Motion for Attorney Fees
requires a party seeking the imposition of monetary sanctions to disclose the negotiated hourly rate between the attorney and client. The relevant inquiry for purposes of determining the amount of monetary sanctions is the reasonable value of the time expended in conjunction with the discovery motion practice. Thus, all Plaintiff is called to do is identify facts justifying the amount of monetary sanctions sought. The particular hourly rate agreed upon between Kiani and his lawyers is not necessary information to make such a determination.
The clerk is directed to return the unredacted declaration of Youzhihang Deng in support of the Motion to Compel Compliance with Deposition Subpoenas and for Sanctions (ROA 520) to Plaintiff. Plaintiff has 10 days to file a revised declaration without redactions that either (1) provides the information regarding the hourly rates charged and time spent on the motions or (2) provides some other factual basis for the Court to assess the request for monetary sanctions.
Plaintiff shall provide notice.
8 Matassa vs. Ramirez
2025-01514585 Motion for Preference
Vacated. See minute order dated 7/21/26 (ROA 110). 9 Rutledge vs. California Civil Rights Department
2026-01543235 Petition for Writ
Continued. See minute order dated 7/1/26 (ROA 33). 10 Seyedsalehi vs. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A, LLC
2025-01459962 Motion to Set Aside/Vacate
Vacated. See notice filed 7/2/26 (ROA 49). 11 Woo vs. General Motors, LLC
2025-01518945 Motion for Attorney Fees
Plaintiff June Woo’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Prevailing Party:
Attorney’s fees are authorized by contract, statute, or law. (See C.C.P. section 1033.5(a)(10)(A),(B) & (C).) The Song-Beverly Act provides as follows: “If the buyer prevails in an action under
this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code § 1794
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Plaintiff accepted Defendant General Motors, LLC (“GM”) Offer to Plaintiff to Compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 998. (Woo Supp. Decl. ¶ 3, Ex.) Pursuant to the 998 offer GM agreed that Plaintiffs were the prevailing party and entitled to attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act. (Woo Decl., ¶ 5, Ex. 1.) Therefore, Plaintiff is the prevailing party entitled to attorney fees.
Amount of Attorneys’ Fees:
“[T]he fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work. The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid. (citation omitted).)
“As the plain wording of section 1794, subdivision (d) makes clear, the trial court is to base the fee award upon actual time expended on the case, as long as such fees are reasonably incurred—both from the standpoint of time spent and the amount charged. In the case of contingency fee arrangements, a prevailing buyer ... is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees for time reasonably expended by his or her attorneys. [¶] Under the lodestar adjustment methodology, the trial court must initially determine the actual time expended and then ‘ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.
Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the attorney skill exhibited and the results achieved. The prevailing party and fee applicant bears the burden of showing that the fees incurred were ... reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 240, 247 (cleaned up).)
Here, Plaintiff June Woo seeks attorney fees, costs, and expenses in the total amount of $17,706.25, consisting of (1) $15,565 in unadorned attorney fees; (2) a 1.1 multiplier resulting in an additional $1,556.50; and (3) $584.75 in costs and expenses.
GM does not challenge the hourly rates. Rather, GM challenges the total number of billable hours claimed by Plaintiff’s attorneys. GM contends the 28.3 hours billed for a case that was settled in less than four months is unreasonable, especially based on counsels’ use of templates to create the documents in this case, specifically, templated complaint, discovery responses, and attorney fees motion.
Regarding GM’s objections, the Court reduces the seven hours claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel for reviewing GM’s opposition to the fee motion, drafting a reply and attending the hearing to four hours - for a reduction of $1,650. The Court finds the remainder of the fees objected to by GM to be reasonable.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff is awarded $13,915 in attorney’s fees.
Multiplier to the Lodestar:
“The Supreme Court has ‘set forth a number of factors the trial court may consider in adjusting the lodestar figure. These include: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys; [and] (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, both from the point of view of eventual victory on the merits and the point of view of establishing eligibility for an award.” ’ ” (Mikhaeilpoor, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at 248.) “The trial court is neither foreclosed from, nor required to, award a multiplier.” (Mikhaeilpoor, at p. 247.) Plaintiffs seek a 1.35 multiplier on the attorney fees.
A multiplier to the lodestar is not warranted. This is a routine lemon law case, with no unusual facts or novel legal issues requiring exceptional skill. Further, the availability of statutory fees for Song-Beverly cases significantly reduced the risk associated with working on contingency. (Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1174-1175 [FEHA fees award].) Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for a multiplier is DENIED.
Costs:
Plaintiff seeks $584.75 in costs via this motion for attorney’s fees but have not filed a Memorandum of Costs.
“A prevailing party who claims costs must serve and file a memorandum of costs within 15 days after the date of service of the notice of entry of judgment or dismissal by the clerk under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.5 or the date of service of written notice of entry of judgment or dismissal, or within 180 days after entry of judgment, whichever is first.” (California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1700(a)(1).)
Plaintiff has not filed a Memorandum of Costs as required under Rule 3.1700. Although there is a Memorandum of Costs attached to Mr. Woo’s Declaration, there is no proof of service and the memo was never filed with the Court. Therefore, Plaintiff’s request for costs is DENIED without prejudice.
Clerk to give notice.