QUALITY LOAN SERVICE CORP VS. ALL CLAIMANTS TO SURPLUS FUNDS, ET AL.

(3) To satisfy the outstanding balance of obligations secured by any junior liens or encumbrances in the order of their priority.

July 28, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 23 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

(4) To the trustor or the trustor's successor in interest. In the event the property is sold or transferred to another, to the vested owner of record at the time of the trustee's sale.

(Civil Code § 2924k, subd. (a).)

Each claimant in a dispute under Civil Code section 2924k has their own burden to prove each fact essential to their claim. (MTC Financial Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 742, 749; Evid. Code, § 500.)

Renee’s claim is granted.

The Court need not and does not rule on Boren’s objections filed July 23, 2026 to the supplemental declaration of Nicholas Flegel because the court did not rely upon his declaration for the ruling.

The Trustee’s Sale Guarantee attached to the Petition shows a junior lien recorded by Renee in 2017 for $350,000. (Petition, Exh. 5.) This lien takes priority over Boren’s claim as a vested owner of record at the time of the sale.

Renee provides a declaration stating that Richard never made any payments on the Installment Note. (Renee Decl., ¶ 4.) The Installment Note states that Richard agrees to pay Renee $350,000 at the rate of 7% interest per annum. (Id., Exh. A.) The note also provides that if obligated to institute legal action to enforce the note, the prevailing party shall recover attorney’s fees and costs. (Ibid.) Thus, Renee seeks $350,000 unpaid principal, $228,666.67 interest through July 28, 2026, $435 costs and $19,761.89 in attorneys’ fees for a total of $598,863.56.

Boren argues that Renee’s claim should be reduced to either $164,000 or $198,432.70 because Renee has not provided evidence showing she actually loaned Richard $350,000. However, as Boren acknowledges, a written instrument is presumptive evidence of consideration. (Civil Code, § 1614.) Boren has not rebutted this presumptive evidence. Further, this action is distinguishable from In re McConnell’s Estate (1936) 6 Cal.2d 493, 499-500. In that case, the respondent paid no consideration on the transfer of the note and the evidence conclusively established that the note was unsupported by consideration. (Id., at p. 499.) In contrast, Renee produced documents showing that she advanced funds to Richard at various times. (Rene Decl., ¶ 2, Exh. A, B.)

Boren also challenges the interest and attorney’s fees incurred after the Trustee’s sale. Boren relies on Civil Code section 2924j which provides that a written claim to the trustee include the “amount of the claim to the date of the trustee’s sale.” (See Civil Code § 2924j, subd. (a)(4)(A).) Civil Code section 2924j(a) addresses notice that is required to be provided by a trustee regarding the surplus proceeds from the sale. Section 2924k, as set forth above, does not include such qualifying language. It provides for payment “[t]o satisfy the outstanding balance of obligations secured by an any junior liens or encumbrances in the order of their priority.” (Civil Code, § 2924k(a)(3).) Thus, it instructs the proceeds be paid to satisfy the outstanding balance.

July 28, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 24 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________

Accordingly, Renee’s claim is GRANTED for $598,863.56.

Boren’s claim is denied.

Boren claims that he is entitled to the remainder of the surplus proceeds because he was the vested owner of record at the time of the Trustee’s sale. However, he has failed to meet his burden of proof to demonstrate that he was the vested owner of record at the time of the Trustee’s sale.

The Trustee’s Sale Guarantee attached to the Petition shows that a deed of trust was recorded in 2019 in favor of Boren for a $350,000 loan to Richard. Boren provides a copy of this note. (Brian Boren Decl., ¶ 4, and Exh. 1.) In 2021, Richard defaulted in making payments on the note. (Id., at ¶ 10.) Boren instituted non-judicial foreclosure proceedings by recording a Substitution of Trustee and a Notice of Default in 2022. (Id., at ¶ 11, and Exhs. 4 and 5.) These recorded documents are stated in the Trustee’s Sale Guarantee, along with a Notice of Trustee’s Sale recorded on October 28, 2022.

Boren claims that it then entered into two Forbearance Agreements with Richard to avoid foreclosure. (Id., at ¶ 12.) Under one of these agreements, Richard waived and released any claims arising out of the note and deed of trust if he defaulted under the Forbearance Agreements. (Ibid.) Boren has not provided a copy of these Forbearance Agreements though, Boren demonstrates no personal knowledge of the transaction and provides no facts to support the contentions.

Boren then states that it foreclosed on its lien by credit bid at a foreclosure sale on July 30, 2025. (Boren Decl., ¶ 12.) The Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded on September 18, 2025. (Id., at ¶ 12, and Exh. 6.) Boren’s Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale shows up in the Trustee’s Sale Guarantee as recorded the day after the Trustee recorded its Notice of Sale on September 17, 2025. Boren’s sale of the property took place on September 17, 2025. However, the Trustee’s Sale Guarantee does not show a Notice of Trustee’s Sale recorded by Boren for this sale. Therefore, there is no evidence that Boren owned the property at the time of the Trustee’s sale.

Thus, Boren’s claim is DENIED.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, Renee’s counsel shall prepare a written order consistent with the Court's ruling for the Court's signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.