MCINTYRE vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A CALIFORNIA CHARTER CITY, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV013308: MCINTYRE vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A CALIFORNIA CHARTER CITY, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Quashing or Modifying Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records Issued by Defendant Universal Protection Service LP And Directed to Silver Lake Psychology in Department 8D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE OR GORDON D. SCHABER COURTHOUSE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION.***

Moving and (former) opposing counsel are admonished for failing to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1119(f)(4), which provides, “electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit and with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit.” Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers not being considered, matters being continued so that papers may be submitted in the proper format, and/or the imposition of sanctions.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Plaintiff in pro per[1] Barbara McIntyre’s (“Plaintiff”) motion to quash or modify a subpoena for production of business records issued by Defendant Universal Protection Service LP (“Defendant”) to Silver Lake Psychology is ruled on as follows.

This is one of several discovery disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant. On December 15, 2025, the Court ruled on a dispute with similar issues. The Court will quote its prior ruling (“December 15 Order”) as relevant:

This action arises from Plaintiff Barbara McIntyre’s claims of workplace discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Plaintiff alleges she was an employee of the City of Sacramento (City), and worked on the second floor of the Sacramento City Hall building. (Second Amended Complaint [SAC] ¶¶ 13, 15.) Plaintiff alleges that the City subcontracted with

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013308: MCINTYRE vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A CALIFORNIA CHARTER CITY, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Quashing or Modifying Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records Issued by Defendant Universal Protection Service LP And Directed to Silver Lake Psychology in Department 8D

Universal for the provision of security guard services. (SAC ¶ 19.) Plaintiff alleges that at least 5 security guards employed by Universal were assigned to work at the City Hall location. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges that the City and Universal required female employees to use a badge to access the women’s bathroom on the second floor of City Hall. (SAC ¶¶16-18.) Plaintiff alleges no similar practice was implemented for male employees accessing the men’s bathroom. (Ibid.) Plaintiff also alleges that beginning in February of 2023, male security guards employed by Universal repeatedly entered the women’s restroom while Plaintiff was inside a bathroom stall and banged on the stall door, returning every few minutes until Plaintiff left the bathroom. (SAC ¶¶ 23-80.)

Plaintiff alleges she repeatedly complained to her employer and Universal about the bathroom intrusions, but no action was taken to stop them. (Ibid.) Plaintiff alleges that she ultimately resigned her position in February of 2024 because of her fear of being unsafe and humiliated at work. (SAC ¶ 80.)

As against Defendant Universal, Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: discrimination based on sex, gender, gender identity, gender expression or sexual orientation; hostile work environment harassment; retaliation; failure to prevent harassment, discrimination and retaliation; and violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

In this motion, Plaintiff seeks to quash or modify a subpoena Defendant issued to Silver Lake Psychology, Plaintiff’s healthcare provider. Plaintiff also requests $6,000 in monetary sanctions.

Plaintiff asserts that the subpoena unjustifiably invades her privacy interests because it seek records too old to be relevant. Plaintiff also argues the records contain third-party private medical information.

Defendant opposes the motion, arguing that Plaintiff has put all the requested records at issue through her claims.

Meet and Confer

Defendant declares in detail the parties’ efforts to meet and confer before Plaintiff filed this motion. (Shelest Decl., ¶¶ 8–27.) The declared facts show a general failure to significantly engage before the instant motion was filed on January 2, 2026. Defendant and Plaintiff’s former counsel did speak on the telephone on January 6, 2026, which

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013308: MCINTYRE vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A CALIFORNIA CHARTER CITY, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Quashing or Modifying Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records Issued by Defendant Universal Protection Service LP And Directed to Silver Lake Psychology in Department 8D

Defendant found to be “more efficient and productive” than email exchanges. (Id., ¶ 22.) However, Defendant does not request that the Court deny the motion based on failure to reasonably attempt to meet and confer. Accordingly, the Court does not rule on the issue.

But it bears repeating from the December 15 Order:

Further, while the Court does not deny the motion for failure to meet and confer, the Court notes its concerns with the minimal efforts that appear to have been undertaken by the Parties prior to filing this motion. The Civil Discovery Act requires a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution – counsel must “attempt to talk the matter over, compare their views, consult and deliberate.” (Clement v. Alegre (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1294; see Townsend v. Superior Ct. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431, 1433 [informal resolution requirement not fulfilled by bickering between counsel during deposition].)

