RIVERA VS IDC LOGISTICS INC.

the agreement or do anything more than allege its existence and attach a copy. (Id.) The burden then shifts to the opposing party to demonstrate the falsity of the purported agreement. (Id.)

“In ruling on a petition to compel arbitration, the trial court may consider evidence on factual issues relating to the threshold issue of arbitrability . . . . Parties may submit declarations when factual issues are tendered with a motion to compel arbitration.” (Engineers & Architects Assn. v. Community Development Dept. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 644, 653.) In the summary proceedings on a petition to compel arbitration, “the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits, declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination.” (Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 972.)

There is a strong public policy in favor of arbitration agreements. (Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 741.) “California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability and a requirement that an arbitration agreement must be enforced on the basis of state law standards that apply to contracts in general.” (Engalla, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 971–72.) Given the policy favoring arbitration, “doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues are to be resolved in favor of arbitration.” (Ericksen, Arbuthnot, McCarthy, Kearney & Walsh, Inc. v. 100 Oak Street (1983) 35 Cal.3d 312, 323; see also Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.)

Federal Arbitration Act The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) generally governs arbitration in written contracts involving interstate commerce and authorizes the enforcement of arbitration clauses unless there are legal or equitable grounds to revoke the contract. (9 U.S.C. § 2.) To promote uniformity in determining the arbitrability of disputes under the Act, conflicting state laws are preempted by the Supremacy Clause. (Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 12.) The burden is on the party claiming that the FAA applies to prove that the underlying transaction affects interstate commerce. (Woolls v. Sup. Ct. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 197, 211–14.) That burden may be satisfied where the arbitration agreement itself expressly designates FAA governance. (Victrola 89, LLC v. Jaman Properties 8 LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 337, 355; Aviation Data, Inc. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1534–35.)

Here, the Arbitration Agreement expressly states that it “shall be in accordance with the [FAA], 9 U.S.C. 1, et seq. . . .” (Juarez Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1 at 5.) This is sufficient to show that the Arbitration Agreement is subject to the FAA. (Victrola 89, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at 355; Aviation Data, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at 1534–35.) Moreover, the evidence shows that the agreement affects interstate commerce because PSH places employees in California, Arizona, Texas, Illinois, and Pennsylvania. (Pena Decl. ¶ 2.) Accordingly, the FAA applies in this case.

Existence of an Arbitration Agreement Before granting a petition to compel arbitration, the court must determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. (Toal v. Tardif (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1219.)

While there is a strong policy favoring arbitration, “[t]here is no policy compelling persons to accept arbitration of controversies which they have not agreed to arbitrate and which no statute has made arbitrable.” (Id. at 1220.) The moving party bears the burden of presenting “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate,” and this can be met by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement bearing the opposing party’s signature or by setting forth its provisions in the petition. (Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413; Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543–44.)

Once the moving party makes that prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the opposing party to challenge the agreement’s existence or validity. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at 413.) If the opposing party submits evidence creating a factual dispute, the moving party must then establish the agreement’s validity by a preponderance of the evidence. (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165– 166.) Importantly, a declarant’s bare assertion that a plaintiff “entered into” an arbitration agreement, without providing specific details about the circumstances of execution, is insufficient to establish authenticity. (Id. at 169 [internal quotation omitted].) By contrast, where a declaration offers the “critical factual connection” and necessary factual details to properly authenticate a signature, the moving party satisfies its burden. (Espejo v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1062.)

Here, IDC/PSH have attached a copy of the Arbitration Agreement bearing what purports to be Plaintiff’s handwritten signature. (Juarez Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1 at p. 3.) The agreement covers all claims, disputes, and/or controversies arising from or related to Plaintiff’s employment or its termination, including claims for wages, discrimination, harassment based on pregnancy or medical condition, and violation of any federal or state law. (Id., Ex. 1 at § 1.) Section 15 further acknowledges that Plaintiff has voluntarily entered into the agreement and expressly states in all caps that the employee understands that by signing, both parties waive their right to a jury trial and their right to bring a class or collective action claim. (Id., Ex. 1 at § 15.) This constitutes a facially valid prima facie showing.

In opposition, Plaintiff disputes executing the agreement and declares that she does not recognize the agreement, did not sign it, and that the signature does not resemble her practice of signing only with the letter “R.” (Rivera Decl. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff further states she has never met Juarez, that June 22, 2024 was a Saturday when staffing agency personnel did not come in, that during the orientation she attended around that time, workers were given only 10 to 15 minutes to fill out an application and company rules, and that no arbitration agreement was presented or mentioned. (Id. at ¶¶ 7–11.)

