Ismael Villanueva Palafox et al v. Empire Farm Labor Contractor, LLC et al

Code, §§ 201-203); (10) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Lab. Code, § 226); (11) unlawful deductions (Lab. Code, § 224). On February 14, 2025, in docket 24CV454910, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding plaintiff Angel Villanueva Vasquez (“Angel”) (collectively with Ismael, Jhonatan, and Juan, “Plaintiffs”). On June 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the operative second amended complaint clarifying that Juan had passed away and that his estate now sought only individual recovery.

On February 18, 2025, in docket 25CV459247, Plaintiffs filed a separate representative action complaint against Defendants seeking civil penalties under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”). The PAGA complaint contains causes of action for (1) PAGA penalties

2 Due to the similarities in the plaintiffs’ last names, the Court will refer to them by their first names. No disrespect is intended.

(Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (a)); (2) failure to pay overtime premiums (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (f)); (3) meal and rest period premiums (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (f)); (4) penalties for failure to pay wages timely (Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (f)). On May 23, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the operative amended PAGA complaint removing Juan as a plaintiff and adding Angel. Now before the Court are Empire’s motions to compel arbitration in each docket. Christopher Ranch has filed notices of joinder in each case. Plaintiffs have opposed each motion to compel arbitration and each joinder. Both Defendants have filed replies in each case. Because the evidence in the class action and PAGA complaints is identical, save for the addition of evidence related to Juan in the class action case, the court will discuss the motions in both cases together.3 II.

Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the Court must inquire as to (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, and (2) if so, whether the scope of the agreement covers the claims alleged. (See Howsan v. Dean Witter Reynolds (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 84.) “Under both federal and state law, the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate. [Citations.] The threshold question requires a response because if such an agreement exists, then the court is statutorily required to order the matter to arbitration.” (Fleming v.

Oliphant Financial, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 13, 19, internal quotation marks omitted.) Under California law, “[a] written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.) “On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that: [¶] (a) The right to compel arbitration has been waived by the petitioner; or [¶] (b) Grounds exist for the revocation of the agreement.” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1281.2, subds. (a), (b).) “This initial issue

3 Juan is no longer a party to the PAGA case as discussed above.

also reflects the very plain principle that you cannot compel individuals or entities to arbitrate a dispute when they did not agree to do so.” (Fleming, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 19.) “Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement--either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation (see [Code Civ.

Proc., § 1281.2, subds. (a), (b))--that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense. [Citation.]” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413 (Rosenthal).) If the proponent of arbitration has shown the existence of an arbitration provision governing the claims at issue by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove a ground for denial. (Ibid.) “Federal law is wholly congruent with these principles.

As the United States Supreme Court observed two decades ago: ‘Because the FAA is “at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements,” [citation] we look first to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to general policy goals, to determine the scope of the agreement.’ (EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc. (2002) 534 U.S. 279, 294 [].) ‘For arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.’ (United Steelworkers of America v.

Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. (1960) 363 U.S. 574, 582.)” (Fleming, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 19-20.) “The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236 (Pinnacle).) “If no agreement to arbitrate was formed, then there is no basis upon which to compel arbitration.” (Ahlstrom v.

DHI Mortgage Co., L.P. (9th Cir. 2021) 21 F.4th 631, 635.) “The FAA, which includes both procedural and substantive provisions, governs [arbitration] agreements involving interstate commerce.” (Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835, 840.) However, “[t]he procedural aspects of

the FAA do not apply in state court absent an express provision in the arbitration agreement.” (Ibid.) Under the FAA, the court must grant a motion to compel arbitration if any suit is brought upon “any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement for such arbitration” (9 U.S.C. § 3), subject to “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract...” (9 U.S.C. § 2). The moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence the existence of the arbitration agreement and that the dispute is covered by the agreement. (See Cruise v.

Kroger Co. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 390, 396 [under both federal and state law, “the threshold question presented by a petition to compel arbitration is whether there is an agreement to arbitrate”]; Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413 [moving party’s burden is a preponderance of evidence].) A moving party can meet their initial burden by showing that an agreement to arbitrate the dispute exists. (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060 (Espejo).)

The burden then shifts to the resisting party to prove a ground for denial. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413.) “In determining the rights of parties to enforce an arbitration agreement within the FAA’s scope, courts apply state contract law while giving due regard to the federal policy favoring arbitration.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.) But the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration ... is merely an acknowledgment of the FAA’s commitment to overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.

