Kaar v. Arka Luxury Windows and Doors

Here, the FACC alleges “Cross-Defendants intentionally and maliciously posted online reviews asserting false and defamatory statements of fact which were not protected by any privilege and made with the intent to injure Cross-Complainant.” (FACC ¶ 16.)

ARKA sets forth the specific statements allegedly made by Moving Party (FACC ¶ 20), which, as discussed below, could reasonably be deemed to be assertions of fact and not mere opinion and also have a natural tendency to injure ARKA in its business. The allegations in the FACC are sufficient at the pleading stage. “To survive a demurrer, the complaint need only allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part of the plaintiff's proof need not be alleged.” (C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872.) The demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Non-Actionable Opinion: The sine qua non of recovery for defamation ... is the existence of falsehood. [Citation.] Because the statement must contain a provable falsehood, courts distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion for purposes of defamation liability. Although statements of fact may be actionable as libel, statements of opinion are constitutionally protected. [Citation.] [Citation.] That does not mean that statements of opinion enjoy blanket protection. [Citation.] To the contrary, where an expression of opinion implies a false assertion of fact, the opinion can constitute actionable defamation. [Citation.] The critical question is not whether a statement is fact or opinion, but whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact.” (GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141, 155-156, internal citations and quotations omitted.)

The statements attributed to Moving Party declare that Moving Party paid four times more for the doors than what the supplier charges, and a consumer can purchase the doors directly from the supplier at a quarter (or a third) of ARKA’s prices. (See FACC ¶ 20.) A reasonable fact finder could conclude these factually specific statements are assertions of fact and not mere opinion or rhetorical hyperbole. It cannot be said as a matter of law that the statements attributed to Moving Party are non-actionable assertions.

The demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Malice: Moving Party argues the FACC does not plead facts supporting actual malice. (See ZL Technologies, Inc. v. Does 1-7 (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 603, 631-632 [“[I]f a plaintiff in a defamation case involving a matter of public concern seeks presumed damages, because the statements are libelous per se (Civ. Code § 45a), it must prove actual malice, i.e., that defendant knew the complainedof speech was false or acted with reckless disregard of whether it was false.”].)

Actual malice can reasonably be inferred from the allegations in the FACC pertaining to alleged verbal threats and posting of multiple online reviews in different names. (See FACC ¶¶ 12, 13, 21, 22.) The allegations appear sufficient to demonstrate at least a reckless disregard of whether the statements at issue were false as the allegations could show Moving Party had some ulterior motive to lie about ARKA’s services.

The demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Special Damages for Libel Per Quod: Moving Party contends to the extent any alleged defamatory meaning is not apparent on its face, the defamation claim sounds in libel per quod and requires special damages, which are not pleaded.

“Libel per se is distinguished from libel per quod in Civil Code section 45a (Citation): ‘A libel which is defamatory of the plaintiff without the necessity of explanatory matter, such as an inducement, innuendo or other extrinsic fact, is said to be a libel on its face. Defamatory language not libelous on its face is not actionable unless the plaintiff alleges and proves that he has suffered special damage as a proximate result thereof...’” (Barnes-Hind, Inc. v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 377, 382.) Libel per se includes statements which impute to a party, in connection with the sale of goods, fraud, dishonesty or questionable business methods. (Id., at 385-386.)

The statements pertaining to excessive charging such as ARKA charging “four times more compared to the actual supplier,” would reasonably appear to be libelous on their face as they could be deemed to impute dishonesty in ARKA’s profession and thus pleading special damages would not be required. “The courts have manifested liberality, at the pleading stage, in finding libel per se. Thus it has been said to be ‘error for a court to rule that a publication cannot be defamatory on its face when by any reasonable interpretation the language is susceptible of a defamatory meaning.’” (Barnes-Hind, Inc., supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at 385.)

The demurrer on this ground is OVERRULED.

Injunctive Relief: Moving Party argues that the prayer for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief compelling removal of the challenged online statements is legally improper as a prior restraint on speech. An improper remedy demanded in the complaint is not a ground for demurrer. (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1561-1562.) This argument thus does not support dismissal of the defamation cause of action.

Request for Judicial Notice: ARKA’s request for judicial notice is DENIED. It appears ARKA seeks to have the Court consider the substance of these declarations, which is not proper in ruling on a demurrer. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

Counsel for ARKA shall give notice. 7 Desmond v. The Motion to Compel Binding Arbitration, filed on 11/21/25 by Hyundai Motor Defendant Hyundai Motor America (HMA) is DENIED. America HMA has failed to show that the parties entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate here. HMA asserts that Plaintiff Alicia