Motion to Dismiss
Defendants’ Responses to Special Interrogatories and Request For Production of Documents.
IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Motion For Order Establishing Admission for Defendants Alan Boyer and Franiaz Mostafavi to Requests for Admission (Set One) be and hereby is granted and that the truth of all specified matters, and the genuineness of all specified documents, in the First Set of Requests for Admissions, propounded by Plaintiff and served on Defendants on June 26, 2026, be deemed admitted.
The Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants’ Responses to Special Interrogatories and Request For Production of Documents is GRANTED. Defendant is hereby ordered to serve full and complete verified responses, without objection to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents, within 5 days of service of notice hereto. Defendant is hereby ordered to serve full and complete verified responses, without objection to Special Interrogatories, within 5 days of service of notice hereto.
The Court orders the Defendants, Alan Doyer and Farinaz Mostafavi, forthwith to pay sanctions in the amount of $640 to the Plaintiff. This sum shall be made payable to "Jackson Tidus, A Law Corporation" within 5 business days and shall be delivered to 2030 Main Street, Suite 1500, Irvine, CA 92614.
The Plaintiff is ordered to provide notice of this Court’s order. 9 30-2026-01569647 The Court has read and considered the Defendant’s Motion for Temporary Due Tran, Trustee of Stay of Execution for Writ of Possession Pending Hearing on Verified the MDRLL Trust vs. Petition for Relief from Forfeiture (CCP section 1179) and Plaintiff’s Bintliff Opposition.
The Court takes Judicial Notice of the 7/13/2026 Minute Order and the 6/23/2026 Minute Order.
This matter was set for a Court Trial on 6/23/2026 in which the Defendant did not appear. After reviewing the evidence presented, the Court found judgment for the Plaintiff. On 7/13/2026 the Court denied the Defendant’s Ex Pare Application for Stay of Execution of Judgment.
The Court finds that the Defendant failed to meet it’s burden under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1179. Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
The Court Clerk is to notify the Orange County Sheriff’s Department to proceed with the lockout.
The Plaintiff is to provide notice of the Court’s ruling. 10 30-2026-01570309 The Court has read and considered the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Mycorn vs. Velasquez Unlawful Detainer Or In the Alternative, for Relief from Forfeiture and Grace Time to Vacate (ROA 7) and Plaintiff’s Opposition (ROA 21).
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
The Court DENIES the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. A Motion to Dismiss is an improper responsive pleading after being served with a complaint regarding an unlawful detainer. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1170(a), the Defendant needs to file a motion to quash service of summons, a motion to strike, a demurrer to the complaint, or an answer.
The Defendant is to file a responsive pleading consistent with California Code of Civil Procedure § 1170 (a) within 5 calendar days of receiving notice of the Court’s ruling.
The Court Clerk is to provide notice of the Court’s ruling. 11 30-2026-01585175 The Court has read and considered the Defendant’s Motion to Quash Service Park Newport LP vs. (ROA 10). Anderson The Court takes Judicial Notice of the Answer to the Complaint (ROA 7) and Application to Serve Summons by Posting (ROA 16).
Plaintiff has not asserted proper service of the Summons and Complaint, in ROA 16 in the Declaration of Diligence the process server indicates leaving a courtesy copy at the premises on July 22, 2026.
The Motion to Quash Service is granted; Plaintiff is ordered to re-serve notice on Uniah Anderson.
The Court Clerk is to provide notice of the Court’s ruling. 14 30-2026-01542411 The Court has read and considered the Defendant’s Motion to Quash Soad Khalil, Trustee Subpoena and Request for Monetary Sanctions (ROA 139), Plaintiff’s vs. Brown Opposition (ROA 127), Declaration of Craig P. Fagan (ROA 133) and Reply to Opposition (ROA 143).
In 1988, the 6th District Court of Appeal quoted a previous decision of the 8th District regarding the issue of deposing opposing counsel: “Taking the deposition of opposing counsel not only disrupts the adversarial system and lowers the standard of the profession, but it also adds to the already burdensome time and costs of litigation. It is not hard to imagine additional pretrial delays to resolve work-product and attorney-client objections, as well as delays to resolve collateral issues raised by the attorney's testimony.
Finally, the practice of deposing opposing counsel detracts from the quality of client representation. Counsel should be free to devote his or her time and efforts to preparing the client's case without fear of being interrogated by his or her opponent. Moreover, the 'chilling effect' that such practice will have on the truthful communications from the client to the attorney is obvious. [para.] We do not hold that opposing trial counsel is absolutely immune from being deposed. We recognize that circumstances may arise in which the court should order the taking of opposing counsel's deposition.
But those circumstances should be limited to where the party seeking to take the deposition has shown that (1) no other means exist to obtain the information than to depose opposing counsel, [citation]; (2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the case. (Shelton v. American Motors Corp. (8th Cir. 1986) 805 F.2d 1323, 1327.)” (Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1487, 1494-1495.)
Here, Plaintiff’s counsel is seeking to have the Defendant’s counsel testify as to an email in which the only people on the email are both counsel for the