Or in another formulation: The policy is to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so. Accordingly, a court must hold a party to its arbitration contract just as the court would to any other kind. (Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. (2022) 596 U.S. 411, 418, internal citations and quotation marks omitted; see also Quach v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 569 [“California policy, like federal policy, puts arbitration agreements on equal footing with other types of contracts”].)

III. Request for Dismissal of Juan’s Estate and Angel

Empire seeks dismissal of Angel in both dockets because he has signed an individual settlement agreement. (Declaration of Leticia Rodriguez (“Rodriguez Decl.”), Ex. F.)4 Empire also seeks dismissal of Juan’s estate in the class action case, asserting that the executor of the estate signed a settlement agreement. (Id., Ex. G.)5 Plaintiffs do not respond to this argument. Accordingly, they have conceded this point. (See Sehulster Tunnels/Pre-Con v. Traylor Brothers, Inc. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1328, 1345, fn. 16 [failure to address point is “equivalent to a concession”]; see also Westside Center Associates v.

Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 529 [failure to challenge a contention in a brief results in the concession of that argument].) The Court will order Juan’s estate dismissed from the civil action and Angel dismissed from both the civil and PAGA actions. IV. Existence of Agreement to Arbitrate The moving party bears the burden of proving the existence of an agreement arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence. As one Court of Appeal summarized, [T]he moving party bears the burden of producing “prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.” (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413.)

The moving party “can meet its initial burden by attaching to the [motion or] petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the [opposing party’s] signature.” (Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-544 (Bannister).) Alternatively, the moving party can meet its burden by setting forth the agreement’s provisions in the motion. (Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219 (Condee); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 [“The provisions must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.”].)

For this step, “it is not necessary to follow the normal procedures of document authentication.” (Condee, at p. 218.) If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its burden of persuasion.

4 The Court relies on the version of the declaration filed in the class action case because it contains the evidence related to Juan. 5 In connection with the motion, Exhibits F and G are provided only in Spanish with no English translations. Plaintiffs do complain that the Rodriguez declaration is “problematic” because Exhibit F (Plaintiffs mistakenly refer to this exhibit as Exhibit E in the opposition in the class action case), the settlement agreement signed by Angel, is not translated. But, in reply, Empire has provided a translated version of both settlement agreements. (See Supplemental Declaration of Catherine M. Houlihan in Support of Reply (“Houlihan Supp. Decl.”), ¶¶ 6-7, Exs. D&E.)

If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the agreement, then in the second step, the opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the agreement. (See Condee, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 219.) The opposing party can do this in several ways. For example, the opposing party may testify under oath or declare under penalty of perjury that the party never saw or does not remember seeing the agreement, or that the party never signed or does not remember signing the agreement. [Citations.]

If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the evidence remains with the moving party. (Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 413.) (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165-166.) Here, to establish the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, Empire submits the declaration of Leticia Rodriguez, who holds the position of Human Resources Director. (Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 1.)

Rodriguez declares that Empire, a farm labor contractor, hired Ismael, Jhonatan, and Angel on July 4, 2024 to harvest garlic for Christopher Ranch through the federal H-2A visa program. (Id. at ¶ 4.)6 All three worked at Christopher Ranch from July l0, 2024 to August 15, 2024. (Ibid.) According to Rodriguez, Jhonatan was presented with and signed the arbitration agreement on July 4, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 12.) Attached to the declaration are a copy of the English version of the “job order” Plaintiffs were hired under (Exhibit A), acknowledgments of receipt of the job order signed by Jhonatan and Ismael (Exhibit B), and an arbitration agreement signed electronically by “Jonathan David Villanueva Palafox” (Exhibit C). (Id. at Exs.

