Geisler – Trust
Case Information
Motion(s)
Motion for Attorneys’ Fees
Motion Type Tags
Motion for Attorney Fees
Parties
- Petitioner: Steven Louis Wagner
- Respondent: Nancy Key
Ruling
Superior Court of the State of California County of Orange TENTATIVE RULINGS FOR DEPARTMENT CM06 HON. JUDGE Megan L. Wagner
Date: 05/14/2026 Court Room Rules and Notices
# Case Name Tentative 1 Geisler – Trust Motion for Fees (2020 – 01140947) Petitioner Steven Louis Wagner’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ROA 259) is GRANTED in the amount of $87,400.41.
In the Final Statement of Decision in this matter, the court made a finding that Respondent Nancy Key’s maintenance of objections after June 6, 2022 was in bad faith and without reasonable cause. (ROA 251 at 20:16-20.) Accordingly, Respondent was ordered to pay the attorney fees incurred by Petitioner after that date as well as Petitioner’s costs of litigation. (Ibid.; Probate Code section 17211(a).)
Pursuant to those findings and orders, Petitioner now seeks fees in the amount of $110,857.50 and administrative charges/costs of $5,542.91 for total award of $116,400.41. Respondent opposes portions of the requested fees on the ground they were unreasonable and/or unnecessary and opposes the awarding of the requested costs.
Pursuant to its discretion under Probate Code section 1002, the Court declines to award the nebulously described “administrative fees” as costs.
Probate Code section 17211(a) reads, in full: “If a beneficiary contests the trustee’s account and the court determines that the contest was without reasonable cause and in bad faith, the court may award against the contestant the compensation and costs of the trustee and other expenses and costs of litigation, including attorney’s fees, incurred to defend the account. The amount awarded shall be a charge against any interest of the beneficiary in the trust. The contestant shall be personally liable for any amount that remains unsatisfied.”
According to Petitioner’s interpretation of section 17211(a), if fees are awarded, the party entitled to recover fees is entitled to recover all their claimed fees and costs, without any consideration of whether the fees were reasonably incurred. According to Respondent’s interpretation of section 17211(a), the party entitled to recover fees may only recover reasonably incurred fees. Neither party provides determinative authority on this issue.
Unlike many attorney fees statutes (e.g. Civ. Code, §§ 86 & 1738.16, Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 405.38, 1021.9, Evid. Code, § 1127, Fam. Code, § 274, Lab. Code, §§ 1404 & 4555, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4659.14), section 12911 does not attach the modifier “reasonable” to the amount of fees. This might suggest Petitioner’s interpretation is correct. However, an award of fees pursuant to section 17211 is entirely discretionary as the language used in the statute is that the court “may” award fees, not that the court “shall” award fees. Accordingly, the court exercises that discretion to award fees in an amount less than that requested by Petitioner by reducing the requested fee amount by $29,000—the amount of fees incurred by Petitioner in seeking summary judgment. The reduction is made because the summary judgment motion filed by Petitioner fell far outside the provisions of Code of Civil Procedures section 437c.
Other than the deduction of the requested costs in the amount of $5,542.91 and the reduction of fees by $29,000, the court makes no other deductions to the amount of requested and awards fees and costs in the total amount of $81,857.50.
Petitioner is directed to give notice.
Nunes – Trust MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER (2024 – 01396741) Petitioner Peggy Nunes’ Motion for Protective Order (ROA 81) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth below.
Petitioner seeks a protective order prohibiting Respondents from examining her at deposition regarding her alleged involvement in a 2016 criminal matter. Petitioner asserts the criminal matter is unrelated to the claims raised in this action because the subject trust amendments were executed in 2014 and 2015—before the alleged criminal matter was initiated.
Respondents oppose the requested order, arguing that although Petitioner’s criminal conviction for elder abuse occurred after the amendments were executed, the underlying wrongful conduct occurred before the amendments were executed and may have been, at least in part, the reason for the amendments, which excluded Petitioner as a beneficiary.
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420(b), the court “for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression . . .” “‘[T]he burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for whatever order is sought.’” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 318.)