The Court must remind counsel and the parties that given the number of motions such as this which must be addressed on a daily basis, there are simply not enough judicial resources available to resolve each and every discovery dispute that could have and should have been resolved informally. This serves to highlight the critical need for all counsel's legitimate, reasonable and good faith meet-and-confer efforts before filing any discovery motion. Although it dealt with a motion to compel answers to deposition questions, the decision of Townsend v.

Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1431 is instructive in that it clarifies that the meet- and confer process is not intended to be some perfunctory formality but rather it “requires...a serious effort at negotiation and informal resolution.” (Id., at 1438.) Rather, the meet and confer requirement is designed “to encourage the parties to work out their differences informally so as to avoid the necessity for a formal order.... This, in turn, will lessen the burden on the court and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of resources by litigants through promotion of informal, extrajudicial resolution of discovery disputes.” (Stewart v.

Colonial Western Agency, Inc. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016, quotations and citations omitted.) The Court notes that failure to engage in robust meet and confer efforts in the future may result in a motion being continued or denied.[2]

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013308: MCINTYRE vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A CALIFORNIA CHARTER CITY, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Quashing or Modifying Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records Issued by Defendant Universal Protection Service LP And Directed to Silver Lake Psychology in Department 8D

The parties must engage in good faith efforts to resolve their discovery disputes informally. Importantly, as of January 1, 2026, California law now requires parties to declare a reasonable and good faith attempt to meet and confer “either in person, by telephone, or by videoconference.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2016.040, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2025, Ch. 200.) As such, to the extent that Plaintiff in pro per attempts to restrict current and future meet and confers to writing or email (Shelest Decl., ¶ 37, Exh. N), such a showing will not amount to a good faith effort.

Plaintiff’s Privacy

From the December 15 Order:

There is no dispute that Plaintiff’s medical information is protected by the right to privacy. Plaintiff also has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her medical information to the extent it is unrelated to the issues in this lawsuit. However, such right is not absolute and private information may be subject to discovery where the information is “directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)

A party “is not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific mental or emotional injury; the scope of the inquiry permitted depends upon the nature of the injuries which the patient-litigant himself has brought before the court.” (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 864 [citations omitted].) “As Lifschutz explains, plaintiffs are 'not obligated to sacrifice all privacy to seek redress for a specific [physical,] mental or emotional injury'; while they may not withhold information which relates to any physical or mental condition which they have put in issue by bringing this lawsuit, they are entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past.

The trial court thus obviously erred in ordering plaintiffs to disclose to defendant their entire lifetime medical histories and this aspect of the challenged discovery order must also be vacated.” (Id. at 864 [citing In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415].)

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered “mental and emotional distress, fear, humiliation, anxiety, embarrassment, sleeplessness, constipation, and bladder infections” as a result of Defendant’s conduct. (SAC ¶ 107.) Further, Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s knowledge of her “pre-existing vulnerability to feeling anxious about unsafe work conditions” because of the violent death of her husband. (SAC ¶ 32.) Although Plaintiff generally

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013308: MCINTYRE vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A CALIFORNIA CHARTER CITY, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Quashing or Modifying Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records Issued by Defendant Universal Protection Service LP And Directed to Silver Lake Psychology in Department 8D

argues that any waiver of privilege or privacy rights must be narrowly construed to only those conditions put in issue by the SAC, Plaintiff does not specify in what way records could be segregated for different conditions.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has put in issue a broad range of emotional and mental health conditions.

Again, from the December 15 Order:

In this case, the [discovery demand] at issue is aimed at medical information for injuries that Plaintiff claims was caused by the conduct at issue in her lawsuit. Further, Plaintiff responds that she has “suffered emotional distress from Universal’s conduct which manifested in psychological, mental and physical injury.” While Plaintiff has a privacy interest, Defendant has shown a compelling need for the information requested in this form interrogatory in light of the causes of action alleged and damages sought. The Court finds that the requested information is directly relevant and essential to the fair resolution of the underlying lawsuit.

