| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Date |
|---|
Motion to Dismiss/Stay Action
2. CMC
The court also CONTINUES the Case Management Conference to July 31, 2026, at 9:30 am in Dept W8, to be heard with the pending law and motion matter scheduled at that time.
Plaintiff to give notice.
10 Chaganti vs. Red Motion to Dismiss/Stay Action Tail Residential LLC The court DENIES without prejudice the motion by specially appearing Defendants RED TAIL RESIDENTIAL, LLC and LINDSY HARVEY to dismiss or stay action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Preliminarily, the court notes that the motion purports to be “made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §583.410, the Court's inherent authority to dismiss as codified in Code of Civil Procedure §583.150, California Rules of Court, rule 3.1342, and California Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3(b).” (Not. of Mot. at p. 1, lines 26-28.) None of these cited authorities appear to be applicable here, as they each concern the issue of undue delay or diligence.
Nonetheless, as the moving points and authorities deal with the issue and authorities concerning motions to dismiss or stay, the court analyzes the motion as being for such. (See Mov. Pts. & Auth. at p. 3, lines 17 to p. 4, line 7 [citing Code Civ. Proc., §§ 418.10(a), (e), 410.30(a), 396b].)
Mandatory Forum Selection Clause?
While not explicit, Defendants appear to argue that the parties entered into a mandatory forum selection clause. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims arise from a residential lease dispute between them, which states: “Should either Party file a lawsuit arising out of this Lease Contract said lawsuit shall be exclusively filed and heard in state court located in the county where the apartment community is located. This Lease Contract shall be
governed by the laws of the state of Missouri.” (Carney Decl., ¶ 3, Exh. A at p. 7, ¶ 41.)
When a case involves a mandatory forum selection clause, the traditional forum non convenien analysis does not apply. (See Intershop Communications v. Superior Court
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To the extent that Defendants are arguing that a mandatory forum selection clause mandates dismissal, Defendants have failed to offer admissible evidence of a contract between the parties containing a mandatory forum selection clause.
Plaintiff challenges Defendants’ failure to authenticate the lease agreement that is attached as Exhibit A of the Declaration of Terence Carney, defense counsel. Mr. Carney appears to lack the ability to authenticate the lease agreement. And Plaintiff filed a declaration stating, “I entered into no written agreement with Red Tail” and that “Red Tail and I have not agreed to any forum selection clause that requires this suit to be filed in St. Louis County, Missouri.” (Naren Chaganti Decl., ¶¶ 4-5, emphasis supplied). The second amended complaint references a written lease with Red Tail (SAC, ¶3) but does not attach the lease agreement. And Plaintiff now appears to believe that Red Tail is not the owner of the Missouri apartment complex. (Chaganti Decl., ¶¶ 2-3.)
As such, it is unclear if the lease agreement attached as Exhibit A (which is purportedly between an FLT HUNTERS
GLEN LLC and “NARENDRA CHAGANTI”) is the same lease agreement on which Plaintiff NAREN CHAGANTI’s claim is based against Defendants RED TAIL RESIDENTIAL LLC and LINDSY HARVEY.
As such, Defendants have not established by admissible evidence that a mandatory forum selection clause exists between the parties.
Traditional Discretionary Forum Non Conveniens
“In applying the traditional forum non conveniens analysis, the trial court must engage in a two-step process, on which the defendant bears the burden of proof. [Citation.] In the first step, the court must determine whether a suitable alternative forum exists. [Citation.] If the court finds that a suitable alternative forum exists, it must then balance the private interests of the litigants and the interests of the public in retaining the action in California. [Citation.]” (Animal Film, LLC v. D.E.J. Prods., Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466, 472.)
Step One - Suitable Alternative Forum
“A forum is suitable if there is jurisdiction and no statute of limitations bar to hearing the case on the merits. [Citation.] ‘[A] forum is suitable where an action “can be brought,” although not necessarily won.’ [Citations.]” (Animal Film, 193 Cal.App.4th at 472.) The existence of a suitable alternative forum is a legal question. (Ibid.)
Defendants contend that Missouri is a suitable alternative forum given that the lease involves real property in Missouri. Further, Defendants contend that Defendants will consent to the jurisdiction of the out-of-state forum, Missouri, for the purposes of litigating these claims and will agree to toll the statute of limitations for the time this Action is pending against Defendant in California. To the extent that Defendants actually reach such an agreement, Defendants have identified a suitable alternative forum.
Step Two - Balance of Interests of Parties and Public
The second step involves consideration of the private interest factors and the public interest factors. The private interest factors include “the ease of access to sources of proof, the cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses, and the availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses.” (Ford Motor Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 604, 610.) “The public interest factors include avoidance of overburdening local courts with congested calendars, protecting the interests of potential jurors so that they are not called upon to decide cases in which the local community has little concern, and weighing the competing interests of California and the alternate jurisdiction in the litigation.” (Stangvik v. Shiley Inc. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 744, 751.)
A. Private Factors (access to proof, cost of obtaining witnesses, availability of compulsory process)
The court finds that the private factors are neutral. Defendant Red Tail is alleged to be a business with a principal place of business in Irvine, California. Plaintiff is also currently a resident of California. Defendants do not dispute Red Tail’s principal place of business. It is unclear the state of which Defendant Lindsy Harvey is a resident. Further, Plaintiff offered evidence of an email relating to the towing at issue, which appears to give the contact information/address of Lindsy Havey at “RED TAIL RESIDENTIAL, 2082 Michelson Drive, Irvine, CA 9612.” (See Chaganti Decl., Exh. 1 at signature block). Defendants do not proffer evidence that the access to proof, cost of obtaining witnesses, or the compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses would be more difficult or burdensome in California.
B. Public Factors
The court also finds that the public factors are neutral. Defendant Red Tail’s principal place of business is in California. Venue is proper in the county where the principal place of business of a corporation is situated. (Hale v. Bohannon (1952) 38 Cal.2d 458, 469). A plaintiff's
choice of venue is regarded as presumptively correct, and a corporate defendant has the burden of negating the propriety of venue as laid on all possible alternative grounds. (Tokuzo Shida v. Japan Food Corp. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 443, 447-448.) Here, Defendants do not proffer admissible showing that a lease was entered into in Missouri and/or that the parties agreed to apply Missouri law. California has a public interest in adjudicating liability of California corporations in California.
Based on the current state of the admissible evidence before the court, Defendants have not sufficiently shown that the private and public factors weigh in favor of a forum outside of California.
The motion is therefore DENIED without prejudice.
Moving Defendants to give notice.
11 Jackson vs. City of Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Laguna Niguel, California The court DENIES Petitioner MICHELLE R. JACKSON’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $428,518.00 against Respondent CITY OF LAGUNA NIGUEL, CALIFORNIA (the “City”).
Evidentiary Objections:
The City’s objection number 7 to the declaration of Michelle Jackson and objection number 5 to the declaration of Carlos Perez are SUSTAINED; the remainder of the City’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.
Petitioner’s objection number 2 to the declaration of Richard Egger is SUSTAINED; the remainder of Petitioner’s evidentiary objections are OVERRULED.
RJN: The City’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED as to Exhibits 1 and 3 (Evid. Code § 452(d) and DENIED as to Exhibit 2, which is not relevant to the court’s analysis. (Sweeney v. California Regional Water Quality Control Board. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 1093, 1118, fn. 5 [“Matters
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