Sethi vs. Telecare Assisted Outpatient Treatment

Plaintiffs alleges that they entered into a warranty contract with Defendant. (Complaint, ¶7.)

This is sufficient to trigger a duty to disclose on the part of Defendant. (See Dhital, supra., 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 [rejecting Nissan’s similar arguments because plaintiffs alleged the manufacturer backed the car with an express warranty]; see Kiluk v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 334, 337, 343 [manufacturer stepped into the role of the distributor and retail seller by issuing an express warranty]; see Fortune v. Nissan North America, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Feb. 16, 2023, No. 22-CV-05247- KAW) 2023 WL 2065043, at *5 [transactional relationship where manufacturer issued a warranty].)

In any event, “it is clear in California that an action for deceit does not require contractual privity.” (Shapiro v. Sutherland (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1549.) This is true because “a defendant cannot escape liability if he or she makes a representation to one person while intending or having reason to expect that it will be repeated to and acted upon by the plaintiff.” (Id. at 1548.)

Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendant was aware of a serious, and potentially hazardous, underlying defect with its 10R80 automatic transmission used in the 2022 F-150 or its related components. (See, e.g., Complaint ¶¶ 24-32). However, the Complaint does not allege with particularity that Defendant concealed any of this information, relying instead on bare conclusions. Nor does the Complaint allege that Defendant influenced anyone who did have direct communications with Plaintiff regarding the vehicle to withhold any of this information. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained for failure to plead the element of concealment with particularity.

Defendant shall provide notice.

10 Sethi vs. Telecare Motion for Protective Order Assisted Outpatient Treatment Motion for Protective Order

Defendant Del Caprio Holdings, LLC’s Motion for Protective Order is GRANTED in part. (Code Civ. Proc. §2030.090, subd. (b)(6).) Defendant Del Caprio Holdings, LLC is excused from providing a response to Plaintiff’s Form Interrogatories – General (Set One), Interrogatory Nos. 12.1 and 12.2 that discloses the identity of non-party residents of the Telehealth facility pending the entry of a stipulated protective order providing a procedure for the handling of these nonparties’ private information.

Accordingly, the Parties are hereby ORDERED to meet and confer regarding the parameters of a stipulated protective order that will ensure the private information of non-party residents of Telehealth who may be witnesses to the subject matter of this lawsuit is adequately protected and that they are given notice and a potential opportunity to object to any disclosure of their identities prior to any production.

Pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §2030.090, subd. (b)(6), “[t]he court, for good cause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or other natural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, or undue burden and expense.” (Code Civ. Proc., §2030.090, subd. (b)(6).)

Any motion for protective order “shall be” accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020, subd. (a).) Section 2016.040, in turn, requires a supporting meet and confer declaration to “state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” Moving Defendant has complied with this requirement. (See Declaration of Thomas R. Nigro at ¶7, Ex. B.)

The burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show “good cause” for whatever order is sought. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255; Stadish v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1145.) “The concept of good cause . . . calls for a factual exposition of a reasonable ground for the sought order.” (Goodman v. Citizens Life & Cas. Ins. Co. (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 807, 819.) Proof on the question of good cause is presented through declarations and counterdeclarations. (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 389.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 2017.020, the “court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Accord, Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.090, subd. (b) [re interrogatories].)

The party claiming a violation of the constitutional right of privacy must “[1] establish a legally protected privacy interest, [2] an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, [3] and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552, citing Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 35-37). The court must balance whether the invasion of the privacy interest is justified by a competing interest. (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 38.)

While the party seeking the discovery need not always show a “compelling need” for the discovery, “when a discovery request seeks information implicating the constitutional right of privacy, to order discovery simply upon a showing that the Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010 test for relevance has been met is an abuse of discretion.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 556.) The discovery must be “directly relevant” and it is not enough if the discovery might lead to admissible evidence. (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 526, disapproved of on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.)

“Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless.” (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224, citation omitted.)

With respect to “contact information,” like home addresses and phone numbers, courts have recognized a privacy interest exists, but have not viewed this information as “particularly sensitive.” (See County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Com. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 927 [noting that non-union employees of county had a privacy interest in their home addresses and that “home contact information is generally considered private”; nevertheless, in balancing this interest with the union’s “duty of fair representation” to both members and nonmembers, the balance favored disclosure]; Life Technologies Corp. v.

Superior Court (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 640, 653, disapproved in part by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557, fn. 8 [rejecting argument that no serious invasion of privacy interests was implicated by seeking disclosure of identities/contact information for nonparty employees and former employees of defendant corporation where nothing in the record suggests these third parties were witnesses to the discriminatory acts plaintiff allegedly suffered] compare Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1253-1254 [in wage and hour action, former employees were entitled to residential contact information of “all potential witnesses” identified in employer’s interrogatory responses; “Nothing could be more ordinary in discovery than finding out the location of identified witnesses so that they may be contacted and additional investigation performed”].)

Here, there is a legitimate third-party privacy interest in the identities of and contact information for the non-party residents of the sober living home where the incident took place – although the level of intrusion at issue here is relatively small [limited to only identity and contact information for residents].

Plaintiff’s characterization of this discovery as merely seeking contact information of percipient witnesses lacks any nuance. Plaintiffs seek the identification of recipients of medical treatment for substance dependency. Thus, by obtaining contact information in response to these interrogatories, the fact that they did solicit/receive treatment at a sober-living home for recovering drug addicts will also necessarily be disclosed. Here, the question is whether there is legally protectable privacy interest in the fact of obtaining treatment from a sober living drug addiction rehabilitation facility; whether there is an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in this information; and whether disclosing such information would seriously jeopardize that privacy interest.

Plaintiff contends that since these individuals are percipient witnesses, their identities are relevant to Plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff is correct that the disclosure of these third parties’ names and contact information might not constitute a violation of CMIA. However, under our Constitution, these third parties nevertheless have a reasonable expectation of privacy in having sought drug addiction treatment, and in their contact information. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1; see also Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252 [finding a legitimate expectation of privacy in addresses and telephone numbers].)

Since these residents may very well be percipient witnesses to the incident who have useful information concerning the allegations of the complaint, discovery of their identities should not be completely precluded. However, there must be some procedure in place to protect their privacy interests.

Moving Defendant shall provide notice.