CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

admitted to Mercy San Juan Medical Center in Sacramento, California. (3AC, ¶ 2.) While Jessie’s medical records indicated a discharge date of April 8, 2023, and despite the fact that Jessie’s family was told that Jessie had been discharged against medical advice, Plaintiffs allege that Jessie had died while in the care of Dignity Health on April 8, 2023. (3AC, ¶¶ 2-3.)

Unaware that Jessie had died on April 8, 2023, Plaintiffs allege that Jessie’s family tirelessly tried to locate her – they filed a Missing Person’s report with the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office, posted information about Jessie on the Department of Justice website for missing persons, and conducted a search for Jessie. (3AC, ¶ 3.)

According to the 3AC, it was not until April 2024, that Dr. Mukhtar completed the physician certification portion of the death certificate enabling the Funeral Director at Cremations Only to issue Jessie’s Death Certificate on April 5, 2024. (3AC, ¶ 3 [citing Exh. 4].) Plaintiffs allege that one week later, on April 12, 2024, the Sacramento County Detective’s Office was able to locate Jessie’s remains and notified Jessie’s family that Jessie had been found in “cold storage,” which “is essentially a large storage warehouse where Dignity Health has contracted to store bodies,” and had been there since April 8, 2023. (3AC, ¶ 3.)

Pertinent to this demurrer, the 3AC alleges five causes of action against Dr. Mukhtar – negligence (second cause of action), negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) (third cause of action), gross negligence (eighth cause of action), intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) (ninth cause of action), and concealment (eleventh cause of action).

Plaintiffs allege that Dr. Mukhtar, “is a natural person providing medical care to patients of Mercy San Juan, including Jessie Peterson. Dr. Mukhtar is alleged herein as the true name of DOE 2.” (3AC, ¶ 15.) According to the 3AC, Dr. Mukhtar was the “attending physician.” (3AC, ¶ 132.) Plaintiffs allege that “Dr. Mukhtar did not provide any medical care to Jessie Peterson at any time after April 9, 2023.” (3AC, ¶ 115.) However, according to the 3AC, Dr. Mukhtar failed to complete the medical and health sections of Jessie’s death record and failed to notify Jessie’s family of her death in violation of legal obligations, medical ethics, and hospital standards. (3AC, ¶ 132.)

While Dr. Mukhtar allegedly made available to Dignity Health’s non-medical hospital staff the information needed to complete Jessie’s death certificate on April 8, 2023, he “did not conduct any follow up to ensure that the death certificate was completed.” (3AC, ¶ 132.)

As it relates to Dr. Mukhtar, Plaintiffs allege, “[i]n violation of Health & Safety Code

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

sections 102795 and 102800, Dr. Mukhtar completed the medical and health and physician certification sections of Jessie’s death record on April 4, 2024.” (3AC, ¶ 108 [citing Exh. 4 at “Boxes 107-118”].) “In violation of Health & Safety Code sections 102775, 102780, and 102800, Jessie’s death certificate was not completed and provided to the local registrar until April 5, 2024, three hundred and sixty-three days (363) after Jessie’s passing while under Dr. Mukhtar’s care.” (3AC, ¶ 110 [citing Exh. 4 at “Box 47”].) “In violation of Health & Safety Code section 7104, AMA Ethics, and Dignity Health’s medical staff rules, although Jessie died on April 8, 2023, Dr. Mukhtar did not notify Jessie’s family of her death until more than one year later on April 18, 2024.” (3AC, ¶ 114.)

Plaintiffs allege, “[o]n information and belief, Dr. Mukhtar also failed to sign off on death certificates for at least two other patients that died under his care during the same time frame of the death of Jessie Peterson, one death occurring on March 14, 2023 and another on March 28, 2023 at Dignity Health.” (3AC, ¶ 116.) Plaintiffs allege, “[a]ccording to the records produced by the California Department of Health, in addition to Jessie Peterson, Brenda S. and Anthony J., Dr. Mukhtar was the treating physician for at least five other parties for which timely death certificates were not filed during 2023 and 2024.” (3AC, ¶ 117.)

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the pleading it challenges by raising questions of law. (Salimi v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 216, 219; Nordlinger v. Lynch (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1271.)

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.)

In this respect, the Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-697.)