A-D.) The arbitration agreement provides, “Employee and Company understand and voluntarily agree that any claim, dispute, or controversy arising out of or in any way related to Employee’s employment with the Company, including, but not limited to, the terms and conditions related to employment, or the termination of the employment relationship, shall be resolved in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.” (Rodriguez Decl., Ex. C.) It goes on

6 “The H-2A Temporary Agricultural Program allows employers to recruit foreign agricultural workers when the domestic labor market cannot meet employers' needs. The United States Department of Labor (DOL) must certify an employer’s participation in the H-2A program. This process requires the employer, among other things, to submit a ‘job order’ describing ‘the material terms and conditions’ of the jobs for which it seeks foreign workers.” (State ex rel. Cisneros v. Alco Harvest, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 456, 458 (Cisneros).)

to state, “This Agreement is supported by our mutual promises to submit any claims against the other which are covered by this Agreement to final and binding arbitration, rather than to have them decided in court before a judge or jury.” (Rodriguez Decl., Ex. C.) Finally, the agreement states: To the maximum extent allowed by law, any dispute, controversy, claim, or cause of action arising out of or in relation to Employee’s employment with the Company or termination of employment (“Covered Claims”) shall be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with this Agreement, Covered Claims include, but are not limited to, the following: claims for alleged embezzlement, conversion, disclosure of trade secrets, or breach of confidentiality; benefit claims; contract claims; claims for equitable relief; tort claims, such as, but not limited to, claims for wrongful termination and defamation; discrimination and harassment claims, including, without limitation, those brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the American [sic] with Disabilities Act, or the Family Medical Leave Act; any wage and hour claims brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the California Labor Code, or any IWG Wage Order; any claims brought under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”) of 2004 (Cal.

Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.); and any other employment-related claims of any type unless otherwise specifically excluded below. Further, this Agreement applies to all covered Claims that the Company may have against Employee, as well as all Covered Claims that Employee may have against the Company, including any parent, subsidiary, and affiliated entities, and any of their owners, directors, officers, shareholders, employees, managers, members, agents, and successors (whether in an official or personal capacity).

A. Certified Translations Plaintiffs contend that Empire has not met its initial burden to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement because the translations of the documents attached to Rodriguez’s declaration are not certified. Assuming without deciding that certified translations are required, Empire has cured this problem by providing certified translations in reply. (See Houlihan Supp. Decl., Exs. A-E.) B. Jhonatan As to Jhonatan, the Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden by submitting prima facie evidence of Plaintiffs’ written agreement to arbitrate the claims asserted in the action. (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060 [a defendant may meet their initial burden “by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signature”].)

Plaintiffs maintain that Jhonatan is Jhonatan’s true name and that Jhonatan did not sign the arbitration agreement. As noted above, the arbitration agreement is signed by on “Jonathan David Villanueva Palafox.” (Rodriguez Decl., Ex. C.) Jhonatan has provided his own declaration, indicating that he did not receive the arbitration agreement on July 4, 2024, that he did not sign the arbitration agreement, and that, at no time during his employment was he informed of the arbitration agreement. (Declaration of Jhonatan Villanueva Palafox, ¶¶ 5-7.)

The contention that Jhonatan was not informed of the arbitration agreement is belied by Jhonatan’s signature, which is handwritten, on the acknowledgement of receipt of the job order, which mentions the arbitration agreement. (See Rodriguez Decl., Exs. A&B.) Notably, Jhonatan does not declare that he did not sign the acknowledgment of receipt of the job order and the signature on that acknowledgement. Empire also presents evidence that it uses an employee management software called Seso that provides a unique link for presenting the arbitration agreement to employees and that such a personalized link was sent to Jhonatan to complete the arbitration agreement. (Rodriguez Decl., ¶ 8.)

Additionally, Empire has provided evidence that payroll records exist for a Jonathan David Villanueva Palafox, (see Houlihan Supp. Decl., ¶ 8, Ex. F.), suggesting that Empire spelled may have spelled Jhonatan’s name as “Jonathan” when they created his onboarding account. For these reasons, the Court finds that, when the burden shifted back to Empire to establish that an arbitration agreement exists between Jhonatan and Empire, it has met its burden.7 C. Ismael As to Ismael, Empire has provided no evidence of an arbitration agreement signed by Ismael.

Empire contends that Ismael is bound by the arbitration agreement because it was a material term and condition of employment. It further contends that he is bound by the arbitration agreement because he was informed in the job order that he would be required to sign an arbitration agreement and that he accepted employment despite that statement in the job order. Empire relies on cases that state generally, that “[w]hen an employee continues his or her employment after notification that an agreement to arbitration is a condition of continued employment, that employee has impliedly consented to the arbitration agreement. [Citations.]”

