Linette Ramirez Lujan vs. Luis Gonzalez

Moving counsel directed to contact opposing counsel and/or self-represented litigants and advise them of Local Rule 1.05, the Court’s tentative ruling procedure for motions noticed in the Presiding Judge’s Department, and the manner to request a hearing. If moving counsel is unable to contact opposing parties prior to hearing, they are ordered to appear at the hearing by Zoom or by telephone.

Proposed Intervenor Prime Insurance Company’s (Intervenor and/or Prime) motion to intervene is GRANTED as follows.

Factual & Procedural Summary

This is a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 21, 2021, between a car driven by Plaintiff Linette Ramirez Lujan (Plaintiff)[1] and a tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Luis Gonzalez (Gonzalez) and owned by Defendant Bar Transport, Inc. (Bar Transport). The Court refers to Gonzales and Bar Transport collectively herein as “Defendants.” Intervenor is Bar Transport’s liability insurer.

On November 17, 2022, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a certified letter to Defendants and Intervenor notifying them of its representation of Plaintiff and demanding that they preserve certain evidence related to the motor vehicle accident, including the subject tractor and trailer. (Decl. of Raymond D. McElfish ISO Mot. for Terminating Sanctions ¶ 3, Ex. A.)[2]

On March 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Complaint against Defendants alleging causes of action for (1) motor vehicle negligence, (2) negligence per se (Veh. Code, § 22100), (3) negligent hiring/retention, and (4) negligent entrustment.

On April 2, 2024, Bar Transport was suspended as a corporation. (Decl. of James Murray ISO Mot. ¶ 4, Ex. A.) California Revenue and Taxation Code section 19719 prevents a suspended corporation from defending itself in a civil action.

Defendants filed an Answer on September 18, 2024.

On November 11, 2024, Plaintiff served several sets of written discovery on Defendants. (Decl. of Raymond D. McElfish ISO Mot. for Terminating Sanctions ¶ 4.) On December 27, 2024,

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Defendants served unverified responses to the written discovery. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

On February 27, 2025, Plaintiff served a meet and confer letter to Defendants, in which Plaintiff, inter alia, requested mutually agreeable dates to conduct an inspection of the subject tractor and trailer. (Decl. of Raymond D. McElfish ISO Mot. for Terminating Sanctions ¶ 6, Ex. B.)

On April 2, 2025, Plaintiff learned that the trailer was not available to be inspected as it was sold on September 11, 2024, to someone in Guatemala. (Decl. of Raymond D. McElfish ISO Mot. for Terminating Sanctions ¶¶ 7, 8, Exs. C, D.) On April 8, 2025, Plaintiff learned that the tractor had also been sold; the date of sale was May 20, 2024. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10, Exs. E, F.)

On June 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for terminating sanctions, issue sanctions, evidentiary sanctions, and/or evidentiary presumptions against Defendants on spoliation of evidence grounds. That motion is scheduled to be heard on December 10, 2026.

Intervenor filed the instant motion on June 6, 2026.

Trial is currently scheduled for January 12, 2027.

Discussion

Intervenor moves for leave to file a Complaint-in-Intervention in this action to protect its insured and its policy, and to defend this action since Bar Transport is a suspended corporation. (Not. of Mot. & Mot. (Mot.) 2:3-6.) Intervenor argues:

As [Bar Transport’s] insurer, Prime may be liable for any judgment against its insured pursuant to the terms of its insurance policy. Prime seeks to intervene in this litigation in order to protect its insured and its policy.

Because a liability insurer agrees to pay any judgment obtained against its insured, it has the right to intervene where an insured is barred from defending itself. (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Sup (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386-387 (“Reliance”) [insurer entitled to intervene where insured barred from defending because its corporate status had been suspended for nonpayment of franchise tax].)

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Under Reliance, Prime has a right to intervene as a matter of law [since] Bar Transport is barred from defending itself. Further, Prime has a direct and immediate interest in the outcome of this litigation, as it may be obligated to pay any judgment against its insureds. Prime’s interest is to protect and defend Bar Transport from any adverse judgment and Prime is so situated such that the disposal of this action without such intervention will, as a practical matter, impair or impede Prime’s ability to protect that interest.