“[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v. Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action – not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 591.) Finally, a demurrer may only be sustained where it disposes of an entire cause of action. (See, e.g., Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 119 [“A demurrer must dispose of an entire cause of action to be sustained.”].)

Discussion

Defendant demurs to the 3AC on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs’ Claims Amount to, at Most, a Single Claim for Professional Negligence Under MICRA

2. The Causes of Action Set Forth in the Third Amended Complaint Against Dr. Mukhtar are Barred by the Statute of Limitations Set Forth in Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.5

3. The Allegations Set Forth in the Third Cause of Action are Vague and Insufficient to State a Viable Cause of Action for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress against Dr. Mukhtar

4. The Cause of Action for General Negligence is Vague/Ambiguous and Fails to set Forth Sufficient Facts to Constitute a Cause of Action

5. The Claim of Gross Negligence Against Dr. Mukhtar is Insufficient to State a

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

Viable Cause of Action and is Vague and Ambiguous

6. The Allegations Against Dr. Mukhtar for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Fail to State a Viable Cause of Action

7. The Allegations of Concealment Fail to Allege a Viable Cause of Action against Dr. Mukhtar and are Vague and Conclusory. (Ntc. Mot.)

The Court addresses each of these arguments, in turn, below:

1. “Plaintiffs’ Claims Amount to, at Most, a Single Claim for Professional Negligence Under MICRA” (Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Causes of Action)

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ allegations and causes of action are nothing more than a “thinly veiled attempt to circumvent the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (‘MICRA’).” (Mov. MPA, p. 6:18-19.) With this, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations against him should be “condensed to a single cause for professional negligence related to the care and services he provided to the Decedent.” (Id. at p. 6:20-21 [citing Lathrop v. Health Care Partners Medical Group (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1418].)

In other words, Defendant argues that because the acts/omissions set forth in the 3AC arose “from professional medical services he provided to Decedent in his capacity as her treating physician,” Plaintiffs can only allege a cause of action for professional negligence under MICRA against him, and thus, the causes of action for negligence, NIED, gross negligence, IIED, and concealment must fail.

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that concealment and IIED are intentional torts that fall outside of MICRA. (Opp’n, p. 8:5-15 [citing Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 355–356; Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 323].) Regarding the negligence claims, Plaintiffs contend that the claims are outside of MICRA because they are not related to any medical diagnosis and treatment. Namely, Plaintiffs contend that Dr. Mukhtar’s failing to complete the medical certification portion of Jessie’s death certificate and failing to notify Jessie’s family of her death are not acts of professional negligence as they did not involve the delivery of medical care. (Opp’n, pp. 8:17-9:7 [citing Gutierrez v.

Tostado (2025) 18 Cal.5th 222, 235].) According to Plaintiffs, the allegations against Dr. Mukhtar involve the “post-death administrative tasks” of notifying families and completing a death certificate which was unrelated to any medical diagnosis, and further, happened after Jessie had died and medical treatment had concluded. (Id. at p. 9:8-23 [citing Larson v. UHS of Rancho

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

Springs, Inc. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 336, 353–354; Johnson v. Open Door Community Health Centers (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 153].)

In reply, Defendant reiterates that the allegations supporting each cause of action in the 3AC are “inextricably intertwined” with Dr. Mukhtar’s role as Jesse’s treating physician and his alleged failure to timely notify the family of her death, determine the cause of death, and timely sign the Death Certificate, and looking to the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims, arise from Dr. Mukhtar’s alleged professional negligence. (Reply, p. 5:21-23.)

MICRA’s provisions, including the noneconomic damages cap and the statute of limitations, apply only to actions based upon “professional negligence.” (Civ. Code, § 333.2(a); Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.) Under MICRA, “professional negligence” is expressly defined to mean “a negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which act or omission is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death, provided that such services are within the scope of services for which the provider is licensed and which are not within any restriction imposed by the licensing agency or licensed hospital.” (Civ. Code, § 3333.2(j)(4); Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5(2).)

