Robertson v. City of Rialto, et al

17. Robertson v. City of Rialto, et al, Case No. CIVSB2325118 [AMENDED AFTER ORAL ARGS] Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Mark Kling Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Deposition of Ed Scott 7/20/26, 9:00 a.m., Dept. S-17

Tentative Rulings As to the Kling Motion: Objections: The Court would SUSTAIN the City’s objections to RFP 1-3 on attorney-client privilege and work product but order the City to provide a privilege log. The Court would otherwise OVERRULE the remaining objections. The Motion: The Court would GRANT the motion. To the extent the parties have not proceeded with the deposition already, the parties shall meet and confer on an appropriate date to occur within the next twenty days. The Court would find substantial justification to DENY Plaintiff’s requested sanctions.

As to the Scott Motion: The Court would DENY. Case Summary In essence, this is an invasion of privacy case. Plaintiff, who is the mayor of Rialto, alleges that Defendant City and its Police Department has permitted at least ten unauthorized California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS)1 searches involving her from 2015 to 2020. She alleges that the unauthorized CLETS searches were done to determine her residency as an elected official and for other unauthorized purposes. Thus, she filed suit against the City on October 6, 2023, alleging causes of action for (1) intrusion into private affairs; (2) violation of the Comprehensive Computer Data and Access Fraud Act; (3) negligent supervision; (4) violation of the Information Practices Act; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED); and (7) violation of the Bane Civil Rights Act.

Analysis

Here, Plaintiff seeks to compel the depositions of (1) the Chief of Police Mark Kling and (2) Mayor Pro Tem Ed Scott. Defendants served objections to the at-issue deposition notices on March 18, 2026, by email. These motions followed. Chief Kling Deposition – As a preliminary matter, the Court would OVERRULE Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s separate statement. Though unorthodox, examining the statement closely page-by-page reveals that Plaintiff did quote verbatim language of the notice, objections, and reasons a further response should be compelled. However, Plaintiff elected a

1 CLETS is a network used by law enforcement to access national databases such as FBI and DMV records, among others.

piecemeal fashion where, instead of cutting and pasting the entire paragraph of objections, she quoted each objection discretely. Nothing in the court rules appears to prohibit this practice; although it is very uncommon and not customary. As to the whether to compel Chief Kling’s deposition, it is clear that Defendants state that they “remain willing to meet and confer to schedule the deposition of Chief Kling on a mutually convenient date for the parties, counsel, and the deponent” depending on whether Plaintiff intends to take the deposition in person or remotely. (Hawkins Decl., Exh.

F, Obj. 2 to Notice, 2:20-23.) As such, Defendants acknowledge they will produce Chief Kling for deposition. In their opposition, Defendants state Kling’s deposition was scheduled for July 8, 2026. If Kling’s deposition has already occurred, then Plaintiff’s motion is moot, and the Court wonders why it was not taken off calendar. If it has not occurred, then it appears appropriate to grant Plaintiff’s motion. Mayor Scott Deposition – The apex doctrine provides that agency heads and other top government executives are not subject to deposition absent compelling reasons. (Contractors’ State License Bd. v.

Superior Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 125, 131.) An exception to the rule will be made only when the party seeking the deposition makes two showings; (1) the government official has direct personal factual information pertaining to material issues in the action; and (2) the information to be gained from the deposition is not available through any other source. (Id., at p. 132.) Defendants, here, argue that Scott is currently serving as the City’s mayor pro tem, which indisputably makes him a top government executive. (Lustig Dec., ¶3.)

Defendants further explain that Scott does not have direct personal factual knowledge of CLETS inquiries made about Plaintiff Robertson because Scott’s February 16, 2021, government claim made under penalty of perjury attests that: “I made a verbal complaint to Rialto Police Chief Mark Kling that I had been informed that a Confidential informant whistleblower, who is a current employee of the City of Rialto had been told by a current member of the Rialto Fire Department that he had been involved in investigating myself (Ed Scott a Rialto City Councilmember) to determine my residency and property I owned in Kernville California and other information related to my personal life and background.” (Lustig Decl., ¶4 & Exh.

A.) As Defendants argue, this statement discloses that Scott does not have direct personal factual knowledge about CLETS searches being performed as to himself; instead, the information came from other sources and individuals. Defendants contend correctly that Scott’s government claim statement discloses at least two levels of hearsay. Moreover, there is no statement in Scott’s government claim that he had or was told any information whatsoever about CLETS searches related to Plaintiff Robertson. (Lustig Decl., Exh.

A, Attachment to Complaint, p. 1.) Instead, Scott states the acts were unknown specifically to him and “Based on information I have received I believe that other members of the City Council may have had similar acts committed against them.” (Id., Attachment to Complaint, p. 2.) Such statements support

Defendants’ arguments that Scott lacked direct personal factual knowledge about CLETS searches about him and other City Council members. *** *** ***

18. Marquez v. Look Cinemas II, LLC, et al, Case No. CIVSB2428912 Defendant Spirit Master Funding’s Motion for Summary Judgment 7/20/26, 9:00 a.m., Dept. S-17

Tentative Ruling The Court would GRANT2 this unopposed motion. Case Summary This is, essentially, a premises liability matter. Defendant Look ran the theater premises; Defendant Spirit owned the premises; and Defendant Morrison was the property manager. Plaintiff was lawfully on the property when she fell due to a purportedly hazardous and dangerous condition. As such, on October 8, 2024, she filed suit alleging (1) negligence and (2) premises liability against all Defendants. On December 5, 2024, Defendant Spirit filed a Cross-Complaint against Look for (1) contractual indemnity; (2) equitable indemnity; (3) contribution; (4) breach of subcontracts; and (5) declaratory relief.

On April 4, 2024, an amended Cross Complaint was filed asserting the same causes but including a corrected caption. On July 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed a dismissal without prejudice as to Defendant Morrison. Relevant here, Defendant Spirit filed a motion for summary judgment as to the Complaint on March 26, 2026. As of the date of this tentative decision’s drafting, no opposition has been presented. Statement of Law Summary judgment is proper where there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 437c(c).) The analysis requires three steps: First, the court must identify the issues framed within the pleading. (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064- 1065.) Second, it must determine whether the moving party has established facts sufficient to negate the claim and justify a judgment in movant’s favor. (Ibid.) Third, and finally, when a summary judgment motion, as a prima facie matter, justifies a judgment, the court must determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable issue of material

2 Materials Considered: Complaint, Answer; MSJ; Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts; Request for Judicial Notice; Campbell Declaration. Undisputed Material Facts: 1-7.

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