Yousefian v. General Motors, LLC

new judgment. It does not suggest that an amended judgment adding costs restarts the deadlines for the entire judgment.

Sanchez v. Strickland (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 758, 767, also cited, is inapposite because the change in judgment reduced the damages awarded, which affected the substantial rights of the parties.

Finally, moving parties argue that because neither judgment addressed the roles of the cross-defendants as trustees, the time for bringing a new trial motion as the original judgment’s substantive issues never commenced. The Court previously determined that the time for bringing a new trial motion as to the original judgment had both commenced and run before the first notice of intention to move for new trial had been filed. Arguing that the original judgment was never final constitutes a procedurally improper motion for reconsideration of the Court’s previous ruling.

Genera to give notice. 8 Hashimi v. Before the Court is the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed American on 2/19/26 by Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. Honda Motor (“Honda”), as to the Fifth Cause of Action asserted in the Complaint Co. Inc. filed by Plaintiff Mer Hashimi (“Plaintiff”) on 3/13/25. Plaintiff filed a “Non-Opposition” on 5/5/26.

The Motion is GRANTED. For the Fifth Cause of Action, the Complaint makes only vague assertions about alleged defects in this vehicle. Generic claims of defects, without more, do not suffice to state the claim, as “[t]he very existence of a warranty presupposes that some defects may occur.” (Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 345.) Plaintiff also has not alleged where and how he acquired the vehicle, or the circumstances surrounding the purchase. Greater specificity is required to state the claim.

The Motion is therefore GRANTED as to the Fifth Cause of Action in the Complaint. As Plaintiff filed a “Non-Opposition,” and thus failed to show that he can amend to cure these defects, this ruling is without leave to amend.

Honda is to give notice of this ruling. 9 Yousefian v. Before the Court is a motion by General Motors, LLC (GM) for an General order striking, or alternatively, taxing the memorandum of costs Motors, LLC filed by plaintiff Arlen Yousefian. The motion to strike is DENIED and the motion to tax is GRANTED, in part, as set forth herein.

GM first argues the entire memorandum of costs is untimely because it was filed 204 days after plaintiff accepted its Section 998 offer. Rule 3.1700 requires the memorandum of costs be filed 15 days after service of notice of entry of judgment or 180 days after entry of judgment. Neither occurred in this case. Accordingly, the motion to strike is DENIED.

GM next argues that several specific items should be taxed.

The right to recover costs of suit is determined entirely by statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032 et seq.) Unless otherwise expressly prohibited by statute, a prevailing party is entitled to recover costs as a matter of right. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1032, subd. (b).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a) specifies cost items that are allowable, including filing and motion fees, deposition costs, and court reporter fees. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (a)(3).) Allowable costs “shall be reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation” and “reasonable in amount.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c).)

In addition to the foregoing authority regarding costs, the Song Beverly Act also provides, “If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) Indeed, “[i]n a claim under the Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to recover costs and expenses (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d)); for purposes of that statute, expenses encompasses out-ofpocket expenses beyond the costs identified in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5.” (Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 450, 457; see Warren v. Kia Motors of America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 42-43.)

Filing & Motion Fees: $22.70

This is the filing fee for the Reply on the Fees motion. When Attorney Hovanes Margarian signed the Memorandum of Costs (Summary) on 11/25/25, he stated that “to the best of my knowledge and belief,” the costs “were necessarily incurred.” The actual truth was that these costs had not yet been incurred. Because the memorandum of costs does not support the cost request, motion is GRANTED as to the $22.70 filing fee.

Jury Fees: $167.07

GM seeks to tax this charge because this matter did not go to trial. However, this is the charge plaintiff incurred to preserve his right to a jury trial. Such costs are recoverable. (Naser v. Lakeridge Athletic Club (2014) 227 Cal. App. 4th 571, 576) Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to the jury fees.

Service of Process: $102.96

GM seeks to tax two charges for $51.48 each for service of process on “Rebecca Vang.” (Worksheet, p. 2, lines 5.a-b.) GM argues plaintiff has not provided any information regarding who this individual is, what Counsel had served on Ms. Vang, or when these costs were incurred.

Although plaintiff was not required to submit copies of invoices along with the memo, once the defendant filed its motion to tax, plaintiff was obligated to submit evidence supporting the costs requested.” Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1267) Here, there are no documents reflecting service on Rebecca Vang attached to Mr. Margarian’s declaration. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to the $102.96.

Witness Fees (Expert Fees): $921.50

GM challenges the expert fees paid to “Thomas Lepper.” (Id., Worksheet, p. 3, line 8.b(1)-(3) & Attachment 8b(5).) GM argues the case did not go to trial and therefore experts were not necessary. Mr. Lepper was hired by plaintiff to evaluate the vehicle and assess the nature of the defects. (Opp. at 7:19-21) Such charges were “reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).) Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as to the $921.50.

Other (AppearMe Service Fee; Veritext Deposition Cancellation Fees): $1,070.00

GM challenges the entire $1,070 sought in Para. 16-Other of the memorandum of costs.

The $75 charge by the attorney who appeared at the Case Management Conference is not a proper item of recoverable costs. Attorney Fees are subject to a separate motion.

The two invoices from Veritext for $550 and $425, for a total of $975, are properly recoverable costs.

Plaintiff has not sought to justify the additional $20.

Accordingly, the motion to tax is GRANTED as to $95.

In summary, the $3,111.47 in costs requested by plaintiff is taxed in the amount of $200.23. This means that plaintiff is awarded costs in the total amount of $2,911.24.

Order to show cause re dismissal on settled case CONTINUED to September 4, 2026, at 2:00 p.m.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling. 10 Olivera v. Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendants Beach, et. al. Jon Beach and Theresa Beach as to the complaint filed by Plaintiff John Olivera. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is GRANTED.

Request for Judicial Notice: Defendants’ request for judicial notice of the plaintiff’s worker’s compensation file is GRANTED. (Evid. Code §452(d).)