JANE RNW DOE v. REDLANDS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.

its final ruling.

II. APPLICABLE LAW A litigant’s attorney may withdraw from representation at any time before or after

judgment or final determination either with the client’s consent or by court order after notice to

the client. (Code Civ. Proc., § 284.)

California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.16 provides various situations in which a

lawyer “shall withdraw from the representation of a client” and “may withdraw from

representing a client.” (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.16(a), (b).) As relevant here, a lawyer may

withdraw from client representation if “the client by other conduct renders it unreasonably

difficult for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively.” (Rules Prof. Conduct, rule

1.16(b)(4).)

“The determination whether to grant or deny a motion to withdraw as counsel lies within

the sound discretion of the trial court.” (Manfredi & Levine v. Super. Ct. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th

1128, 1133 (Manfredi).) “Where issues of confidentiality prevent ‘counsel from further

disclosure and the court [accepts] the good faith of counsel’s representations, the court should

find the conflict sufficiently established and permit withdrawal.’” (Id., at p. 1133.)

Conflicts of interest come in all shapes and sizes. (Aceves v. Super. Ct. (1996) 51

Cal.App.4th 584, 590 (Aceves).) One circumstance giving rise to a conflict is where there has

been an irreparable breakdown of the working relationship between counsel and client.

(Manfredi, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1134-35.)

III. WHY THE COURT IS GRANTING THE MOTION

Counsel Stewart moves to be relieved as Plaintiff’s counsel because “there has been a

breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and communication between Plaintiff and counsel,

such that counsel is unable to continue to represent Plaintiff.” (Stewart Decl., ¶ 4.) Stewart also

states in his initial supporting declaration that there “have been persistent and ongoing

deficiencies in mutual trust, candid and timely communications, and alignment with respect to

legal strategy between counsel and Plaintiff such that continued representation has been rendered

unreasonably difficult and adverse to Plaintiff’s best interests.” (Stewart Decl., ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff opposes the motion; her filing states she is “In Pro Per.” Plaintiff provides a

variety of arguments against withdrawal: because the case is in a procedurally critical stage with

a pending summary judgment motion (MSJ) and trial less than three months away; Counsel

seeks withdrawal without any meaningful transition plan, without having prepared an opposition

to the MSJ, and without ensuring Plaintiff has sufficient time to secure replacement counsel; and

Plaintiff contends she will suffer irreparable prejudice if Counsel is permitted to withdraw.

(Plaintiff Opp., 1:17-25.)

Plaintiff further contends that Counsel seeks to withdraw because of a disagreement over

trial strategy, because Counsel has not been diligent in their representation, and intends to

abandon Plaintiff on the eve of trial. (Plaintiff Opp., 2:19-21.) Plaintiff argues the purported

breakdown in communication “amounts to little more than a disagreement about litigation

strategy and does not warrant immediate withdrawal.” (Plaintiff Opp., 3:3-4.) Plaintiff states she

is open to seeking alternate counsel and is willing to consent to withdrawal after Counsel has

discharged their obligations to her.

Plaintiff’s opposition consists of a three-page memorandum of points and authorities plus

a signature page and two-page proof of service. Plaintiff did not supply any declarations under

penalty of perjury nor any other evidence in support of her opposition. In that regard, Plaintiff

did not present any evidence that prejudice will result from the withdrawal nor any evidence

refuting the good faith of Counsel Stewart’s representations of the conflict warranting

withdrawal. Plaintiff did not present any evidence supporting the various arguments outlined

above.

When a litigant is appearing in propria persona, she is entitled to the same, but no

greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys; she is held to the same restrictive rules

of procedure as an attorney. (Nelson v. Gaunt (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 623, 638-39 (Nelson);

accord Bistawros v. Greenberg (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 189, 193 (Bistawros).) Plaintiff’s lack of

supporting evidence does not further her opposition arguments.

In terms of legal authority, some of Plaintiff’s cited cases do not stand for the

propositions she argues. For example, Plaintiff contends the court must assess whether there is

“good cause” for the attorney to withdraw and if so, whether withdrawal will result in prejudice

to the client’s case thereby denying the client a fair hearing. For these points, Plaintiff relies on

Ramirez v. Sturdevant (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 904, 915 (Ramirez) and Aceves, supra, 51

Cal.App.4th at p. 592.

The Ramirez case at page 915 does not mention the necessity of a good cause assessment.

Instead, the Ramirez court states: “We see no basis in law, or in logic, for a conclusion that an

attorney never may withdraw from a case except for cause.” (Ramirez, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at

p. 915.) However, the Ramirez court acknowledges that a lawyer violates his or her ethical

mandate by, inter alia, withdrawing at a critical point thereby prejudicing a client’s case. (Ibid.)

As such, a consideration of prejudice is part of the court’s withdrawal analysis.

Regarding Aceves, Plaintiff cites this case for the point that a trial court must consider

prejudice to the client and the stage of the proceedings when ruling on a motion to withdraw,

directing the court to pinpoint cite 592 in Aceves. However, the Aceves court at page 592 does

not discuss prejudice nor the stage of the proceedings. (Aceves, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 592.)

Next, Plaintiff cites to Manfredi for the point that a court must exercise informed

discretion and is not required to accept conclusory assertions of “good cause.” (Manfredi, supra,

66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133.) The Manfredi court at page 1133 does not mention the words

“informed discretion” and “conclusory,” but states the determination whether to grant or deny a

motion to withdraw as counsel lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. (Ibid.)

