In the Matter of: Jeffrey Macomber

26CV011782: IN THE MATTER OF: JEFFREY MACOMBER 07/27/2026 Hearing on Petition to Release Property-Mechanic's Lien in Department 8C

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING

***NOTICE: THIS MATTER WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 11B OF THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G STREET SACRAMENTO, CA. PARTIES APPEARING REMOTELY VIA ZOOM SHOULD ENSURE THAT THEY ARE USING THE CORRECT ZOOM LINK AND/OR ZOOM MEETING ID FOR DEPARTMENT 11B, WHICH ARE PROVIDED ABOVE.***

TENTATIVE RULING:

Petitioner Jeffrey Macomber (“Petitioner”) filed his petition for an order to show cause (“OSC”) why lien or encumbrance should not be stricken and released on May 7, 2026.

This petition arises from a UCC Financing Statement No. U250106730217, filed with the California Secretary of State by Respondent Lonnie Glenn Schmidt (“Respondent”) on January 28, 2025. This Financing Statement claims a lien on “All of Debtor’s property,” referencing Security Agreement No. LGS-9589071052701006772134-JM-CDCR effective December 31, 2024. (Pet., Exh. A.)

Petitioner is the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). (Macomber Decl., ¶ 1.) Petitioner declares that the UCC Financing Statement is false and that “[t]here is, in fact, no security agreement, commercial transaction, contractual or other relationship that would give the respondent a security interest or lien against my assets or property.” (Id., ¶ 2.)

The Court set this OSC initially for July 8. Prior to that hearing, Petitioner had not been able to give notice of the Court’s Tentative Ruling system pursuant to Local Rule 1.06. The Court continued the hearing to July 15. There was no fault in service of the motion

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV011782: IN THE MATTER OF: JEFFREY MACOMBER 07/27/2026 Hearing on Petition to Release Property-Mechanic's Lien in Department 8C

papers.

Respondent filed a “Response to Tentative Ruling” on July 13. The “Response” is, in substance, a late-filed opposition to the Petition. In the Response, Respondent contends that a “Notice By Written Communication/Security Agreement” (“Security Agreement”) dated October 30, 2024, provides a valid basis for the financing statement. (See Respondent’s Exhibits, Exh. A [Security Agreement].) Respondent states that “The Security Agreement arose from a civil damages demand served on Petitioner by certified mail on February 22, 2023, while Respondent remained in custody.” (Resp., at p. 2:16–17.)

The Court continued the July 13 hearing to this date to allow Petitioner a reply and now rules on the merits.

Petitioner’s unopposed request for judicial notice dated May 7, 2026, is granted. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (c).) The Court takes judicial notice only of the “official acts” of the Secretary of State: that a lien search for Petitioner’s name returned only UCC Financing Statement No. U250106730217 and that the Secretary of State accepted and maintains this record in its files. (See Stevens v. Super. Ct. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 607–608.) The Court does not accept the truth of the contents of the lien record itself. (Ibid.)

Petitioner’s second request for judicial notice dated July 30, 2026, is denied. An adverse party must be given the opportunity to object to a request for judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 453.) Further delay in this matter is unwarranted, and the records requested to be noticed are not necessary for determination of this ruling.

Code of Civil Procedure section 765.010 provides, in relevant part:

(b) A person shall not file or record, or direct another to file or record, a lawsuit, lien, or other encumbrance, including a notice of lis pendens, against another person or entity knowing it is false, with the intent to harass the person or entity or to influence or hinder the person in discharging his or her official duties if the person is a public officer or employee.

(c)(1) A person or entity whose property is subject to a lien or encumbrance in violation of this section may petition the superior court of the county in which the person or entity resides or in which the property is located for an order, which may be granted ex parte, directing the lien or other encumbrance claimant to appear at a hearing before the court and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV011782: IN THE MATTER OF: JEFFREY MACOMBER 07/27/2026 Hearing on Petition to Release Property-Mechanic's Lien in Department 8C

show cause why the lien or other encumbrance should not be stricken and other relief provided by this article should not be granted.

