McRae v. Triton Global Services, Inc., et al

During the course of his employment, he alleges that he was subjected to discriminatory and harassing behavior directed at him on account of his disability, sexual orientation, and religious beliefs. More specifically, he alleges that Boulware would listen to sermons on the radio that would play sermons, preaching that homosexuals were possessed by demons, and that he was micromanaged and bullied. He further asserts that, after reporting the behavior, the response was ineffectual, and that he was told that he needed to stop mistreating Boulware.

Further, on July 8, 2021, he was given a performance review that indicated that he was distracted – a comment he felt attacked his ADHD. Ultimately, on July 26, 2021, he was asked whether he took pictures of Boulware, which he admitted he did to validate his complaints. He was thereafter suspended indefinitely and eventually his employment was terminated on August 3, 2021, following a purported investigation.

Plaintiff filed this instant suit on April 21, 2025. On May 27, 2025, he filed this instant First Amended Complaint, alleging 24 causes of action for (1) disability discrimination; (2) disability harassment; (3) failure to accommodate; (4) failure to engage in the interactive process; (5) religious discrimination; (6) religious harassment; (7) failure to accommodate religious practice; (8) failure to engage in the interactive process to accommodate religious practice; (9) gender-based discrimination; (10) race discrimination; (11) orientation discrimination; (12) civil rights violations; (13) failure to prevent, correct, and remedy discrimination and harassment; (14) retaliation; (15) failure to conduct a proper workplace investigation; (16) failure to page wages; (17) failure to provide meal/ rest breaks; (18) failure to provide itemized and accurate wage statements; (19) waiting time penalties; (20) failure to pay accrued vacation time; (21) violation of the unfair competition law (UCL); (22) wrongful termination; (23) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (24) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

On November 14, 2025, the Court sustained, without leave to amend, Defendants’ demurrer as to the 1-10th, 12th, 15th, and 23rd-24th causes of action. Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal on January 13, 2026. This motion was originally calendared for January 15, 2026, but it was continued since the matter was stayed pending appeal. An Order dismissing the Appeal was entered on March 20, 2026.

Analysis

First, as to the untimeliness objections by Plaintiff in the reply, Section 1005(b) requires an opposition to be served at least nine court days prior to the hearing. However, Plaintiff filed a reply on the merits. Timing is generally disregarded when the opponent has an opportunity to respond. (See Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 343 [“That purpose [of the timing requirement in Section 1005(b)] is served if the party appears at the hearing, opposes the motion on the merits, and was not prejudiced in preparing an opposition by the untimely notice”]; Clark v. Stabond Corp. (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 50, 59 [“Although appellants objected to the untimely service, they also filed opposition papers and argued the motion on its merits. By doing so, appellants effectively waived any irregularity in the service”].)

Second, as to amended documents, Plaintiff is raising a new argument in his amended motion. As a preliminary matter, no amended documents were authorized or where permitted. Nonetheless, there is no evidence of any perjury or of Court bias presented to support the arguments in any event. Moreover, as discussed infra, Plaintiff is attempting to get the employee information from Defendant, and the proper method for that is by the process set forth in Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 544.

Third, as to Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff has failed to file any actual motion but simply filed a declaration, separate statement, and a document titled “motion” (without a notice of motion), the Court would find sufficient information to address the issues. While the Court could find that the criteria for motion-work under Rule 3.1113 has not been met, there is sufficient detail to show where and how discovery is purportedly lacking.

RFP1, No. 1: Troublingly, while couched as a request for production, this request seeks “[a]ll names, addresses, and phone numbers . . .” of employees. This is not a request for production, but should have been brought as an interrogatory. Furthermore, even in that light, these third-party employees have a right to privacy and are typically provided after following the Belaire-West procedure. The Court would deny.

RFP1, No. 2: This seeks all “Asure Time & Attendance” clock records for Plaintiff and Ms. Boulware. Preliminarily, Plaintiff’s time records were produced. Thus, at issue is Ms. Boulware’s time records. Ms. Boulware is not a party to this action. Thus, the same third-party privacy concerns relate to this request in as much. The Court would deny.

RFP1, No. 3: This seeks all “Silvertrac daily overviews” for Plaintiff, as well as third parties Barton and Boulware. Defendant asserted that it no longer uses Silvertrac but was trying to coordinate to get such documentation. Thus, Defendant instead provided the name and contact information of the “the natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.230.) This is sufficient, and therefore the Court would deny.