7 The Court will discuss Plaintiffs argument that the agreement is unenforceable below.

(Diaz v. Sohnen Enterprises (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 126, 130 (Diaz); see also Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236; Harris v. TAP Worldwide, LLC (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 373, 383 (Harris); Craig v. Brown & Root, Inc. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 416, 420 (Craig).) Each of those cases is distinguishable from the instant case. In Pinnacle, which was not an employment case, the California Supreme Court held that a homeowners association was bound by a covenant in a recorded declaration entered into by individual homeowners based on the law applicable to common interest developments.

In both Diaz and Harris, there was evidence that the employee received a copy of the arbitration agreement. (Diaz, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at p. 128 [“All employees received a copy of the agreement to review at home.”]; Harris, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at pp. 377, 381 [employee confirmed receipt of dispute resolution agreement].) In Craig, the employee was provided with a memorandum and a brochure containing the terms of the arbitration agreement. (Craig, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at pp. 419-420.) The memorandum and brochure did not refer to a separate arbitration agreement that must be signed.

In Gorlach v. Sports Club Co. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1497, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a petition to compel arbitration. (Id. at p. 1512.) There, the employee handbook relied upon by the employer in that case, did not unilaterally impose an arbitration requirement that could create an implied in fact contract due to the employee’s continued employment despite notice of the arbitration requirement. (Id. at p. 1509.) Instead, it contained an express requirement that the employee sign an arbitration agreement: “ ‘As a condition to employment, all Team Members must sign the Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims ... .’ ” (Ibid, italics omitted.)

The Court of Appeal held that the handbook informed employees that they must sign the arbitration agreement and, because the employee did not do so, the court declined to find the existence of an implied in fact agreement. (Ibid.) In Mitri v. Arnel Management Co. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1164, 1167-1168 (Mitri), the employees received an employee handbook stating, in part, “Any dispute arising out of employment with the Company, as allowed by law, will be settled by binding arbitration. As a condition of employment, all employees are required to sign an arbitration agreement. . . .

Employees will be provided a copy of their signed arbitration agreement.” No signed

arbitration agreement was provided in support of the motion to compel arbitration in that case but the employer did provide a signed copy of the acknowledgement of receipt of the employee handbook. (Id. at p. 1168.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying the arbitration agreement. (Id. at p. 1174.) It rejected the employer’s argument that the terms related to arbitration set forth in the handbook were sufficient to compel the employees to arbitration because that would contradict an express term in the agreement that an arbitration agreement would be signed. (Id. at pp. 1172-1173.)

It further held that the employee handbook held itself out as an informational resource rather than a binding agreement. (Id. at p. 1173.) Here, the job order states, “A copy of the applicable rules and policies will be provided to each worker on or before the first day of work, which includes a Dispute Resolution Agreement outlining procedures for the worker to follow when raising concerns and procedures for seeking prompt resolution including arbitration of unresolved matters. [¶] The Dispute Resolution Agreement shall not preclude the workers from filing claims with the America’s Job Center of California offices (AJCCs) under the Employment Services Complaint System, and the workers will not face retaliation. [¶] The Dispute Resolution Agreement will be provided to H-2A workers outside of the U.S. prior to or at the time visas are issued, and U.S. workers no later than the first day of work.” (Rodriguez Decl., Ex.

A, p. C6 of C8.) Here, unlike in Craig, where the agreement was contained in the memorandum and brochure provided to the employee, the job order cannot constitute the arbitration agreement. Rather, as in Mitri and Gorlach, the job order refers to a separate arbitration agreement to be provided to the employee for signature. Empire has provided no evidence that Ismael ever received the arbitration agreement. Accordingly, he cannot be bound by its terms. Alternatively, the Court will find below that the agreement is unenforceable as to Ismael under Cisneros.

The motion is DENIED as to Ismael. V. Whether the Job Order Adequately Informs Prospective Employees of the Arbitration Requirement Plaintiffs contend that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable because the job order does not inform prospective employees of the arbitration requirement. In Cisneros, the Court of Appeal held that waiver of the right to a jury trial and the right to bring class actions pursuant

to an arbitration agreement constituted material terms of employment such that they must be included in the job order for the purposes of employment based on an H-2A visa. (Cisneros, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 461.) The court found that the job order, which did not mention arbitration, was insufficient to apprise the employee of the mandatory conditions of employment included in the arbitration agreement. (Ibid.) Accordingly, it held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable. (Ibid.) Here, unlike in Cisneros, the job order mentions the arbitration agreement in Addendum C, under a heading, “Additional Material Terms and Conditions of Job Offer.” (Rodriguez Decl., Ex.