Because Plaintiff submitted sworn testimony challenging her execution of the agreement, the burden shifted to IDC/PSH to establish its validity by a preponderance of the evidence. IDC/PSH submitted the Supplemental Declaration of Fatima Juarez, which provides the following: Juarez was PSH’s sole representative at the June 22, 2024 orientation; Plaintiff was personally present; Juarez personally handed Plaintiff the packet containing the agreement; Juarez told workers they could ask questions or take the packet home; Plaintiff returned the signed packet along with her Driver’s License and Social Security Card, which Juarez photographed. (Juarez Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 2–6, Ex.

1.) Juarez countersigned on PSH’s behalf the same day. (Id. at ¶ 8; Juarez Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1 at p. 8.)

Juarez’s firsthand account is further corroborated by the record, which contains photographs of Plaintiff’s Driver’s License and Social Security Card taken at the orientation, and a Spanish language background check authorization, bearing Plaintiff’s signature. (Juarez Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 6–7, Exs. 1–2.) This documentary corroboration, combined with Juarez’s firsthand account, weighs in IDC/PSH’s favor, and is sufficient to establish that Plaintiff executed the Arbitration Agreement on June 22, 2024.

Accordingly, IDC/PSH have established the existence of a valid written Arbitration Agreement that covers all claims at issue by a preponderance of the evidence. The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate a defense to its enforcement.

Unconscionability Having established the existence of the Arbitration Agreement, the Court turns to Plaintiff’s unconscionability defense. Plaintiff argues that the agreement is unenforceable because it is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. If the party opposing the petition to compel arbitration raises a defense to enforcement, that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense. (Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) An arbitration agreement must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable to permit the court to refuse to enforce the agreement. (Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1519, 1533.) These elements need not be present in the same degree—the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required, and vice versa. (Mercuro v. Sup. Ct. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 167, 174.)

Procedural Unconscionability Procedural unconscionability pertains to the making of the agreement; it focuses on the oppression that arises from unequal bargaining power and the surprise to the weaker party that results from hidden terms or the lack of informed choice. (Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, L.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 795.) An adhesion contract does not per se render an arbitration agreement unenforceable, and the adhesive nature of an agreement establishes only a low degree of procedural unconscionability. (Peng v. First Republic Bank (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469; Serpa v. Cal. Sur. Investigations, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 695, 704.) Moreover, enforcement of an adhesive agreement is not precluded absent evidence of surprise or other sharp practices. (Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.)

Plaintiff argues the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable on three grounds: (1) oppression; (2) contract of adhesion; and (3) no opportunity to opt-out. As to oppression, Plaintiff contends she had no legal training, was never told what arbitration was or how it would affect her rights, and that, if she signed the agreement in June 2024, it would have been at a time of significant economic pressure, having relied on her income from IDC/PSH for nearly a year. (Rivera Decl. ¶¶ 10, 12–16.) Plaintiff further argues the agreement is complex, requiring reference to multiple external legal sources to determine its scope. (Pl.’s Opp. p. 5 [citing Juarez Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1].) As to

the contract of adhesion, Plaintiff argues the agreement was imposed on employees without any opportunity for discussion or negotiation. As to the absence of an opt-out provision, Plaintiff argues this heightens the degree of procedural unconscionability.

IDC/PSH do not dispute that the Arbitration Agreement is a contract of adhesion. However, they contend the degree of procedural unconscionability is minimal on all three grounds. On oppression, IDC/PSH point out that Juarez instructed Plaintiff to read carefully every form in the packet, including the Arbitration Agreement, told her she could ask questions, and expressly advised her she was free to take the packet home if she needed more time or felt uncomfortable signing. (Juarez Suppl. Decl. ¶ 5.) On the opt-out argument, IDC/PSH argue that Plaintiff was not required to sign the agreement that day, was free to take additional time to review it, and the agreement itself acknowledged her right to consult with legal counsel prior to signing, such that she was not deprived of a meaningful opportunity to reflect and decide for herself whether to sign. (Id.; Juarez Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1 at p. 3.) IDC/PSH further contend that Plaintiff, having chosen to sign the agreement that day, cannot now claim she was pressured into doing so. (Defs.’ Reply 5:14–15 [citing Juarez Suppl. Decl. ¶¶ 5–6].)

