motion for attorney fees and costs
Cal.App.5th 770, 782, citing Hanson v. Grode (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 601, 607, Powell v. Kleinman (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 112, 125-126, and Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 189, [“a reasoned explanation required in an expert declaration filed in opposition to a summary judgment motion need not be as detailed or extensive as that required in expert testimony presented in support of a summary judgment motion or at trial”].)
Based on the conflicting expert declarations, the Court finds a question of fact exists as to breach and causation.
Defendant’s Objections to Meredith Declaration are OVERRULED.
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Plaintiffs are ordered to give notice of this ruling. 2 National Before the Court is an unopposed motion to quash service of the Funding, Inc. summons and complaint filed by defendant Mortaza Sayed v. AAA Air (Defendant). Conditioning and Heating A motion to quash service of the summons can be brought for lack Services, Inc. of personal jurisdiction based on improper service of process. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 418.10, subd. (a)(1); Summers v. McClanahan (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 413.) The Court already determined service was improper when it vacated the default and default judgment against Defendant. (ROA 104.)
Defendant shall provide notice of this ruling. 3 Tumarin v. Before the Court is a motion for attorney fees and costs filed by Birch Strategic plaintiff/cross-defendant Inna Tumarin (Cross-Defendant). For the Capital, LLC reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $30,038.25.
The Court determined cross-defendant is the prevailing party the the anti-SLAPP motion such that she is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees under Section 425.16, subdivision (c). (ROA 71.)
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“A prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion is entitled to seek fees and costs ‘incurred in connection with’ the anti-SLAPP motion itself, but is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred for the entire action.” (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 426, 433.)
“The California Supreme Court has upheld the lodestar method for determining the appropriate amount of attorney fees for a prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Mann v. Quality Old Times Serv., Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 342.) Under this method, a court assesses attorneys’ fees by first determining the time spent and the reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney. (Ibid.) The court next determines whether that lodestar figure should be adjusted based on various relevant factors. (Ibid.)
Hourly rate: A “reasonable” hourly rate is the prevailing rate charged by attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 C4th 1084, 1095; Chacon v. Litke (2010) 181 CA4th 1234, 1260.) The court may rely on personal knowledge and familiarity with the legal market in setting a reasonable hourly rate. (Heritage Pac. Fin., LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1009; 569 E. County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal. App. 5th 426, 437.) In this case, the Court finds the following rates to be the prevailing rate in Orange County based on the attorney’s skill and level of experience: Joseph Preis (JP) - $600; Joshua Mino (JM) - $600; Richard Angel (RA) - $450; and Kris Amundsen (KA) - $450.
Hours Expended: “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Horsford v Board of Trustees of California State University (2005)132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) “The party opposing the fee award can be expected to identify the particular charges it considers objectionable. A reduced award might be fully justified by a general observation that an attorney overlitigated a case or submitted a padded bill or that the opposing party has stated valid objections.” (Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 101.) The court will reduce the hours it determines were excessive or not supported. (Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816; Christian Research Institute v. Ahor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1326-29.)
The Court strikes the times entries unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion. (569 East County Boulevard LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at 433 [“a fee award under the anti-SLAPP motion may not include matters unrelated to the anti- SLAPP motion”]). These include time entries for RA on 06/03/25 (0.60), 06/04/25 (1.90), 06/09/25 (4.70), 06/16/25 (1.20), 06/16/25 (0.60), 06/20/25 (0.50), 07/02/25 (0.80), 07/09/25 (0.30), 07/16/25 (0.20), 07/30/25 (0.50), 09/24/25 (0.50) 09/25/25 (0.40), 10/01/25 (1.70), 10/02/25 (3.40), 10/02/25 (0.40) and 10/03/25 (0.30) for a total reduction of 18 hours; time entries for JM on 06/16/25 (0.90), 07/03/25 (0.30), 09/25/25 (0.20) for a total reduction of 1.4 hours; time entries for JP on 07/03/25 (0.20), 07/16/25 (0.20), 09/24/25 (0.30), 10/03/25 (1.6), 10/03/25 (1.70) for a total reduction of 4 hours.
The Court also denies the following expenses which are unrelated to the anti- SLAPP motion: 07/01/25 ($149.05), 07/01/25 ($218.49) and 07/03/25 ($17.05).
The Court reduces time entries containing block-billing for tasks unrelated to the anti-SLAPP motion by two-thirds. (Bell v. Vista Unified School District (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 689 [“trial court should exercise its discretion in assigning a reasonable percentage to the entries, or simply cast them aside”]; In re Marriage of Nassimi (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 667, 695). These include time entries for RA on 06/16/25 (0.60), 06/23/25 (0.60), 06/25/25 (0.90), 06/26/25 (0.20), 10/06/25 (0.30) for a total 2/3 reduction of 1.70
hours; and time entries for JP on 06/16/25 (2.80), 06/23/25 (2.30), 06/25/25 (1.30), 10/06/25 (2.10), and 10/10/25 (0.80) for a total 2/3 reduction of 6.2 hours.
The Court also reduces the amount of anticipated time in preparing the reply and attending the hearing on this fee motion by 2 hours.
The Court thus awards the lodestar as follows:
Attorney Hours Hourly Total Rate Joseph M Preis 18.5 $600 $11,100 Joshua R. Mino 3.2 $600 $1,920 Richard Angel 23.5 $450 $10,575 Kris L. Amundsen 6.0 $450 $2,700 Anticipated Hours 8 $450 $3,600 TOTAL 69.2 $29,895
The Court also awards costs in the amount of $143.25. The sum total of attorney fees and costs awarded is $30,038.25.
Counsel for Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant shall provide notice of this ruling. 4 Rodriguez Before the court is the motion of defendant Maria De Lourdes Hernandez v. Ledesma (Ledesma) challenging the application for good faith Ledesma settlement filed by defendant Ramon Villalbaso Hernandez (Villalbaso). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is DENIED.
The only argument Ledesma makes to contest the application for determination of good faith settlement is that Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6 are inapplicable to Ledesma because she contends she was not involved in the car accident giving rise to this lawsuit and thus she cannot be considered a joint tortfeasor with Villalbaso. As Ledesma acknowledges, the good faith settlement provisions apply to “one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort, or to one or more other co-obligors mutually subject to contribution rights.” (Code Civ. Proc., §877, emphasis added.) In addition, Section 877.6 applies “to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors.” (Code Civ. Proc., §877.6, emphasis added.)
Here, plaintiff Jose A. Rodriguez Hernandez (Plaintiff) has alleged claims against both Villalbaso and Ledesma arising out of the same accident. The good faith settlement provisions thus apply to the instant settlement and to Ledesma. Ledesma cites no authority supporting her interpretation of the statutes. Moreover, the only evidence offered by Ledesma to support her contention she was not involved in the subject accident is the declaration of her counsel stating Ledesma has maintained she was not involved. This hearsay statement offered by counsel is insufficient to establish Ledesma was not involved in the accident.
The court has reviewed the application for determination of good faith settlement filed by Villalbaso and has determined that an