N G vs Milpitas Aquatic Club et al

In or around early 2021, SafeSport investigated a complaint against Daly for having watched a minor female athlete in the shower. (FAC, ¶ 24.) The matter was closed within a month without any material discipline. (Ibid.)

In December 2023, Plaintiff disclosed to her college swimming coach Matthew Crawford (“Crawford”) that Daly had sexually harassed her. (FAC, ¶ 67.) Crawford reported the harassment to Swim Defendants and the San Jose Police Department contacted Plaintiff regarding her report. (FAC, ¶¶ 71, 73.) In April 2024, a representative from SafeSport informed Plaintiff that the case would be forwarded to the Investigations Unit, but that SafeSport could not act until Daly was criminally charged. (FAC, ¶ 86.)

SafeSport told Plaintiff that if Daly was not charged or was acquitted, it would conduct its own investigation. (Ibid.) The San Jose Police Department arrested Daly after conducting their investigation. (FAC, ¶ 84.) Daly was later indicted in July 2024. (Ibid.) Months later, on or around November 15, 2024, US Swim issued a lifetime ban against Daly, permanently revoking Daly’s membership and/or declaring Daly permanently ineligible for membership. (FAC, ¶ 87.) Plaintiff alleges causes of action for (1) sexual harassment, (2) negligence, (3) negligent hiring, retention and supervision, (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) invasion of privacy, and (7) unfair business practices against Daly,1 Milpitas Aquatic Club, Pacific Swimming, USA Swimming, and Does 1 through 20.

Plaintiff also asserts a cause of action against Defendants Milpitas Aquatic Club, Pacific Swimming, USA Swimming, and Does 1 through 20 for negligent hiring, retention and supervision. This matter was transferred from the Superior Court of San Francisco County on August 27, 2025, and Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint on November 17, 2025. Swim Defendants demurred to Plaintiff’s FAC as a whole and specifically, to Plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, on December 30, 2025.

Swim Defendants also moved to strike punitive damages from Plaintiff’s FAC on December 30, 2025. Plaintiff opposes both the demurrer and the motion to strike. Defendants filed replies to both oppositions. II. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE In support of their demurrer and motion to strike, Swim Defendants request judicial notice of the following documents: (1) Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, (2) “SafeSport Code for the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Movement Effective July 1, 2024,” (3) “Noteworthy Revisions 2024 SafeSport Code for the U.S.

Olympic and Paralympic Movement,” (4) “Confidentiality and Protective Order Pursuant to Stipulation By the Parties entered on October 5, 2025,” and (5) “36 U.S.C. §220541 - Designation of United States Center for SafeSport.” (Request for Judicial Notice, p. 2:8-24.) Plaintiff opposes. The court GRANTS Swim Defendants’ request for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint but notes that the request is unnecessary where, as here, the court is required to consider the contents of the plaintiff’s complaint in ruling on a demurrer. (Evid.

Code, § 452, subd. (d); Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) Defendants seek judicial notice of “SafeSport Code for the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Movement Effective July 1, 2024” and “Noteworthy Revisions 2024 SafeSport Code for the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Movement” under Evidence Code section 452 subdivision (b). Plaintiff objects on the basis that the contents of a

1 The third cause of action for negligent hiring, retention and supervision is asserted only against Defendants Milpitas

Aquatic Club, Pacific Swimming, USA Swimming, and Does 1 through 20.

document or piece of evidence cannot be judicially noticed at the demurrer phase, the document sought is irrelevant and would be more prejudicial than probative. “[T]he truth of statements contained in the document and its proper interpretation are not subject to judicial notice if those matters are reasonably disputable[.]” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp., (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113.) However, section 220541 of Title 36 of the United States Code delegates to SafeSport the responsibility to “develop training, oversight practices, policies, and procedures to prevent the abuse...of amateur athletes,” and establishes that those policies and procedures “shall apply as though they were incorporated in and made a part of section 220524 of this title.” (36 U.S.C. § 220541(a)(1)(C), (b).)

Federal public statutory law is a required subject of judicial notice, and here, federal public statutory law explicitly incorporates the SafeSport regulations Defendants seek judicial notice of. (See Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a) [requiring judicial notice of federal statutory law].) However, the “Noteworthy Revisions” document is a summary document that does not itself establish policies and procedures but rather purports to summarize revisions made to the code effective July 1, 2024 and provide accompanying rationale for those changes.

