.

While the Amended Notice of Errata filed by defendant TPCP on 6/26/2026 does include a suggestion that the hearing on this motion for summary judgment/adjudication could be continued to 9/8/2026 to be heard concurrently with another defendant’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication, such a 9/8/2026 hearing date would still occur less than the minimum 81 days after defendant TPCP’s 6/25/2026 service of the Cardenas Declaration inadvertently omitted from the original moving papers. In any event, as already noted, a continuance of the hearing date on this motion at this time would not retroactively cure defendant TPCP’s admitted non-compliance with the mandatory 81-day service requirements of Code of Civil Procedure §437c(a)(2) given that plaintiffs have already (1) filed and served their opposition to this motion for summary judgment/adjudication, (2) included with their opposition a timely objection to TPCP’s belated filing and service of the Cardenas Declaration and (3) been denied the full minimum statutory period for notice of this motion and for filing their opposition papers.

In light of the foregoing, the Court need not proceed further but it nevertheless does so in order to address several additional separate and distinct reasons why the present motion for summary judgment/adjudication must be denied.

B. Plaintiffs Satisfied Their Burden of Production. Even assuming arguendo that the moving papers filed on 5/15/2026 were sufficient to satisfy defendant TPCP’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure §437c(p)(2) (which they are not), the present motion for summary judgment/adjudication based on UMF Nos. 1-31

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set forth in the moving separate statement must still be denied because as shown below, plaintiffs have met their own burden of producing evidence sufficient to establish the existence of at least one triable issue of material fact. This is especially true in light of California law holding that the evidence produced by the opposing party must be construed liberally while the evidence of the moving party is construed narrowly, with the Court resolving any doubts in the opposing party’s favor. (See, e.g., Miller v.

Bechtel Corp., supra, 33 Cal.3d at 874; Cortez v. Vogt, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at 925-926.) When this standard is applied to the case at bar, this Court finds that the evidence in opposition is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of multiple triable issues of material fact each of which independently mandates denial of summary judgment and summary adjudication as a matter of law.

UMF No. 13 asserts that after arrival at CRP-Henrietta, Ms. Moseley “received an initial psychiatric assessment by Dr. Mitchell and a biopsychosocial assessment” and while she remained at CRP-Henrietta, “there was no indication that Blair was decompensating psychiatrically or suffering from a grave disability.” In response to UMF No. 13, plaintiffs dispute the assertion there was “no indication” of psychiatric decompensation or grave disability during her admission and further contend in part that (1) TPCP’s own Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 33 and 34 “admit Ms.

Moseley exhibited one or more behaviors associated with psychiatric decompensation” and (2) plaintiffs’ psychiatric and licensed clinical social work experts also conclude Ms. Moseley demonstrated progressive psychiatric deterioration including “prolonged immobility in a fixed posture, staring for extended periods, and verbal non-responsiveness” are “concerning for the emergence of catatonia, which is a neuropsychiatric syndrome that can progress to a life-threatening state, requiring continued reassessment, intervention, and escalation of care.”

Although defendant TPCP has filed written objections to the evidence offered in opposition including the evidence cited in response to UMF No. 13, such objections have been overruled for the reasons explained above and thus, the evidence cited in response to this UMF is properly considered by the Court. Plaintiffs have correctly indicated that TPCP in its Response to Request for Admission No. 34 did “admit” Ms. Moseley had exhibited “multiple behaviors that can be associated with” psychiatric decompensation and under Code of Civil Procedure §2033.410(a), this matter is “conclusively established against the party making the admission in the pending action” (unless and until the Court permits withdrawal or amendment of such admission).

Additionally, both the McClendon Declaration and the McCarthy Declaration in opposition contain facts and opinions which, when construed liberally as required by California law, are sufficient to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact relative to UMF No.

13. Therefore, both summary judgment and summary adjudication

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00331719-CU-PO-GDS: Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

in favor of defendant TPCP must be denied as a matter of law and although the Court need not proceed further, it does in order to address another triable issue of material fact which mandates denial of this motion.

UMF No. 14 indicates that “[t]here was no clinical indication that [Ms. Blair] required additional observation or supervision based on the trajectory of her symptoms” but plaintiffs dispute this, citing some of the same evidence discussed above in connection with UMF No.

14. For the reasons explained in the preceding paragraph, the Court finds that TPCP’s Response to Request for Admission No. 34 and the McClendon and McCarthy Declarations in opposition are, when construed liberally, enough to create a triable issue of material fact with respect to UMF No. 14 as well, thereby independently mandating denial of summary judgment/adjudication in favor of defendant TPCP.

