Christopher Connally vs. Samsung SDI Co Ltd

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34-2020-00278930-CU-PL-GDS: Christopher Connally vs. Samsung SDI Co Ltd 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Timely Bring the Action to Trial (Filed by Samsung SDI, Co., LTD) in Department 16D

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TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Samsung SDI Co., Ltd.’s (“Samsung SDI”) motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §583.310 and §583.360 to dismiss this 2020 action on the grounds that plaintiff Connally failed to bring it to trial within five years is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Connally commenced this personal injury action on 5/19/2020, filing against various defendants a complaint for damages based on strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty and other theories of liability arising from plaintiff’s use of a lithium-ion battery in an e-cigarette. No trial date has ever been set in this matter.

Moving Papers. On 1/5/2026, defendant Samsung SDI filed the present motion to dismiss this 2020 action on the grounds that plaintiff Connally has failed to timely bring it to trial within five years of filing his complaint on 5/19/2020 (even after accounting for this Court’s suspension of civil trials from 3/17/2020 through 1/4/2021) and none of the limited tolling provisions potentially available (including Judicial Council Emergency Rule 10(a)) applies to this case, nor does equitable estoppel or waiver. As such, the moving papers insist dismissal is mandatory under California law.

Opposition. Plaintiff Connally opposes, arguing that he “has pursued his case with vigor[b]ut for the first three years after this case was filed, his efforts were stymied by an inability to effectively serve Samsung, a Korean entity, with process under the Hague Service Convention” and thus, this Court should exercise its discretion by finding that the five-year statute was tolled due to these difficulties. (Opp., p.1:4-8.) More specifically, plaintiff promptly hired a foreign process server whom counsel had used in the past (“Civil Action Group”) to serve Korean entities including Samsung in other “exploding battery cases” and despite “consistently check[ing] in” over “the next three years,” plaintiff was informed that they were unable to effect service. (Id., at p.1:9-13.)

Ultimately, plaintiff retained another process server in early 2023 and service on defendant Samsung was completed on 3/8/2023, “nearly three years after filing the lawsuit.” (Id., at p.3:10-12.) Since then, “Plaintiff has diligently litigated this case,” having “regularly engaged in substantial document exchanges, written discovery exchanges, meet and conferrals, depositions, and motion practice,” as well as “multiple depositions of Samsung corporate witnesses” after the present motion to dismiss was filed, in preparation of an opposition to Samsung SDI’s motion for summary judgment

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which was set for hearing more than six years after this case was commenced. (Id., at p.1:15-19.) The opposition adds that defendant Samsung SDI “never objected to producing a witness on the basis that the matter had not been timely brought to trial” and “[w]hen Plaintiff tried to bring up trial timing, Samsung simply ignored Plaintiff for months and then filed its motion to dismiss on the first day possible.” (Id., at p.1:19- 22.) According to plaintiff, “[r]ecent California Supreme Court rulings make clear that a prolonged inability to serve a key defendant justifies tolling the five-year statute for that time, even if there is time afterwards to bring the matter to trial, so long as the plaintiff was diligent in pursuing the case” and “the Ninth Circuit has expressly recognized that delays attributable to Hague service warrant tolling because service under the Hague Convention is beyond the control of the Plaintiff” but Samsung SDI instead “relies on outdated, overruled caselaw to escape this case on procedural technicalities.” (Id., at p.1:23-p.2:1.)

The opposition is primarily premised on a claim that the five-year statutory period should be tolled due to plaintiff’s “prolonged inability to serve a key defendant, despite diligent efforts and as support for this contention, plaintiff cites the following three appellate decisions: Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081; Wurnitsch v. Nordvik (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 679; and Seto v. Szeto (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 76. (Opp., p.5:18-p.6:14.) Plaintiff adds that service under the Hague Convention was not only required but also the delays associated therewith were beyond his control, citing both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and opinions from the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals. (Id., at p.6:15-p.7:15) Still, conceding that the “critical question” is one of diligence, plaintiff maintains that he diligently pursued service on defendant Samsung SDI and once served, diligently pursued a variety of written discovery and depositions, insisting this case is ready for trial and that the five-year statute should be deemed tolled for the time it took to effect service on defendant Samsung SDI. (Id., at p.6:12-14; p.7:15-p.8:11)

The opposition further asserts defendant Samsung SDI’s reliance on Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262 for the proposition that plaintiff effectively “waived any impracticality claim by not filing a motion to specially set the matter for trial within the five-year window” is misplaced because Sanchez is “no longer good law” and is also “inapplicable” here because Samsung SDI “did not cooperate in discovery to such a degree that Plaintiff could have fully developed the factual record within the two years after Samsung was served.” (Opp., p.8:12-p.9:1.)

