The Motion for Leave to Amend did not identify the changes in the proposed pleading as required by California Rules of Court rule 3.1324(a). Nor did the Declaration of Brian Ballo comply with California Rules of Court rule 3.1324(b).

While the Supplemental Declaration of Brian Ballo attempts to address this defect, “[i]t is elementary that points raised for the first time in a reply brief are not considered by the court.” (Magic Kitchen LLC v. Good Things Intern. Ltd. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1161.) Additionally, a trial court may require compliance with California Rules of Court rule 3.1324. (See Hataishi v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1454, 1469.)

In addition to the above, the Supplemental Declaration of Brian Ballo indicates Cross-Complainant Carmen Trejo wishes to alter the proposed pleading attached to the motion. (See ¶3 of Supplemental Ballo Declaration.) Counsel’s Supplemental Declaration requests leave to attach a new Exhibit F to the proposed pleading. (Ibid.) Additionally, “request is made to add a new paragraph 18 attaching the Litigation Guarantee as Exhibit ‘G’ to the FACC, once leave to amend is granted.” (¶3 of Supplemental Ballo Declaration.)

These newly proposed alterations deprive Cross Defendants of the opportunity to respond thereto. Moreover, the newly submitted requests ask the Court to approve a complaint which has not, technically, been submitted.

Based on the above, and to avoid any due process implications, the motion is DENIED, without prejudice, as specified above.

Cross-Defendants to give notice. 11 Sweiss v. Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Holbrook cross-defendant Randa Sweiss as to the Cross Complaint filed by Merrill Holbrook. For the reasons set forth herein, the motion is DENIED.

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“A party may move for summary judgment in an action or proceeding if it is contended that the action has no merit or that there is no defense to the action or proceeding." (Code Civ. Proc., §437c(a)(1).) "The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In determining if the papers show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the court shall consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objections have been made and sustained by the court, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence, except summary judgment shall not be granted by the court based on inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence if contradicted by other inferences or evidence that raise a triable issue as to any material fact." (Code Civ.

“[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no

triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) “When the notice of motion seeks only summary judgment, the presence of any triable issue requires denial of the motion. The court may not summarily adjudicate claims or defenses as to which no triable issue was raised unless requested in the notice of motion.” (Rutter Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication, Chapter 10-C, § 10.88, citing Homestead Sav. v. Sup.Ct. (Dividend Develop. Corp. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 494, 498.)

Here, Sweiss argues the first cause of action for Assault fails “because there is no evidence that Sweiss committed any act intended to cause Holbrook apprehension of harmful contact.” (Motion at 7:11-12) Sweiss also argues that “the Battery claim fails because there is no evidence that Sweiss intentionally made harmful or offensive contact with Holbrook. (Motion at 7:26-27)

The Court has reviewed the transcript from Holbrook’s deposition submitted by Sweiss at Exh. B and finds there is question of material fact. At pages 48-54, 67, 79, 83, 84 and 86, Holbrook describes the incidents which occurred as he was exiting the Nixon library on his electric mobility scooter. He describes how the plaintiff and another person used a flag they were displaying as part of a protest to “clothesline” him has he was exiting. He also describes how the plaintiff stepped on his scooter in such a manner as to nearly cause him to fall. While plaintiff may claim it was Holbrook who was the agitator and not the plaintiff, for purposes of summary judgment, there is a triable issue of material fact exists as to the causes of action for Assault and Battery.

Because Sweiss had failed to establish she is entitled to judgment on the entire complaint, the motion is DENIED.

In addition, Sweiss identified 26 material facts in her separate statement. The Court notes that many of the facts include inaccurate citations to evidence. Notwithstanding, Holbrook has effectively disputed “undisputed material fact” numbers 7, 8 and 12, thus further establishing a question of material fact exists and that the motion should be DENIED. (Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of W. Contra Costa Cnty. (2020) 49 Cal. App. 5th 506, 522 - “Because a dispute as to any one of these facts means there was a dispute as to a concededly material fact, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.”)

The Court also notes that the notice of motion originally gave notice for a hearing on 7/20/26. Because the motion was served by email on 4/30/26, that was less than the notice required by Section 437c(a)(2). Although the Clerk continued the hearing to 7/27/26, that does not change the fact that the motion was served with insufficient notice for the original hearing date.

In light of the foregoing, Holbrook’s request to continue the hearing pursuant to Section 437c(h) is MOOT.

Holbrook’s objections contained in his separate statement are OVERRULED. Objections are required to be separately filed. (Rule 3.1354(b).)

For the foregoing reasons, the motion is DENIED.

Holbrook’s request for sanctions is DENIED.

Holbrook is ordered to give notice. 12 Pham v. Tran, Before the Court is a motion by Brian W. Easton, Esq. in which he et. al. seeks to be relieved as counsel for plaintiff Dung Pham.

The Court finds the motion has been properly served on Mr. Pham. The Court also finds Mr. Pham will not be prejudiced by Mr. Easton’s withdrawal because trial has not been set. Further, because this motion is only brought by Mr. Easton, Mr. Pham will continue to be represented by Saul E. Wolf, Esq. (See Substitution at ROA 72) The Court also finds the motion generally complies with Rule 3.1362.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED.

The Court’s ruling will become effective upon the filing of a proof of service of the Court’s signed order on Mr. Pham.

Mr. Easton is ordered to give notice. 13 Cabrera v. Before the Court are two unopposed motions to be relieved as Ponc counsel of record for defendants Diego Ponce and P3Elite LLC filed by counsel Monica D. Dib and Nina Jafari. Both motions are GRANTED.

Each counsel has complied with the procedural requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 3.1362. The court finds good cause to grant the relief requested on the merits.

The order granting relief is effective upon filing of a proof of service of the signed order on the client.

Moving counsel shall give notice. 14 Black vs. A) Form Interrogatories Mercy House Living Centers Defendant Mercy House Living Centers’ (“Defendant”) unopposed motion to compel plaintiff Kevin Black’s (“Plaintiff”) further responses to form interrogatories is GRANTED.

Plaintiff appears to have failed to serve verifications with any of the interrogatories or requests for production. Failure to serve a verification is “tantamount to no responses at all.” (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.) Plaintiff has waived any objections to the Discovery as a result. (Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 902, 906.)