SANCHEZ vs FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al.

If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiff Sanchez’s motion to compel defendant Ford Motor Company’s (“FMC”) further responses to the former’s Requests for Production, Set One, is ruled upon as follows.

*** If oral argument is requested, the parties must at the time oral argument is requested notify the clerk and the opposing party of the specific discovery requests that will be addressed at the hearing. The parties are also reminded that pursuant to local rules, only limited oral argument is permitted on law and motion

24CV016458: SANCHEZ vs FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to plf's Request for Production of Docs, Set One in Department 53

matters. ***

Although the notice of demurrer provides notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06, the notice does not comply with that rule which distinguishes between matters filed before the Presiding Judge (Rule 1.06(E)) and matters filed in the assigned law & motion department (Rule 1.06(D)). Moving counsel directed to review the Local Court Rules, effective 1/1/2025.

The moving points & authorities do not comply with the page limitations set forth in California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(d) and moving counsel failed to timely seek or obtain leave of Court to file an oversized memorandum as required by Rule 3.1113(e).) Moving counsel is advised that failure to comply with these and other applicable Rules of Court may result in the denial of future motions.

Plaintiff’s moving separate statement suggests defendant FMC’s responses to the subject discovery requests included certain objections which were not actually included anywhere in FMC’s responses and not expressly asserted in response to any individual request (i.e., “equally available,” “vague and ambiguous,” “not reasonably calculated” and “trade secret”). Thus, it remains unclear why the moving separate statement argued such objections were improperly asserted by FMC and moving counsel is advised to avoid such impertinent and misleading argument from future filings.

Factual Background

This is a “lemon law” action relating to a 2019 Lincoln Navigator which plaintiff purchased in May 2020. The complaint filed in August 2024 alleges the subject vehicle suffers from various defects and nonconformities relating to the electrical, structural, transmission, engine, steering, suspension and emission systems (Compl., ¶11) and it asserts several causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act, as well as a common law claim against a local dealership for negligent repair.

The parties submitted in January 2025 a proposed stipulated protective order regarding certain information and/or documents expected to be exchanged during this litigation. However, it was rejected by the Court and has not been resubmitted. The parties are reminded that protective orders governing the use and disclosure certain sensitive, proprietary and/or confidential information are typically entered in “lemon law” like this one and thus, the parties should promptly meet-and-confer on a revised proposed protective order. If the parties are able to reach an agreement, they may submit the revised proposed protective order for the Court’s consideration but if no agreement can be reached, FMC may need to proceed by a noticed motion for protective order.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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In late October 2024, plaintiff served FMC with a first set of Requests for Production consisting of 31 individual requests, all of which are at issue in this motion. FMC responded in late November 2024, asserting a variety of objections but also agreeing to produce at least some responsive documents, some of which would only be produced subject to a protective order. In response to a few requests, FMC did not agree to produce any responsive documents (i.e., Request Nos. 19, 22, 30.) FMC subsequently provided a verification for its responses and on 12/19/2024, plaintiff emailed a 14-page meet-and-confer letter which ultimately demanded FMC provide a written response to the letter by 12/26/2024.

According to the moving declaration, FMC did not respond to this letter but based on the opposition papers, FMC did provide a written response on 1/16/2025, shortly before this motion was ultimately filed on 2/6/2025.

Additionally, the Court notes that FMC did provide (concurrently with its opposition to this motion) a “supplemental” (but unverified) response to Request No. 30, which “incorporated” all prior objections but agreed to “produce documents sufficient to identify customer complaints or concerns in California regarding vehicles that are of the same year, make, and model as Plaintiff’s vehicle, which is a 2019 Lincoln Navigator 4x4 Reserve equipped with a 3.5L V6 engine and a 10-Speed Automatic Transmission (10R80), involving the symptoms from Plaintiff’s repair records allegedly exhibited in Plaintiff’s vehicle.”

