E & A Monroy Holdings LLC vs. HSU Family Trust

in consideration of Wong-Mar granting the easements as hereinbefore set forth. Sun Wong further agrees, on behalf of his heirs, executors, administrators,

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successors, assigns, tenants and lessees, that so long as Wong-Mar, their beneficiaries, successors or assigns shall be engaged in the operation of a grocery store on the Parcel No. 1 building area, no grocery, supermarket, bakery or business engaged in the off-sale of beer, wine or liquor, shall be permitted on the premises described herein as Parcel No. 2, it being the intent of the parties hereto that Sun Wong’s Covenant that Parcel No 2 not be used for the purposes above set forth shall be deemed a covenant running with the land and shall bind Sun Wong’s Parcel No. 2 and his successors or assigns, and shall be for the benefit of and enforceable by Wong-Mar’s Parcel No. 1 and their beneficiaries, successors or assigns.[1]

It is further agreed that neither party shall lease any portion of their respective building area to any tenant for the purpose of engaging in business as a retail merchant, which business will be in competition with any then existing tenant of the other party; provided, however, that this covenant shall not apply to leases to tenants engaged in the furnishing of services.[2]

(2AXC, ¶ 44, Ex. C.)

Hsu alleges that in October of 2020 (prior to E&A’s purchase of Parcel 1), Cross-Defendants became aware that Carniceria had leased premises at 7900 and planned to open a grocery store. (2AXC, ¶ 27.) Carniceria opened a grocery store on 7900 in February 2022.

Hsu alleges that “[d]espite the existence of restrictions [in the Retail Merchant Provision] and Cross-Complainant Carniceria’s operations as a retail grocery store, Cross-Defendant SAI Supermarket has signed a lease, applied for a liquor license, and obtained a building permit to operate a retail grocery store on 7870 in breach of the clear language of the Grant[s] of Easements.” (2AXC, ¶ 46.)

In the Supplemental Cross-Complaint, Hsu alleges that in March 2023, Cross-Defendants began operating Mexican specialty supermarket on 7870. Hsu alleges that by opening their competing grocery store, Cross-Defendants breached the terms of the Grants of Easements. In March 2024, Carniceria closed its business and abandoned its lease. Hsu alleges this was a direct result of the competition from the Cross-Defendants’ much larger Mexican specialty grocery store operating on the property next door.

Hsu further alleges that paragraph 9 of the Grants of Easement grants 7870 an easement over 7900’s driveway and parking areas as follows:

Sun Wong does hereby grant to Wong-Mar an easement for parking and driveway purposes over, across, and upon the Parcel No 2 [7900] parking and driveway area, an easement for driveway purposes over, across, and upon any upon the

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Parcel No. 2 driveway area and a 10-foot-wide easement for utilities over, across, upon and under the Parcel No. 2 [7900] driveway area. (“Driveway Easement”)

(2AXC, ¶ 17.)

Hsu alleges that this easement allowed occupants of 7870 to exit 7870 in the rear across 7900 to Power Inn Road. Hsu alleges that sometime prior to the acquisition of 7900 in 2004, Hsu’s predecessors in interest blocked the Driveway Easement described in paragraph 9 of the Grant[s] of Easements to prevent occupants of 7870 from using the rear of 7900, as set forth in the Grant[s] of Easements by a gate and fence obstacles. (2AXC, ¶ 22.) The fence remained in place, and the driveway was blocked from approximately 2004 through early September 2020. As a result, Hsu alleges that during that period occupants of 7870 were unable to exit to Power Inn from the rear of the building because the gate was locked and the 7870 owners and tenants did not have a key. (2AXC, ¶ 23.) Hsu seeks to terminate the Driveway Easement and obtain quiet title to the Driveway Easement via adverse possession.

At issue here are causes of action in the 2AXC for breach of covenants, conditions, and restriction (COA 1), quiet title-driveway easement adverse possession (COA 2).

Trial is currently scheduled for August 11, 2026.

Cross-Defendants move for summary adjudication of the breach of covenants, conditions, and restrictions cause of action on the grounds that “the alleged restrictive covenant is not applicable, does not run with the land, and Carniceria Mi Mercadito, LLC was not a ‘then existing tenant’” under the Grant[s] of Easement[s].” (Motion, 2:8-9.)

Cross-Defendants move for summary adjudication of the quiet title-driveway easement adverse possession cause of action on the grounds that Hsu has “not exclusively used the driveway easement, and the driveway easement is necessary for the use and enjoyment of Plaintiffs/Cross- Defendants’ parcel.” (Motion, 2:13-15.)

