damages the court allows the defendant to recover in the event the injunction is determined to have been unjustifiable. (Abba Rubber Co. v. Seaquist (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1, 14 [finding $1,000 bond inadequate where defendant shows possible lost profits of $315,000].) These may include defense costs in those cases where attorney’s fees are recoverable. (Ibid.)

While a defendant’s failure to request a bond does not waive the requirement does not waive the bond requirement (Abba Rubber Co. v. Seaquist (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1, 10), the bond requirement may be affirmatively waived or forfeited. (Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 740, citing Civil Code section 3513 [providing that “[a]nyone may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit”], Code Civ. Proc., § 995.230 [providing the beneficiary of a bond may in writing consent to a bond in an amount less than the amount required by statute or may waive the bond].)

Here, Plaintiffs argue Defendants waived their right to demand a bond. Section 10.10 of the SPA provides in relevant part that: “the parties shall be entitled to enforce any provision of this Agreement by a decree of specific performance and to temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief from a court of competent jurisdiction to prevent breaches or threatened breaches of the terms of this Agreement, without posting any bond or other undertaking . . . .” (SPA at § 10.10.)

The court finds a bond in the amount of $90,000 would reasonably protect Defendants against damages caused by the preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs Shue and Clouser SHALL file and serve proof of undertaking in the amount of $90,000.

Plaintiffs to give notice. 4 Adjemian vs. Gallo Defendants Rafael Gallo’s Motion for Summary Adjudication is DENIED.

Defendant Gallo moves for summary adjudication on the issue of whether or not Plaintiff is precluded from recovering attorney’s fees due to failure to meet condition precedent (mediation) contained in the Residential Purchase Agreement.

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“A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, . . . or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) 15

Here, Defendant Gallo purports to move for partial summary adjudication on the singular issue of a portion of damages that does not completely dispose of Plaintiff’s causes of action.

A party is entitled to recover fees as “damages” only when the party brings an action against a third party as “the natural and probable consequence” of the defendant’s misconduct. (Prentice v. North Am. Title Guar. Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 621.) Contractual attorney’s fees are generally recoverable as costs, not an element of damages. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5(a)(10)(A).). As such, the issue of attorneys’ fees is not a “claim for damages” for which summary adjudication is available.

Further, Defendant Gallo’s motion for summary adjudication is untimely. Code of Civil Procedure 437c(a)(2) requires “Notice of the motion and supporting papers shall be served on all other parties to the action at least 81 days before the time appointed for hearing.” If the notice is served by facsimile transmission, express mail, or another method of delivery providing for overnight delivery, the required 81-day period of notice shall be increased by two court days.” (Id.)

Here, 81 days before the July 23, 2026 hearing is Sunday, May 3, 2026. Because Defendant served the motion by electronic service, the required 81-day notice period is increased by 2 court days, or Thursday, April 30, 2026. Because Defendant Gallo served the motion on May 1, 2026, one day later, Defendant Gallo failed to provide the notice required under section 437c(a)(2). The trial court does not have the authority to “shorten the minimum notice period for hearings on summary judgment motions.” (Urshan v. Musicians' Credit Union (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 758, 764). “[W]aiver of the right to the statutorily mandated minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings should not be inferred from silence.” (Id. at 768). Waiver of minimum notice can only be based on the affirmative assent of the affected parties. (Id.) There is no affirmative assent from Plaintiff here.

For these reasons, the motion is DENIED.

Moving Defendant to give notice. 5 Kang vs. Lucid Group OFF CALENDAR USA, Inc. 6 Xu vs. American Defendant American Honda Motor Co. Inc.’s Petition and Motion to Honda Motor Co., Inc. Compel Arbitration are DENIED.

Plaintiff’s Opposition

Defendant Honda first argues that all allegations in its Petition to Compel Arbitration are deemed admitted because Plaintiff failed to file a response to the petition within 10 days.