Maria Consuelo Huerta De Mora v. Cintas Corporation No. 3 et al

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

Defendant Maria Calderon (“Calderon”) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, 1 for an order determining that the settlement agreement between Calderon and Plaintiff Maria Consuelo Huerta De Mora (“Plaintiff”) is entered into in good faith.

“Any party to an action in which it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors ... shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors ....” (§ 877.6, subd. (a)(1).)

“[T]he intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants.” (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 499.)

However, a party objecting that a settlement lacks good faith has the burden of proving the issue. (§ 877.6.) In Opposition, Defendant Cintas Corporation No. 3 (“Cintas”) argues that Calderon is 100% liable to Plaintiff and there is a strong presumption that Plaintiff and Calderon colluded, based solely on the fact that Plaintiff and Calderon share a mutual friend, Lupe Gonzalez.

The Court finds that Calderon has established the foregoing facts:

(1) Calderon does not dispute that her vehicle struck Cintas’ vehicle, but a genuine dispute exists as to fault between all co-Defendants, as Calderon contends that, had Cintas not been speeding, the vehicles would not have collided. (Declaration of Adam K. Tanouye (“Tanouye Decl.”), ¶ 3.) (2) $15,000 represents the entirety of Defendant’s only applicable insurance. (Id., ¶ 15.) (3) Calderon has been unemployed for more than five years, is on a fixed income derived from her limited lifetime earnings and social security income, has limited assets, does not have any retirement plan, stocks, bonds, etc., is unable to personally contribute to the settlement, does not own the property where she resides, and owns one vehicle (the one involved in the collision). (Id., ¶ 18.) (4) The total amount of Plaintiff’s damages sought is $550,971.54; however, Plaintiff suggests that the amount incurred for her left knee should be eliminated therefrom, as Plaintiff has had a history of issues with her left knee. (Id., ¶ 14.)

Without the amount for her left knee, Plaintiff’s damages come down to $47,306.58. Using the reduced amount, the settlement amount 1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

of $15,000 is roughly 30% of Plaintiff’s damages. Using the full amount of damages, Calderon is only paying approximately 3% of Plaintiff’s damages. (5) A mutual friend of Plaintiff and Calderon, Lupe Gonzalez, asked Calderon to take Plaintiff to her doctor’s appointment on the date of the incident. Plaintiff and Calderon have not communicated since the accident. (Reply Declaration of Adam K. Tanouye (“Tanouye Decl.”), ¶ 2, Exh. K.)

There is no precise yardstick for measuring “good faith” of a settlement with one of several tortfeasors. But it must harmonize the public policy favoring settlements with the competing public policy favoring equitable sharing of costs among tortfeasors. To accomplish this, the settlement must be within the “reasonable range” (within the “ballpark”) of the settling tortfeasor’s share of liability for the plaintiff's injuries—taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the particular case. (Tech-Bilt, Inc., supra, 38 Cal.3d at 499.) Thus, even a settlement that seems disproportionately low may be justified by showing that damages or liability are speculative; or that the settling defendant had no insurance or was underinsured or insolvent. (Ibid.)

Here, Calderon has offered a theory for the reduction of Plaintiff’s total amount of damages sought. Moreover, Calderon has shown that the settlement is for the full amount of her insurance policy and that she is otherwise unable to pay. The Court finds Cintas’ claim of collusion unsupported by the evidence. Calderon further submits evidence showing the nature of the parties’ dispute as to all the defendants’ liability. Cintas does not address Calderon’s reduced damages theory or showing of relative insolvency.

While neither Calderon’s Memorandum nor Reply meaningfully discuss whether 30% (using the reduced theory of damages) or 3% (using Plaintiff’s actual amount of damages sought) is a fair share of Calderon’s culpability as compared to the other co-Defendants, the Court finds that the other Tech-Bilt factors outweigh any deficiency in Calderon’s moving papers as to the proportionality factor.

While the general rule is that a court must consider a defendant’s and co-defendants’ proportionate liability so that the settlement figure is not grossly disproportionate thereto, “the court in Tech–Bilt acknowledged that the quoted rule is subject to an exception. Thus, the court noted that bad faith is not established merely by a showing that a settling defendant with limited ability to satisfy a judgment will pay less than his or her theoretical proportionate share: ‘Such a rule would unduly discourage settlements.

For the damages are often speculative, and the probability of legal liability therefor is often uncertain or remote. And even where the claimant’s damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.’ [Citation.]” (Schmid v. Sup. Ct. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1244, 1248.)

Even though no opposition was filed in Schmid, the Court finds the reasoning in Schmid equally applicable here. “The latter rule controls here. We can think of no earthly good that would come from requiring defendant [Calderon] to remain in the action. Good faith approval of the settlement would bar contribution or indemnity claims against [Calderon] by codefendant [Cintas]. [Citations.] ... No evidence suggests that [Calderon] has any assets, or any prospect of acquiring assets, other than her insurance policy. Yet disapproval of the good faith of the

settlement would doubtless require [Calderon] to continue her defense, possibly at the expense of her insurer, to avoid a judgment in excess of her policy limits that could require her to declare bankruptcy. [¶] We see no virtue in this. [¶] [Calderon’s] continued defense would simply increase her defense costs (possibly producing an unnecessary ultimate boost in insurance premiums) and needlessly add to the work of all personnel of the court.” (Id., 1248-49.)

