Whitney Crow v. Puneet Singh et al

(Dean Decl.).) The stipulated settlement contains eight enumerated terms. None of these relate to an agreement, by Plaintiff, to forego making any disparaging comments about Chem-Aqua. One of the terms provided that “[t]he parties agree to execute a full and final settlement agreement in the near future and the Court shall retain jurisdiction pursuant to CCP 664.6.” (Id. at 1385:18- 20.)

“Chem-Aqua's position is that non-disparagement is a standard term of the full and final agreement the parties contemplated, and that it is part of the settlement.” (Support Memo at 2:17-18.) “Enforcing the non-disparagement provision does not ask the Court to add a new term to the parties' bargain. It asks the Court to recognize a term the parties already agreed upon as part of the ‘full and final’ agreement they expressly contemplated.” (Support Memo at 5:24- 27.)

The Court disagrees. As noted above, the stipulated agreement recited into the record contains no mention of a non-disparagement term. Moreover, Chem-Aqua fails to provide the Court with any evidence suggesting that Plaintiffs ever agreed to such term. The Court finds no merit in Chem-Aqua’s argument that, because Plaintiffs agreed to a non-disparagement clause in other agreements, their agreement to such clause in this agreement may be inferred.

“‘The statutory procedure for enforcing settlement agreements under section 664.6 is not exclusive. It is merely an expeditious, valid alternative statutorily created.’ [Citation.] ‘Even though it is not exclusive, [section 664.6] is intended to provide a means for enforcing an agreement that requires nothing more than a single motion.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Although a judge hearing a section 664.6 motion may receive evidence, determine disputed facts, and enter the terms of a settlement agreement as a judgment [citations], nothing in section 664.6 authorizes a judge to create the material terms of a settlement, as opposed to deciding what terms the parties themselves have previously agreed upon.” ’ [Citation.]

As such, ‘[t]he power of the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 . . . is extremely limited. [¶] . . . The court is powerless to impose on the parties more restrictive or less restrictive or different terms than those contained in their settlement agreement.’ [Citation.]” (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 790.)

Based on the foregoing, the Motion is DENIED.

Whitney Crow v. Puneet Singh et al 23CV001513

[1] MOTION TO STRIKE ISAAC AL GHAZALI'S CROSS COMPLAINT, OR PORTIONS THEREOF