In the Matter of: Trujillo

On February 11, 2026, the Court sustained Respondents’ demurrer and granted Respondents’ motion to strike. Petitioners were granted leave to amend to allege facts with particularity regarding the applicability of the Brown Act and violation(s) of Oakland’s Sunshine laws. (2/11/26 Order at pp. 5-6.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in a complaint. (Title Ins. Co. v. Comerica Bank-California (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 800, 807.) A court should not sustain a general demurrer unless the complaint liberally construed fails to state a cause of action on any theory. (Kramer v. Intuit Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 574, 578.) A plaintiff must plead facts as are necessary to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of her claims to provide defendant with notice of the issues sufficient to enable preparation of a defense. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 570.)

On a demurrer, the court accepts the truth of material facts properly pleaded in the operative complaint, but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 276.) Facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however improbable they may be. (Id. at p. 280, citations omitted.)

The court may strike any “irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading,” or may strike out all or any part of a pleading “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a rule of court, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Respondents’ unopposed Request for Judicial Notice, filed on January 30, 2026, is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

Respondents demur to the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action for failure to allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Respondents demur to the Second and Fourth Causes of Action for failure to adequately allege administrative exhaustion. Respondents further demur to the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action as uncertain.

Respondents separately move to strike portions of the SAP, specifically, the entirety of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action and Paragraphs E, F, and G in the Prayer for Relief.

Allegations of a Legislative Body and Local Body (First and Second Causes of Action)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV115408: IN THE MATTER OF: TRUJILLO 07/30/2026 Hearing on Demurrer TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT CRS# 485667589306 in Department 20 Respondents contend that the First and Second Causes of Action for violations of the Brown Act and the Oakland Sunshine Ordinance fail because the SAP does not identify a Brown Act “legislative body” or a Sunshine Ordinance “local body” as required to state a claim under these laws.

The Brown Act requires local legislative bodies to hold open meetings. (McKee v. Los Angeles Interagency Metropolitan Police Apprehension Crime Task Force (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 354, 358.) Government Code § 54952 sets forth numerous definitions for the term “legislative body.” (Id. at p. 362.) A legislative body includes the governing body of a local agency or any other local body created by state or federal statute. (Id., citing Govt. Code § 54952(a).)

OMC § 2.20.030(E) defines “local body” as, inter alia, (1) the Oakland City Council; (2) any board, commission, task force or committee established by the City Charter, chapter, or by motion or resolution of the City Council; (3) any advisory board, commission, or task force created by the mayor and which exists for longer than a 12-month period; and (4) any standing committee of any body specified in the earlier subsections. (RJN Exh. E.)

The SAP alleges that “one or more Respondents” are “legislative bodies,” “local bodies,” or “functioned as such.” (SAP ¶¶ 2, 15-16, 48, 89, 91, 106-107, 194.) Generally, statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity. (Covenant Card, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.) Here, however, Petitioners’ general allegations that one or more Respondents are a legislative body and/or local body are conclusory and not pled with particularity. Petitioners fail to allege specific facts that OakDOT is a local body as defined by OMC § 2.20.030(E) or a legislative body as defined in Government Code § 54952, as required to state a claim under the Brown Act and the Oakland Sunshine Ordinance.

OakDOT is a department of City staff that administers and enforces the City’s parking regulations. As a matter of law, it is neither a Brown Act “legislative body” (Gov. Code § 54952) nor a Sunshine Ordinance “local body” (OMC § 2.20.030(E)), and no amendment can make it one. Moreover, the Court’s February 11, 2026 Order specifically directed Petitioners to allege facts with particularity establishing that the Brown Act and Sunshine Ordinance apply to OakDOT. (2/11/26 Order at pp. 4-5.) Petitioners have not done so. The demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action is therefore SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to OakDOT.

The analysis differs as to the City of Oakland. Unlike OakDOT, the Oakland City Council is a “local body” under OMC § 2.20.030(E) and may constitute a “legislative body” under Government Code § 54952, and the SAP defines “Respondents” to include “any and all City affiliated staff and/or legislative bodies and ‘local bodies’ having any involvement in policy making, decision making, and/or code enforcement concerning Underhills Road.” (SAP ¶ 2.) The City Council thus may be included within Petitioners’ definition of “Respondents.”

Nonetheless, the SAP does not state a claim against the City. Petitioners’ allegations that “one or

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV115408: IN THE MATTER OF: TRUJILLO 07/30/2026 Hearing on Demurrer TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT CRS# 485667589306 in Department 20 more Respondents” are “legislative bodies” or “local bodies,” or “functioned as such,” are conclusory and do not plead with particularity the specific manner in which the City— presumably acting through the City Council—violated the Brown Act or the Sunshine Ordinance. (SAP ¶¶ 2, 15-16, 48, 89, 91, 106-107, 194.) General allegations of unspecified meetings do not suffice. Respondents’ contention that the City Council could not, as a matter of law, have participated in the parking decision (see Oakland City Charter §§ 207, 218) raises factual and characterization questions regarding what action, if any, a qualifying body took, which are not resolved on the face of the pleading and are not a proper basis to sustain without leave at this juncture.