In noting that MICRA’s core motivating principle was, “containing the costs associated with traditional malpractice cases, including the insurance premiums associated with medical malpractice,” the California Supreme Court, in Gutierrez, stated the following regarding the application of MICRA’s statute of limitations:

This review of MICRA’s purpose and history corroborates that in determining whether the MICRA statute of limitations applies, we look to whether the plaintiff’s claim derives from professional obligations that are distinct from the duty to exercise ordinary care that is owed to the public generally. Where the plaintiff’s claim is premised on the violation of a professional obligation owed in the rendering of a patient’s medical care, treatment, or diagnoses, the claim sounds in professional negligence and the MICRA statute of limitations will apply. (Gutierrez, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 237-238 [italics in original].)

When a plaintiff asserts a claim against a health care provider on a legal theory other than professional negligence, courts must determine whether the claim is nonetheless based on the health care provider’s professional negligence, which would require application of MICRA – “[t]o make that determination, courts must examine not only the legal theory alleged, but also the nature of the health care provider's alleged conduct and the legislative history of the MICRA provision at issue. [Citations.] When, as here,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

the question presented concerns which limitations period applies, courts also must focus on the nature or gravamen of the claim, not the label or form of action the plaintiff selects. [Citations]” (Larson, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 347 [citations omitted].)

Pursuant to its express language, MICRA’s provisions are limited to negligent acts or omissions, not intentional conduct. Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiff’s causes of action for IIED and concealment must be brought as a singular cause of action for professional negligence and would otherwise be subject to MICRA.

As it relates to the negligence-based causes of action, turning to the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ allegations, construing them broadly, as the Court must in the context of this demurrer, the Court is not persuaded that for purposes of pleadings, these causes of action must be brought as a singular cause of action for professional negligence, and be subject to MICRA. Indeed, as alleged, Dr. Mukhtar’s wrongful conduct amounts to his failure to complete Jessie’s death certificate, and his failure to notify her family after her death. (3AC, ¶¶ 107-117.)

Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that “Dr. Mukhtar did not provide any medical care to Jessie Peterson at any time after April 9, 2023.” (3AC, ¶ 115.) Notably, missing here are any allegations or evidence, which the Court can properly consider in the context of demurrer, that would suggest that the specific conduct would amount to a licensed hospital function – that the alleged failure to complete a death certificate or notify family members is a service within the scope of medical care for which a provider is licensed as a health care professional.

In sum, the Court determines that the alleged conduct at the crux of Plaintiffs’ negligence-based causes of action need not be brought as a singular cause of action for professional negligence subject to MICRA. Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

2. “The Causes of Action Set Forth in the Third Amended Complaint Against Dr. Mukhtar are Barred by the Statute of Limitations Set Forth in Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.5” (Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Causes of Action)

Dr. Mukhtar’s statute of limitations argument is premised on the application of MICRA’s one-year limitation period (Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5). In light of the Court’s ruling above regarding MICRA, Defendant’s demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

3. Failure to State Facts – NIED (Third Cause of Action)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

There is no independent tort of NIED. (See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 984-985.) NIED is a species of negligence predicated upon the traditional elements of duty, breach, cause and harm. (Id. at p. 984.) The law in California is that “there is no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to another.” (Ibid.) Consequently, “unless the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant's breach of some other legal duty and the emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty.” (Id. at p. 985; Erlich v.

Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 555.) Such a legal duty “may be imposed by law, be assumed by the defendant, or exist by virtue of a special relationship.” (Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 985; Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 583, 590.)

Dr. Mukhtar argues that Plaintiffs’ third cause of action fails because the allegations in the 3AC fail to set forth a duty of care under a “direct victim” or “bystander” theory of recovery. Dr. Mukhtar argues that he did not have a contractual relationship with Plaintiffs, was not their treating physician and he was not employed by Dignity Health or Mercy San Juan Medical Center. According to Dr. Mukhtar, while Plaintiffs rely on Health and Safety Code section 7104 to assert that he owed Plaintiffs a duty to notify the next of kin, “Section 7104 does not create a duty in favor of a decedent’s family because the statute was intended to protect the county treasury, not the relatives of deceased patients.” (Mov. MPA, p. 12:12-18 [citing Spates v. Dameron Hospital Assn (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 220].)

In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Mukhtar fails to address the alleged duty to complete death certificates, under California Health & Safety Code sections 102775, 102795, and 102800. Further, Plaintiffs contend that despite Dr. Mukhtar’s focus on Health and Safety Code section 7104, Plaintiffs also allege that pursuant to Dignity Health Medical Staff Rules and Responsibilities, and American Medical Association’s Principles of Ethics, Dr. Mukhtar was required to notify Jessie’s family of her death. Plaintiffs contend that they also allege common law negligence, and thus, the demurrer “commits a fundamental logical error: it conflates the absence of a duty arising from section 7104 with the absence of any legal duty.” (Opp’n, p. 15:1-4 [emphasis in original].)