Moving Papers. Plaintiff contends his Requests for Production (“RFP”) merely seek documents relating to his own vehicle, defendant FMC’s warranty and replacement/repurchase policies and procedures, and defendant FMC’s knowledge of the same and similar defects in other vehicles of the same make, model and year as plaintiff’s vehicle. (Not. of Mot., p.2:17-21.) Claiming that defendant FMC has asserted “boilerplate objections that are not Code-compliant” and “failed to produce many of the responsive documents” (Id., at p.2:22-24), plaintiff now seeks an order striking defendant FMC’s “meritless objections and compelling further responses and all responsive documents within ten calendar days.” (Id., at p.3:2-5.)

According to the moving separate statement, the 31 RFP at issue in this motion seek documents relating to the following:

(1) Plaintiff’s own 2019 Lincoln Navigator (RFP Nos. 1-14); (2) Defendant FMC’s “policies and procedures for handling Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Cases” (RFP Nos. 15-22); (3) Defendant FMC’s “warranty policy and the procedure used for handling warranty issues” (RFP Nos. 23-29); and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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(4) “Information regarding similar customer complaints in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle” (RFP Nos. 30-31). (Mov. Sep. Stm., p.2:7-13.)

Opposition. Defendant FMC opposes, arguing this should be denied since (1) FMC “properly responded, supplemented, and/or objected to each of these Requests in compliance with California Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.240” and (2) FMC “properly objected to Request Nos. 1-4, 6, 8-9, and 12-30 because they potentially seek privileged information, given that they seek the production of “all” documents or “any” documents related to each Request” and “may include communications between [FMC] and its attorneys or attorney work product.” (Opp., p.1:6-8; p.2:1-5.)

Reply. In his reply, plaintiff argues defendant FMC “misrepresents the prevailing authority governing the scope of permissible discovery in Song-Beverly cases, and the discovery produced by Defendant.” (Reply, p.1:3-7.) This motion should be granted because the “opposition fails to assert any legitimate reason as to not produce the full range of discovery sought” and FMC “knows that the discovery will further bolster [its] willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act,” supporting plaintiff’s claim for civil penalties.” (Id., at p.2:7-10.)

The opposition fails to acknowledge that the documents produced consist “almost entirely of documents which Plaintiff already have [sic] available, including repair orders for the Subject Vehicle, the Owner’s and Warranty Manuals” but “[c]learly missing are the full breadth of documents including internal communications related to the Subject Vehicle, Defendant’s knowledge of the same or similar defects in other vehicles of the same year, make, and model, and any documents not produced based on one of Defendant’s near endless boilerplate objections.” (Id., at p.2:11-19.)

In the end, plaintiff asks for an order striking all objections and compelling verified, codecompliant responses, along with the production of responsive documents within 10 days. (Id., at p.7:2-4.)

Legal Standards for Discovery

“[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2017.010.) “In the absence of contrary court order, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad...[and] statutes governing discovery ‘must be construed liberally in favor of disclosure unless the request is clearly improper by virtue of well-established causes for denial.’ [Citation.]” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541; see also Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 355, 378 [“disclosure is a matter of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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right unless statutory or public policy considerations clearly prohibit it”].) Nevertheless, while civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. (Board of Registered Nursing v. Superior Court (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 1011, 1039 [citing Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223].) It cannot be based on pure speculation. (Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 227.)

The party seeking to resist discovery based upon objections has the burden to justify its objections. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 22 Cal.4th 245, 255 [citing Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 220-221].) Indeed, in the discovery context, information is relevant “if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement. [Citations omitted.] Admissibility is not the test and information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to admissible evidence.” (Lipton v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1611-1612 [italics in original].) “Any doubts regarding relevance are generally resolved in favor of allowing the discovery.” (Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 60, 98.)

“On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply: [¶] (1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete. [¶] (2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate. [¶] (3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.” (Code Civ. Proc. §2031.310(a).)

For requests for production, the burden is on the moving party to show both relevance to the subject matter and specific facts justifying discovery. (Glenfed Develop. Corp. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1117; Code Civ. Proc. §2031.310(b)(1) [requiring “good cause” for requests for production].) Once “good cause” is established by the moving party, the burden then shifts to the responding party to justify any objections made to document disclosure. (See, e.g., Hartbrodt v. Burke (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 168, 172-174.)