Accordingly, Prime respectfully requests this Court for an order permitting it to intervene and file [the proposed] Complaint- In-Intervention in this action[, which] is attached to the [Declaration of James G. Murray filed in support of the motion] as Exhibit “B”.

(Mot. 4:13-5:10.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion, rejoining that the proposed Complaint-in-Intervention is “untimely, prejudicial, and beyond the scope of this litigation.” (Opp’n 6:12-13.) Plaintiff argues:

Moving Party has failed to provide an adequate explanation for why it waited more than two years after Bar Transport’s corporate suspension to file a motion to intervene and only after Plaintiff advised that she would file a spoliation motion against Bar Transport for complete and intentional destruction of evidence.

Further, moving party cannot intervene into the place and instead of its own insured when Plaintiff has moved to strike its answer on the grounds that it has intentionally destroyed the main piece of key evidence in the case. The current case is not a typical situation where the Defendant has defaulted and now in the insurance carrier is timely seeking to intervene to protect the interests of its insured; this is a case where the insured has intentionally destroyed key evidence, the only evidence, that the Subject Tractor Trailer was not visible to the Plaintiff on the

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evening of the accident. In addition, this is not the typical case where Defendant defaulted for failure to timely answer, in this case, Defendant Bar Transport intentionally or recklessly continued litigating this case for two years while knowing it was suspended.

(Opp’n 7:4-8:2.) Plaintiff further argues that the proposed intervention “enlarges the issues in this litigation” by alleging a reservation of rights in the proposed Complaint-in-Intervention, which also creates a conflict of intertest between Intervenor and its insured. (Opp’n at 9:6-26.)

Intervenor replies that “Plaintiff’s opposition is premised upon the unsupported assertion that [Prime] and defense counsel knowingly litigated this matter on behalf of a suspended corporation for more than two years[,]” when “the undisputed facts establish that Prime and defense counsel did not become aware of Bar Transport's suspended status until Plaintiff’s counsel raised the issue in connection with Plaintiff’s threatened motion to strike the Answer and motion for sanctions. Upon learning of the suspension issue, Prime acted promptly and diligently by filing the present motion for leave to intervene.” (Reply 2:8-16.) Intervenor further replies:

Plaintiff will suffer no cognizable prejudice if intervention is permitted. Trial is not scheduled until January 12, 2027. No trial date is imminent, and intervention will not delay the proceedings. Plaintiff has done nothing to prosecute the case other than serving some written discovery. Plaintiff has not taken a single deposition.

Rather, denying intervention would create the possibility of a substantial judgment without an adjudication on the merits and would elevate a technical corporate-status issue over California’s strong public policy favoring determination of cases on their merits.

Moreover, the issues regarding alleged spoliation and sanctions remain fully before the Court and may be litigated irrespective of intervention. Intervention does not deprive Plaintiff of any sanctions remedies it believes are available.

Plaintiff repeatedly characterizes Prime’s motion as an attempt to avoid sanctions. However, intervention simply permits

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Prime to protect its interests after learning that its insured’s corporate status may impair the defense of the action.

There is no evidence of bad faith, intentional concealment, or gamesmanship by Prime or defense counsel. To the contrary, Prime sought intervention promptly once the issue was brought to its attention.

(Reply 3:19-4:11.)

The Court agrees that intervention is appropriate under the circumstances.

Code of Civil Procedure section 387 sets forth the rules for intervention by a third party in existing litigation. “Section 387, subdivision (a) states in relevant part: ‘Upon timely application, any person, who has an interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, may intervene in the action or proceeding.’” (Reliance Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 383, 386.) Code of Civil Procedure section 387, subdivision (b) “provides that ‘if the person seeking intervention claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest, unless that person's interest is adequately represented by existing parties, the court shall, upon timely application, permit that person to intervene.’” (Ibid.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 387, the trial court has discretion to permit a nonparty to intervene where the following requirements are satisfied: (1) the proper procedures have been followed; (2) the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the action; (3) the intervention will not enlarge the issues in the litigation; and (4) the reasons for the intervention outweigh any opposition by the parties presently in the action. (Truck Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 342, 346.)

“An insurer’s right to intervene in an action against the insured, for personal injury or property damage, arises as a result of Insurance Code section 11580.” (Reliance Ins. Co., supra, at p. 386.) “Section 11580 provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability insurance covering the defendant, and obtain satisfaction of the judgment up to the amount of the policy limits. [Citation.] Thus, where the insurer may be subject to a direct action under Insurance Code section 11580 by a judgment creditor who has or will obtain a default judgment in a third party action against the insured, intervention is appropriate.” (Id. at pp. 386-387.)

