Ronald L. Curd vs. Marriot International, Inc.

34-2020-00287359-CU-PO-GDS: Ronald L. Curd vs. Marriot International, Inc. 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

the hearing, the Court's does not imply any ruling pertaining to whether notice and service of the underlying motion was proper.”

Trial is currently set for September 1, 2026.

A motion for summary judgment must be served “at least 81 days before the time appointed for hearing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a)(2).) “If the notice is served by mail, the required 81-day period of notice shall be increased by 5 days if the place of address is within the State of California If the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 81-day period of notice shall be increased by two court days.” (Ibid.)

Thus, pursuant section 437c, subdivision (a)(2), the last day to serve a motion for summary judgment via mail for a July 30, 2026 hearing date was May 5, 2026. Here, however, Defendants served the motion via mail on May 6, 2026 (the same day it was filed), which is only 85 days before the hearing. This is insufficient notice because it does not provide the 81 plus 5 days of notice as required by the statute.

The trial court may not shorten the notice period absent consent from all parties. (Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 760.) Nor may insufficient notice be cured by a continuance of the hearing. (Robinson v. Woods (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267- 1268.) Thus, since Defendants did not provide sufficient notice, the motion must be DROPPED.

To the extent that Defendants argue that they gave sufficient notice because the motion papers were also email served on Plaintiff, the Court rejects such an argument.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(b) permits electronic service upon a person represented by counsel without an agreement. If the party is unrepresented, they may consent to receive electronic service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6(c).) While an unrepresented party may consent to receive electronic service, there is no indication in the record that Plaintiff has expressly consented to receive electronic service by one of the specified means listed in Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6(c)(3). Absent such consent, electronic service on a self-represented party is improper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1010.6.) Accordingly, any service via email on May 6, 2026 was defective.

While the Court need not continue, it does so to explain that even if this motion had not been dropped, it would have still been denied because Defendants failed to meet their initial burden.

The Court must first note, as a threshold matter, however, that Defendants fail to properly move summary adjudication. “The language in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00287359-CU-PO-GDS: Ronald L. Curd vs. Marriot International, Inc. 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

makes it clear that a motion for summary adjudication cannot be considered by the court unless the party bringing the motion duly gives notice that summary adjudication is being sought.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1545-1546.) “If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).) A movant’s failure to comply with the requirements of a separate statement, in the Court’s discretion, may constitute a sufficient ground for denying the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(b)(1).)

Here, Defendants titled their motion as one for “summary judgment/summary adjudication.” Defendants’ notice of motion[1] also provides the following three issues for adjudication:

1. Plaintiff cannot establish he was harmed or injured;

2. Plaintiff cannot establish Defendants breached any duty that causally related to his falling;

3. Plaintiff cannot establish that anything done or not done by Defendants played any role in causing the Incident or his alleged harms.

(Notice of Motion at 2:12-16.)

However, Defendants’ accompanying separate statement does not state any of the issues stated in its notice of motion verbatim as required. Indeed, the separate statement only contains the following two issues: (1) “Plaintiff cannot establish Defendant breached any duty” and (2) “Plaintiff cannot establish any action or inaction attributable to any Defendant caused Plaintiff Harm.” (Defendants Moving Separate Statement at 8:21-23.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the deficiencies in Defendants’ notice of motion and separate statement warrant denial of Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication and the motion, if properly served on Plaintiff with the requisite notice, would have been denied as such. Thus, all that would have remained was the motion for summary judgment. However, this too would have been denied.

In this regard, on summary judgment a moving party must meet its initial burden regardless of whether the opposing party disputes any issues of material fact. (See Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087 [moving party on summary judgment must meet his initial burden even if the motion is unopposed].) Here, Defendant has failed to adequately support UMF 28[2]. UMF 28 asserts that “Plaintiff has admitted he lied under oath in this lawsuit.” In support of this material fact, Defendants cite to its Exhibit R, which contains the Court’s April 2, 2026 Minute Order granting Defendants Motion to Deem Requests for

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00287359-CU-PO-GDS: Ronald L. Curd vs. Marriot International, Inc. 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D

Admissions Admitted, as well as to Requests for Admissions, Set Four, Nos. 106, 107, 108, 125 and 126 within Exhibit S. However, none of this evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff has admitted he lied under oath in this lawsuit as asserted in UMF 28. Rather, requests 106, 107, and 108 ask Plaintiff to admit that he is “fully and wholly to blame” for causing the “incident,” that Plaintiff knew there was water on the floor prior to the “incident,” that Plaintiff failed to take reasonable action to clear the floor, and that Plaintiff has no valid claims against any Defendant in this matter because he caused the “incident.” (Declaration of Tim Simmen [“Simmen Decl.”] at Exhibit S, RFA Nos. 106, 107, 108.)

Requests 125 and 126 ask Plaintiff to admit that defendants did not take or fail to take any action to cause or contribute to the “incident” or to Plaintiff’s alleged harms in this case. (Id., at RFA Nos. 125 and 126.) Such evidence does not establish that Plaintiff admitted he lied under oath in this lawsuit as asserted by UMF 28.

The Court notes that it is unclear why Defendants have purposefully injected this fact as constituting a material fact upon which their motion for summary judgment is based. Indeed, if Defendants believed that Plaintiff’s honesty (or lack thereof) in this proceeding was not material to its motion, Defendants should not have included UMF 28 in its motion. (See Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2) [separate statement to include “only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion”]; Beltran v.

Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 875-876 [paragraphs in separate statement should be limited to facts that address elements of cause of action or affirmative defense].) But in any event, because Defendants have purposefully included such a material fact, Defendants cannot now be heard to assert that their failure to establish such a fact is somehow inconsequential to granting summary judgment. As previously explained, under Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not. (See also, Insalaco v.

Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.) Thus, the Court finds that Defendants fail to support UMF 28 with adequate evidence and, consequently did not satisfy their initial burden with respect to this UMF. Accordingly, even if this motion was not dropped for defective service, it would still be denied. It is immaterial that Plaintiff has failed to oppose this motion as the burden never shifted to Plaintiff to create a triable issue of material fact.

As it stands, however, Defendants’ motion is DROPPED in its entirety because Defendants did not provide sufficient notice.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] The Court observes that Defendants’ notice of motion is not signed in violation of Code of

Civil Procedure section 128.7 subdivision (a).

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00287359-CU-PO-GDS: Ronald L. Curd vs. Marriot International, Inc. 07/30/2026 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 16D [2] The Court notes that UMF 28 is asserted in support of both of the two issues included in

Defendants’ separate statement. Therefore, even if Defendants had properly moved for summary adjudication of these two issues, Defendants still failed to meet their initial burden with respect to both issues.