Discussion

Privilege Log. At the outset, the Court finds that FMC has objected to a number of these 31 RFP on grounds they seek information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine, as well as “the joint defense doctrine” and “the common interest doctrine.” Although the breadth of several of plaintiff’s RFP does potentially implicate the protections afforded to attorney-client communications and/or attorney work product, the opposition papers offer no legal or evidentiary support

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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for FMC’s objections based on “the joint defense doctrine” or “the common interest doctrine” and thus, these two objections are overruled. (See, e.g., Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 255 [party resisting discovery has burden to justify its objections].) To the extent any documents responsive to these RFP have been withheld from production based on either the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine, defendant FMC must (if not already done) also comply with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §2031.240(b) and (c).

Protective Order. Similarly, FMC has responded to a number of the subject RFP with a statement that some or all of the responsive documents will be produced “subject to a protective order” because such documents contain “confidential and proprietary information” which, if disclosed publicly, would result in “competitive and financial harm” to FMC. As the previously-submitted proposed protective order was rejected, the parties should promptly meet-and-confer on a revised protective order and if an agreement can be reached, a revised protective order may be submitted for the Court’s consideration. Otherwise, FMC may need to proceed by a noticed motion for protective order.

Additionally, as it is anticipated a protective order will ultimately be entered in this case and it will effectively address FMC’s concerns about information claimed to be “confidential and proprietary,” the Court need not specifically address in this ruling FMC’s objections based on the disclosure of “confidential and proprietary information” and FMC remains free to designate documents to be produced subject to such anticipated protective order.

Good Cause. Code of Civil Procedure §2031.310(b)(1) provides that a motion to compel further responses to requests for production must show “good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” Although the opposition does include a general argument that plaintiff has failed to establish “good cause” needed to justify further responses to the RFP (Opp., p.6:17-25), the Court disagrees. According to TBG Insur. Services Corp. v. Superior Court (Zieminski) (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 443, the “good cause” requirement of Code of Civil Procedure §2031.310(b)(1) is, in the absence of a “legitimate” claim of privilege or attorney work product, “met simply by a fact-specific showing of relevance” (Id., at 448) and this Court finds that the moving papers here, including the supporting separate statement, are sufficient to satisfy this initial burden and to effectively shift to defendant FMC to justify its objections to the subject RFP. (See, e.g., Hartbrodt v.

Burke, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at 172-174.)

RFP Nos. 1-14. As noted above, the moving separate statement characterizes these 14 RFP as seeking documents relating to plaintiff’s own Lincoln Navigator. Although

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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RFP No. 2 actually seeks all documents relating to the affirmative defenses alleged in defendant FMC’s Answer to Complaint, these opening RFP do specifically seek documents relating to the subject vehicle, its acquisition by plaintiff, its manuals and warranties, inspections, repairs, recalls, advisories, technical service bulletins (“TSB”) and/or communications about it including with plaintiff himself and/or third parties.

While FMC’s responses to these first 14 RFP included an agreement to produce at least some responsive documents, FMC also generally asserted the following objections (aside from the attorney-client privilege, attorney work product doctrine, “the joint defense doctrine” and/or “the common interest doctrine,” which were addressed above): (1) “Overly broad, unduly burdensome and irrelevant because it is not limited to a reasonable or relevant timeframe, to any particular inspection, to the components at issue, or to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint;” (2) “does not identify the documents sought with reasonable particularity;” (3) “seeks expert opinions and/or premature disclosure of documents developed by [FMC’s] experts and/or consultants;” and (4) “seeks documents not within [FMC’s] possession, custody or control.”

While it appears many of these first 14 RFP could have and should have been more carefully crafted so as to better describe the precise categories of documents sought by plaintiff, the Court finds that they are sufficient to enable defendant FMC to understand the types of documents being requested and notably, the opposition fails to proffer any meaningful argument to the contrary. Indeed, as noted above, defendant FMC has in response to each of these 14 RFP agreed to produce at least some of the documents which are responsive to these RFP.