Moreover, plaintiff maintains that Samsung SDI should be estopped from seeking dismissal inasmuch as it “actively litigated the case, including producing its person most qualified for deposition and setting its own summary judgment motion for hearing beyond the five-year deadline,” thereby reasonably conveyed it “intended to litigate the case on the merits rather than stand on a procedural dismissal,” and also “ignored requests by Plaintiff to coordinate

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setting a trial date while still within the five-year cutoff as adjusted for the COVID 19 sixmonth extension.” (Id., at p.9:2-22.) Finally, the opposition argues that tolling of the fiveyear statute does not create any burden or prejudice because Samsung SDI remains subject to various cross-complaints brought by parties who have agreed to toll the fiveyear deadline. (Id., at p.9:23-p.10:9.)

Reply. In its reply, defendant Samsung SDI states that the five-year statute expired on 5/19/2025 and even with an additional 230 days for the time when this Court suspended civil trials, the five-year statute expired on 1/5/2026. Thus, because plaintiff has failed to establish any entitlement to tolling of the five-year period including a stipulation, waiver or estoppel, this Court must dismiss this action pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Code of Civil Procedure §583.310 and §583.360.

According to defendant Samsung SDI, while plaintiff contends his inability to serve defendant Samsung SDI for 34 months should be excluded from the five-year period, he failed to cite any authority for such contention. The opposition’s reliance on Wurnitsch v. Nordvik is unavailing since that case, by its own terms, dealt with a defendant’s absence from California after a motor vehicle accident and the subsequent concealment of her location by her parents, attorney and insurance adjuster, making this case entirely inapposite insofar as Samsung SDI did nothing to avoid service and plaintiff was at all times aware of its publicly known locations. (Reply, p.4:6-10.)

Regardless, plaintiff admits that he waited over two years to replace the original process server and once the new one was retained, service on Samsung SDI was promptly completed in March 2023 and this shows that plaintiff’s own lack of diligence was the primary cause of this nearly three-year delay.

Defendant Samsung SDI further argues that the opposition’s citation to Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. fares no better given that the California Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s conclusion there was no impossibility, impracticability, or futility under §583.340(c) because the stay to complete mediation was requested by the plaintiff, lasted only four months and did not preclude discovery and because plaintiff failed to demonstrate diligence during the period in question (Gaines v.

Fidelity National Title Ins. Co., supra, 62 Cal.4th at 1089), thereby offering no support for the tolling claim in the case at bar. Moreover, the opposition’s assertion of prosecuting this case with diligence is further contradicted by the fact plaintiff waited over a year to serve written discovery on Samsung SDI and did not take his first deposition until after this motion was filed in January 2026. (Reply, p.4:20-24.)

According to defendant, similarly misplaced is plaintiff’s reliance upon the federal appellate court decisions of Nylok Corp. v. Fastener World Inc. (7th Cir. 2005) 396 F.3d 805 and Lucas v. Natoli (9th Cir. 1991) 936 F.2d 432 because (1) the Federal Rules of

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Civil Procedure do not contain a mandatory dismissal provision analogous to §583.360 and (2) both Nylok and Lucas involve questions relating to “timely” service of process. However, this motion to dismiss is not based on any claim relating to timely service but rather only failure to bring this action to trial within the required five-year period.

Defendant Samsung SDI adds that plaintiff’s tolling argument based on delays in completing service on the former is undermined by Hughes & Ladd, Inc. v. Rogue River Paving Co. (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 311, where the Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff’s tolling claim for the seven months it took to obtain an order for publishing the summons needed to serve a foreign corporation. The Court rejected this argument and concluded that plaintiff chose to use this method of service. (Hughes & Ladd, Inc., at 313.)

As such, plaintiff is not entitled to any relief from the five-year statute based on his selection of Civil Action Group to serve Samsung SDI in Korea, which it was unable to do in 21⁄2 years but its replacement accomplished in less than a month in early 2023. (Reply, p.3:23-p.4:5.) Notably, Samsung SDI has also afforded plaintiff an additional 230 days to account for the period of time when civil trials with before this Court were suspended despite the fact this action is not entitled to an automatic six-month extension under the Judicial Council’s Emergency Rules.