The Court sustains the demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action as to the City of Oakland WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, for two reasons. First, unlike OakDOT, the City— through the City Council—may be a legislative body and/or local body subject to these openmeeting laws, so the defect is potentially curable. Second, while the Court’s February 11, 2026 Order directed Petitioners to plead the applicability of these laws to OakDOT, it did not contain a specific directive as to the City. Petitioners therefore cannot be said, at this juncture, to have failed to comply with a prior order as to the City. On amendment, Petitioners must plead with particularity how the City, presumably acting through the City Council or a qualifying committee, violated the Brown Act and the Oakland Sunshine Ordinance; general contentions relating to unspecified hearings or meetings will not suffice.

In sum, the demurrer to the First and Second Causes of Action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the Oakland Department of Transportation and SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the City of Oakland.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies (Second and Fourth Causes of Action)

Respondents contend that Petitioners have failed to comply with procedural requirements for bringing claims for violations of Oakland’s Sunshine Laws under the Second and Fourth Causes of Action. Where an administrative remedy is provided by statute or ordinance, relief must be sought from the administrative body and that remedy exhausted before the courts will act. (Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292; Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321.) Exhaustion of an available administrative remedy is a prerequisite to judicial relief. (Campbell, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 321.) Petitioners seek a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief, not money or damages. As such, the exhaustion requirement at issue is the administrative-review process established by the Oakland Sunshine Ordinance.

Oakland Municipal Code (“OMC”) § 2.20.270(B)(1) states, “[u]pon the conclusion of the administrative review process, as implemented pursuant to subsection (A)(3) herein, any person may institute proceedings for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce his or her rights under this chapter.” (RJN Exh. F.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV115408: IN THE MATTER OF: TRUJILLO 07/30/2026 Hearing on Demurrer TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT CRS# 485667589306 in Department 20 Subdivision (A)(3) of section 2.20.270 requires the development and maintenance of an administrative process for review and enforcement of the ordinance, which may include mediation to resolve disputes, but no administrative process is to preclude, delay, or in any way limit a person’s remedies under the Public Records Act. (Id.)

The SAP alleges that Petitioners timely requested, inter alia, mediation via letter in January and/or February 2025. (SAP ¶¶ 34-35, 102, 104-105, 129, 131-132, 142, 144-146, 165, 168-169, 188-189, 191.) Petitioners allege that the City’s Public Ethics Commission (“PEC”) responded in November 4, 2025, stating that the matter was closed, and as such, Petitioners were denied the administrative process, including mediation, leaving them with no recourse but to file this action. (SAP ¶¶ 35, 102, 105, 129, 132, 142, 145, 149, 165-166, 169, 188-189, 192.) The PEC’s response that the matter was closed permits the reasonable inference that the administrative review process had concluded, as required by OMC § 2.20.270(B)(1). As such, Petitioners adequately allege facts to establish the exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The demurrer to the Second and Fourth Causes of Action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is OVERRULED.

Improper Combination of Primary Rights (Seventh Cause of Action)

Respondents demur to the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action on the ground of uncertainty, contending that each improperly intermingles multiple primary rights. Because the Court sustains the demurrer to the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action on the merits, as set forth below, it does not reach the uncertainty ground as to those causes. The Court addresses the objection only as to the Seventh Cause of Action. Failure to state each cause of action separately is not itself a ground for demurrer; the objection is cognizable, if at all, only through the ground of uncertainty, and demurrers for uncertainty are disfavored and sustained only where the pleading is so uncertain that the responding party cannot reasonably determine what issues it must address. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.112.)

Under the primary right theory, a cause of action is comprised of a plaintiff’s primary right, a corresponding primary duty of defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty. (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681.) A primary right is indivisible; “the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action.” (Id., internal citations omitted.) A plaintiff’s primary right is distinguishable from legal theories of recovery, as well as remedies sought. (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 904.) The manner in which a plaintiff organizes his or her claims within a complaint is irrelevant to determining the causes of action alleged under the primary right theory. (Hindin v. Rust (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1257.)

The Seventh Cause of Action, brought under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a, combines within a single count two distinct primary rights: the right of access to public records under the CPRA and the Oakland Sunshine Act, and the right to open and public meetings under the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV115408: IN THE MATTER OF: TRUJILLO 07/30/2026 Hearing on Demurrer TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT CRS# 485667589306 in Department 20 Brown Act. (SAP ¶¶ 187-210.) Although the count is framed principally around the alleged withholding of public information and records, it also alleges that “Respondents who are legislative bodies met improperly, secretly, and/or via serial meeting, and failed to hold required public meetings.” (SAP ¶ 194.) These are separate primary rights, each with its own corresponding duty and alleged breach.

