BABATKIS v. CITY OF RANCHO CUCAMONGA, ET AL.

pleadings is equivalent to a demurrer” (internal quotes omitted)].) The motion tests the

sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause of action. (Wise v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (2005)

132 Cal.App.4th 725, 738 (Wise).)

If the moving party is the defendant, the motion is limited to the grounds that the court

has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint or the complaint

does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)&(ii); Templo, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 735.) The motion may

be made as to the entire complaint or to any of the causes of action therein or to the entire answer

or one or more affirmative defenses in the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd.

(c)(2)(A)&(B).)

“Except as provided in the statute governing motions for judgment on the pleadings,

Code of Civil Procedure section 438, the rules governing demurrers apply.” (Alameda Cnty.

Waste Mgmt. Auth. v. Waste Connections US, Inc. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1162, 1174 (Alameda

Cnty.).) In evaluating the sufficiency of the challenged pleading, the court accepts all material

facts pleaded and those that arise by reasonable implication, but not conclusions of fact or law.

(Id., at p. 1174.)

The grounds for the motion shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any

matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (d).)

“The court must assume the truth of all factual allegations in the complaint, along with matters

subject to judicial notice.” (Wise, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 738; Alameda Cnty., supra, 67

Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.)

“Leave to amend ‘is properly denied if the facts and nature of plaintiffs’ claims are clear

and under the substantive law, no liability exists.’ [Citation.]” (Templo, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at

p. 735.)

Timeliness

Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (e), specifies that “[n]o motion may be

made pursuant to this section if a pretrial conference order has been entered pursuant to Section

575, or within 30 days of the date the action is initially set for trial, whichever is later, unless the

court otherwise permits.”

Regarding the first timing limitation, Section 575 does not define a pretrial conference

order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 575.) But one case construing prior court rule 210(c) explains that at

pretrial conferences, counsel submit a written statement of the factual and legal contentions to be

made as to the issues remaining in dispute which are then carried over into the pretrial

conference order. (Pulse v. Hill (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 301, 304.) “The principal purposes of

pretrial are to find out what the lawsuit is about, to simplify and define the issues to be litigated,

and to determine how the trial may proceed most expeditiously. It is also to give notice of

matters not necessarily revealed by the pleadings where such matters may be issues in the case.”

(Id., at p. 304.) Under this definition, there does not appear to have been any pretrial conference

order issued in this case.

Regarding the second limitation, on June 25, 2026, the court issued an initial trial setting

conference order that set a further trial setting conference for July 23, 2026. Thus, no trial date

has been set in this action. As such, the second timing limitation does not apply. County’s

motion is made timely.

Request for Judicial Notice

“Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact

or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in the action

without requiring formal proof of the matter.” (Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119

Cal.App.4th 140, 145.)

Where the MJOP is based on matters the court may judicially notice (under Evidence

Code sections 452 or 453), such matters shall be specified in the notice of motion or supporting

points and authorities, except as the court may otherwise permit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 438, subd.

(d).) “On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may take judicial notice of something

that cannot reasonably be controverted, even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading.”

(Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549 (Evans), disapproved in

part on other grounds by Black Sky Capital, LLC v. Cobb (2019) 7 Cal.5th 156, 165.)

County seeks judicial notice that on the date of the subject incident, 12/31/24, Plaintiff

was an inmate at West Valley Detention Center (WVDC). County also seeks judicial notice that

WVDC is located at 9500 Etiwanda Avenue in Rancho Cucamonga, which is the same address

of the premises where the alleged injury occurred. County’s RJN is supported by five San

Bernardino County Superior Court minute orders and a County Sheriff’s Department website

printout showing 9500 Etiwanda as WVDC’s address. (County’s RJN, Exhs. 1-6.)

The court may judicially notice records of any court of this state. (Evid. Code, § 452,

subd. (d).) Such notice includes court orders and the court may notice the truth of their contents.

“[T]he truth of a document's contents will not be considered unless it is a judgment, statement of

decision, or order.” (C.R. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1103.)

Also, the court may judicially notice facts that are of such common knowledge within the

territorial jurisdiction of the court that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute. (Evid.

Code, § 452, subd. (g).) Here, it is common knowledge not reasonably disputed that 9500

Etiwanda Avenue in Rancho Cucamonga houses WVDC, which is within the territorial reach of

the Superior Court of San Bernardino County.

The Court GRANTS County’s judicial notice request in its entirety.

Analysis of Merits

County argues it is immune, expressly, from liability for Plaintiff’s claims under

Government Code section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2). Because of such immunity, the Complaint

fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the County. Furthermore,

amendment would be futile because the defect cannot be cured as a matter of law.

Section 844.6, subdivision (a), provides: “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this

part, except as provided in this section and in Sections 814, 814.2, 845.4, and 845.6, or in Title

2.1 (commencing with Section 3500) of Part 3 of the Penal Code, a public entity is not liable for:

(1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner. (2) An injury to any prisoner.” (Gov. Code, §

844.6, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)1 “Section 844.6, subdivision (a)(2) establishes the State’s immunity to

liability for injuries to prisoners.” (Collins v. Cnty. of San Diego (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1035,

1055.)

1 As described next, none of the exceptions identified in Section 844.6, subdivision (a), appears to apply here. Section 814 provides that Part 2 (where these sections are located) does not affect liability based on contract or the right to obtain relief other than money or damages against a public entity or public employee. (Gov. Code, § 814.) Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege a contract or relief aside from compensatory damages. Therefore, Section 814 does not appear to apply here. 6

Section 844.6, subdivision (c), specifically bars prisoner claims arising from allegedly

dangerous conditions of public property. (Gov. Code, § 844.6, subd. (c).) A prisoner includes

an inmate of a prison, jail, or penal or correctional facility. (Gov. Code, § 844.) When

interpreting the word “prisoner” as used in Section 844.6, the “focus has always been on whether

the person was lawfully confined in a jail, prison or other similar penal facility.” (Reed v. Cnty.

of Santa Cruz (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1277 (Reed).) In refining the “prisoner” definition,

the confinement must be for a penological or correctional objective or the person must be

incarcerated as part of the penal processes. (Id., at p. 1277.)