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that a withdrawal lacking good cause constitutes abandonment

of the client, relying on Ramirez, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 915. However, the Ramirez

decision does not so state; instead, the Ramirez court wrote: “[a] lawyer violates his or her

ethical mandate by abandoning a client” but does not equate lack of good cause with

abandonment. (Ibid. (emphasis in original).)

In reply, Counsel Stewart supplies a declaration providing more evidence about the

nature of the breakdown of the attorney-client relationship, apparently in response to Plaintiff’s

opposition contentions about the breakdown being limited to a trial strategy disagreement.

Normally, the general rule of motion practice holds that new evidence is not permitted with reply

papers. (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537.) However, reply declarations that

fill gaps in evidence created by an opposition are proper. (Id., at p. 1538.) Here, Counsel

Stewart’s reply declaration addresses the concerns raised in Plaintiff’s opposition and gives the

court more information concerning the nature of the claimed attorney-client communication

breakdown that supports the motion to be relieved as counsel.

“The trial court still has a duty to explore the conflict, and counsel has a corresponding

duty to respond, and to describe the general nature, as fully as possible but within the confines of

privilege.” (Aceves, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at pp. 592-593.) The Court exercises discretion to

consider Counsel’s reply brief including its declaration.

The reply declaration from Counsel Stewart, together with the separate declaration from

Counsel Baker, make clear that they should be allowed to withdraw from this representation. The

uncontradicted evidence establishes that the relationship between Counsel and Plaintiff “has

suffered a foundational collapse of trust and cooperation.” (Stewart Reply Decl., ¶ 3.) Stewart

elaborates: “Following Plaintiff’s deposition in this matter on February 13, 2026, there has been

a substantial lack of my trust in Plaintiff, candid and timely responses by Plaintiff to my

communications, and sufficient alignment regarding litigation decisions between myself and

Plaintiff.” (Id., ¶ 4.) Stewart states he “can no longer rely on or trust Plaintiff’s representations or

cooperation in this matter” and this development prevents him and his firm from opposing

dispositive motions, advancing positions opposing the District’s MSJ, and preparing for trial.

(Id., at ¶ 7.)

Stewart attests that his firm has made diligent efforts to obtain a continuance for Plaintiff

regarding the MSJ deadlines and the trial date; his firm drafted a stipulation for continuance (to

which District expressed interest in agreeing) but Plaintiff has not given authority to seek a

continuance on her behalf. (Stewart Reply Decl., ¶ 8.) Following Plaintiff’s February 13, 2026,

deposition, Stewart states the attorney-client relationship between himself and Plaintiff

deteriorated to the point where he “can no longer rely on or trust Plaintiff’s representations or

cooperation.” (Id., at ¶ 5.)

This additional evidence underscores and confirms the existence of a conflict in the form

of an irreparable breakdown of the working relationship between counsel and client. (Manfredi,

supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1134-1135.) Counsel Stewart’s evidence is not conclusory; he

provides specific examples, including a time frame, of how and when the communication

breakdown occurred and how it has impacted his and his firm’s ability to represent the Plaintiff

within the bounds of their ethical duties as attorneys. There is no evidence controverting the

good faith of Counsel Stewart’s representations. “Where issues of confidentiality prevent

‘counsel from further disclosure and the court [accepts] the good faith of counsel’s

representations, the court should find the conflict sufficiently established and permit

withdrawal.’” (Manfredi, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 1133.)

With the case filed on July 22, 2022, the case is still over one year away from the five-

year statutory dismissal requirement. (Code Civ. Proc., § 583.310.) Although a jury trial is

scheduled for July 20, 2026, and District’s MSJ is set for hearing on June 4, 2026, the Court will

be inclined to continue both of these dates upon Plaintiff’s request, to allow Plaintiff time to

obtain new counsel.1 While Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of prejudice, to the extent

that any prejudice may exist, the court’s ability to continue the MSJ and trial dates mitigates such

prejudice. Plaintiff acknowledges she is open to seeking alternate counsel.

IV. CONCLUSION

Counsel Stewart and Manly, Stewart & Finaldi’s motion to be relieved as counsel is

GRANTED, effective upon filing a proof of service with the court reflecting service upon

Plaintiff of the court’s order on this motion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [TENTATIVE – NOT FINAL] Hon. Joseph B. Widman Judge of the Superior Court

1 The Court intends to schedule the MSJ hearing at least 30 days before any continued trial date. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(3).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO

JORGE ALBERTO ESPARZA, Case No.: CIVSB2502290 Plaintiff, [TENTATIVE] ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON v. THE PLEADINGS FILED BY DEFENDANT MERCEDES-BENZ MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, ET AL., OF ONTARIO Defendants.

V. INTRODUCTION

This is a lemon law action. On January 22, 2025, Plaintiff Jorge Alberto Esparza

(Plaintiff) filed a Complaint alleging the following causes of action against Defendants

Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (Mercedes), and Jones Ontario Acquisition, LLC dba Mercedes-Benz

of Ontario (Jones Ontario): (1) violation of Song-Beverly Act - breach of express warranty

(against Mercedes only); (2) violation of Song-Beverly Act - breach of implied warranty (against

Mercedes only); (3) violation of Song-Beverly Act – Civil Code section 1793.2; and (4)

negligent repair (against Jones Ontario only). Defendants answered.