By combining these distinct primary rights within one count, the Seventh Cause of Action is uncertain. The open-meeting component is deficient for the same reason discussed above in connection with the First and Second Causes of Action: Petitioners do not plead with particularity a qualifying legislative body or the specific manner of any open-meeting violation.

The uncertainty is compounded by Petitioners’ pleading structure. As in the prior iterations of the pleading, Petitioners allege most of their operative facts in the first eighty-six paragraphs and then incorporate paragraphs 1-46 and 55-86 wholesale into the Seventh Cause of Action. (SAP ¶ 187.) This practice “should be avoided as it tends to cause ambiguity and creates redundancy” (Uhrich v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 598, 605 [internal quotations omitted]), and it requires the Court and the responding party to search through the preamble to determine which allegations are intended to support which claim. The Court is not required to do so.

Based upon the foregoing, the demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. On amendment, Petitioners are ORDERED to (1) allege the operative facts supporting the Seventh Cause of Action within the cause of action itself, and not by incorporating the preamble paragraphs by reference, and (2) not combine distinct primary rights—such as the right to open and public meetings and the right of access to public records— within a single cause of action. This is a directive, not a suggestion.

Illegal Expenditure of Taxpayer Funds (Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action)

Respondents further contend that even if the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action were ascertainable, they still fail for want of illegal acts required to claim waste and injury sufficient to warrant injunctive relief. A taxpayer action to enjoin the illegal expenditure or waste of public funds does not lie where the challenged governmental conduct is legal. (Lyons v. Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1502-1503.)

The SAP alleges that requiring Petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies before suing under the Sunshine Ordinance is illegal and/or unconstitutional, and therefore wastes taxpayer funds and causes irreparable injury. (SAP ¶¶ 142-151, 165-174.) The SAP alleges that requiring mediation as part of the administrative review process is illegal and unconstitutional because mediation is voluntary under C.R.C. rule 3.853, and because such a process is contrary to, and not permitted under state law and the California Constitution. (Id.)

As discussed above, the administrative-review process under OMC § 2.20.270 applies to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV115408: IN THE MATTER OF: TRUJILLO 07/30/2026 Hearing on Demurrer TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT CRS# 485667589306 in Department 20 Sunshine Ordinance complaints and, by the ordinance’s own terms, does not “preclude, delay, or in any way limit” a person’s remedies under the Brown Act or the CPRA. (OMC § 2.20.270(A)(3).) A requirement that a person request and participate in mediation before filing an administrative complaint with the PEC is a lawful administrative prerequisite. It is not facially unconstitutional, and it does not infringe upon state law or the California Constitution.

The Rules of Court regarding mediation are intended to establish the minimum standards of conduct for mediators in court-connected mediation programs for general civil cases. (C.R.C. Rule 3.850(a).) A mediator is required to inform parties that any resolution of a dispute in mediation requires voluntary agreement of the parties, and no parties may be coerced to make a decision or to continue to participate in mediation. (C.R.C. Rule 3.853.) This remains true even where a court orders a case to mediation. (Berkeley Cement, Inc v.

Regents of University of California (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141.) There is a strong public policy in the promotion of mediation as a preferable alternative to judicial proceedings in a less expensive and more expeditious forum. (Cullen v. Corwin (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1079.)

California Rule of Court 3.853 establishes the voluntary character of participation within courtconnected mediation; it does not prohibit a local agency from requiring mediation as a prerequisite to an administrative complaint. Petitioners’ contrary premise is incorrect as a matter of law. Because the mediation and administrative-exhaustion requirements challenged in the Fifth Cause of Action are lawful, there is no illegal act or waste to support a taxpayer claim under section 526a. (Lyons, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1502-1503.) The demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Because the facialinvalidity theory fails as a matter of law, the defect cannot be cured by amendment.

The Sixth Cause of Action fares no better. Although styled as an as-applied challenge—alleging that the administrative process is illusory, withheld, or futile in practice—the claim is, in substance, an attempt to use taxpayer standing to avoid the Sunshine Ordinance’s administrativeexhaustion requirement. A taxpayer action may not be used for that purpose. (Imagistics Internat., Inc. v. Dep’t of Gen. Servs. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 581, 593-594.) Nor is a public entity’s assertion of a lawful exhaustion requirement as a defense an illegal act.

Petitioners’ allegations of a “scheme of concealment” and futility are conclusory and need not be accepted as true on demurrer. And “waste” under section 526a “means something more than an alleged mistake by public officials in matters involving the exercise of judgment or wide discretion.” (Sundance v. Municipal Court (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1101, 1138-1139 [internal quotations omitted].) Petitioners’ disagreement with the manner in which the City administers its Sunshine Ordinance procedures does not qualify.

