Christos v. Crane

IF ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED, MATTER WILL BE HEARD IN DEPT.

17. PLEASE USE DEPT. 17’S ZOOM LOGIN INFORMATION (SEE BOTTOM OF PAGE).

This matter is on calendar for the motion of defendant City of Rohnert Park (“City”) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2031.060 and 2023.030, and Paragraph 6 of the parties’ Stipulated Protective Order, for an order upholding the confidentiality designations on documents, testimony, and information addressed in Plaintiff Jose Miguel Valencia’s (“Plaintiff’s”) designation objections. On May 27, 2026, Plaintiff attempted to file a Dismissal of the Entire Action. The filing was rejected. The court clerk noted: “Page two is not included in this filing. Since 2. has been marked as "yes" page two needs to be included and completed.” As Plaintiff intends to dismiss this action, the City’s pending motion will become moot. Accordingly, the motion is taken off calendar.

4. 25CV04416, Christos v. Crane

(TENTATIVE ISSUED BY HON. JANE GASKELL)

IF ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED, MATTER WILL BE HEARD IN DEPT.

17. PLEASE USE DEPT. 17’S ZOOM LOGIN INFORMATION (SEE BOTTOM OF PAGE).

Defendants Leslie Jo Crane (“Crane”), Dan Larson (“Larson”), River Time Restaurant & Bar (“River Time”), Rhonda Hall (“Hall”), and Christina Hulsey (“Hulsey”)(together “Defendants”) move for an order vacating the clerk’s entry of default entered against them. Defendants request sanctions in the amount of $6,695.40 against Plaintiff’s counsel, Suzanne Schornack, pursuant to CCP section 128.5 for failing to warn defense counsel before seeking Defendants’ defaults.

1. Standards on Motion for Relief from Default Where the party in default moves promptly to seek relief, and no prejudice to the opposing party will result from setting aside the default and letting the case go to trial on the merits, “very slight evidence will be required to justify a court in setting aside the default.” (Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal. 3d 227, 233.)

2. Proofs of service of process Plaintiff Cherie Sexton Christos (“Plaintiff”) filed her complaint on July 11, 2025. Proofs of service of process for Defendants were filed on September 25, 2025. The proofs of service of process show each Defendant was served at 16225 Main St, Guerneville, CA 95446, on August 24, 2025, at 1:30 p.m., by leaving summons and complaint with River Time owner, Leslie Jo Crane. The declaration of diligence for service on Hulsey indicates that the process server attempted to serve Hulsey several times at River Time and once at her home prior to serving her by substituted service.

The declaration of diligence for service on Larson indicates the same. The declaration of diligence for service on Hall indicates the process server attempted to serve Hall at River Time numerous times prior to serving her by substituted service. In her declaration, Crane states defendants Larson and Hulsey are not employed by River Time. (Crane decl., ¶7.) She states that when she was served, she was only served with one summons and one complaint. (Id., ¶10.) The summons attached to Crane’s declaration lists all defendants in the “Notice to Defendant” section. (Id., Exhibit A.)

Crane states she was not told if she was being personally served in her capacity as an individual, if she was being served on behalf 3

of River Time, or in some other capacity. (Id., ¶11.) The summons served upon Crane does not state how Crane was served; i.e., as an individual or on behalf of an entity or other person. (Id., Exhibit A.) Crane states she did not make any copies of the Summons and Complaint for Defendants Larson, Hulsey, or Hall; she did not know they were being served by substituted service. (Id., ¶13.) She further states River Time did not receive any copies of the summons and complaint by mail. (Id., ¶14.)

3. Service on entities “In an action against a corporation or an unincorporated association (including a partnership), the copy of the summons that is served shall contain a notice stating in substance: “To the person served: You are hereby served in the within action (or special proceeding) on behalf of (here state the name of the corporation or the unincorporated association) as a person upon whom a copy of the summons and of the complaint may be delivered to effect service on said party under the provisions of (here state appropriate provisions of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 413.10) of the Code of Civil Procedure).”

If service is also made on such person as an individual, the notice shall also indicate that service is being made on such person as an individual as well as on behalf of the corporation or the unincorporated association. “If such notice does not appear on the copy of the summons served, no default may be taken against such corporation or unincorporated association or against such person individually, as the case may be.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 412.30.) Here, as the notice did not comply with CCP section 412.30, no default could be taken against River Time.