RFP1, No. 4: This seeks Plaintiff’s pay stubs. The request as worded is not overbroad and appears reasonably particularized. However, the response to see “Exhibit B” appears inappropriate and does not reasonably identify the responsive documents. Answers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is generally not acceptable to answer requests for production with responses such as “see my deposition” or “see financial statements.” If a question does require the responding party to make reference to a pleading or document, the pleading or document should be identified and summarized so the answer is fully responsive to the question. (See Cal. Civil Discovery Practice § 8.55; 4A Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed. 1975) § 33.25[1], pp. 33-131 to 33-132.) Thus, the Court would grant.

RFP1, No. 5: This seeks harassment training certificates for the entirety of relevant staff. Defendant objects, indicating that the request is overbroad, unduly burdensome, and harassing, as there are no allegations that the entirety of staff are at issue. Thus, the request is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant, admissible evidence. The request does not appear limited to Plaintiff or to the Defendant’s policies in place at the time he was employed. Rather, it seeks all certificates for all employees, regardless of how removed they may be from the circumstances or facts pleaded. While training is certainly relevant, the request is not sufficiently narrowly tailored. Thus, the Court would deny.

RFP1, No. 6: This request seeks signed and dated disciplinary counseling forms related to Plaintiff. Troublingly, however, it also seeks “several examples of others written against fellow . . . employees . . . .” The later request is impermissibly vague and also, again, triggers the privacy concerns related to third-party employees discussed supra. Nonetheless, the documents as related to Plaintiff should be produced without objection. Again, while Defendant directs Plaintiff to “Exhibit C”, this sort of general directive is insufficiently detailed. The Court would grant, but as to Plaintiff’s discipline only.

RFP1, No. 7: This request seeks the “name of the third-party Human Resources investigator” that was hired relevant to the case. As with request number 1, this should be couched as an interrogatory and not a request for documents. It does not seek a document, and therefore the objection that it does not seek a document that exists is appropriate. The Court would deny.

RFP1, No. 8: This seeks any “incident, police, and other reports” that involve Defendant or any of its employees from the last five years preceding the date of Plaintiff’s termination of employment. Defendant objected as vague, ambiguous, unduly burdensome and intended to harass. It further asserted privacy concerns related to third-party employees. Certainly, the “all reports” sort of request is improperly overbroad. A more tailored request could be discoverable, but the current request is overbroad. The Court would deny.

RFP1, No. 9: Finally, this request seeks all “documents, footage, photographs, emails and other materials” that was sent as evidence to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing. Defendant agreed to comply. The response appears to be complete and in compliance with Section 2031.210 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus, the Court would deny.

*** *** ***

15. McRae v. Triton Global Services, Inc., et al, Case No. CIVSB2509611 Plaintiff’s Motion to Pierce the Corporate Veil 5/13/26, 9:00 a.m., Dept. S-17 Tentative Ruling The Court would DENY.

Analysis

As a preliminary matter, rather than seeking to amend the complaint to add an alter-ego theory, Plaintiff brings a so-called “motion to piece the corporate veil.” There appears to be no authority to support that the corporate veil can be pierced by way of a noticed motion or against an unnamed Defendant. (Hennessey’s Tavern, Inc. v. Am. Air Filter Co. (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1351, 1358.)

Further, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence required for piercing the corporate veil. (Shaoxing Cnty Huayue Imp & Exp. v. Bhamik (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1189, 1198.) Generally speaking, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its stockholders, officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations. (Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal. App. 4th 399, 411. “[T]he corporate form will be disregarded only in narrowly defined circumstances and only when the ends of justice so require.” (Ibid.)

Before a corporation's obligations can be recognized as those of a particular person, the requisite unity of interest and inequitable result must be shown. “The alter ego doctrine arises when a plaintiff comes into court claiming that an opposing party is using the corporate form unjustly in derogation of the plaintiff’s interest.” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 300.) “[T]he corporate form will be disregarded only in narrowly defined circumstances and only when the ends of justice so require.” (Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal. App. 4th 486, 511 [internal citation omitted].)

In order to establish alter ego liability, a plaintiff must show “(1) such a unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that no separation actually exists and (2) an inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone.” (Leek v. Cooper, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at 417.) Here, even if the motion were proper (and it appears it is not), Plaintiff has not submitted substantial facts showing entitlement to pierce the corporate veil.

*** *** ***