In Reed, the plaintiff sued the county for personal injuries received when she was

assaulted by a man confined with her in a holding room at the county jail while both were being

booked on criminal charges. (Reed, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1276.) In finding that plaintiff

was lawfully confined as part of the penal process at the time of the alleged assault, the court

pointed to undisputed facts that plaintiff was arrested under a warrant, taken to jail and confined

in a jail holding room. (Id., at p. 1277.)

Here, County’s judicially noticeable minute orders show that between December 20,

2024, and February 10, 2026, Plaintiff was labeled as “present in custody” in the minute orders.

(County’s RJN, Exhs. 1-5.) On 2/10/26, the minute order reflects that Plaintiff was released

Section 814.2 provides that Part 2 does not impliedly repeal workers’ compensation provisions in Labor Code Divisions 4 and 4.5. (Gov. Code, § 814.2.) Because Plaintiff’s allegations do not encompass workers’ compensation, this section is inapplicable. Section 845.4 concerns public entity or public employee interference with a prisoner’s right to judicial determination or review of the legality of his or her confinement. (Gov. Code, § 845.4.) Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that he is challenging any confinement, rendering this section inapplicable.

Section 845.6 pertains to failure to obtain medical care for prisoners by a public entity or public employee. (Gov. Code, § 845.6.) Plaintiff does not allege a failure to obtain medical care, so this section likewise does not apply here. Penal Code, Part 3, Title 2.1 concerns biomedical and behavioral research, which is not alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and therefore inapplicable here. 7

from custody on that date. (County’s RJN, Exh. 5.) The alleged incident occurred on 12/31/24

at 9500 Etiwanda Avenue which is the judicially noticed location of WVDC. Thus, based on the

minute orders and address of WVDC, the court can accept the reasonable implication that

Plaintiff was in custody as an inmate or prisoner as part of the penal process at the time of the

alleged injury.2 Therefore, under Government Code section 844.6, subdivisions (a)(2) and (c),

County is immune from liability for Plaintiff’s premises liability tort claim.

Leave to amend should be denied where no liability exists under substantive law or where

amendment would be futile. (Singh v. Lipworth (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 813, 828; Foxborough

v. Van Atta (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 217, 230-231; Heckendorn v. City of San Marino (1986) 42

Cal.3d 481, 489.) As County points out persuasively, leave to amend would be futile because the

pleading defect here is based on statutory immunity, not insufficient factual pleading.

In opposition, Plaintiff first argues that Government Code sections 820 and 815.2 provide

the necessary statutory basis for liability. Section 820, subdivision (a), states that except as

otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or

omission to the same extent as a private person. (Gov. Code, § 820, subd. (a.).) However, the

County Defendant and moving party here are not a public employee or private person, so this

section does not help Plaintiff.

Government Code section 815.2, subdivision (a), provides that a public entity is liable for

injury proximately caused by an act or omission of the public entity’s employee within the scope

of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a

cause of action against that employee or his personal representative. However, Plaintiff does not

2 Notably, in his opposition, Plaintiff concedes that the alleged incident occurred while he was wearing footwear provided by the County Jail. (Plaintiff’s Oppo., 2:5-7.) 8

address the applicability, as discussed above, of Government Code section 844.6. Both sections

815.2 and 844.6 are found in Title 1, Part 2 of the Government Code. Section 844.6, subdivision

(a), starts with the phrase “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this part” (which would

include Section 815.2) and concludes by stating a public entity is not liable for injuries

proximately caused by any prisoner or to any prisoner. (Gov. Code, § 844.6, subd. (a)(1)-(2).)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument to ground statutory liability in Section 815.2 is not persuasive.

Next, Plaintiff relies on Government Code section 835, which begins with this language:

“[e]xcept as provided by statute, a public entity is liable for injury caused by a dangerous

condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in a dangerous condition

at the time of the injury....” Plaintiff overlooks the first clause “except as provided by statute.”

Specifically, Government Code section 844.6, subdivision (c), is a statute that sets forth an

exception for public entity liability for an injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public

property under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830); the exception is for an injury to a

prisoner. Thus, Section 835 does not advance Plaintiff’s cause.

With respect to interpreting and applying Section 844.6’s immunity standard, Plaintiff

urges a nuanced analysis, relying on Collins, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 1035, arguing the court

rejected a mechanical application of immunity because the nature and context of the negligent

act must be examined. Plaintiff did not supply a pinpoint cite for Collins that advances this

proposition; a search for the word “nature” in Collins did not yield any results. Thus, Plaintiff

failed to supply any legal authority for this argument. “We need not consider an argument for

which no authority is furnished.” (Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379, 384.) The

remainder of Plaintiff’s opposition arguments likewise lack supporting legal authority and do not

merit consideration.

Regarding leave to amend, Plaintiff merely states he is prepared to provide more detailed

and specific factual allegations to reinforce the Complaint and its cause of action. Because

County’s immunity argument has merit, it is unclear how Plaintiff could amend his pleading to

circumvent or overcome the statutory immunity of Government Code section 844.6.

The Court GRANTS County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to

amend.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court rules as follows:

1) FINDS that the moving party satisfied the meet and confer requirement.

2) GRANTS County’s judicial notice request in its entirety.

3) GRANTS County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend.

Counsel for the moving party is ordered to provide notice.

10