This not only undermines any suggestion that these RFP fail to adequately identify the various categories of documents being requested but also implicitly confirms these RFP satisfy the liberal standards for discovery discussed above. Thus, defendant’s objections based of plaintiff’s failure to “identify the documents sought with reasonable particularity” shall be overruled.

For similar reasons, FMC’s objections based on these 14 RFP being “overly broad” and/or seeking “irrelevant documents” are insufficient to mandate denial of the present motion. As explained above, Code of Civil Procedure §2017.010 specifically provides that parties “may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” and case law further confirms that discovery in California is broad, with any dispute generally to be resolved in favor of disclosure unless there is a well-established ground for denial. (See, e.g., Williams v.

Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 541.) Additionally, published authority indicates that information is considered relevant “if it might

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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reasonably assist a party in evaluating its case, preparing for trial, or facilitating a settlement.” (Lipton v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at 1611-1612 [italics in original].) This Court holds that the array of documents sought by RFP Nos. 1-14 seek information which is sufficiently relevant to justify this discovery, especially in light of California liberal standards and this remains true even if these RFP could have been more narrowly tailored and/or if FMC believes they should have been more narrowly tailored. Consequently, FMC’s objections of “overly broad” and seeking “irrelevant documents” are overruled.

FMC’s “unduly burdensome” objections will also be overruled. The points & authorities in opposition offer no discernible or meaningful argument in an attempt to show any of these 14 RFP present any genuine undue burden and this alone could be construed as a waiver of such a contention. (See, e.g., Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1008 [“failure to offer reasoned analysis of the issue constitutes a waiver”]; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [when party fails to support assertion with reasoned argument and citations to authority, point is treated as waived].)

Regardless, the opposition papers (including the Won Declaration in opposition) provide no evidence which purports to describe the time and effort FMC and/or its counsel would need to expend in order to respond to any or all of these 14 RFP and as a result, the Court finds no valid evidentiary basis on which to sustain any of FMC’s “unduly burdensome” objections. (See, e.g., West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417 [objection based upon burden must be supported by evidence showing the quantum of work required and is incommensurate with the discovery sought]; (Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 12, 19 [time and expense required to respond to discovery so great and utility of information sought so minimal that it would defeat the ends of justice to require response]; Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 255 [party resisting discovery has burden to justify its objections].)

Defendant FMC’s objections based on these RFP calling for the production of documents that are not within FMC’s possession, custody or control are misguided and unjustified insofar as there is no legitimate dispute FMC is obligated to respond only with respect to those documents in its own possession, custody, or control. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc. §2031.010(b)-(e); §2031.220.) Moreover, §2031.220 expressly requires that a response which indicates an inability to comply with the particular RFP shall not only “affirm that a diligent search and a reasonable inquiry has been made in an effort to comply with that demand” and “specify whether the inability to comply is because the particular item or category has never existed, has been destroyed, has been lost, misplaced, or stolen, or has never been, or is no longer, in the possession,

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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custody, or control of the responding party” but also “set forth the name and address of any natural person or organization known or believed by that party to have possession, custody, or control of that item or category of item.” FMC’s response to RFP No. 12 does not comply with these express requirements of §2031.220.

Defendant FMC’s remaining objection based on the “premature disclosure of documents developed by [FMC’s] experts and/or consultants” was asserted in response to only three (3) of the first 14 RFP (i.e., RFP Nos. 2, 3 and 12) but in response to the last of these three, FMC confirmed that no responsive documents (i.e., photographs and videotapes of the vehicle) have been located. To the extent FMC has withheld from production any documents responsive to RFP Nos. 2 and 3 based on the protection of expert materials, FMC must (if not already done) also comply with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §2031.240(b) and (c).