Here, Plaintiffs allege various duties which Dr. Mukhtar owed to Plaintiffs, and which Dr. Mukhtar breached by failing to complete Jessie’s death certificate and notify Jessie’s family of her death. (3AC, ¶¶ 118-130,156-162.) By failing to address all alleged duties, including the alleged duty to complete death certificates, under California Health &

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

Safety Code sections 102775, 102795, and 102800, Dr. Mukhtar’s demurrer must fail. A demurrer may be sustained only if it disposes of an entire cause of action. (Fremont Indemnity Co., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.) Defendant’s demurrer to the third cause of action is OVERRULED.

4. Failure to State Facts – Negligence (Second Cause of Action)

Dr. Mukhtar raises similar arguments in support of his demurrer to the second cause of action for negligence. (See Mov. MPA, pp. 13:11-14:15.) As further explained above, Defendant’s demurrer to the second cause of action is also OVERRULED.

5. Failure to State Facts – Gross Negligence (Eighth Cause of Action)

Dr. Mukhtar demurs to the eighth cause of action for gross negligence on grounds that “gross negligence is not recognized in California as a standalone cause of action in a civil case.” (Mov. MPA, p. 14:20-21.) Thus, Dr. Mukhtar concludes that because gross negligence is not recognized as an independent legal theory, it cannot stand on its own, and is subject to demurrer.

In opposition, seemingly conceding, Plaintiffs state “Plaintiffs do not dispute that Gross Negligence is based on Negligence and only differs in degree.” (Opp’n, p. 16:3.) However, Plaintiffs contend that the pleadings should be viewed liberally.

Indeed, California Courts have held that “gross negligence” is not a separate cause of action. (Anderson v. Fitness Internat., LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 867, 879; Santa Barbara v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 747, 779-780.) As “gross negligence” is not an independent cause of action, but rather a degree of negligence, the Court finds that it should not be pleaded as a separate cause of action. Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the eighth cause of action is SUSTAINED. Leave to amend is GRANTED to permit Plaintiffs to allege facts in support of their “gross negligence” theory, within the second cause of action for negligence, rather than as a standalone cause of action.

6. Failure to State Facts – IIED (Ninth Cause of Action)

The established elements of a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress are that a plaintiff must identify facts demonstrating that “(1) the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, severe emotional distress to the plaintiff; (2) the plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

actually suffered severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) the outrageous conduct was the actual and proximate cause of the emotional distress.” (Ross v. Creel Printing & Publ'g Co. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 736, 744-45.) The conduct at issue “must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” (Trerice v. Blue Cross of California (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 878, 883.)

Conduct is “extreme and outrageous” when it is “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197.) Where reasonable minds could differ, “it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous as to result in liability.” (Alcon v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 499.)

Dr. Mukhtar argues that Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action for IIED fails because the allegations do not meet the legal threshold for “outrageous conduct,” nor do they establish severe emotional distress or intent. (Mov. MPA, p. 15:11-12.) Dr. Mukhtar argues that Plaintiffs fail to allege that Dr. Mukhtar owed a legal duty of care to them nor do they allege facts showing that he acted or failed to act with the intent to cause them emotional harm or with reckless disregard of the likelihood of emotional harm to them. Dr. Mukhtar contends that Plaintiffs have “bootstrapped” a professional negligence theory against Dr. Mukhtar into an IIED claim. (Mov. MPA, p. 16:8-9.)

In opposition, pointing to the allegations in the 3AC, Plaintiffs argue to the contrary – that the cause of action is sufficiently pled. (Opp’n, pp. 17:11-18:28 [citing 3AC, ¶¶ 2-6, 9, 14, 21-23, 29, 35, 40-46, 48-49, 107-110, 112-114, 116-117,132, 140].)

Considering these allegations, and the other allegations in the 3AC, including the allegation that “Defendants either intended to cause Plaintiffs emotional distress, or acted with reckless disregard of the probability that Plaintiffs would suffer emotional distress[,]” (3AC, ¶ 200), construing the allegations broadly, as the Court must in the context of this demurrer, the Court finds this sufficient to allege a cause of action for IIED. Defendant’s demurrer to the ninth cause of action is OVERRULED.