UMF No. 16 states in pertinent part that CRP-Henrietta staff had Ms. Moseley under daily observation, medication administration, and continued therapy and “[s]he remained at her baseline and never expressed suicidal or homicidal ideation nor any intent, thoughts, or plans to harm herself or others,” with “no sign of distress, behavioral instability, intent to leave the facility, nor foreseeable risk of harm.” In response, the opposition not only essentially reiterates plaintiffs’ aforementioned response to UMF No. 13 but also insists that TPCP’s own “contemporaneous medical records document progressive withdrawal, guardedness, depression, flat affect, poor judgment and insight, disorganized thought processes, limited verbal communication, poor hygiene, staring into space for hours, mutism, neglect of activities of daily living, and preoccupation with internal stimuli.” The Court finds that TPCP’s Response to Request for Admission No. 34 and the McClendon and McCarthy Declarations in opposition are alone, for the reasons already explained, sufficient to show a triable issue of material fact in connection with UMF No. 16 as well.

That plaintiffs have also cited TPCP’s own “contemporaneous medical records” (TPCP’s objections to which have been overruled) which appear to document that Ms. Blair indeed exhibited progressive withdrawal, guardedness, depression, flat affect, poor judgment, disorganized thought processes, limited verbal communication, poor hygiene, staring into space for hours, mutism, etc. only serves to reinforce the finding that plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of material fact relative to UMF No. 16 so as to independently preclude summary judgment/adjudication in favor of defendant TPCP.

UMF No. 17 asserts in part that because the County requires a clinical director to enter information regarding each client and each behavior observed by staff to be entered into an electronic health record, “there may be a lag time before the entries are signed off by a director” but “[r]egardless, there is no indication that the clinical information regarding Blair Moseley is/was incorrect.” In response, plaintiffs maintain that (1) TPCP’s “own

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00331719-CU-PO-GDS: Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

records demonstrate that numerous progress notes concerning Ms. Moseley’s psychiatric presentation were completed days or weeks after the services they purported to describe, with several notes not reviewed or electronically approved by the supervising Licensed Clinical Social Worker until after Ms. Moseley's death;” (2) plaintiffs’ own expert has opined that such delays “materially impaired the ability of supervising clinicians to recognize patterns of psychiatric deterioration, reassess Ms. Moseley’s condition, and timely intervene;” and (3) at least one particular individual, Stephanie Vera, LMFT, who “authored multiple encounter notes reflecting purported face-to-face observations of Ms. Moseley” later testified “she never actually met Ms. Moseley.”

The Court has reviewed the evidence cited by plaintiff and finds that (1) Ms. Vera did indeed testify she had never met Ms. Mosley (see, Pl. Ex. G (Vera Depo.), p.26:11-12) despite other evidence which appears to indicate the existence of records authored by Ms. Vera based on face-to-face meetings with Ms. Moseley (see, generally, Pl. Ex. H (MRK Medical Consultants “Record Review Report”), pp.16-18, 35). Since all of defendant TPCP’s objections to evidence have been overruled, this evidence in opposition must be construed liberally and is in this Court view more than enough to create a triable issue relative to UMF No. 17’s assertion that “there is no indication that the clinical information regarding Blair Moseley is/was incorrect.” This triable issue of material facts represents a separate and distinct basis for mandatory denial of the present motion for summary judgment/adjudication and although the Court need not proceed further, it does in order to address still more triable issue of material fact which likewise preclude the granting of this motion.

According to UMF No. 26, “[t]he care and treatment provided by TPCP to Blair Moseley complied with the standard of care expected of a reasonably competent crisis residential program and social rehabilitation facility under similar circumstances” and “[t]he facility had appropriate staff training and number of staff on site, appropriate policies and procedures regarding AWOL protocols and risk assessments, and appropriate hourly head counts of members consistent with licensing requirements.” In response to UMF No. 26, plaintiffs point out that their psychiatric and licensed clinical social work experts have each concluded that TPCP “breached the standard of care, failed to recognize Ms.

Moseley’s progressive psychiatric deterioration, failed to synthesize and appropriately respond to multiple documented signs of decompensation, failed to conduct timely psychiatric reassessment, failed to consult its psychiatrist, failed to implement its own Crisis Response policies, failed to return Ms. Moseley to Sierra Vista or otherwise escalate her care despite documented clinical indications requiring a higher level of psychiatric treatment, and thereby breached the applicable standard of care.” Plaintiffs further contend that TPCP’s own contemporaneous medical records,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00331719-CU-PO-GDS: Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

written policies and procedures, discovery responses, and deposition testimony of its employees show multiple triable issues in connection with UMF No.

26.

The Court has reviewed and considered the declarations by plaintiffs’ two experts, Dr. McClendon and Declaration and Ms. McCarthy, LCSW and given that defendant TPCP’s objections thereto have been overruled, these declarations must under current California law be construed liberally in favor of the opposition. When so construed, this Court finds them to be sufficient to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact with respect to UMF No. 26 and this alone mandates denial of this motion for summary judgment/adjudication without regard to whether TPCP’s own contemporaneous medical records, written policies and procedures, discovery responses, and/or employee deposition testimony establishes any other triable issue.