A, p. C6 of C8.) As mentioned above, the job order states, “A copy of the applicable rules and policies will be provided to each worker on or before the first day of work, which includes a Dispute Resolution Agreement outlining procedures for the worker to follow when raising concerns and procedures for seeking prompt resolution including arbitration of unresolved matters. [¶] The Dispute Resolution Agreement shall not preclude the workers from filing claims with the America’s Job Center of California offices (AJCCs) under the Employment Services Complaint System, and the workers will not face retaliation. [¶] The Dispute Resolution Agreement will be provided to H-2A workers outside of the U.S. prior to or at the time visas are issued, and U.S. workers no later than the first day of work.” (Rodriguez Decl., Ex.

A, p. C6 of C8.) Plaintiffs contend that this statement in the job order is insufficient under Cisneros. Specifically, they assert that it “[d]oes not identify the agreement as a binding, allencompassing arbitration agreement covering all employment claims; [d]oes not disclose the waiver of the right to a jury trial; [d]oes not disclose the class action and PAGA representative action waiver; [d]oes not disclose that signing the agreement is a condition of employment; [d]oes not attach or describe the agreement’s actual terms; and [p]romises only future delivery, after workers have already accepted employment, obtained visas, and traveled internationally.” (Opposition, p. 5:9-16.)

Empire asserts that Cisneros does not preclude an employer from explaining that an arbitration agreement is a condition of employment in an addendum to the job order. The Court agrees that Cisneros does not preclude including such information in an addendum. (Cisneros,

supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 461 [Stating that “Job Orders submitted to DOL have lengthy addenda describing such things as work experience and physical requirements, the grounds for terminating a worker, training and production standards, and reimbursement of transportation costs” but that the arbitration requirement was stated nowhere in the job order.].) Moreover, the portion of the addendum referring to the arbitration agreement lies under a heading referring to material terms of the job offer, alerting the reader to the fact that signing the dispute resolution agreement is a mandatory condition of employment.

Additionally, the job order explicitly states that the arbitration agreement will be provided to H-2A employees outside the U.S. at or before the time visas are issued. The Court further agrees with Empire that Cisneros does not require the full terms of the arbitration agreement to be included in the job order itself. Some of Plaintiffs’ other argument, however, fare better. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the job order does not alert the prospective employee to the fact that he or she will be waiving the right to a jury trial and the right to file a class action lawsuit.

These were the specific rights the Cisneros court was concerned with in holding that the job order before it did not disclose mandatory conditions of employment. (Cisneros, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 461.) Here, the above statement in the job order cannot be read to apprise employees of the waiver of their jury and class action rights. Accordingly, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable as to Jhonatan and Ismael. The motion is DENIED to the extent it seeks to enforce the arbitration agreement as to Jhonatan and Ismael.

VI. Christopher Ranch’s Joinder Christopher Ranch seeks to join in Empire’s motion. “Under certain circumstances, a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement may seek to enforce it against a signatory. Whether such enforcement is permissible is a question of state law.” (Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1332.) “A third party beneficiary is someone who may enforce a contract because the contract is made expressly for his benefit.” (Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 295, 301, internal quotation marks omitted; see also Civ.

Code, § 1559 [‘[a] contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by him ... .’].)

“ ‘Equitable estoppel precludes a party from asserting rights “he otherwise would have had against another” when his own conduct renders assertion of those rights contrary to equity.’ [Citation.] In the arbitration context, a party who has not signed a contract containing an arbitration clause may nonetheless be compelled to arbitrate when he seeks enforcement of other provisions of the same contract that benefit him.” (Metalclad Corp. v. Ventana Environmental Organizational Partnership (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1705, 1713.) Because the Court finds that Empire cannot enforce the arbitration agreement as to Jhonatan and Ismael, the sole remaining named Plaintiffs, Christopher Ranch’s request for joinder is DENIED. VII.

Conclusion

Plaintiff Angel Villanueva Vasquez is hereby dismissed from both actions. The estate of Juan Manuel Villanueva is dismissed from docket 24CV454910. The motion to compel arbitration is DENIED in all other respects. Because the Court finds that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable by Empire, it DENIES Christopher Ranch’s request for joinder. Plaintiffs shall prepare the order.

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