According to the reply, plaintiff failed to diligently litigate this action once served on Samsung SDI, waiting a year to commence written discovery, completing only one deposition prior to this motion being filed in January 2026 and serving two additional sets of written discovery well after it was filed. (Reply, p.6:4-24.) As such, plaintiff was not ready for trial in May 2025, when the five-year statute expired or even in January 2026, when this motion was filed, despite the fact that Samsung SDI had already completed a variety of discovery including destructive testing, several examinations of plaintiff, records subpoenas and many depositions. (Id., at p.6:8-p.7:1.)

In response to the opposition’s suggestion that Samsung SDI’s reliance on Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles ignores more recent statutory amendments and Seto v. Szeto, defendant Samsung SDI maintains that the moving papers set forth the relevant and current statutes governing disposition of this motion and competently demonstrates plaintiff is not entitled to additional time under the five-year statute based on any claim it was impossible, impracticable, or futile to bring this case to trial on or before 5/19/2025 or alternatively, 1/5/2026 and was not even ready to proceed to trial on such dates.

Additionally, defendant argues that not only was Sanchez neither overruled nor superseded by Seto but it held that a stipulation to continue the trial to a date beyond passed the five-year deadline did not constitute a stipulation to extend the five-year deadline and that the death of a witness did not satisfy the impossibility or impracticability prongs of §583.340(c). (Reply, p.7:12-16.) Moreover, Seto does not advance the opposition because it concluded that tolling applied to a four-month period

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in which a settlement agreement was in place and made it impossible, impracticable or futile to bring the case to trial and because Seto’s facts bear no resemblance those of the case at bar. That Seto does not provide plaintiff with any relief is particularly true in light of the Court of Appeal’s confirmation that even with the period of tolling based on the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs were not freed from their ongoing obligation to diligently prosecute the case and that “a lack of diligence can lead to the dismissal of a case despite the application of section 583.340.” (Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 101.)

Finally, the reply insists plaintiff’s estoppel argument lacks merit, the authorities offered as support are distinguishable and ultimately, “Samsung SDI should not be penalized for actively participating in this action” and diligently defending itself by filing a summary judgment motion and producing a witness plaintiff claimed was essential to his opposition thereto. As such, there is no valid basis for estoppel based on Samsung SDI’s conduct. Likewise, neither Samsung SDI’s alleged failure to respond to plaintiff’s request to schedule a trial date nor this case’s removal from the Court’s existing Case Management Program precludes dismissal under the five-year statute inasmuch as nothing prevented plaintiff from timely requesting a trial date on or before 5/19/2025 and Seto, as discussed above, confirms that plaintiff has an ongoing duty of diligence which actually increases as the case proceeds to the end of the five-year period. (Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 98.)

That other defendants in this case may have stipulated to extend the five-year statute or have cross-complaints against defendant Samsung SDI are irrelevant to the question of whether plaintiff timely brought this action to trial and is subject to mandatory dismissal.

Objections to Evidence

Defendant Samsung SDI’s six (6) written objections to plaintiff’s evidence in opposition are ruled upon as follows:

No. 1: Overruled because Paragraph 6 is not “irrelevant” and defendant has advanced no other objection to this evidence. Defendant’s additional arguments about this evidence tending to show a lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff do not constitute a valid basis for excluding this evidence. No. 2: Overruled because Paragraph 7 is not “irrelevant” and does not impermissibly attest to any out of court statement that is now being offered by the declarant for the truth of the matter asserted therein.

Instead, the declarant is offering a general summary of the communications which are authenticated in the same paragraph and to which no separate objections have been asserted. Defendant’s additional arguments that the quoted paragraph “shows a lack of diligence on the part of Plaintiff” do not constitute a valid basis for excluding this evidence. No. 3: Overruled because Paragraph 8 is not “irrelevant” and defendant has

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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advanced no other objection to this evidence. Defendant’s additional arguments about this evidence tending to show a lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff do not constitute a valid basis for excluding this evidence. No. 4: Overruled because Paragraph 9 is not “irrelevant” and does not impermissibly attest to any out of court statement that is now being offered by declarant for the truth of the matter asserted therein. Instead, the declarant merely states that Civil Action Group “request[ed] a status update” from the Central Authority” but received “no response.” Such statements are not inadmissible under the hearsay rule because they do not recite any out of court statement which is offered for the truth of the matter asserted therein but rather offered to show “no response” was received.