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is granted. In taking judicial notice of these documents, the Court accepts the fact of their existence, not the truth of their contents. (See Professional Engineers v. Dep’t of Transp. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 543, 590; Steed v. Department of Consumer Affairs (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 112, 120-121.)

Cross-Defendants are admonished for failing to comply with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1110(f)(4), which provides, “Unless they are submitted by a self-represented party, electronic exhibits must include electronic bookmarks with links to the first page of each exhibit and with bookmark titles that identify the exhibit number or letter and briefly describe the exhibit.” Failure to comply with these requirements in the future may result in papers not being considered, matters being continued so that papers may be submitted in the proper format, and/or

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the imposition of sanctions.

Legal Standard

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment and/or summary adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. The court cannot consider an unpleaded issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. (Roth v.

Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a defendant’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2)].)

Once the moving party has met its initial burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or affirmative defense claimed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p); see generally, Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.)

In ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, at p. 843.) Summary judgment is properly granted only if the moving party’s evidence establishes that there is no issue of material fact to be tried. (Lipson v. Super. Ct. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 362, 374.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is that the California Rule of Court, rule 3.1350, subdivision (b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for punitive damages, or a question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure § 437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides in its entirety:

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A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.

The Court reminds the parties of the “Golden Rule” of summary judgment or adjudication: “If it is not set forth in the separate statement, it does not exist.” (See Zimmerman, Rosenfeld v. Larson (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1466, 1477 [italics in original].) Moreover, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Id. at 252 [citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1].)

Breach of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (COA 1)

Cross-Defendants contend that the Retail Merchant Provision does not run with the land because it is a personal/restrictive covenant expressly limited to the parties to the Grants of Easements. (Los Angeles Terminal Land Co. v. Muir (“Muir”) (1902) 136 Cal. 36, 42 [“a personal covenant [is] not binding upon the assigns of the covenantor, nor inuring to the benefit of the successors or assigns of the covenantee.”].) “A personal covenant is one that by its nature is a mere personal undertaking, and not intended to have any binding effect beyond the immediate parties to the instrument.” (Oceanside Community Assn. v. Oceanside Land Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 166, 175 disapproved on other grounds by Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345.)

In opposition, Hsu argues that Muir is factually distinguishable because it involved a restrictive covenant in a deed which could not be enforced against subsequent purchasers of the property, whereas here, adjoining landowners entered into a written agreement regarding the use of easements and the properties. Hsu further notes that Muir pre-dates Civil Code section 1468 (“Section 1468”).

With respect to Section 1468, Hsu maintains that the Retail Merchant Provision runs with the land as a statutory covenant pursuant to Section 1468.[3] “A covenant is said to run with the land if it binds not only the person who entered into it, but also later owners and assigns who did not personally enter into it.” (Citizens for Covenant Compliance, supra, 12 Cal.4th at 353.) “In

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California, only covenants specified by statute run with the land (§ 1461), primarily those described in sections 1462 and 1468. However, prior to the amendments of section 1468 in 1968 and 1969, these sections were written and interpreted very narrowly.” (Ibid.) The former Section 1468 stated:

A covenant made by the owner of land with the owner of other land to do or refrain from doing some act on his own land, which doing or refraining is expressed to be for the benefit of the land of the covenantee, and which is made by the covenantor expressly for his assigns or to the assigns of the covenantee, runs with both of such parcels of land.

(Marra v. Aetna Constr. Co. (1940) 15 Cal.2d 375, 377 [quoting former Section 1468](underline added).)

Hsu advances that each of the requirements of former Section 1468 has been satisfied because the Grants of Easements were entered into by a voluntary written agreement made by adjoining landowners (AMF 1.) Hsu points to a provision in the Grants of Easements which states:

The easements hereinafter granted in each instance are and shall be in perpetuity, appurtenant to the building area subparcel of the grantee of the easement, and in each instance shall be nonexclusive for the use and benefit of the grantor and grantee and their heirs, beneficiaries, executors, administrators, successors, assigns, tenants, customers, suppliers, common carriers, deliverers of merchandise, and other business invitees, and the customers, employees, and business invitees of their tenants.

(AMF 4, Grants of Easements, ¶ 3 (“Perpetuity Provision”).)

According to Hsu, the Perpetuity Provision shows “[t]he reciprocal Non-Compete Promises were expressly made for the benefit of each of the parcels. (DAF 1, 4)” (Opposition, 11:19-22); and “the parties made all of the promises contained in the Grant[s] of Easements expressly binding on and for the benefit of their respective assigns. (DAF 4.).” (Ibid.) Thus, Hsu claims that “the parties made all of the promises contained in the Grants of Easements expressly binding on and for the benefit of their respective assigns. . . . [and] the Reciprocal Non-Compete Promises run with the land as statutory covenants pursuant to the applicable version of Civil Code section 1468.” (Opposition, 11:20-23.)

