| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
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Motion to Be Relieved As Counsel of Record
Here, in Pham’s opposition, Pham admits that “Plaintiff identifies no contractual provision, statutory authority, or other applicable basis entitling recovery of these claimed appellate consultation fees.” (Opposition, 5:16-17). As such, without identifying the contractual or statutory authority to recover legal fees, Pham has not met his burden of justifying recovery of this cost.
Further, Pham contends that the $800 in travel and hotel costs should be recoverable under the court’s discretionary power. However, Pham has not provided any evidentiary support to establish that these costs were actually incurred.
For these reasons, the motion is granted and Pham’s costs on appeal are taxed by $4,300.
Pham shall be awarded total costs in the amount of $502.20.
Defendants/Appellants to give notice.
10 Rincon vs. TENTATIVE RULING: Ameriestate Legal Plan, Motion to Be Relieved As Counsel of Record Inc. Lawrence Borys and Anna Novruzyan move to be relieved as counsel of record for Defendant AmeriEstate Legal Plan, Inc. The motion is GRANTED. The order relieving counsel will be effective upon the filing of a proof of service of the executed order upon all parties.
In Paradise v. Nowlin (1948) 86 Cal.App.2d 897, the court explained that: “A corporation is not a natural person. It is an artificial entity created by law and as such it can neither practice law nor appear or act in person. Out of court it must act in its affairs through its agents and representatives and in matters in court it can act only through licensed attorneys. A corporation cannot appear in court by an officer who is not an attorney and it cannot appear in propria persona. (Citations omitted.)” (Id. at 898; see also Iannaccone v. Law (2nd Cir. 1998) 142 F.3d 553, 559 (holding that administrator of estate may not appear pro se on behalf of estate).)
Nevertheless, the ban on corporate self-representation does not prevent a court from granting a motion to withdraw as attorney of record even if it leaves the corporation without representation. (Ferruzzo v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 501, 504 [“An attorney may be allowed to withdraw without offending the rule against corporate self-representation”].) “Such an order puts pressure on the corporation to obtain new counsel or risk forfeiting important
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rights through nonrepresentation.” (Gamet v. Blanchard (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1284 n. 5.)
A Status Conference re: Defendant AmeriEstate Legal Plan, Inc.’s Failure to Be Represented by Counsel is set for July 14, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Department N16.
Moving counsel to give notice.
11 Tariffa vs. TENTATIVE RULING: Bako Motion to Set Aside Default
Defendant Jordan Bako moves to set aside the default entered against him on January 24, 2025. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED.
Code Civ. Proc. § 473(b) provides in pertinent part,
“The court may, upon any terms as may be just, relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Application for this relief shall be accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein, otherwise the application shall not be granted, and shall be made within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken. . . .
Notwithstanding any other requirements of this section, the court shall, whenever an application for relief is made no more than six months after entry of judgment, is in proper form, and is accompanied by an attorney's sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect, vacate any (1) resulting default entered by the clerk against his or her client, and which will result in entry of a default judgment, or (2) resulting default judgment or dismissal entered against his or her client, unless the court finds that the default or dismissal was not in fact caused by the attorney's mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.
The court shall, whenever relief is granted based on an attorney's affidavit of fault, direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties.”
Defendant Jordan Bako seeks discretionary relief based on claimed mistake, inadvertence, and excusable neglect.