Defendant’s additional arguments relating to plaintiff’s alleged lack of diligence do not constitute a valid basis for excluding this evidence. No. 5: Overruled because Paragraph 10 is not “irrelevant” and does not impermissibly attest to any out of court statement that is now being offered by the declarant for the truth of the matter asserted therein. Instead, the declarant is offering a general summary of the communications which are authenticated in the same paragraph and to which no separate objections have been asserted.

Accordingly, defendant’s additional objections based on lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge, speculation and improper lay opinion are also overruled. No. 6: Sustained because Paragraph 11 lacks a proper foundation and the declarant has failed to demonstrate her personal knowledge of the factual assertions contained therein. Accordingly, defendant’s additional objections based on speculation, hearsay and improper lay opinion are also sustained.

The Court notes that a different ruling on any or all of these objections to evidence would not alter the disposition of this motion.

Discussion

At the outset, the Court notes that defendant Smoke 4 Less filed on 4/13/2026 a “Joinder” in defendant Samsung SDI’s present motion to dismiss but this “Joinder” need not be addressed here since Smoke 4 Less has also noticed its own motion to dismiss, which is now set for hearing on this same calendar and is the subject of a separate ruling.

Turning the present motion by defendant Samsung SDI, Code of Civil Procedure §583.310 establishes a mandatory five-year period within which a case must be brought to trial and in the case at bar, this statutory period expired by its own terms on 5/19/2025, exactly five years after plaintiff commenced this action 5/19/2020. However, defendant Samsung SDI acknowledges that because civil trials in this Court were in 2020-2021 suspended for a 230-day period ending on 1/5/2021, plaintiff may be

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considered to have had until 1/5/2026 to bring this case to trial but contends he still failed to satisfy this extended deadline. Additionally, §583.360 provides that “[a]n action shall be dismissed by the court if the action is not brought to trial within the time prescribed in this article” and that the requirements of this article are not only “mandatory” but also “not subject to extension, excuse, or exception except as expressly provided by statute.”

Code of Civil Procedure §583.340 provides in its entirety:

In computing the time within which an action must be brought to trial pursuant to this article, there shall be excluded the time during which any of the following conditions existed: (a) The jurisdiction of the court to try the action was suspended. (b) Prosecution or trial of the action was stayed or enjoined. (c) Bringing the action to trial, for any other reason, was impossible, impracticable, or futile.

As an initial matter, neither defendant Samsung SDI nor plaintiff suggests in their respective papers that the jurisdiction of this Court to try the present action was ever “suspended” or that the prosecution of trial of this action was ever “stayed or enjoined” within the meaning of §583.340(a) or (b). Indeed, while the opposition does advance several arguments about why this action should not be dismissed at this time, the bulk of these arguments is made in an attempt to demonstrate that bringing plaintiff’s claims against Samsung SDI to trial within the original or extended five-year deadline of 5/19/2025 or 1/5/2026, respectively, “was impossible, impracticable, or futile” largely due to the delays plaintiff encountered in serving defendant Samsung SDI in Korea (but the opposition does also include a suggestion that Samsung SDI should for several independent reasons be estopped from relying on the five-year limitations period, which claim will be addressed separately below).

However, California law is clear that an exclusion of time pursuant to §583.340(c) is not automatically available in all cases but rather, “[d]etermining whether the subdivision (c) exception applies requires a fact-sensitive inquiry and depends on the obstacles faced by the plaintiff in prosecuting the action and the plaintiff’s exercise of reasonable diligence in overcoming those obstacles.” (Howard v. Thrifty Drug & Discount Stores (1995) 10 Cal.4th 424, 438.) The determination “of whether the prosecution of an action was indeed impossible, impracticable, or futile during any period of time, and hence, the determination of whether the impossibility exception to the five-year statute applies, is a matter within the trial court’s discretion.” (Sanchez v.