Hsu further suggests that the Retail Merchant Provision is a negative easement that runs with the land. Hsu notes that the parties entitled their document as “Grants of Easements,” which shows that “the parties who made those promises decided to treat them as easements, naming them and all of the other promises exchanged in their writing as a ‘Grants of Easements.’” (Opposition, 9:19-20.) Hsu adds that “[n]one of their reciprocal promises are denominated as anything other

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than easements in the instrument they chose to document their exchange of restrictions and rights as between their contiguous parcels.” (Opposition, 9:21-23.) As a result, viewing the Grants of Easement as a whole (including the Perpetuity Provision) and in her favor pursuant to Civil Code section 1069, Hsu asserts that the Retail Merchant Provision runs with the land as a negative easement.

In reply, Cross-Defendants maintain that post-Muir, California courts continue to distinguish personal covenants from covenants running with the land, and that the Retail Merchant Provision is not a negative easement. Cross-Defendants continue that Hsu’s reliance on Section 1468 (which applies to covenants) is incompatible with her argument that the Retail Merchant Provision is an easement (which is governed by Civil Code section 801 et seq.), and that, reading the Grants of Easements as a whole, the Retail Merchant Provision is not an easement, and therefore the Perpetuity Provision does not apply.

Interpretation of a contract is a judicial function that courts routinely perform in deciding a motion for summary judgment or adjudication. (Tustin Field Gas & Food, Inc. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 220, 226 [affirming trial court’s order granting summary judgment based on contract interpretation]; McGuire v. More-Gas Investments (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 512, 523 [“Unless it turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence, the interpretation of a written contract is solely a judicial function”].) “All contracts, whether public or private, are to be interpreted by the same rules ....” (Civ.

Code § 1635; see also Oberg v. Los Angeles (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 151, 158.) In interpreting any contract, the fundamental goal is to give effect to the “mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting....” (Civ. Code § 1636; see also Wolf v. Sup. Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1356.) “The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.” (Civ. Code § 1638.) “The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.” (Civ.

Code § 1641.) “Moreover, it is well settled contracts are construed to avoid rendering terms surplusage.” (Rebolledo v. Tilly’s, Inc. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 900, 923.) Thus, “[i]t is fundamental in the interpretation of contracts that the various terms will be harmonized if possible.” (Retsloff v. Smith (1926) 79 Cal.App.443, 11 452.)

The Court agrees with Cross-Defendants that the Retail Merchant Provision is a restrictive covenant, rather than a negative easement, and that the Retail Merchant Provision is not a statutory covenant.

In its preamble, the Grants of Easement provides, in part, “WHEREAS it is the intent and purpose of the parties by entering into this agreement, and the grants of easements hereinafter made, to provide reciprocal motor vehicle and driveway facilities for the common use and benefit of the parties and their respective properties.” (Cross-Defendants’ Compendium of Evidence, Ex. A, pp. 1-2.) Again, the Perpetuity Provision, which is located at paragraph 3 of the Grants of Easements, states:

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The easements hereinafter granted in each instance are and shall be in perpetuity, appurtenant to the building area subparcel of the grantee of the easement, and in each instance shall be nonexclusive for the use and benefit of the grantor and grantee and their heirs, beneficiaries, executors, administrators, successors, assigns, tenants, customers, suppliers, common carriers, deliverers of merchandise, and other business invitees, and the customers, employees, and business invitees of their tenants.

(AMF 4, Grants of Easements, ¶ 3.)

The parties then expressly granted certain easements to each other. Specifically, Wong-Mar granted to Sun Wong an easement for parking and driveway purposes, and an easement for utilities over Parcel 1. (Id., ¶ 8.) Sun Wong granted to Wong-Mar Wong an easement for parking and driveway purposes, and an easement for utilities over Parcel 12. (Id., ¶ 9.)

The Competing Grocery Provision and the Retail Merchant Provision are within the last paragraph (paragraph 15) of the Grants of Easements. The first line of the Competing Grocery Provision states “in consideration of Wong-Mar granting the easements as hereinbefore set forth.” (Cross-Defendants’ Compendium of Evidence, Ex. A, ¶ 15 (underline added).) This clearly indicates that easements were granted in the preceding paragraphs and not in paragraph 15. Further, the Perpetuity Provision states that the easements are for the “use and benefit” of, among others, “customers, suppliers, common carriers, deliverers of merchandise, and other business invitees, and the customers, employees, and business invitees of their tenants.” (AMF 4, Grants of Easements, ¶ 3.)