The “Noteworthy Revisions” document is not a proper subject for judicial notice because its contents are reasonably subject to dispute. The court DENIES Defendants’ request for judicial notice of “Noteworthy Revisions 2024 SafeSport Code for the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Movement.” The court also notes Plaintiff’s argument that the documents are irrelevant because both are largely outside the relevant time period; however, July through November 2024 covers the time between Daly’s arrest and Swim Defendants’ ban of Daly and is thus relevant to Plaintiff’s allegations. (FAC, ¶¶ 99, 100.)

The court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of “SafeSport Code for the U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Movement Effective July 1, 2024.” Defendants seek judicial notice of “Confidentiality and Protective Order Pursuant to Stipulation By the Parties entered on October 5, 2025” to prove “Plaintiff is only aware of this prior complaint pursuant to a prior protective order entered by this Court on October 5, 2025.” (Demurrer, p. 12, fn. 1.) Plaintiff objects on the basis that the request falls outside the scope of proper use of requests for judicial notice and would be more prejudicial than probative.

The court denies Defendants’ request for judicial notice because Plaintiff’s knowledge of the 2021 incident is not relevant to the outcome of this demurrer. The court DENIES the request for judicial notice of “Confidentiality and Protective Order Pursuant to Stipulation by the Parties entered on October 5, 2025.” (See Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 722, 745 [authority to take judicial notice subject to the limitation that the proffered evidence be relevant].) Finally, Defendants seek judicial notice of “36 U.S.C. §220541 - Designation of United States Center for SafeSport.”

The court GRANTS Defendants’ request for judicial notice of this code section. (See Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a) [requiring judicial notice of federal statutory law].) III. DEMURRER A.

Legal Standard

The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading. (Trs. Of Capital Wholesale Elec. Etc. Fund v. Shearson Lehman Bros. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 617, 621.) Consequently, “[a] demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.” (Mathews v.

Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 762, internal citations and quotations omitted; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s conduct. ... Thus, ... the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be.” (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958, internal citations and quotations omitted. In ruling on a demurrer, the allegations of the complaint must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Glennen v.

Allergan, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1, 6.) Nevertheless, while “[a] demurrer admits all facts properly pleaded, [it does] not [admit] contentions, deductions or conclusions of law or fact.” (George v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120.) B. Discussion i. Demurrer on Grounds that Swim Defendants Had No Ability to Investigate Daly Due to SafeSport’s Exclusive Jurisdiction Swim Defendants demur to the FAC as a whole on the basis that Plaintiff cannot establish their liability for Daly’s conduct or negligence in failing to take action earlier “because Swim Defendants were legally forbidden by the federal government from interfering or influencing while the Center was conducting its investigation.” (Demurrer, p. 11:9-12.)

Plaintiff alleges that Swim Defendants knew Daly made offensive sexual comments about female swimmers, hugged female athletes inappropriately, and that he had been investigated in 2018 for watching a minor female in the shower, and that Swim Defendants failed to investigate, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline Daly. (FAC, ¶ 96.) Plaintiff further alleges that Swim Defendants failed to pursue any interim discipline during the SafeSport investigation, and their eventual disciplinary action was unjustifiably delayed. (FAC, ¶¶ 98-100.)

Defendants state that under federal law, only SafeSport has jurisdiction to investigate claims of sexual misconduct, and national governing bodies like Swim Defendants are barred from interfering with or influencing SafeSport investigations. (Demurrer, p. 10:26-28.) “Swim Defendants contend that 36 U.S.C. §220541(f)(4)(A) barred their ability to ban, discipline, or otherwise take any action against Daly, the alleged perpetrator coach, until at least the Center revised its Code in July 2024.” (Demurrer, p. 4:23-25.)

Section 220541 of Title 36 of the United States Code establishes SafeSport as an independent national safe sport organization with the jurisdiction over each national governing body to investigate and resolve abuse allegations. (36 U.S.C. § 220541(a)(1).) “The corporation and the national governing bodies shall not interfere in, or attempt to influence the outcome of, an investigation.” (36 U.S.C. § 220541(f)(4)(A).) However, federal law does not preclude Swim Defendants from pursuing interim discipline prior to SafeSport investigation. “Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the ability of a national governing body to impose an interim measure to prevent an individual who is the subject of an allegation of sexual abuse from interacting with an amateur athlete prior to [SafeSport]exercising its jurisdiction over a matter.” (36 U.S.C. § 220542(b).)