Further, as noted above, the parties have entered into a stipulated protective order governing the use of information designated as “confidential” by a litigant. (Stipulated Protective Order, April 10, 2025.) Defendant Universal is now a party to that protective order.

Temporal Scope

Plaintiff argues that the subpoena must be quashed or limited because it will discover ancient information not directly relevant to this action.

From the December 15 Order:

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court find[s] that the information in the [discovery demand] may be limited to prior complaints or injuries five years prior to the date of the INCIDENT, which the Court finds is directly relevant and essential to the fair resolution of the underlying lawsuit.

Plaintiff’s allegations primarily relate to a course of conduct beginning in February

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013308: MCINTYRE vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A CALIFORNIA CHARTER CITY, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Quashing or Modifying Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records Issued by Defendant Universal Protection Service LP And Directed to Silver Lake Psychology in Department 8D

2023. (SAC ¶ 23.) The Court finds that limiting the subpoena to reach back five years, that is, to February 2018, is a reasonable balance between Plaintiff’s privacy interests and Defendant’s needed discovery.

In Reply, Plaintiff argues that the Court has “established a five-year lookback boundary for the lawsuit.” (Reply, at p. 1:22–23.) The Court has not established a strict or immutable scope of discovery. Instead, the Court has held that the production of records limited to February 2018 (five years) is a reasonable balance of the interests at this stage in the litigation and on the showing so far made by parties. On different facts and arguments, the Court could determine that a different scope is appropriate.

Third-Party Privacy

Plaintiff asserts that private medical information of third parties is intermixed with the records that may be produced in response to the subpoena. These third parties are apparently Plaintiff’s family members.

Plaintiff’s assertions about third-party records are not specific. It is not apparent to the Court why or to what extent family members’ private medical information may be in Plaintiff’s medical records. Regardless, the Court finds that a reduced temporal scope, as stated above, and the parties’ preexisting protective order will adequately safeguard third-party rights. As such, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request for “first look” rights to the produced information.

In Reply, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has violated the terms of the parties’ protective order (“PO”) dated April 1, 2025 and filed with the Court on April 10, 2025. (Reply, at pp. 3:9–26.) Plaintiff appears to state that Paragraph 2 of the PO already grants her “an absolute contractual right to review, object to, and selectively redact or designate nonparty clinical records before they are distributed.” (Id., at p. 3:11–12.) First, Plaintiff’s motion only asked the Court to “mark the documents as Confidential pursuant to the parties’ Protective Order.” (Memorandum of Points & Auth., at p. 17:3.)

Plaintiff did not assert that Defendant has violated the PO, and these arguments are not properly before the Court. (Reichardt v. Hoffman (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 754, 764.) Second, the Court does not read Paragraph 2 of the PO to give Plaintiff an absolute right prior to Defendant to review and redact. Paragraph 2 allows any party to designate certain records, which have already been produced to all parties, as Confidential, triggering special handling and a dispute resolution process.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV013308: MCINTYRE vs CITY OF SACRAMENTO, A CALIFORNIA CHARTER CITY, et al. 06/17/2026 Hearing on Motion for Order Quashing or Modifying Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Records Issued by Defendant Universal Protection Service LP And Directed to Silver Lake Psychology in Department 8D

In the event that private third-party information is produced in response to the subpoena, the Court expects the parties to cooperatively identify and segregate such information, according to the PO. If such records must be filed with the Court, the parties shall move to appropriately redact and seal the records. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.550, 2.551.)

Disposition

Plaintiff’s motion to quash the subpoena is DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion to modify the subpoena is GRANTED to the extent that the subpoena is limited to records dated on or after February 2018.

Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions is DENIED.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] Plaintiff substituted herself as counsel in place of former attorney, Marjorie A.

Wallace, on April 14, 2026, after the instant motion was filed. [2] Regarding conservation of judicial resources, the Court agrees with Defendant that

Plaintiff’s Separate Statement is excessively long and substantially consists of argument that should properly be in a memorandum of points and authorities. But Defendant exacerbated this issue by filing its own Separate Statement in opposition, a filing not authorized by any statute or rule of court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1345.)