The Court fails to see how a purported “easement” prohibiting the successors or assigns of Wong-Mar or Sun Wong from “engaging in business as a retail merchant, which business will be in competition with any then existing tenant of the other party,” are for the use and benefit of the “customers, suppliers, common carriers, deliverers of merchandise, and other business invitees, and the customers, employees, and business invitees of their tenants.” On the other hand, easements for parking and driveway purposes undoubtedly are for the use and benefit of the “customers, suppliers, common carriers, deliverers of merchandise, and other business invitees, and the customers, employees, and business invitees of their tenants.” As a result, the Court finds that Hsu fails to satisfy her burden to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact on the issue of whether the Retail Merchant Provision is a negative easement.

For the same reasons, the Court finds that Hsu fails to satisfy her burden to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact that the Retail Merchant Provision is a statutory covenant under the former Section 1468.

Cross-Defendants’ motion for summary adjudication of the breach of covenants, conditions, and restriction cause of action is GRANTED. Having granted summary adjudication on this ground, the Court need not address Cross-Defendants’ remaining arguments.

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Quiet Title-Driveway Easement Adverse Possession

Cross-Defendants move for summary adjudication of the quiet title-driveway easement adverse possession cause of action on the grounds that Hsu has “not exclusively used the driveway easement, and the driveway easement is necessary for the use and enjoyment of Plaintiffs/Cross- Defendants’ parcel.[4]” (Motion, 2:13-15.)

According to Cross-Defendants, Hsu allowed Plaintiffs to use the Driveway Easement from 2021 to 2026, which is inconsistent with the requirement that Hsu’s use was “hostile.” (UMFs 23-28.) Cross-Defendants rely on the Declaration of Enrique Monroy to support UMFs 25-28 to show that Cross-Defendants used the driveway from 2023-2026. Hsu objects to Mr. Monroy’s declaration based on the parties’ November 13, 2023 stipulation in which the parties agreed “not to do anything which will block, obstruct, or impair any easement for ingress or egress claimed by any party and presently in use as of the date of this Stipulation.” (Hsu’s Compendium of Evidence, Ex. 4.)

The parties also agreed that “[t]he existence of this Stipulation and any use of any of the claimed easements from this day forward shall not be admitted in evidence in the above-captioned suit or any other suit for any purpose other than enforcing this Stipulation.” (Ibid.)

Additionally, Hsu provides evidence that “a fence and gate continuously physically severed the Driveway Easement from 2004, until Conrad physically dismantled the gate without permission in or about September 2020. (AMF 23.) Hsu objected to Conrad’s self-help measure. (Declaration of Jieun Hsu (“Hsu Decl.”), ¶ 7”.)

In reply, Cross-Defendants’ counsel apologizes for offering the evidence in violation of the stipulation, explaining that counsel had overlooked the prior stipulation. In recognition thereof, Cross-Defendants have agreed to withdraw UMFs 26-28.[5] Cross-Defendants suggest that the Court should still grant the motion because “Hsu cannot refute that she provided access to the easement area in 2021, 2022 and 2023 prior to the stipulation.” (Reply, 8:2-3.)

An easement may be extinguished by the adverse possession of the servient owner if his or her use satisfies the requirements for adverse possession. These requirements include that the servient owner occupies the easement in an open and notorious manner and uses it under a claim of right that is hostile and adverse to the owner of the easement for a five-year period. (Glatts v. Henson (1948) 31 Cal. 2d 368; Tract Development Services, Inc. v. Kepler (1988) 199 Cal. App. 3d 1374; see also Vieira Enterprises, Inc. v.

McCoy (2017) 8 Cal. App. 5th 1057.) “The five-year prescriptive period begins to run when a cause of action accrues, that is, when the owner is deprived of possession.” (Sevier v. Locher (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1082, 1085.) “‘Title to property acquired by adverse possession matures into an absolute fee interest after the statutory prescriptive period has expired.’” (Marriage v. Keener (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 186, 192.) “Whether the various elements of adverse possession have been established is a question of fact.” (Sevier, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at 1087.)

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The motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.

Preliminarily, it is unclear to the Court whether Cross-Defendants may withdraw the UMFs because their inclusion of the UMFs in the separate statement indicates that the UMFs are material. (See CRC, Rule 3.1345(d).) In any event, the Cross-Defendants provide no legal authority on when the five-year period for adverse possession begins.[6] While Cross-Defendants focus on the five-year period from 2021 to 2026, the evidence shows that Hsu purchased Parcel 2 on January 27, 2004. (Hsu Decl., ¶ 6.) The 2AXC alleges that sometime prior to Hsu’s acquisition, her predecessors blocked the Driveway Easement to prevent occupants of 7870 from using the rear of 7900, as set forth in the Grants of Easements by a gate and fence obstacles. (2AXC, ¶ 22.)