On this record, the Arbitration Agreement reflects only a low degree of procedural unconscionability. While the agreement is admittedly adhesive and was presented in an employment onboarding context, the record reflects that Plaintiff was given time to review the agreement, was told she could take it home, and was under no obligation to sign that day. These circumstances substantially diminish any claim of oppression or surprise, and adequately address the absence of a formal opt-out provision. (See Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1245.) Because the degree of procedural unconscionability is low, Plaintiff must demonstrate a correspondingly high degree of substantive unconscionability to defeat enforcement.

Substantive Unconscionability Substantive unconscionability looks beyond the circumstances of contract formation and considers the fairness of an agreement’s actual terms, focusing on whether the contract will create unfair or one-sided results. (Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 493.)

Plaintiff argues that the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable on five grounds: (1) non-mutuality; (2) inadequate discovery; (3) attorney fees waiver; (4) arbitration costs; and (5) PAGA waiver. Of these, non-mutuality is dispositive.

Plaintiff argues the Arbitration Agreement is not mutual for two reasons. First, Section 1 binds Plaintiff to arbitrate claims against IDC/PSH’s employees and agents, but those employees and agents are not required to arbitrate claims against her. Second, while Section 1 requires Plaintiff to arbitrate all claims, including contract, tort, and discrimination claims, Section 3 carves out from arbitration “precautionary measures” claims (i.e., injunctive relief), which IDC/PSH are far more likely to bring against their employees.

IDC/PSH respond that Plaintiff’s non-mutuality arguments are preempted by the FAA because they are defenses that apply only to arbitration agreements and derive their

meaning solely from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue. (AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339.)

An arbitration agreement must contain a “modicum of bilaterality.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 117.) It is “unfairly one-sided for an employer with superior bargaining power to impose arbitration on the employee as plaintiff but not to accept such limitations when it seeks to prosecute a claim against the employee, without at least some reasonable justification for such one-sidedness based on ‘business realities.’” (Id. at 117.) Where no justification is offered, the court “must assume” the lack of mutuality is unconscionable. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at 500.)

First, Section 1 of the Arbitration Agreement requires Plaintiff to arbitrate claims against IDC/PSH or their “employees or agents,” but does not require those employees or agents to arbitrate claims against Plaintiff. (Juarez Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1 at § 1.) Cook v. University of Southern California (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 312 is instructive. There, the employee was required to arbitrate claims against USC’s “officers, trustees, administrators, employees or agents,” but those individuals were not required to arbitrate their claims against the employee. (Id. at 319.) Cook found this unconscionable because it “provides a significant benefit to USC’s related entities without any reciprocal benefit to Cook,” and because it was “unlikely” the employee could practically compel those individuals to arbitrate even if theoretically possible. (Id. at 328.) “[T]he presence of a modicum of bilaterality will not save a clause that is, in practical effect, unjustifiably one sided.” (Id. at 327.)

The same imbalance exists here. IDC/PSH’s employees and agents may invoke the agreement against Plaintiff as third-party beneficiaries simply by virtue of their status. Plaintiff, by contrast, could not compel those same individuals to arbitrate without first establishing they independently accepted a benefit under the agreement—an “unlikely” showing under Cook. IDC/PSH offer no business justification for this asymmetry. (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 117–18 [“‘“unconscionability turns not only on a ‘onesided’ result, but also on an absence of ‘justification’ for it”’”].) The Court finds this provision substantively unconscionable.

Second, Section 3 of the Arbitration Agreement excludes from arbitration claims “that the Company or Employee may have for precautionary measures . . . .” (Juarez Decl. ¶ 3, Ex. 1 at § 3 [emphasis added].) Although facially bilateral, this carve-out is functionally one-sided.

In Ramirez, the California Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement was unconscionable where it excluded injunctive and equitable relief claims—precisely the category of claims an employer, rather than an employee, is “more likely” to initiate. (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at 498.) The Court rejected the argument that facial bilaterality saved the provision: “That remote possibility does not change the conclusion that the Agreement, as a whole, tends to exempt claims likely to be made by [the employer] while directing [the employee’s] likely claims into arbitration . . . . The presence of a modicum of bilaterality will not save a clause that is, in practical effect, unjustifiably one sided.” (Id. at 498–99.)