(2) The court shall schedule the hearing no earlier than 14 days after the date of the order. The scheduled date of the hearing shall allow adequate time for notice of the hearing.

(Code Civ. Proc., § 765.010, subds. (b)–(c).) If the court determines the lien or encumbrance violates Section 765.010, subdivision (b), the court must issue an order striking and releasing the lien. (Id., § 765.030.) Furthermore, the court may award attorney’s fees and must award a civil penalty of up to $5,000. (Id., §§ 765.030, 765.040.)

Respondent argues that because the Security Agreement is valid, he did not file the Financing Statement “knowing it to be false.” (Resp., p. 1:24–25.) But Respondent fails to provide any reasonable justification for filing the Financing Statement.

The Security Agreement, upon which the Financing Statement is based, relates to Respondent’s allegations that he was falsely imprisoned and had funds seized by CDCR. (Security Agreement, p. 2, ¶ 1.) The Security Agreement purports to require Petitioner to admit Respondent’s allegations and redeposit the allegedly seized funds within 3 days of receipt of the Security Agreement or agree to pay Petitioner $100,000,000 plus $100,000 “for each and every day of continued deprivation of the liberty” of Petitioner. (Id., p. 2, ¶ 3.) The Security Agreement further purports to create a security interest in the same amount. (Id., pp. 3–5.) Respondent declares that he served the Security Agreement on Petitioner on or about October 30, 2024. (Schmidt Decl., ¶ 3.)

The Court finds the Security Agreement to have no legal effect as to Petitioner. A party’s consent is an essential element to any contract. (Civ. Code., § 1550.) Respondent provides no evidence that Petitioner consented to the Security Agreement. Petitioner did not sign the Security Agreement. Instead, Respondent typed Petitioner’s name onto the signature line. (See Security Agreement, p. 7, definition of “Signature”.) Petitioner’s failure to respond to Respondent’s service of the Security Agreement is not consent because “silence or inaction does not constitute acceptance of an offer.” (Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1385–1386.) Absent Petitioner’s consent to the Security Agreement, it is a nullity that does not support the Financing Statement.

Further, the purported Security Agreement exists not only outside of law but also

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV011782: IN THE MATTER OF: JEFFREY MACOMBER 07/27/2026 Hearing on Petition to Release Property-Mechanic's Lien in Department 8C

outside of common sense. It is beyond ordinary experience in ordered society that an unsolicited agreement would bind the recipient to indebtedness of more than one hundred million dollars unless the person agrees unconditionally to its terms. Respondent’s argument is absurd. The Court finds that Respondent could not reasonably believe the Security Agreement to be a valid or binding contract.

On this basis, the Court finds that Respondent filed the Financing Statement knowing it to be false and with the intent to harass. As used here, “harass” means to engage in knowing and willful conduct that serves no legitimate purpose. (Code Civ. Proc., § 765.010, subd. (a)(1).) Respondent admits that his grievance against Petitioner arises from Respondent’s imprisonment. (See, e.g., Schmidt Decl., ¶ 5.) Respondent could have sought redress through administrative process or civil action. Instead, Respondent made something up. This is knowing and willful conduct that serves no legitimate purpose.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the petition and orders UCC Financing Statement No. U250106730217, on January 28, 2025, to be struck and released. Petitioner shall prepare an order for the Court’s review and signature directing the California Secretary of State to expunge and remove the lien from its index.

Petitioner’s request that a $5,000 penalty be awarded against Respondent is GRANTED.

Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs is DENIED, without prejudice. A party seeking costs must file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1700.) A prevailing party seeking a reasonable award of statutory or contractual attorney's fees must do so by noticed motion after judgment is entered and within the time permitted for an appeal of the judgment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702.)

Petitioner shall prepare a formal order for the Court’s signature pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

This minute order is effective immediately.