In light of the foregoing, defendant FMC must provide further responses to each of these first 14 RFP without objections other than a valid assertion of the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product protection and with respect to RFP Nos. 2 and 3 only, a valid assertion of the protections currently afforded to the materials generated by FMC’s experts and/or consultants. To the extent FMC’s further responses include an agreement to comply with these RFP either in whole or in part, these further responses must also comply with all applicable provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §2031.240. Notably, §2031.240(b) explicitly states that if the responding party objects to a particular request, the response shall do both of the following:

(1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. (Underline added for emphasis.)

RFP Nos. 15-22. According to plaintiff, RFP Nos. 15-22 seek documents relating to defendant FMC’s “policies and procedures for handling Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act Cases” (Mov. Sep. Stm., p.2:6-10) and broadly speaking, this can be considered a fair characterization of these RFP to the extent they seek documents pertaining to the handling of customer complaints (RFP Nos. 16, 17, 19) and repurchasing or replacing vehicles (RFP Nos. 15, 18, 20-22).

In response to RFP Nos. 15-22, defendant FMC asserted the same array of objections (i.e., (1) “overly broad, unduly burdensome and irrelevant;” (2) “does not identify the documents sought with reasonable particularity;” and (3) seeks documents protected by

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine) but nevertheless agreed to produce at least some responsive documents except with respect to RFP Nos. 19 and 22.

For the reasons explained above, the Court overrules FMC’s objections of (1) “overly broad, unduly burdensome and irrelevant” and (2) “does not identify the documents sought with reasonable particularity.” To the extent defendant FMC has withheld documents responsive to RFP Nos. 15-22 based on either the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine, it must comply with Code of Civil Procedure §2031.240(b) and (c). In short, in the absence of a valid assertion of the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine, all documents responsive to RFP Nos. 15-22 are subject to discovery and where applicable, the production of responsive documents may be subject to the terms of the anticipated protective order.

Consistent with the foregoing, defendant FMC shall provide further responses to RFP Nos. 15-22 without objections other than a valid assertion of the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product protection and where applicable, FMC’s agreement to produce responsive documents may be subject to the provisions of a protective order.

RFP Nos. 23-29. Each of these RFP ask for FMC’s “Warranty Policy and Procedure Manuals,” generally relating to repairs and to determining whether repairs will be covered under warranty. Defendant FMC’s responses to these RFP were nearly identical in that FMC asserted the same array of objections which were made in response to RFP Nos. 15-22 (i.e., (1) “overly broad, unduly burdensome and irrelevant;” (2) “does not identify the documents sought with reasonable particularity;” and (3) seeks documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product doctrine) but FMC nevertheless agreed to produce at least some responsive documents, including but not limited to FMC’s “Warranty Policy and Procedure Manual applicable to 2022,” subject to a protective order.

The Court again overrules FMC’s objections of (1) “overly broad, unduly burdensome and irrelevant” and (2) “does not identify the documents sought with reasonable particularity” for the same reasons as cited above. Additionally, to the extent FMC maintains that RFP Nos. 23-29 encompass documents protected by the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product doctrine, FMC must also comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure §2031.240(b) and (c). Accordingly, defendant FMC must provide further responses to RFP Nos. 23-29 without objections other than a valid assertion of the attorney-client privilege and/or attorney work product protection but where applicable, FMC’s agreement to produce documents responsive to these RFP may be subject to the anticipated protective order.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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RFP Nos. 30-31. According to plaintiff, these final two RFP seek “[i]nformation regarding similar customer complaints in vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the Subject Vehicle.” (Mov. Sep. Stm., p.2:6-13.) More specifically, these RFP seek the following:

30. All DOCUMENTS, in the form of a list or compilation, of other Customer Complaints in YOUR electronically stored information of database(s) that are SUBSTANTIALLY SIMILAR to complaints made by Plaintiff with respect to the SUBJECT VEHICLE in other 2019 Lincoln Navigator vehicles.

31. All DOCUMENTS that refer to, reflect, or relate to any Field Service Action issued, or in the process of being issued, in response to complaints experienced by Plaintiff as described in Defendant’s warranty history/summary and within the line items of the repair orders created at Defendant’s authorized repair facility.

