Motion to Compel
to amend. Any first amended complaint was therefore due on 4/16/26. No first amended complaint has been filed.
For this reason, the motion is GRANTED.
The court notes that the original notice of motion was made on behalf of “Defendant CITY OF ANAHEIM”, which was later corrected via a Notice of Errata filed on 7/7/26 to reflect the true name of the defendant, ANAHEIM POLICE DEPARTMENT – i.e., the only named defendant in this action. The successful demurrer was made by Anaheim Police Department and the current moving papers was filed by the Anaheim City Attorney’s Office, which represents the successful demurring party.
Moving Defendant to give notice.
2. CMC
In light of the above ruling, the court VACATES the Case Management Conference.
13 Sosa vs. Cornejo Motion to Compel (re Requests for Admission)
The court DENIES in part, and GRANTS in part, Plaintiff BENITO GONZALEZ SOSA’s motion to have Requests for Admission Deemed Admitted.
The request to deem Defendant to have admitted Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission appears to be MOOT. Both sides appear to agree that untimely responses have been served. The court generally does not grant a motion to deem requests admitted where a party serves a response in substantial compliance before the hearing. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2033.280.)
The request to deem requests admitted is therefore DENIED.
The motion however is not moot as to the issue of monetary sanctions. Section 2033.280(c) states, “It is mandatory that the court impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) on the party or attorney, or both, whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated this motion.”
Here, Plaintiff requests $1,885.00 in monetary sanctions against Defendant JOSE CORNEJO.
The amount requested appears excessive in light of the circumstances. The court awards a total of $1,185.00 (representing 2.5 hours at $450/hour plus $60 filing fee). Defendant Jose Cornejo to pay Plaintiff a total of $1,185.00 within 60 days.
Plaintiff to give notice.
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
Plaintiff alleges she fell on the stairs at a property in Laguna Hills and that Defendants Airbnb, Inc. and Tatiana Taleb negligently owned, maintained, managed, or operated the premises. (ROA 2.)
Defendant proffers evidence that Plaintiff agreed to Defendant’s Terms of Service before creating an Airbnb account and booking accommodation through Defendant. (Anderson Decl., ¶¶ 3-6; 15-24.) The Terms of Service Version 13 contain the following arbitration provision:
23.4 Agreement to Arbitrate. You and Airbnb mutually agree that any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to these Terms or the applicability, breach, termination, validity, enforcement or interpretation thereof, or any use of the Airbnb Platform, Host Services, or any Content (collectively, “Disputes”) will be
settled by binding individual arbitration (the “Arbitration Agreement”). If there is a dispute about whether this Arbitration Agreement can be enforced or applies to our Dispute, you and Airbnb agree that the arbitrator will decide that issue. ... 23.6 Arbitration Rules and Governing Law. This Arbitration Agreement evidences a transaction in interstate commerce and the Federal Arbitration Act governs all substantive and procedural interpretation and enforcement of this provision.
(Anderson Decl., Exh. K.)
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), which includes both procedural and substantive provisions, governs agreements involving interstate commerce. The FAA applies here because the Terms of Service expressly state that the FAA applies. (See, e.g., Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355.)
The FAA states that written arbitration agreements ”shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” (9 U.S.C. § 2.) On a motion to compel arbitration, the court’s role is limited to deciding: “(1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the agreement covers the dispute.” (Brennan v. Opus Bank (9th Cir. 2015) 796 F.3d 1125, 1130.) If these conditions are satisfied, the court is without discretion to deny the motion and must compel arbitration. (9 U.S.C. § 4; Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985) 470 U.S. 213, 218 [“By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration.”].)
“‘[P]arties may agree to have an arbitrator decide not only the merits of a particular dispute but also ““gateway’ questions of ‘arbitrability,’ such as whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate or whether their agreement covers a particular controversy.”' [Citation.] But ‘[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is “clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]”
25