Arana v. Alonzo, et al.

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR JUNE 26, 2026

The court rules on defendants Windt’s and EXP Realty’s objections6 as follows:

1. Paragraph 10 – sustained.

2. Paragraph 9, Ex. 1 – overruled.

3. Paragraph 8 – overruled.

4. Paragraph 11 – overruled. Windt’s and EXP Realty’s own evidence indicates that

Rinat Erlich represents defendant TAG Inspections (“TAG”). Ms. Erlich’s

statement that she is not counsel of record is not contradictory because TAG has

not appeared in this case.

5. Paragraph 13 – sustained in part. The court sustains the objection to the

estimated value of plaintiff’s total damages due to lack of foundation.

6. Paragraph 14 – sustained.

2.

Background

Plaintiff has agreed to settle his claim against TAG for $10,000. To date, TAG has not

been served and has not appeared in this action.

On March 30, 2022, plaintiff submitted an offer to purchase a home in South Lake

Tahoe, California, from defendant John Alonzo (“Alonzo”). (Compl., ¶ 15.) On

April 7, 2022, plaintiff entered into a written agreement with TAG for TAG to conduct a

home inspection. (Crespo Decl., Ex. 1.) On April 7, 2022, defendant Josie Timmerman,

acting on behalf of TAG, prepared a disclosure report. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 16.)

Escrow closed on April 27, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 19.)

Plaintiff’s real estate agent was defendant Paul Windt (“Windt”) of defendant EXP

Realty. (Compl., ¶¶ 6, 15.) The complaint alleges that, in deciding to purchase the home,

plaintiff relied, in part, upon the following disclosure reports: (1) a report prepared on

6 The court lists the objections in the order presented by defendants with the

corresponding Objection Numbers.

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR JUNE 26, 2026

April 7, 2022, by defendant Josie Timmerman, who was acting on behalf of TAG;7 and

(2) a report prepared on April 13, 2022, by defendant Thomas A. La Treille, who was

acting on behalf of defendant Frontier Pest Control. (Compl., ¶¶ 1, 16.) Plaintiff later

discovered that the property differed substantially from the representations made in

the disclosure reports. (Compl., ¶ 2.)

The complaint asserts causes of action against Alonzo, Windt, and EXP Realty for

concealment, intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, violation of

Civil Code section 1102, et seq. Plaintiff also claims breach of contract against Alonzo.

With respect to TAG and Frontier Pest Control, as well as its employees named in

this action, the complaint alleges various claims of negligence, negligent

misrepresentation, and fraud.

The complaint also alleges negligence against defendant Urreaga, Inc., the roofing

company which performed work on the roof of the home.

Plaintiff’s attorney declares there are numerous liability issues regarding plaintiff’s

case against TAG. The agreement between plaintiff and TAG contains a waiver of a

consequential damages clause (requiring written notice of claim within 10 business days

of discovery) and a choice of law clause, which identifies Nevade law as operative.

TAG is no longer in business. (Timmerman Decl., ¶ 1.) The former owner has retired

and moved to Mexico. (Timmerman Decl., ¶ 2.) The former owner lives off of Social

Security and has no other assets. (Timmerman Decl., ¶ 3.) The former owner does not

have insurance coverage for plaintiff’s claim. (Timmerman Decl., ¶ 4.)

Plaintiff’s attorney estimates TAG’s proportional liability is less than 10 percent of

plaintiff’s total damages. (Crespo Decl., ¶ 13.) The settlement was reached between

plaintiff’s counsel and Rinat K. Erlich, counsel for TAG, after extensive telephone

7 The declaration from plaintiff’s attorney submitted in support of the instant motion

states that plaintiff hired TAG to conduct a home inspection shortly after purchasing the property. (Crespo Decl., ¶ 6.)

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR JUNE 26, 2026

negotiations. (Crespo Decl., ¶ 11.) The settlement was not reached through collusion or

with any intent to harm or injure any existing or future defendant. (Crespo Decl., ¶ 11.)

3. Legal Principles

A good faith determination bars “any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any

further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative

contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or

comparative fault.” (§ 877.6, subd. (c).) “A good faith settlement determination also

reduces the claims against the nonsettling defendants in the amount stipulated by the

settlement. (§ 877, subd. (a).)” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194

Cal.App.4th 939, 959.) The procedure for a good faith settlement determination is set forth in

section 877.6, subdivision (a)(2). “Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or

more parties are joint tortfeasors or co-obligors on a contract debt shall be entitled to a

hearing on the issue of the food faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or

other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors or co-obligors, upon giving notice in

the manner provided in subdivision (b) of Section 1005.” (§ 877.6, subd. (a)(1).)