Although defendant FMC initially provided in November 2024 a response to RFP No. 30 consisting solely of objections, FMC recently served on 5/7/2025 a “supplemental” (but unverified) response which “incorporated” all prior objections but agreed to “produce documents sufficient to identify customer complaints or concerns in California regarding vehicles that are of the same year, make, and model as Plaintiff’s vehicle, which is a 2019 Lincoln Navigator 4x4 Reserve equipped with a 3.5L V6 engine and a 10-Speed Automatic Transmission (10R80), involving the symptoms from Plaintiff’s repair records allegedly exhibited in Plaintiff’s vehicle.” The Court construes FMC’s voluntary service of a “supplemental” (albeit unverified) response to RFP No. 30 as a concession that FMC’s initial response to this RFP was deficient and will therefore order FMC to provide a verification for this “supplemental” response to response to RFP No. 30. (To the extent defendant FMC may have already provided a verification for its “supplemental” response, FMC need not re-serve its response in order to comply with this ruling and to the extent moving plaintiff may contend FMC’s verified “supplemental” response to RFP No. 30 is deficient for any reason, plaintiff may file and serve an appropriate motion only after completing the requisite meet-and-confer process.)

With respect to RFP No. 31, FMC objected on the grounds of “overly broad, unduly burdensome and irrelevant because [this RFP] is not limited to a reasonable or relevant timeframe, to the subject vehicle, to any particular repair, to any particular recall, to the components or systems at issue, or to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint” but FMC nevertheless agreed to produce “the Field Service Action (“FSA”)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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history for the subject vehicle, including exemplar customer letter(s) and Dealer Bulletin(s) for FSA 21B10, FSA 22M03, and FSA 23S48, which were performed on the subject vehicle.” The Court overrules FMA’s objections to RFP No. 31 since the category of documents sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence relating to the specific allegations in this case, keeping in mind California’s liberal standard for the scope of permissible discovery, and since FMA’s opposition papers are entirely devoid of any evidentiary basis for its claim of undue burden, requiring evidence to show the time and/or effort needed to respond to discovery is disproportionately great in comparison to the benefit to be derived by the propounding party. (See, e.g., West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v.

Superior Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at 417 [evidentiary showing required to sustain objection based upon undue burden]; (Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at 19 [same] Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 22 Cal.4th at 255 [party resisting discovery has burden to justify its objections].) Accordingly, defendant FMC shall provide a further response without objections to this RFP.

Production of Documents. The Court notes that the moving papers in various places requests an order requiring defendant FMC to produce all documents responsive to plaintiff’s RFP. (See, Not. of Mot., p.3:2-5; Mov. MPA, p.19:2-5; Mov. Sep. Stm., p.17:8- 9, p.36:6-7, p.46:10-11; p.55:8-9.) To the extent this motion was intended to compel the actual production of responsive documents, that request is denied since plaintiff noticed only a motion to compel “further responses” pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §2031.310 rather than a motion to compel compliance pursuant to §2031.320. Additionally and notably, even if plaintiff had noticed both of these motions and sought both forms of relief in a single motion, plaintiff failed to pay the additional $60 filing fee for a motion to compel compliance pursuant to §2031.320.

Disposition

For the reasons explained above, plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant FMC’s further responses to the former’s first set of requests for production is GRANTED. Defendant FMC to provide verified further responses, consistent with the above-cited terms no later than 7/8/2025 (unless plaintiff agrees to a later date memorialized in writing). To the extent any documents responsive to these RFP are being withheld from production based on the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work product doctrine or some other valid basis, defendant FMC shall (if not already done) also comply with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §2031.240(b) and (c).

To the extent this motion also seeks to compel the actual production of responsive documents, it is DENIED on the grounds cited above.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV016458: SANCHEZ vs FORD MOTOR COMPANY, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, et al. 06/17/2025 Hearing on Motion to Compel Further Responses to plf's Request for Production of Docs, Set One in Department 53

Neither side requested monetary sanctions, so none are awarded.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.)