The fence remained in place, and the driveway was blocked from approximately 2004 through early September 2020. (2AXC, ¶ 23.) Cross-Defendants provide no evidence showing that Hsu’s possession of the Driveway Easement from 2004 to 2020 was not hostile.[7]

As it was Cross-Defendants’ initial burden to demonstrate that no triable issue of material fact exists, Cross-Defendants fail to satisfy their initial burden.

Relying on Southern Pacific Co. v. San Francisco (“Southern Pacific”) (1964) 62 Cal.2d 50, Cross-Defendants claim that because Hsu purportedly consented to Cross-Defendants’ use of the Driveway Easement from 2021 to 2023 for its intended purpose, such consent “destroys” her claim of adverse possession. Cross-Defendants suggest that since the gate could be opened during that time and allowed vehicles to pass through it, the existence of the gate is not inconsistent with the existence of the easement.

Cross-Defendants also rely on Sorensen v. Costa (“Sorensen”) (1948) 32 Cal.2d 453, for the proposition that Hsu’s consent to Cross-Defendants’ use of the Driveway Easement in 2021, 2022, and 2023 was not hostile. As noted above, however, Cross-Defendants provide no evidence showing that Hsu’s possession of the Driveway Easement from 2004 to early September 2020 was not hostile. Cross-Defendants also fail to show that the gate could be unlocked and vehicles from Parcel 1 would use the Driveway Easement during that time.

The Court need not rule on Cross-Defendants’ objections to evidence because it was not material to the Court’s disposition of the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (q).)

This minute order is effective immediately. Cross-Defendants shall prepare a formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312 and Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g).

NOTICE:

Consistent with Local Rule 1.06(B), any party requesting oral argument on any matter on this calendar must comply with the following procedure:

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To request limited oral argument, on any matter on this calendar, you must call the Department 16C Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-1475 by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing and advise opposing counsel. At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below.

If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court. Unless ordered to appear in person by the Court, parties may appear remotely either telephonically or by video conference via the Zoom video/audio conference platform with notice to the Court and all other parties in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §367.75. Although remote participation is not required, the Court will presume all parties are appearing remotely for non-evidentiary civil hearings.

The Department 16C Zoom Link is https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16030877014 and the Zoom Meeting ID is 160 3087 7014. To appear on Zoom telephonically, call (833) 568-8864 and enter the Zoom Meeting ID referenced above. NO COURTCALL APPEARANCES WILL BE ACCEPTED.

Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed on the Court Reporter Services webpage available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://saccourt.ca.gov/general-information/court-reporter-services-transcripts. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://saccourt.ca.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/227/639084034465370000.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

[1] This provision shall be referred to herein as the (“Competing Grocery Provision”). [2] This provision shall be referred to herein as the (“Retail Merchant Provision”). [3] Section 1468 was enacted in 1905, and later amended in 1968. Since the Grants of Easements

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was entered into and recorded in 1964, the original version of Section 1468 applies here. (See Citizens for Covenant Compliance, supra, 12 Cal. 4th at 354.) [4] Cross-Defendants’ memorandum of points and authorities fails to address the ground that the

Driveway Easement is necessary for their use and enjoyment. Accordingly, the Court will not rule on the issue. [5] UMF 25 also cites to Hsu’s response to request for admission, no.

8. Hsu has not objected to

that evidence. Thus, evidence remains to support UMF 25, namely, that Cross-Defendants used the Driveway Easement in 2023. [6] As reference above, the five-year prescriptive period begins to run “when the owner is

deprived of possession.” (Sevier, supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at 1085.) [7] Cross-Defendants’ UMF 29 states, “[t]he gate that was constructed on the Driveway Easement

could be unlocked to allow vehicles to pass through.” (UMF 29.) Cross-Defendants rely upon Hsu’s response to Request for Admission No. 9 to support UMF 29. Request for Admission No. 9 sought an admission that “Plaintiffs currently use the ingress and egress point provided identified in Paragraph 22 of YOUR First Amended Cross-Complaint.” (Cross-Defendants’ Compendium of Evidence, Ex. E.) Hsu responded, “They do, and they frequently abuse the courtesy by not locking the gate.” Hsu verified her responses on July 27, 2022. (Ibid.) This merely shows that around July 2022, the Driveway Easement could be unlocked.