KELLY TRAN VS. BAY AREA AG INC. A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL

Controlling California authority also holds, “when a plaintiff's lawsuit contains at least one claim that fits within the scope of the act, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to all claims asserted in the lawsuit.” (Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 791, 800.) “By its

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HONORABLE MICHAEL L. MAU, Department 20 ________________________________________________________________________ plain language, ... the [EFAA] applies to the entire case, not merely to the sexual assault or sexual harassment claims alleged as a part of the case.” (Doe v. Second Street Corp. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 577; accord. Quilala v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 75, 89–90; Casey v. Superior Court (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 575, 588.)

BAAG’s argument to the contrary—that only particular claims should be kept in court if the EFAA applies—is thus entirely without merit. As long as the present case relates to a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under California law, then the entire case is exempt from arbitration.

B. Conduct is Adequately Alleged.

BAAG also contends that Tran has not adequately alleged conduct constituting sexual harassment and that she conflates discrimination and harassment.

The Court of Appeal has expressly left open the question of what need be pleaded for the EFAA to apply. (See Liu v. Miniso Depot CA, Inc., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 799, fn. 2.) Subsequent published cases do not address the question and merely hold that pleading a valid a cause of action under state law as determined by federal pleading standards is sufficient to bring the entire action within the scope of the EFAA, but none have held that such pleading is necessary. (See Decloedt v. Radnet Management, Inc. (Jun. 26, 2026, B343963) __ Cal.App.5th __ 2026 WL 1959641, **6–7; Quilala v.

Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at pp. 86–87.) Many federal district courts have, however, required a plaintiff to “show[] that his case relates to conduct that would, if proven, actually amount to sexual harassment under Federal, Tribal, or State law.” (Smith v. Meta Platforms, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2025, No. 24 CIV. 4633 (JPC)) 2025 WL 2782484 (“Smith”), *8.) Smith, having rejected the requirement that the plaintiff assert a sexual harassment claim, notes:

To be sure, this does not mean that a party invoking the EFAA need necessarily state a cause of action for sexual harassment, because to invoke the EFAA, a party’s case need only “relat[e] to” sexual harassment. [Citation.] But regardless of the party’s cause of action, there still must be factual allegations sufficiently showing sexual harassment for a party to invoke the EFAA on account of a “sexual harassment dispute.”

(Ibid.)

BAAG argues that the allegations of sexual harassment must be plausible. This argument is based on the mistaken premise that federal pleadings standards of plausibility apply and that evidentiary facts such as those need to defeat summary judgment are required at the pleading stage. It is at the very least questionable whether, in state court, the allegations must satisfy the plausibility standards of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) 550 U.S. 544 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009) 556 U.S. 662. In assessing the sufficiency of pleadings, California state courts do not assess whether the allegations are plausible. (See Thomas v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 618, fn. 12.) Likewise, only the ultimate facts are necessary, and evidentiary

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HONORABLE MICHAEL L. MAU, Department 20 ________________________________________________________________________ allegations are not only superfluous but subject to being stricken. (See 4 Witkin, Cal. Proc. (6th ed. 2025) Pleading, § 406.) Furthermore, not all federal courts have required plausibility on this point, instead only requiring the allegations to be non-frivolous. (See, e.g., Diaz-Roa v. Hermes Law, P.C. (S.D.N.Y. 2024) 757 F.Supp.3d 498, 533.)

In support of its argument, BAAG cites to Decloedt v. Radnet Management, Inc. supra, __ Cal.App.5th __ 2026 WL 1959641, arguing that the case decided whether federal pleading standards apply. To the contrary, in that case, the Court of Appeal merely “[a]ssum[ed] arguendo the pleading standard in Rule 12(b)(6) applies,” because it held that the complaint satisfied the heightened standard regardless. (Decloedt, supra, at *6.) BAAG’s intimation that anything more was decided is erroneous—if not deceptive. In light of this representation and the argument discussed above regarding the EFAA’s application to entire cases, BAAG’s counsel is reminded that they owe a duty of candor to the Court. (See Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 3.3(a)(1).)

Certainly, there is no suggestion in the text of the EFAA that the question of whether a case relates to conduct relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under state law turns on whether the plaintiff’s pleading sets forth allegations constituting a cause of action for sexual harassment under that satisfy federal pleading standards. Furthermore, as defined by the EFAA, a “sexual harassment dispute” is not one that relates merely to a cause of action for sexual harassment but “conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable ... State law. (9 U.S.C. § 401(4); see Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, Incorporated (2d Cir. 2024) 112 F.4th 74, 92 [allegations of retaliation for reporting sexual harassment is “sexual harassment dispute” under EFAA].)

Importantly, California state law renders any harassment based on sex or gender by an employer unlawful. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1) [making unlawful for “any employer ..., because of ... sex ... to harass an employee ... ”].) When the harassment is so offensive, humiliating, distressing, or intrusive so as to create a hostile work environment, a cause of action may accrue, but the harassment itself is distinct from the resulting hostile work environment. (See id., at § 12923, subd. (a).) That is, even if it does not give rise to a cause of action, the harassing conduct is still legally prohibited. And harassment does not merely include “[s]exual favors” and “unwanted sexual advances” but “epithets, derogatory comments or slurs on a basis” such as sex or gender. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, § 11019, subd. (b)(2).)

Arguably the Complaint appears to conflate sexual harassment with sexual discrimination, such as when it complains that certain job privileges were given only to male employees. (See Sep. 25, 2025 Complaint, ¶¶ 13b–13c; see also Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 706–707 [harassment & discrimination are distinct].) Nevertheless, liberally interpreted as required (see Code Civ. Proc., § 452), the Complaint alleges that, throughout her employment, Tran “was publicly dismissed, criticized, and labeled ‘too strong,’ ‘too fierce,’ and ‘too aggressive’” while her “male colleagues never faced similar criticism or negative labeling” (Complaint, ¶ 13h). These criticisms were allegedly levied at Tran “based on her gender.” (Id., at ¶ 13; see Gov. Code, § 12926, subd. (r)(2) [“‘Sex’ also includes, but is not limited to, a person’s gender”].))

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HONORABLE MICHAEL L. MAU, Department 20 ________________________________________________________________________ Section 402(a) expressly applies to "any case ... which relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute." (9 U.S.C. § 402(a) [emphasis added].) The Legislature’s use of the phrase "relates to" is inherently, and appears to be intentionally, broad. That phrase has been interpreted expansively in federal jurisprudence to mean having "a connection with," "bearing upon," or "referring to." (See Morales v. TTWA (1992) 504 U.S. 374, 383.)

While the alleged comments may arguably not be so severe and pervasive as to support a cause of action for sexual harassment, the comments are clearly conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment under California law. Accordingly, this case is related to a dispute that is related to conduct alleged to constitute sexual harassment under state law, and the EFAA applies.

Because the Court finds that the EFAA applies, Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED. “[T]he plain language of the EFAA exempts a plaintiff’s entire case from arbitration.” Liu v. Miniso Depot, CA., Inc., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at 796 (emphasis added).

Any party who contests a tentative ruling must email Dept20@sanmateocourt.org with a copy to all other parties by 4:00 p.m. stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, Counsel for the prevailing party shall prepare for the Court’s signature a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and by the CRC. Please note that Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv) states in part “prevailing party on a tentative ruling is required to prepare a proposed order REPEATING VERBATIM the tentative ruling” (emphasis added). The order should be filed or e-filed only, do not email or mail a hard copy to the Court.