The demurrer to the Sixth Cause of Action is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. Given that this is the third iteration of the pleading and the theory fails as a matter of law, there is no reasonable possibility that amendment would cure the defect.

Illegal Expenditure of Taxpayer Funds re: Brown Act Violation (Seventh Cause of Action)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV115408: IN THE MATTER OF: TRUJILLO 07/30/2026 Hearing on Demurrer TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT CRS# 485667589306 in Department 20 To the extent the Seventh Cause of Action rests on an alleged Brown Act violation as the “illegal activity” constituting waste under Code of Civil Procedure section 526a (see SAP ¶ 194), it is deficient for the same reason as the First and Second Causes of Action: Petitioners do not plead with particularity a qualifying legislative body, and OakDOT is not a legislative body. This is an additional deficiency in the Seventh Cause of Action, which, as discussed above, also improperly combines distinct primary rights within a single count.

As set forth above, the demurrer to the Seventh Cause of Action is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, subject to the repleading directives stated above.

Leave to Amend

Petitioners contend that if any part of the demurrer is sustained, leave to amend should be granted because the facts, circumstances, and authorities demonstrate that any defect in the pleading is curable.

Petitioners bear the burden to demonstrate how the pleading may be amended to cure its defects. (Guananian v. Wagstaffe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1539.) As to the causes of action sustained without leave to amend—the First and Second Causes of Action against OakDOT, and the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action—those defects cannot be cured. OakDOT cannot, as a matter of law, be a legislative body or local body, and the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action challenge conduct that is lawful. Petitioners have proffered no facts that would cure these defects, and this is the third iteration of the pleading originally filed in March 2025. (See Safeco Insurance Co. of America v.

Tholen (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 685, 704 [no abuse of discretion in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend where the amended pleading did not substantially change and the plaintiff did not show what amendments would cure the defects].) Leave to amend is therefore DENIED as to those causes of action.

As to the causes of action sustained with leave to amend—the First and Second Causes of Action against the City of Oakland, and the Seventh Cause of Action—leave to amend is warranted for the reasons stated above. Any Third Amended Petition shall be filed and served within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(g).) The amended pleading shall not re-allege the causes of action dismissed without leave to amend (the First and Second Causes of Action against OakDOT, and the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action) and shall omit Prayer for Relief paragraphs (E) and (F). Petitioners shall comply with the repleading directives set forth above regarding the Seventh Cause of Action.

MOTION TO STRIKE

Respondents concurrently move to strike the entirety of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action, as well as paragraphs (E), (F), and (G) of the Second Amended Petition’s Prayer for Relief. As with their demurrer, Respondents contend that these causes of action improperly intermingle multiple primary rights and that Petitioners fail to allege facts supporting the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV115408: IN THE MATTER OF: TRUJILLO 07/30/2026 Hearing on Demurrer TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT CRS# 485667589306 in Department 20 requested relief.

In light of the Court’s rulings on the demurrer, the motion to strike is resolved as follows. The motion to strike the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action is DENIED AS MOOT: the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action have been dismissed without leave to amend, and the Seventh Cause of Action has been sustained with leave to amend, so the intermingling concern Respondents raise will be addressed through the repleading directives stated above. A motion to strike is not a substitute for a demurrer, and the Court declines to reach the same primary-rights objection a second time on this motion.

As to the Prayer for Relief, paragraphs (E) and (F)—which seek declarations that OMC §§ 2.20.270 and 2.20.280 are unconstitutional on their face and as applied—are tied solely to the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action, which have been dismissed without leave to amend; paragraphs (E) and (F) are accordingly STRICKEN. Paragraph (G), which seeks relief concerning Respondents’ responses to public records requests, is supported by causes of action that remain in the case, including the Third and Fourth Causes of Action; the motion to strike paragraph (G) is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

The demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the First and Second Causes of Action insofar as they are alleged against the Oakland Department of Transportation, and as to the Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action. The demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the First and Second Causes of Action insofar as they are alleged against the City of Oakland, and as to the Seventh Cause of Action. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the Fourth Cause of Action. Any Third Amended Petition shall be filed and served within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, consistent with the directives set forth above.

The motion to strike is DENIED AS MOOT as to the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action; GRANTED as to Prayer for Relief paragraphs (E) and (F), which are STRICKEN; and DENIED as to Prayer for Relief paragraph (G).

If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court.

HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING?

THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select "Search" 4. Select the Case Name

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV115408: IN THE MATTER OF: TRUJILLO 07/30/2026 Hearing on Demurrer TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT CRS# 485667589306 in Department 20 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select "Click to Contest this Ruling" 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select "Proceed" BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely.

BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.