Defendants do not cite any precedential authority establishing that the above code section prevented them from pursuing any action against Daly. The statute establishes that Defendants were barred from interfering with or attempting to influence the outcome of SafeSport’s investigation of Daly, but not that Defendants were

explicitly prohibited by statute from taking disciplinary action against Daly while SafeSport investigated. The statute gives SafeSport the power to “impos[e] interim measures or sanctions on an individual before an opportunity for a hearing or arbitration,” but does not make this power exclusive or state that only SafeSport can impose interim measures during an investigation. (36 U.S.C. § 220541(a)(2)(A).) Additionally, as stated above, the statute expressly gives national governing bodies the authority to impose interim protective measures prior to SafeSport’s exercise of jurisdiction. (36 U.S.C. § 220542(b).)

The statute does not define the meaning of “prior to ... exercise of jurisdiction,” and the phrase could mean assumption of jurisdiction through initiating investigation or it could mean exercise of jurisdiction through issuing a ruling. In sum, the language of the statute is ambiguous as to Defendants’ ability to take disciplinary action and does not clearly prohibit Defendants from banning, discipling, or otherwise taking any action against Daly as they claim. Defendants further claim that “[i]t wasn’t until a rule change in the SafeSport Code in July 2024 that national governing bodies like USA Swimming could enact disciplinary measures while a SafeSport investigation was ongoing.” (Demurrer, p. 11:1- 2.)

The FAC alleges that Defendants learned of Daly’s abuse of Plaintiff in late 2023 and that Defendants failed to take action until November 2024. (FAC, ¶¶ 71, 73, 87.) Defendants evidently concede that they were not prohibited from enacting disciplinary measures against Daly between July 2024 through November 2024. Even if Defendants were correct that they were prohibited from taking action until July 2024, the FAC’s allegations include the time period between July 2024 and November 2024. A demurrer cannot be used to attack a portion of a cause of action. (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v.

Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 274.) Thus, the court cannot sustain Defendants’ demurrer on the basis that they were prohibited from acting based on SafeSport Code revisions effective July 2024. Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC on the grounds that Swim Defendants could not investigate or take action under federal law is OVERRULED.

ii. Demurrer on Grounds that FAC Fails to Allege that USA Swimming and Pacific Swimming Knew or Should Have Known About Daly’s Harassment Prior to 2024

Swim Defendants demur to the FAC as a whole on the basis that Plaintiff fails to allege that Swim Defendants “actually knew about the harassing messages, at least until Coach Crawford allegedly reported the incident in December 2023,” and that “Swim Defendants never had an opportunity to discover the harassment until Coach Crawford got involved in December 2023.” (Demurrer, p. 11:19-21, 23-25.) A demurrer cannot be used to attack a portion of a cause of action. (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v.

Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 274.) As mentioned above, the FAC alleges that Defendants learned of Daly’s abuse of Plaintiff in late 2023 and that Defendants failed to take action until November 2024. (FAC, ¶¶ 71, 73, 87.) Defendants’ demurrer thus only attacks a portion of Plaintiff’s causes of action, as the FAC includes allegations about Defendants’ conduct in 2024.

Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC on the grounds that the FAC fails to allege that Swim Defendants knew about Daly’s harassment prior to 2024 is OVERRULED. iii. Demurrer to Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress In the alternative, Defendants defer to the FAC’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and argue that the FAC does not allege extreme or outrageous conduct. (Demurrer, pp. 13:5-27, 14:1-6.) The FAC alleges that Swim Defendants’ knowledge and indifference to Daly’s sexual harassment of Plaintiff, as well as conduct of negligently supervising Daly and putting him in positions of authority, was “oppressive, malicious, and despicable in that it was intentional and done in conscious disregard of [Plaintiff’s] rights and safety.” (FAC, ¶¶ 170-172, 175.)

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must show: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 833.) “In order to avoid a demurrer, the plaintiff must allege with great specificity the acts which he or she believes are so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Ibid., internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) “If properly pled, a claim of sexual harassment can establish the outrageous behavior element of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” (Haberman v.

Cengage Learning, Inc. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 365, 389, internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) Here, the FAC alleges a cause of action for sexual harassment which Swim Defendants do not demur to, thus sufficiently alleging that Swim Defendants’ conduct was outrageous. Swim Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC is OVERRULED in its entirety. IV. MOTION TO STRIKE A.