UMF No. 27 is similar to UMF No. 26, stating that “TPCP acted within the applicable standard of care at all relevant times and no evidence suggests Defendant deviated from the standard of care.” Plaintiffs’ response to UMF No. 27 is likewise similar to their response to UMF No. 26, again insisting based largely on the same evidence that TPCP failed in various respects to comply with the applicable standard of care. For the reasons explained in the preceding paragraph, the Court finds that plaintiffs have met their burden of producing evidence which, when construed liberally, is enough to create a triable issue of material fact in connection with UMF No. 27 as well, thereby independently mandating denial of summary judgment/adjudication in favor of defendant TPCP.

UMF No. 28 contends “TPCP did not cause or contribute to the death of Blair Moseley” as “[t]here was no clinical indication that Blair Moseley was suicidal, intending to leave the facility to harm herself or others, or decompensating during her stay at CRP- Henrietta.” In response to UMF No. 28, plaintiffs again argue that TPCP’s “own contemporaneous medical records document progressive withdrawal, guardedness, depression, flat affect, poor judgment and insight, disorganized thought processes, limited verbal communication, poor hygiene, neglect of activities of daily living, extended staring, mutism and preoccupation with internal stimuli” and despite TPCP’s own Responses to Request for Admission Nos. 33 and 34 admitting that Ms.

Moseley exhibited one or more behaviors associated with psychiatric decompensation, TPCP failed to recognize and appropriately respond to Ms. Moseley’s progressive psychiatric deterioration, failed to conduct timely psychiatric reassessment, failed to consult its psychiatrist, failed to implement its own Crisis Response policies, and failed to timely escalate her care despite documented clinical indications requiring a higher level of psychiatric treatment. Plaintiffs further assert their psychiatric expert, Dr.

McClendon, has opined that to a reasonable degree of medical probability, TPCP’s breaches of the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00331719-CU-PO-GDS: Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

standard of care were substantial factors contributing to Ms. Moseley’s death.

Because defendant TPCP’s objections to evidence have all been overruled, the evidence cited by plaintiffs in response to UMF No. 28 must be construed liberally and as such, it is in this Court’s view sufficient to establish a triable dispute in connection with UMF No. 28, which relates to the element of causation. In brief, Dr. McClendon has submitted a 19-page declaration which sets forth a multitude of foundational facts along with their significance and in Paragraphs 55-56, she sets forth not only her opinion that to a reasonable medical certainty, Ms.

Moseley’s death was proximately caused by defendant TPCP’s breach of the standard of care but also the various bases for such opinion. This opinion plainly conflicts with the assertion in UMF No. 28 that “TPCP did not cause or contribute to the death of Blair Moseley” and thus, the Court finds there to be a triable issue of material fact relative to this UMF, thereby precluding summary judgment/adjudication here.

UMF No. 29 is quite similar to UMF No. 28 in that it states, “There is no evidence to suggest a causal connection between the care and treatment Blair Moseley received from TPCP and her subsequent death.” However, for the reasons explained in the preceding paragraph, this Court finds that plaintiffs have met their burden of producing evidence which, when construed liberally, is enough to create a triable issue of material fact with respect to a causal connection between TPCP’s care and treatment of Ms. Moseley and her death, thereby independently mandating denial of this motion by defendant TPCP.

Finally, UMF No. 31 asserts that Ms. Moseley’s death was not foreseeable given “[t]here was no clinical basis for predicting her ultimate death, no evidence of an intent to harm herself, and no conduct by [TPCP] and its staff which caused or contributed to her death. To the extent this UMF also suggest TPCP neither caused nor contributed to Ms. Moseley’s death and this Court has already determined that the evidence offered by plaintiffs in response to UMF No. 28 is sufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact on the element of causation, this Court finds for essentially the same reasons discussed above in connection with UMF No. 28 that there is also a triable issue of material fact relative to UMF No.

31. Accordingly, this motion for summary judgment/adjudication must be denied.

In sum, as explained above, defendant TPCP’s motion for summary judgment/adjudication must be denied because the moving papers fail to satisfy TPCP’s initial burden of production and even if this initial burden had been satisfied, plaintiffs have produced evidence which when construed liberally is sufficient to establish the existence of numerous triable issues of material fact in connection with UMF Nos. 13,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00331719-CU-PO-GDS: Catherine Moseley Jackson, in her individual capacity and as successor-in-interest to the Estate of Blair Moseley vs. BHC Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc. 08/04/2026 Hearing on Motion of Summary Judgment/Adjudication in Department 16D

14, 16, 17, 26-29 and 31, each of which constitutes a separate and distinct ground mandating denial of this motion. In light of this determination, the Court need not proceed further but it is worth adding here that this Court also finds that plaintiffs’ own AMF Nos. 1-20 are, especially when considered collectively, enough to demonstrate the existence of several additional triable issues of material fact which independently preclude the granting of summary judgment/adjudication in favor of defendant TPCP.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, defendant TPCP’s motion for summary judgment or alternatively, summary adjudication of the individual causes of action alleged therein is DENIED in its entirety.

Moving defendant to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)