Vargas Flaherty v. Kerston

The Award states Adams became subject to the terms of the easement agreement, which is binding upon all future titleholders, upon becoming the title-holder-in-fact of the property and the court-appointed receiver on May 25, 2022. The Award further states that Adams has taken actions that violate the terms of the lease.

“On February 29, 2024, Adams obtained three Writs of Possession, which failed to specify the terms of the easement or the lease. Adams used the writs to evict lawful tenants of the claimant, remove property, prevent collection of rents and prevent access. These actions have directly interfered with the Claimant's ability to use the lease in the manner contemplated by the contract.” (Award, ¶16.)

“The Respondent's actions, which included evicting the lawful tenant and sub-tenants of Nature's Way, LLC, removing property, changing locks, preventing access to the rental properties, preventing collection of rents, and preventing access to the structures and the property, constitutes a clear breach of these contractual obligations.” (Id., ¶17.)

The June 3, 2025, Award ordered that the lease agreement between the LLC and its tenant is binding upon all titleholders, including Adams. It confirmed the existence of an express grant easement in the LLC’s favor, which is also binding upon all titleholders. It determined Adams breached the lease and caused a nuisance. The Award ordered liquidated damages in the LLC’s favor in the amount of $250,000; damages of $7,500 for each month of lost rents beginning March 1, 2024; reconstruction costs of $358,312.94; and $800 as the costs of arbitration.

B. 9/25 Order Vacating the Award

In his request for judicial notice, Adams attaches a copy of the September 5, 2025, Amended Order in SCV-265714, County of Sonoma v. Michael L. Castagnola, Trustee of the Michael L. Castagnola Revocable Trust, et al. (“9/25 Order”). Adams argues that the 9/25 Order vacated the Award.

The 9/25 Order was entered after the Hon. Oscar A. Pardo considered Adams’ Thirteen Report of Receiver, the Declaration of Mark Adams, the Supplement to the Thirteenth Report of Receiver, and all other oral and documentary evidence presented in connection with the hearing of the Report. (RJN, Exhibit B, ¶2.)

The 9/25 Order states: “The June 3, 2025 Arbitration Award issued in the matter of Nature’s Way 12778 Dupont Road, LLC v. Mark Adams is hereby vacated in its entirety pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure §1286.2.” (RJN, Exhibit B, ¶2.)

In opposition, Cupp argues various reasons why the 9/25 Order should be declared ineffective or invalid as to the LLC and Cupp. No authority is cited that this court may revive an arbitration award that has been invalidated in its entirety in another action. Here, Cupp never obtained leave to sue Adams in his capacity as a court-appointed receiver, which is required. (Ostrowski v. Miller (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 79, 84.) Thus, there can be no valid arbitration award as to Adams.

III.

Conclusion

Because the Award has been vacated in its entirety and Cupp did not obtain leave to sue Adams in his capacity as a court-appointed receiver, the Amended Petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Adams as it is based entirely upon the vacated Award. Accordingly, the demurrer is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

Petitioner Ron Cupp (“Petitioner”) moves for an order granting his First Amended Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award (“FAP”). Due to the ruling on the demurrer showing no valid award against Adams, the motion is DENIED. Adams is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

7. 25CV08885. Vargas Flaherty v. Kerston 9

(TENTATIVE ISSUED BY HON. DANA B. SIMONDS)

IF ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED, MATTER WILL BE HEARD IN DEPT.

18. PLEASE USE DEPT. 18’S ZOOM LOGIN INFORMATION (SEE BOTTOM OF PAGE).

Plaintiffs Casilda Vargas Flaherty and Christopher Flaherty (“Plaintiffs”) move for an order authorizing service of summons and the First Amended Complaint on defendant Peter Guy Kerston (“Kerston”) by alternative means. Subsequent to the filing of this motion, Kerston filed an answer. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED as MOOT.

8. SCV-273553, Insurance Company of the West, a California Corporation v. Blakeslee

(TENTATIVE ISSUED BY HON. OSCAR A. PARDO)

IF ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED, MATTER WILL BE HEARD IN DEPT.

19. PLEASE USE DEPT. 19’S ZOOM LOGIN INFORMATION (SEE BOTTOM OF PAGE).

IF THERE ARE ANY REQUESTS TO APPEAR, THEY WILL BE HEARD ON FRIDAY, JULY 24, AT 9:00 A.M. IN DEPT.

19.

I.

Introduction

Defendant Christopher Terrell Blakeslee (“Defendant”) moves for an order granting leave to conduct an independent medical examination (“IME”) of Plaintiff Ephraim Giron Goltiao (“Plaintiff”) compelling Plaintiff to appear for and to submit to that examination, with the court setting reasonable conditions governing the examination, including conditions regarding testing materials, raw test data, and recording. The motion is GRANTED.

The instant motion seeks to have Dr. Howard J. Friedman, Ph.D., ABPP, examine Plaintiff. Defendant states that Plaintiff agreed to the IME with Dr. Friedman if Dr. Friedman provided Defendant with the raw test data from the examination.

II. Motion

Plaintiff does not challenge defendant’s showing that good cause exists for the requested examination. Plaintiff states he is willing to submit to the requested neuropsychological examination with Dr. Friedman provided Defendant agree: (1) Dr. Friedman shall provide all raw test data and findings directly to Plaintiff’s counsel, with the raw test data subject to a protective order and with instructions to destroy all of the data at the conclusion of this matter; and (2) that Plaintiff be permitted to video and/or audio record the entire examination.

In his supplemental declaration, Dr. Friedman states he remains willing to provide the raw test data to “plaintiffs retained neuropsychologist, treating psychologist, or other qualified psychological professional in accordance with the applicable professional and ethical standards governing neuropsychological testing materials.” (Friedman supp. decl., ¶9.)

With respect to Plaintiff’s request to audio record the examination, Dr. Friedman states he does not object to Plaintiff audio recording the clinical interview portion of the examination. (Friedman supp. decl., ¶7.) However, he states: “it is not appropriate for plaintiff to audio record the remainder of the examination because doing so would capture the proprietary test questions and comprise the security and integrity of the testing materials. Audio recording of the test 10