Park Newport LP vs. Anderson

Procedure § 1170(a), the Defendant needs to file a motion to quash service of summons, a motion to strike, a demurrer to the complaint, or an answer.

The Defendant is to file a responsive pleading consistent with California Code of Civil Procedure § 1170 (a) within 5 calendar days of receiving notice of the Court’s ruling.

The Court Clerk is to provide notice of the Court’s ruling. 11 30-2026-01585175 The Court has read and considered the Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service Park Newport LP vs. (ROA 10). Anderson The Court takes Judicial Notice of the Answer to the Complaint (ROA 7) and Application to Serve Summons by Posting (ROA 16).

Plaintiff has not asserted proper service of the Summons and Complaint, in ROA 16 in the Declaration of Diligence the process server indicates leaving a courtesy copy at the premises on July 22, 2026.

The Motion to Quash Service is granted; Plaintiff is ordered to re-serve notice on Uniah Anderson.

The Court Clerk is to provide notice of the Court’s ruling. 14 30-2026-01542411 The Court has read and considered the Defendant’s Motion to Quash Soad Khalil, Trustee Subpoena and Request for Monetary Sanctions (ROA 139), Plaintiff’s vs. Brown Opposition (ROA 127), Declaration of Craig P. Fagan (ROA 133) and Reply to Opposition (ROA 143).

In 1988, the 6th District Court of Appeal quoted a previous decision of the 8th District regarding the issue of deposing opposing counsel: “Taking the deposition of opposing counsel not only disrupts the adversarial system and lowers the standard of the profession, but it also adds to the already burdensome time and costs of litigation. It is not hard to imagine additional pretrial delays to resolve work-product and attorney-client objections, as well as delays to resolve collateral issues raised by the attorney's testimony.

Finally, the practice of deposing opposing counsel detracts from the quality of client representation. Counsel should be free to devote his or her time and efforts to preparing the client's case without fear of being interrogated by his or her opponent. Moreover, the 'chilling effect' that such practice will have on the truthful communications from the client to the attorney is obvious. [para.] We do not hold that opposing trial counsel is absolutely immune from being deposed. We recognize that circumstances may arise in which the court should order the taking of opposing counsel's deposition.

But those circumstances should be limited to where the party seeking to take the deposition has shown that (1) no other means exist to obtain the information than to depose opposing counsel, [citation]; (2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the case. (Shelton v. American Motors Corp. (8th Cir. 1986) 805 F.2d 1323, 1327.)” (