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“This exposure to such direct liability has been repeatedly held sufficient to create a basis for insurer intervention in a third party action against the insured.” (Western Heritage Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1205.) “Thus, for example, insurers have been permitted to intervene when the third party has obtained a default against the insured. [Citations.] Similarly, an insurer may intervene when its insured’s corporate status has been suspended. (Reliance Ins. Co., supra, at pp. 384-387.)” (Ibid.; accord Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 694, 709 [“Because it may be sued directly under section 11580, when the corporate status of its insured has been suspended, the insurer has the right to intervene in litigation against the insured to protect its interests.”].)

Further, the Court of Appeal has held that an insurer’s reservation of rights to dispute coverage has no impact on the scope of its right to intervene as it neither creates an irreconcilable conflict between the insurer and its insured nor expands the scope of issues to be decided in the tort action. (Western Heritage Ins. Co., supra, at pp. 1212.) As the Western Heritage Insurance Company court explained, “coverage issues are simply not present in the [tort] case. [Such] issues will be litigated, if ever, in a subsequent coverage action or in an action under [Insurance Code] section 11580(b)(2).” (Ibid.)

As stated above, a party seeking to intervene must make “timely” application to the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(1).) “Timeliness is measured from ‘the date the proposed interveners knew or should have known their interests in the litigation were not being adequately represented’” (Lofton v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1013), and “is determined by the totality of the circumstances, with a focus on three primary factors: (a) the stage of the proceedings; (b) the prejudice to other parties from the delay in seeking to intervene; and (c) the reason for the delay.” (Weil & Brown, Cal.

Practice Guide: Civ. Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2026 Update) ¶ 2:438 [citing Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Lacy (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 574-576].) “Prejudice to the existing parties from the delay is the most important consideration in determining whether the motion is timely.” (Weil & Brown, supra, at ¶ 2:438; Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 485.) “This does not, however, include prejudice that would result from allowing intervention. [Citation.]

Rather, only the ‘“prejudice caused by the movant’s delay”’ should be considered.” (Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc., supra, at p. 485.) “[T]imeliness is hardly a reason to bar intervention when a direct interest is demonstrated and the real parties in interest have not shown any prejudice other than being required to prove their case.” (Truck Ins. Exchange, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 351.)

Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds that Intervenor’s motion should be

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granted. As the insurer of a suspended corporation, Intervenor should be permitted to intervene to protect its interest under Reliance and its progeny. Intervenor’s reservation of its rights to dispute coverage in the proposed Complaint-in-Intervention does not affect the scope of its right to intervene. (Western Heritage, Inc. Co., supra, at p. 1212.)

Furthermore, the Court finds that the motion was timely made. Although Plaintiff argues Intervenor concealed its insured’s suspended corporate status, Intervenor disputes that characterization and represents that it sought intervention promptly once the issue was brought to its attention. Also, and more importantly, there is no evidence that Plaintiff has been prejudiced by any delay in Intervenor bringing its motion. Plaintiff argues it has been prejudiced, but the claimed prejudice is from permitting intervention, not from any delay in Intervenor seeking to intervene.

Lastly, as argued by Intervenor in its reply, the issues regarding alleged spoliation and sanctions will be litigated by the Court irrespective of intervention. Plaintiff has not shown that intervention will deprive her of any sanctions remedies that she believes are available.

For the stated reasons, the motion for leave to intervene is granted.

Intervenor's Complaint-in-Intervention shall be filed upon presentation to the Clerk and payment of the requisite filing fee.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Plaintiff brings this lawsuit by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Camellia Cabigon. [2] Plaintiff’s motion for terminating sanctions is attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of Raymond D. McElfish filed in support of Plaintiff’s opposition to the instant motion.

*** This case has been assigned to Department 17A for hearing. In the event that either party requests a hearing the matter will be heard at 9:30 a.m. in Department 17A. Any party requesting an oral argument must contact the clerk at (916) 874-5487 and opposing counsel or parties in pro per by 12:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing. If a proper request for hearing is not made,

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this shall become the order of the Court.

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If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. ***