The same logic applies here. Plaintiff’s claims—wages, discrimination, harassment, and retaliation—are compelled into arbitration under Section 1. However, the “precautionary measures” carve-out under Section 3 exempts the category of relief IDC/PSH, as an employer deploying a staffing workforce, are more likely to seek (i.e., injunctive relief to restrain an employee or protect business operations). With no justification offered, this provision is substantively unconscionable.

To the extent IDC/PSH argue that Plaintiff’s non-mutuality arguments are preempted by the FAA, that argument fails. In Ramirez, the California Supreme Court rejected this argument: “The approach adopted here is not hostile to arbitration . . . . The FAA seeks to treat interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements equally with other contracts.” (Id. at 518–19.) The FAA “permits courts to declare arbitration agreements unenforceable upon the same grounds as any other contract, including unconscionability.” (Id. at 518.) Unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense, and applying it here does not “derive [its] meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” (AT&T Mobility, supra, 563 U.S. at 339.) AT&T Mobility bars defenses that single out arbitration for disfavored treatment, not standard contract defenses applied evenly. Accordingly, the challenged non-mutuality provisions are substantively unconscionable.

Having found the non-mutuality provisions in Sections 1 and 3 substantively unconscionable, the Court need not reach Plaintiff’s remaining substantive challenges— inadequate discovery, attorney fees waiver, arbitration costs, and PAGA waiver.

Severability The Court must next determine whether the unconscionable non-mutuality provisions may be severed to preserve the remainder of the Arbitration Agreement.

First, courts ask whether “the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality.” (Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at 124.) The central purpose of the Arbitration Agreement is mutual dispute resolution, which is facially lawful. The unconscionable provisions are therefore collateral to that central purpose, and the agreement survives this first step.

Second, the court “must have the capacity to cure the unlawful contract through severance or restriction of the offending clause.” (Id. [italics in original].) Curing Section 1’s one-sided scope would require adding a reciprocal arbitration obligation for IDC/PSH’s employees and agents—an obligation those individuals never undertook. That is augmentation, not severance. (Id. at 125; Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at 516.) “Courts cannot ‘rewrite agreements and impose terms to which neither party has agreed.’” (Ramirez, supra, 16 Cal.5th at 516 [internal quotation omitted].) Similarly, deleting Section 3’s carve-out would subject injunctive claims to arbitration, an outcome the parties did not contemplate or agree to. Because neither defect can be cured by striking language alone, the agreement fails at this step.

Finally, even if augmentation were permissible, severance would be inappropriate because the two defects operate in tandem: Plaintiff’s claims are compelled into arbitration while IDC/PSH retain court access for the category of relief they are most

likely to seek. That pattern reflects “a systematic effort to impose arbitration on the weaker party not simply as an alternative to litigation, but to secure a forum that works to the stronger party’s advantage.” (Id. at 516–17.) Severing the provisions would also create an incentive for employers to draft one-sided agreements knowing courts will simply redraft them to include the bilateral terms the employer should have included in the first place. (Id. at 517 [citing Mills v. Facility Solutions Grp., Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1045].)

Because the unconscionable provisions cannot be cured without augmentation, and because the interests of justice would not be furthered by severance, the Arbitration Agreement is permeated with unconscionability and is therefore void in its entirety.

4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CVRI2503822 ESTEVEZ VS ALVAREZ MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CVRI2503822 ESTEVEZ VS ALVAREZ MOTION FOR ORDER ESTABLISHING ADMISSIONS CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CVRI2503822 ESTEVEZ VS ALVAREZ MOTION FOR ORDER ESTABLISHING ADMISSIONS CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CVRI2503822 ESTEVEZ VS ALVAREZ MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO FORM INTERROGATORIES CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CVRI2503822 ESTEVEZ VS ALVAREZ MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CVRI2503822 ESTEVEZ VS ALVAREZ MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO FORM INTERROGAOTIRES CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME CVRI2503822 ESTEVEZ VS ALVAREZ MOTION TO COMPEL ANSWERS TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES Tentative Ruling: Hearing is continued to 6/19/26, for Defendants to provide verifications.

Code of Civil Procedure sections 2030.290(b) and 2031.300(b) allow the propounding party to file a motion to compel responses to interrogatories and document demands if a response has not been received. If responses are untimely, responding party waives objections. (Id. at §§ 2030.290(a), 2031.300(a).)