City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1271.) “What is impossible, impracticable or futile must be determined in light of all the circumstances in the individual case, including the acts and

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conduct of the parties and the nature of the proceedings themselves.” (Moran v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 229, 238.) “‘[I]mpracticability and futility’ involve a determination of ‘ “excessive and unreasonable difficulty or expense,” ’ in light of all the circumstances of the particular case.” (Bruns v. E-Commerce Exchange, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 717, 731 [quoting Brunzell Constr. Co. v. Wagner (1970) 2 Cal.3d 545, 554].) Finally, a plaintiff seeking to rely on §583.340(c)’s tolling provision bears the burden of first establishing the existence of those circumstances which are claimed to have made it impracticable, impossible, or futile to bring the matter to trial, and then demonstrating the existence of a causal connection between those circumstances and the failure to bring the case to trial. (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 730 [citing Moran, supra].)

As noted above, Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c) indicates that the determination of the five-year limitations period shall exclude the amount of time, if any, when bringing the action to trial was impossible, impracticable or futile but case law confirms that in order for §583.340(c)’s provisions to be invoked, the plaintiff must show the existence of some facts or circumstances which are claimed to have made it impracticable, impossible, or futile to bring the matter to trial within the five-year period, as well as the existence of a causal connection between those circumstances and the failure to bring the case to trial. (Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 730.)

Recently, the First District Court of Appeal in Seto v. Szeto (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 76 made clear that “a plaintiff’s duty of diligence increases as the case proceeds to the end of the five-year period and a plaintiff has the duty to call the court’s attention to the deadline.” (Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 98 (citations omitted; emphasis added).) Consistently, the Second District Court of Appeal in Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the action because even after the trial court assigned a specific trial date which was beyond the five-year limitations period, the plaintiffs still had “ample time after [trial setting] to bring a motion to advance the trial date” but failed to do so. (Sanchez, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1273-1274.)

The Second District Court of Appeal explained that where a plaintiff possesses the means to bring a matter to trial before the expiration of the five-year period by filing a motion to specially set the matter for trial, the plaintiff’s failure to bring such motion will preclude a later claim of impossibility or impracticability. (Id., at 1274 (citations omitted).)

Although the opposition characterizes the Sanchez decision cited above as being “overruled” to the extent it indicates a plaintiff’s failure to make a motion to specially set a trial date within the five-year period is deemed a waiver of any claim it was impracticable to commence trial within the five-year period (Opp., p.8:14-19 [referring to Sanchez, at 1273-1274 (citing Lauriton v. Carnation Co. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 161, 165; Tejada v. Blas (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1335, 1340)]), this characterization is premised on a misreading of Seto and in particular, the final paragraph found at the end of Page 99, to wit:

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Defendants’ citations to various other cases fare no better. Most of the cases they cite did not consider the Law Revision Commission's intent to change the law regarding the application of the section 583.340(c) exceptions. (Jordan v. Superstar Sandcars (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1422; Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 593–594; Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1272–1273; Baccus v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1526, 1533–1535; Hill v. Bingham (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1, 10–12.) Accordingly, they are not authority for construing the meaning of that intent. [Fn. 6.] (People v. Hillhouse (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1622 [“‘cases are not authority for propositions they did not consider’”].) (Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 99 (underline added for emphasis).)

Based on this plain language, Seto did not actually “overrule” any portion of Sanchez nor did it even purport to address that portion of Sanchez which concludes that a plaintiff’s failure to make a motion to specially set a trial date within the five-year period amounts to waiver of any impracticability claim, given that Sanchez’s discussion of this point is actually found on Pages 1273-1274, not 1272-1273. To be sure, the passage found on Pages 1272-1273 of Sanchez which is cited in Seto instead merely pertains to the Court of Appeal’s discussion of whether the death of the defense counsel made it impracticable for the plaintiffs to bring their case to trial within five years.

As such, the opposition’s suggestion that Sanchez was “overruled” or is “no longer good law” is neither accurate nor dispositive of this motion, since there is in the case at bar no claim that an attorney’s death impacted plaintiff’s ability to bring the instant suit to trial within five years.

Because there is no claim here that the jurisdiction of this Court to try the action was ever “suspended” or that the prosecution of trial of this action was ever “stayed or enjoined” as referenced in Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(a) and (b), all that remains is to determine whether plaintiff has satisfied his burden to warrant an exclusion of time under Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c). Thus, the Court will now consider each of the various arguments advanced by plaintiff in an attempt to show that it was impossible, impracticable or futile to bring to trial his claims against defendant Samsung SDI on or before 5/19/2025 (or alternatively, 1/5/2026) and why time should be excluded from the calculation of the five-year period pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c).