“The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof on that

issue.” (§ 877.6, subd. (d).) Specifically, “[o]nce there is a showing made by the settlor of

the settlement, the burden of proof on the issue of good faith shifts to the non-settlor

who asserts that the settlement was not made in good faith. [Citation.] If contested,

declarations by the non-settlor should be filed which in many cases could require the

moving party to file responsive counterdeclarations to negate the lack of good faith

asserted by the non-settling contesting party.” (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court

(1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261–1262.) “[T]he trial court’s consideration of the

settlement agreement and its relationship to the entire litigation in a contested setting

must proceed upon a sufficient evidentiary basis to enable the court to consider and

evaluate the various aspects of the settlement.” (Id., at p. 1263.)

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR JUNE 26, 2026

In Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 (Tech-Bilt),

the California Supreme Court explained that in making a good faith settlement

determination, a trial court should “inquire, among other things, whether the amount of

the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s proportional

share of comparative liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.” (Id., at p. 499.) Tech-Bilt

explained, “the intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of

factors be taken into account” in making this inquiry, “including a rough approximation

of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in

settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition

that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a

trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy

limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious

conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. [Citation.] Finally,

practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of

information available at the time of settlement. ‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must

not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of settlement,

would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’ ” (Tech-Bilt, at p. 499.) “When

evaluating whether the parties reached a settlement in good faith, a trial court must

examine not only the settling tortfeasor’s potential liability to the plaintiff, but also the

settling tortfeasor’s potential liability to all nonsettling tortfeasors.” (PacifiCare of Cal. v.

Bright Medical Associates, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1451, 1465 (PacifiCare).) “[A]

court not only looks at the alleged tortfeasor’s potential liability to the plaintiff, but it

must also consider the culpability of the tortfeasor vis-à-vis other parties alleged to be

responsible for the same injury.” (TSI Seismic Tenant Space, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007)

149 Cal.App.4th 159, 166.)

A party contesting the good faith of a settlement must “demonstrate ... that the

settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to” the factors identified by our

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR JUNE 26, 2026

Supreme Court “as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute.”

(Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500.) “ ‘[A] “good faith” settlement does not call

for perfect or even nearly perfect apportionment of liability. In order to encourage

settlement, it is quite proper for a settling defendant to pay less than his proportionate

share of the anticipated damages. What is required is simply that the settlement not be

grossly disproportionate to the settlor’s fair share.’ ” (PacifiCare, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1465.) “[E]ach case must be decided based on its particular circumstances and the

trial court may consider its own judicial experience ....” (Cahill, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at

p. 968.)

“In the context of section 877.6, ‘[t]he trial court is given broad discretion in

deciding whether a settlement is in “good faith” for purposes of section 877.6, and its

decision may be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.’ ” (Cahill, supra,

194 Cal.App.4th at p. 957.) “[T]here is no abuse of discretion requiring reversal if there

exists a reasonable or fairly debatable justification under the law for the trial court’s

decision or, alternatively stated, if that decision falls within the permissible range of

options set by the applicable legal criteria.” (Ibid.) “ ‘On appellate review, a trial court’s

determination of good faith of a settlement involving the resolution of factual issues will

be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Superior Court

(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 894, 909.) “If ... there is no substantial evidence to support a

critical assumption as to the nature and extent of a settling defendant’s liability, then a

determination of good faith based upon such assumption is an abuse of discretion.”

(Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 871.)

4.

Discussion

Having sustained objections to plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration regarding the

estimated value of plaintiff’s total damages, the court finds that plaintiff has not set

forth a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish the required Tech-Bilt factors. Without

such showing, the burden of proof has not shifted to the non-settling parties to

LAW AND MOTION CALENDAR JUNE 26, 2026

“demonstrate that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to” the factors

identified by our Supreme Court “as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of

the statute.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499–500.)

Plaintiff’s motion is denied without prejudice.

TENTATIVE RULING # 2: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT IS

DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. NO HEARING ON THIS MATTER WILL BE HELD (LEWIS v.

SUPERIOR COURT (1999) 19 CAL.4TH 1232, 1247), UNLESS A NOTICE OF INTENT TO

APPEAR AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT IS TRANSMITTED ELECTRONICALLY

THROUGH THE COURT’S WEBSITE OR BY TELEPHONE TO THE COURT AT (530) 573-3042

BY 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY THE TENTATIVE RULING IS ISSUED. NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES

OF AN INTENT TO APPEAR MUST BE MADE BY TELEPHONE OR IN PERSON. PROOF OF

SERVICE OF SAID NOTICE MUST BE FILED PRIOR TO OR AT THE HEARING.