Given the exception to the Tech-Bilt rule discussed above, Cintas’ request for further discovery from State Farm to determine that Calderon was fully at fault for the accident is DENIED.

Based on the foregoing, the Motion is DENIED.

[2] MOTION TO QUASH DEFENDANTS CINTAS CORPORATION NO. 3 AND SAM BROVELLI’S SUBPOENA FOR DEFENDANT MARIA CALDERON’S RECORD FROM STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

Defendant Maria Calderon (“Calderon”') moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1, subdivision (a), 2 for a protective order and/or an order quashing, modifying and/or limiting Defendants’ Cintas Corporation No. 3 and Sam Brovellia (collectively, “Co- Defendants”) subpoena (“Subpoena”) for Calderon’s records from State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (“State Farm”) issued June 11, 2026.

“If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein...the court, upon motion reasonably made by [a party]...after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.” (§ 1987.1, subd. (a).) Pursuant to California’s Civil Discovery Act, a civil litigant’s right to discovery is broad. “[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action ... if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (§ 2017.010.)

Here, the Subpoena requests “Any and all records and documents including, the entire insurance file from State Farm for the below policy, including but not limited to any payments, adjustments, valuation, and settlements related to the accident on June 2, 2023 at or near 1512 Trower Avenue, Napa, CA 94558.” (Separate Statement, pp. 1-2.) “The information sought also includes documents and information concerning insurance, payments, and billing for services rendered.” (Id., p. 2.)

Co-Defendants argue the “documents are directly relevant and are necessary for [Co- Defendants] to defend themselves in this action, as they relate to Calderon’s clear liability” and the “discovery is necessary for [Co-Defendants] to defend the claim, as it is expected that the 2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

insurance file would include a determination that Calderon was at fault.” (Opp., 2:8-9, 3:22-23.) Specifically, Co-Defendants argue that Calderon’s State Farm insurance policy settled with both Co-Defendants by paying each $5,000 for Co-Defendants’ personal injury and property damage claims, prior to Plaintiff bringing this action against Calderon and Co-Defendants. (Opp., 3:4-8.) Now, Co-Defendants seek the entire State Farm file, asserting that the documents therein are likely to show that State Farm found its insured, Calderon, to be liable.

As an initial matter, Co-Defendants fail to articulate to whom the documents will show Calderon’s purported liability—i.e., whether the documents are purportedly relevant to show Calderon’s liability to Co-Defendants or to Plaintiff. Based on the concurrently filed motion regarding Plaintiff and Calderon’s good faith settlement, it would appear Co-Defendants seek these documents from State Farm to prove that Calderon is liable or at fault for Plaintiff’s damages. However, the fact that State Farm settled with Co-Defendants regarding Co- Defendants’ personal and property damage claims is not necessarily relevant to Plaintiff’s damages.

Moreover, in light of the concurrent ruling on the good faith settlement motion, proof of Calderon’s liability to Plaintiff appears moot. To the extent Co-Defendants contend the documents will prove Calderon’s liability for Co-Defendants’ damage, Co-Defendants fail to discuss the relevancy of that proof to the present action, nor does it appear relevant to the Court given that Co-Defendants have asserted that those liability issues have allegedly settled. Based on the foregoing, Co-Defendants have failed to sufficiently show the relevancy for the sought after documents.

Even assuming arguendo the documents are relevant, Co-Defendants have failed to show that their interest in disclosure outweighs Calderon’s interest in privacy and privilege. Calderon argues that the insurance file includes “valuations” related to the subject accident, reports and documents reflecting the handling attorney’s impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal research related to the case, which is not discoverable under any circumstances, and confidential communications between Calderon and her counsel regarding settlements. (Separate Statement, 2:13-25.)

While insurance policies are generally discoverable in civil litigation, Co-Defendants’ broad request for any and all documents, including the entire insurance file from State Farm, and specifically including payments, adjustments, valuation, and settlements related to the accident, combined with Co-Defendants’ reason behind the Subpoena to prove Calderon’s liability through State Farm’s settlement of claims with Co-Defendants, is sure to include private settlement communications and privileged documents, to the extent they exist. Co-Defendants’ assertions in Opposition that the Subpoena would not result in privileged documents and that it is narrowly and specifically tailored to relevant documents are conclusory and fail to meaningfully engage with Calderon’s objections to the Subpoena or to acknowledge that the Subpoena expressly requests documents and records regarding “settlements.”

In light of Co-Defendants’ insufficient showing of relevance for the discovery, and Calderon’s compelling showing of the possible invasion of her privacy and privilege interests in the discovery, the motion to quash is GRANTED.

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