The opposition’s primary contention is that the 34-month period in which plaintiff was unable to serve defendant Samsung SDI should be excluded from the statutory fiveyear period to bring to trial his claims against this same defendant, particularly when service had to be effected pursuant to the Hague Convention and the delays in such

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service were beyond plaintiff’s control. (See, Opp., p.1:4-14; p.2:10-p.3:12; p.5:12- p.7:27.) As support for this position, the opposition cites Wurnitsch v. Nordvik (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 679, in which the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the action based on the plaintiff’s failure to bring the case to trial within five years. However, as pointed out in the reply, the facts of Wurnitsch are easily distinguishable from the case at bar insofar as (1) the defendant in Wurnitsch was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident occurring in California but who thereafter moved out of California, with her parents, attorney and insurance adjuster effectively concealing her location from the plaintiff and (2) the Court of Appeal ultimately relied on express language of the then-existing version of the five-year statute then found in Code of Civil Procedure §583 (which version was subsequently repealed in 1984) which excluded from the five-year period that time when “the defendant has been absent from the State or concealed therein and his whereabouts unknown to plaintiff and not discoverable to said plaintiff upon due diligence.” (Wurnitsch, at 682-686.)

Because the version of the five-year statute applicable to Wurnitsch is no longer operative and because there is no evidence showing that defendant Samsung SDI’s whereabouts were at any time unknown to plaintiff or not otherwise discoverable with due diligence, neither the holding nor the analysis in Wurnitsch advances the opposition’s claim that the 34 months it took to accomplish service on defendant Samsung SDI should be categorically excluded from the calculation of the mandatory five-year period to bring this case to trial.

This conclusion is only bolstered by plaintiff’s concession that the process server he finally retained to replace Civil Action Group after two-plus years was able to effect prompt service on defendant Samsung SDI in accordance with the Hague Convention in roughly one month.

Plaintiff’s reliance on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or more specifically, the purported absence any provision limiting the time within which a plaintiff must effect service on a foreign defendant pursuant to the Hague Convention, is likewise misplaced given that (1) these Federal Rules do not by their own terms govern the case at bar or the instant motion, (2) the instant motion does not seek dismissal based on plaintiff’s failure to timely serve defendant Samsung SDI, and (3) the Federal Rules do not otherwise contain any mandatory deadline for bringing a case to trial in any event.

Accordingly, neither of the two federal decisions rendered by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits pertaining to the service of foreign defendants (i.e., Nylok Corp. v. Fastener World Inc. and Lucas v. Natoli, respectively) is legally or factually relevant to the disposition of this motion to dismiss based on the five-year statute of limitations and even if these federal opinions could be considered legally or factually relevant, this Court is not obligated to follow either decision. Consequently, none of the foregoing federal authorities cited by plaintiff compels the result sought by his opposition.

Another appellate decision offered by plaintiff in connection with his argument that the

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34-2020-00278930-CU-PL-GDS: Christopher Connally vs. Samsung SDI Co Ltd 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Timely Bring the Action to Trial (Filed by Samsung SDI, Co., LTD) in Department 16D

nearly three-year period it took to accomplish service on defendant Samsung SDI should be excluded from the five-year period to bring this case to trial is Gaines v. Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1081 but this California Supreme Court opinion provides no assistance to plaintiff as (1) it bears no legal or factual similarity to the case at bar; (2) it ultimately affirmed the dismissal of the underlying lawsuit (except as to one defendant) on the ground that trial was not commenced within the mandatory five-year period; (3) the trial court’s order “stay[ing] the proceedings while the parties engaged in mediation and completed all outstanding discovery” “did not effect a complete stay of the prosecution of the action [n]or did the order create a circumstance of impracticability because plaintiff agreed to it, remained in control of the circumstances, and made meaningful progress towards resolving the case during the stay period;” and (4) the plaintiff also failed to demonstrate diligence during the period of the subject stay in question. (Gaines, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 1087-1089.)

According to the reply, Exhibit A to the Dalia Declaration in opposition reveals that plaintiff did not serve any written discovery on defendant Samsung SDI until more than one year after it was served in March 2023 and did not take his first deposition until after this motion was filed in January 2026.[1] (Reply, p.4:20-24 (citing Dalia Decl., ¶5 and Ex. A, p.3:108; p.7:269.) This unjustified delay in prosecution of this case, in and of itself, tends to show plaintiff’s own lack of diligence and weighs against the tolling of the five-year period to bring this case to trial. (See, e.g., Seto v.