Legal Standard

A court may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter asserted in a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) A court may also strike out all or any part of a pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of the State of California. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).) The grounds for a motion to strike shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437, subd. (a).) The court’s decision to strike the petition pursuant to section 436 is discretionary. (See Code Civ.

Proc., § 436 [“The court may . . . strike”].) B. Punitive Damages Swim Defendants move to strike punitive damages from Plaintiff’s FAC because the FAC “fails to support the claim that the Swim Defendants had advanced knowledge of the alleged abuse and/or that the Swim Defendants ratified Daly’s conduct,” and Swim Defendants did not act with oppression, fraud or malice as required by Civil Code section 3294. (Motion to Strike, p. 4:5-6.)

Civil Code section 3294 subdivision (b) states that an employer cannot be liable for punitive damages for the actions of an employee unless “the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).) “With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Ibid.)

Claims for punitive damages cannot rely on entirely conclusory allegations and must be supported by facts. (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 168 [striking punitive damages request from a complaint that failed to sufficiently allege corporate defendant’s advance knowledge, authorization, or ratification].) Here, the FAC alleges that Daly was a co-owner of Milpitas Aquatic Club, and was an employee, and/or agent of Swim Defendants, and/or was under their complete control and/or direct supervision. (FAC, ¶¶ 3, 11, 12.)

The FAC further alleges that Swim Defendants knew Daly made offensive sexual comments about female swimmers, hugged female athletes inappropriately, and that he had been investigated in 2018 for watching a minor female in the shower, and that Swim Defendants failed to investigate, remove, suspend, or otherwise prevent Daly from continuing to coach female athletes. (FAC, ¶¶ 28, 96.) In addition, the FAC alleges that Swim Defendants allowed Daly to coach and serve in supervisory positions in 2024 while Daly was actively being investigated. (FAC, ¶¶ 99-101.)

This is sufficient to allege that Swim Defendants acted with conscious disregard for the safety of female athletes being coached by Daly. (See Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1159 [employer who had advance knowledge that an employee was likely to sexually harass other employees and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent that employee’s misconduct had exhibited conscious disregard for the rights and safety of others giving rise to punitive damages].)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot prove ratification because Swim Defendants banned Daly for life and were barred from acting or unable to act any earlier. (Demurrer, pp. 10:27-28, 11:8-16.) “[R]atification generally occurs where, under the particular circumstances, the employer demonstrates an intent to adopt or approve oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious behavior by an employee in the performance of his job duties. The issue commonly arises where the employer or its managing agent is charged with failing to intercede in a known pattern of workplace abuse, or failing to investigate or discipline the errant employee once such misconduct became known.” (College Hospital Inc. v.

Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 726.) Here, the FAC alleges that Swim Defendants allowed Daly to coach and serve in supervisory positions in 2024 when Swim Defendants knew that Daly was being investigated for sexual misconduct. (FAC, ¶¶ 99-101.) Thus, the FAC alleges that Swim Defendants knew about Daly’s improper conduct and failed to intercede or discipline him. Civil Code section 3294 subdivision (c)(1) defines “malice” as “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ.

Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) Defendant argues that it could not have

acted with malice because it banned Daly for life, and the “delay was due to [SafeSport]’s investigation, which was outside of Swim Defendants’ control. Such delay was not a conscious disregard – moreover, it was neither malicious, fraudulent or oppressive. At most, it was negligence, which cannot sustain a claim for punitive damages.” (Motion to Strike, p. 8:13-17.) As described above, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that Defendants acted with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.

Plaintiff is not required to plead that Swim Defendants’ conduct was willful or that an agent of Swim Defendants was personally guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (See Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137 [“California’s punitive damages statute, Civil Code section 3294, states the general rule that punitive damages may be awarded only upon a showing that the defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. Subdivision (b), however, governs awards of punitive damages against employers, and permits an award for the conduct described there without an additional finding that the employer engaged in oppression, fraud or malice.”].)

Accordingly, the motion to strike punitive damages is DENIED. V. CONCLUSION Swim Defendants’ demurrer to Plaintiff’s FAC is OVERRULED in its entirety. Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: July 31, 2026

Hon. Panteha E. Saban Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara

Line 3 Case Name: Jenna Garrett et al vs Ford Motor Company et al