NB CP Cincy, DST v. Versity Invest, LLC

provides that “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading . . . by adding . . . the name of any party.” “Amendments to complaints under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (a), are liberally allowed to substitute in plaintiffs with standing for original plaintiffs without standing.” (CashCall, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 273, 287, internal quotes omitted, citing Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 1004- 1011.)

This “general rule allowing substitution of new plaintiffs with standing in place of original plaintiffs without standing applies to class actions” and equally to “a plaintiff who initially had standing when the class action complaint was filed, but subsequently lost his or her standing” and to “a plaintiff who never had standing when the complaint was filed.” (Id. at pp. 288-289.)

Plaintiff shall give notice. 109 Jefferson vs. Alignment healthcare USA, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company;

2026-01546489 Motion to Compel Arbitration

In light of Plaintiff Jenny Jefferson’s Non-Opposition (ROA #21) to Defendant Alignment Healthcare USA, LLC’s Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration of Plaintiff’s Claims and Dismiss Action (ROA #14), the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion.

Plaintiff is ORDERED to arbitrate her individual claims against Defendant. Plaintiff’s class claims against Defendant are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to the rights of the absent putative class members. This action is otherwise STAYED until the arbitration is had pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4.

An ADR review hearing is scheduled for February 25, 2027 at 9:30AM in Department CX102. The parties shall submit a joint status report 10 days in advance of the hearing.

Defendant shall give notice of this ruling. 110 NB CP Cincy, DST vs. Versity Invest, LLC

2026-01543537 Motion to Compel Mediation

All Defendants’ Motion to Compel Mediation and Stay Proceedings Pending Mediation is DENIED.

Defendants, as the moving parties, have not established that the Court has authority to compel mediation in this case.

In their opening brief, Defendants cite Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1775. (Mot. at p. 7.) However, CCP sections 1775, et seq. relate to the Civil Action Mediation Program, which is a separate court-ordered program that also applies only mandatorily to Los Angeles County Superior Court. (CCP, § 1775.2, subd. (a).) Defendants make no showing that this case even falls under CCP sections 1775, et seq.

Defendants also Evidence Code section 1116. (Mot. at p. 10.) But Evidence Code sections 1115, et seq. deal with the confidentiality of mediation proceedings, and section 1116, subdivision (a) explicitly states that

“[n]othing in this chapter expands or limits a court’s authority to order participation in a dispute resolution proceeding” or “authorizes or affects the enforceability of a contract clause in which parties agree to the use of mediation.”

Defendants also cite Frei v. Davey (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1506. (Mot. at p. 7.) However, Frei involved the resolution of a motion for attorneys’ fees by enforcing a contractual provision that bars prevailing parties from recovery attorneys’ fees if they commence a court action without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation. (Frei, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1508-1509.) Frei does not hold that a court may enforce contractual mediation by granting a motion to compel the parties to participate in mediation.

Defendants also cite Cione v. Foresters Equity Services, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 625 and CCP sections 1281 and 1281.4. (Mot. at p. 7.) However, both Cione and the cited statutory provisions involve motions to compel arbitration, not mediation.

Moreover, there is also contrary authority indicating courts may not compel parties to mediation, as mediation is “voluntary,” and “unless the parties have agreed to a binding award, any party who voluntarily enters mediation may revoke its consent and withdraw from the dispute resolution process.” (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 536, 540-541; see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 467.7, subd. (a) [“Unless the parties have agreed to a binding award, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any person who voluntarily enters the dispute resolution process from revoking his or her consent, withdrawing from dispute resolution, and seeking judicial or administrative redress”]; Kirschenman v.

Super. Ct. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 832 [trial “court had no statutory authority to require the parties to participate in mediation,” and “parties are specifically not prohibited from revoking consent to participate in voluntary dispute resolution”].) Here, Defendants have not shown that the parties agreed to any “binding award” through mediation.

In fact, the cited “Dispute Resolution” provision also states only that “[t]he parties will first attempt in good faith to promptly resolve the Dispute by negotiations between such parties,” but “[i]f the Dispute has not been resolved by the disputing parties within 60 days after the disputing party’s notice, . . . either party may initiate mediation of the Dispute.” (ROA #30, Wettengel Decl., Exh. 1 [Versity I Operating Agreement], ¶¶ 13.4(a), (b), emphasis added.) Not only does the word “may” in the subparagraph (b) suggest that initiating mediation is optional, but subparagraph (c) then goes on to state that “if either party will not participate in a mediation, then the aggrieved party may file an appropriate action in any state . . . court located within the County of Orange in the State of California.” (Id. at ¶ 13.4(c).)

Therefore, the cited “Dispute Resolution” provision does not even itself require the parties to participate in mediation, much less provide for a court to compel the parties to mediate.

111 Versity Investments, LLC vs. Versity Invest, LLC Motion to Compel Mediation

All Defendants’ Motion to Compel Mediation and Stay Proceedings Pending Mediation are DENIED.

Defendants, as the moving parties, have not established that the Court has authority to compel mediation in this case.

In their opening brief, Defendants cite Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) section 1775. (Mot. at p. 7.) However, CCP sections 1775, et seq. relate to the Civil Action Mediation Program, which is a separate court-ordered program that also applies only mandatorily to Los Angeles County Superior Court. (CCP, § 1775.2, subd. (a).) Defendants make no showing that this case even falls under CCP sections 1775, et seq.

Defendants also Evidence Code section 1116. (Mot. at p. 10.) But Evidence Code sections 1115, et seq. deal with the confidentiality of mediation proceedings, and section 1116, subdivision (a) explicitly states that “[n]othing in this chapter expands or limits a court’s authority to order participation in a dispute resolution proceeding” or “authorizes or affects the enforceability of a contract clause in which parties agree to the use of mediation.”

Defendants also cite Frei v. Davey (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1506. (Mot. at p. 7.) However, Frei involved the resolution of a motion for attorneys’ fees by enforcing a contractual provision that bars prevailing parties from recovery attorneys’ fees if they commence a court action without first attempting to resolve the matter through mediation. (Frei, supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1508-1509.) Frei does not hold that a court may enforce contractual mediation by granting a motion to compel the parties to participate in mediation.

Defendants also cite Cione v. Foresters Equity Services, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 625 and CCP sections 1281 and 1281.4. (Mot. at p. 7.) However, both Cione and the cited statutory provisions involve motions to compel arbitration, not mediation.

Moreover, there is also contrary authority indicating courts may not compel parties to mediation, as mediation is “voluntary,” and “unless the parties have agreed to a binding award, any party who voluntarily enters mediation may revoke its consent and withdraw from the dispute resolution process.” (Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 536, 540-541; see also Bus. & Prof. Code, § 467.7, subd. (a) [“Unless the parties have agreed to a binding award, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any person who voluntarily enters the dispute resolution process from revoking his or her consent, withdrawing from dispute resolution, and seeking judicial or administrative redress”]; Kirschenman v.

Super. Ct. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 832 [trial “court had no statutory authority to require the parties to participate in mediation,” and “parties are specifically not prohibited from revoking consent to participate in voluntary dispute resolution”].) Here,