4. Service by substituted service After a diligent attempt has been made to personally serve an individual defendant, “summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint during usual office hours in the person's office or, if no physical address is known, at the person's usual mailing address, other than a United States Postal Service post office box, with the person who is apparently in charge thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.

When service is effected by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at a mailing address, it shall be left with a person at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20.) Neither Hulsey nor Larson worked at River Time. Therefore, substituted service on them at River Time was improper.

5. Ineffective Service of Process Defendants have established service of process was ineffective. Crane was not given notice that River Time was being served. Larson and Hurley are not employees of River Time such that Crane did not have authority to accept service of summons on their behalf. Crane was not given notice that she was being served on behalf of Hall. Moreover, because only one summons and complaint were served, it was reasonable for Crane to believe she was the only one being served. However, even as to Crane, service was defective due to the incomplete summons for failure to identify the capacity in which she was being served.

6. Failure to Warn Defense counsel seeks sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.5 against Plaintiff’s counsel for failure to warn him that Defendants’ defaults would be taken. A trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay. (CCP § 128.5(a).) 4

For purposes of section 128.5, “Actions or tactics” include, but are not limited to, the making or opposing of motions or the filing and service of a complaint, cross-complaint, answer, or other responsive pleading. (CCP section 128.5(b)(1). “Frivolous” means totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party. (CCP section 128.5(b)(2).) Whether a court makes an award under section 128.5 is a matter within its sound discretion. (Park Magnolia v. Fields (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.)

In Park Magnolia, the court described the following conduct as completely without merit: the requests to enter default filed by plaintiff; plaintiff's use of a void default judgment to obtain a writ of possession against defendant; plaintiff's opposition to defendant's motion to vacate the default and default judgment and to quash the writ; and plaintiff's insistence that defendant deposit $2,900 with the court as a condition of relief. (Park Magnolia v. Fields (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 4.)

As a result, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s request for sanctions pursuant to CCP section 128.5. (Id., at p. 7.) Here, Defendants’ counsel states Ms. Schornack refused a reasonable request for an extension to file answers; provided no warning of her intention to seek defaults; did not serve the Request for Entry of Default; and did not notify defense counsel that default had been entered. When defense counsel promptly requested cooperation to stipulate to set aside the default, Plaintiff’s counsel ignored multiple written requests.

Defense counsel argues Plaintiff’s counsel: 1) knew that several Defendants had not been served at all, and that substituted service on others was improper; 2) refused to re-serve or inquire whether defense counsel would accept service; 3) refused a reasonable request for a brief extension to respond; 4) sought defaults without providing the required professional courtesy notice; 5) did not serve any Request for Entry of Default; and 6) ignored multiple written requests to stipulate to set aside the defaults.

Defendants state Hall and Hulsey were personally served weeks after Plaintiff claimed substituted service had already been completed demonstrating that Plaintiff’s counsel knew the original service was inadequate, yet she proceeded to take their defaults anyway. (Lewis decl., ¶¶3-17; Veres decl., ¶¶2, 3.) Defendants argue that as a direct result of Ms. Schornack’s conduct, Defendants were forced to incur unnecessary attorneys’ fees and costs in bringing this motion. The only default that may have had some merit was that of defendant Crane who had been personally served, even though the summons failed to state she was being served in her individual capacity.

As Plaintiff’s actions in seeking Defendants’ defaults, without having properly served each of them, were without merit, sanctions are justified to compensate Defendants for having to bring this motion. Defendants’ counsel states she spent 16.4 hours researching and preparing the motion. (Veres decl., ¶5.) Her hourly rate is $325. (Ibid.) She has been a California licensed attorney for eight years. (Ibid.) The cost of filing the motion is $60 and a $5.40 electronic filing processing fee. (Ibid.)

As of the time the court reviewed this matter, no opposition has been filed. The requested amount of attorney fees for the time spent on this motion—over two full days—seems high. This court finds sanctions are reasonable in the amount of $3,205.40.

7. Conclusion and Order The motion is GRANTED. Defendants’ defaults are hereby vacated. Defendants may file a response to the complaint within 10 days of this order. Sanctions are granted against Plaintiff’s counsel of record, Suzanne Schornack, in the amount of $3,205.40. Defendants’ counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling.

5. 25CV06228, Cupp v. Preciado 5