7. Failure to State Facts – Concealment (Eleventh Cause of Action)

The elements of fraud “are (a) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) knowledge of falsity (or 'scienter'); (c) intent to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.) A failure to disclose a material fact can constitute

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

actionable fraud. (Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 255.)

When pleading a claim for fraud/negligent misrepresentation, each and every element must be alleged, “and the facts constituting the fraud must be alleged with sufficient specificity to allow defendant to understand fully the nature of the charge made.” (Stansfield v. Starkey (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 59, 73; Cadlo v. Owens-Illinois, lnc. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 513, 519 [stating that “[e]ach element in a cause of action for fraud or negligent misrepresentation must be factually and specifically alleged”). As it relates to intentional misrepresentation, to satisfy the particularity requirement, the plaintiff must plead facts which “show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.' (Stansfield, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 74; see also Lazar, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 645.)

As it relates to fraudulent concealment, “[t]he required elements for fraudulent concealment are (1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact was known; and (5) the plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan v.

Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal. 5th 1, 40; Bigler- Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 310-311 [same]; see also Lazar, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 638.) Although in California, fraud must be pled specifically, courts have repeatedly recognized that “[i]t is harder to apply [the requirement of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure. 'How does one show 'how' and 'by what means' something didn't happen, or 'when' it never happened, or 'where' it never happened?'” (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199, citing Alfaro v.

Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384; Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217.)

Nevertheless, “California case law similarly has viewed fraud by concealment on equal footing with fraud by affirmative misrepresentation. Where failure to disclose a material fact is calculated to induce a false belief, the distinction between concealment and affirmative misrepresentation is tenuous. Both are fraudulent.” (Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 39.)

Dr. Mukhtar argues that Plaintiffs’ eleventh cause of action for concealment fails because the 3AC does not sufficiently plead the elements of concealment with the specificity required under California law. In this regard, Dr. Mukhtar contends that the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

allegations are “vague and conclusory” and further, the 3AC does not identify what specific facts “Dr. Mukhtar concealed, intent to defraud, when and how Dr. Mukhtar’s concealment occurred, or what he knew and intended at the time.” (Mov. MPA, p. 17:1- 3.)

In opposition, pointing to the allegations in the 3AC, Plaintiffs argue to the contrary – that the cause of action is sufficiently pled. (Opp’n, p. 19:2-24 [citing 3AC, ¶¶ 3-4, 34-36, 39-43, 44-48, 97-98, 107-110, 112-114, 116-117, 132-133, 148-150].)

Considering these allegations, and the other allegations in the 3AC, including the allegations that, “[d]espite having the contact information in its records, Defendants failed to notify Jessie’s (1) mom, (2) sister, or (3) friend of Jessie’s death for one year[,]” (3AC, ¶ 216), and that “Defendants intentionally withheld information and misled Plaintiffs of information related to Jessie’s death . . .” (Id. at ¶ 219), construing the allegations broadly, as the Court must in the context of this demurrer, the Court finds this sufficient to allege a cause of action for concealment. Defendant’s demurrer to the eleventh cause of action is OVERRULED.

Disposition

Dr. Mukhtar’s demurrer to the 3AC is OVERRULED in part and SUSTAINED in part as further set forth herein.

Where leave to amend was granted Plaintiffs may file and serve an amended pleading no later than 10 days after this ruling. Defendant may file and serve a response within 30 days of service of amended pleading, 35 days if served by mail.

To request oral argument on this matter, you must call Department 8a at 916-874-5754 by 4:00 p.m., the court day before this hearing and notification of oral argument must be made to the opposing party/counsel. If no call is made, the tentative ruling becomes the order of the court. (Local Rule 1.06.)

Please check your tentative ruling prior to the next Court date at www.saccourt.ca.gov prior to the above referenced hearing date.

If oral argument is requested, the parties may appear by Zoom with the links below:

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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV015815: CONGI, et al. vs DIGNITY HEALTH 06/24/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Third Amended Verified Complaint in Department 8A

To join by phone dial (833) 568-8864, ID 16108301121

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code section 68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporterservices-transcripts. Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order or further notice is necessary.