Szeto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 98 [“a plaintiff’s duty of diligence increases as the case proceeds to the end of the five-year period and a plaintiff has the duty to call the court’s attention to the deadline”]; Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1273-1274 [plaintiff who has opportunity to bring a motion to secure timely trial date but fails to do so cannot later claim impossibility or impracticability of complying with five-year deadline].) While it is true plaintiff in the case at bar did file a “Motion for Pre-assignment of Long Cause Jury Trial,” this motion was not filed until 4/23/2026, nearly six years after this litigation was commenced and more than four months after this motion to dismiss was filed on 1/5/2026.

As such, plaintiff’s “Motion for Pre-assignment of Long Cause Jury Trial” fails to show any diligence which is of legal consequence here.

Notably, defendant Samsung SDI has pointed to Hughes & Ladd, Inc. v. Rogue River Paving Co. and there, the plaintiff appealed the judgment entered after the case was dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to comply with the five-year statute. On appeal, the plaintiff argued “the five-year statutory period should have been tolled” for the 11-plus months “which elapsed between the filing of the complaint and the filing of defendant’s answer” or alternatively, the seven months which the plaintiff spent “endeavoring to locate some agent or officer of defendant in California before obtaining said order” authorizing service on the foreign defendant. (Hughes & Ladd, Inc., supra, 46 Cal.App.3d at 312-313.) The First District Court of Appeal found the first contention to be “completely without merit” because Code of Civil Procedure §583 had been

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278930-CU-PL-GDS: Christopher Connally vs. Samsung SDI Co Ltd 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Timely Bring the Action to Trial (Filed by Samsung SDI, Co., LTD) in Department 16D

amended in 1933 to specifically provide that the five-year period commences upon the filing of the complaint and the second contention to have no support in either “statutory or case law.” (Id., at 313.) Although the facts of Hughes & Ladd, Inc. are certainly not identical to the case at bar, they are at a minimum analogous insofar as plaintiff in this case is specifically arguing that the time it took to accomplish service on defendant Samsung SDI (i.e., 34 months) should be excluded from the statutory five-year period to bring this case to trial and in light of this similarity, the opposition’s argument necessarily falls short in light of the decision in Hughes & Ladd, Inc., which remains good law.

As discussed above, a plaintiff seeking to rely on §583.340(c) to avoid dismissal bears the burden of first establishing the existence of circumstances which are claimed to have made it impracticable, impossible, or futile to bring the matter to trial and then also demonstrating the existence of a causal connection between those circumstances and the failure to bring the case to trial (see, e.g., Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 730 [citing Moran, supra]), keeping in mind that the plaintiff alone always bears a duty of diligent prosecution and that this duty of diligence increases as the case proceeds to the end of the five-year period such that s/he is obliged to bring the deadline to the court’s attention beforehand (see, e.g., Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 98; Sanchez, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1273-1274).

In the case at bar, the opposition primarily argues that it was impossible, impracticable, or futile to bring this case to trial within the five-year period because it took nearly three years for to effect service Samsung SDI pursuant to the Hague Convention” but as explained above, plaintiff has failed to proffer any California legal authority which supports his position that such time should be excluded from the five-year period and at least one California appellate opinion (i.e., Hughes & Ladd, Inc.) subverts his position.

Moreover, the opposition concedes that plaintiff waited over two years before ultimately replacing the original process server (Civil Action Group) and that once the replacement was retained, service on Samsung SDI was promptly completed in March 2023, which only bolsters the conclusion that it was plaintiff’s own lack of diligence (in failing make such change earlier) constituted a primary factor in the nearly three-year delay. In short, plaintiff has failed to show that any, much less all, of 34 months it took to serve defendant Samsung SDI in Korea should be excluded from the mandatory five-year period due to impossibility, impracticability or futility and this alone is fatal to the continued prosecution of this case at least as against Samsung SDI.

Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that plaintiff were potentially entitled to exclude from the five-year period some or all of the 34 months it took to complete service on defendant Samsung SDI, he was still obliged to establish the existence of a causal connection between the delays in service and his failure to timely bring the case to trial (see, e.g., Bruns, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 730 [citing Moran, supra]) but he has not carried this additional burden. Again, while the opposition vaguely claims that plaintiff diligently

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278930-CU-PL-GDS: Christopher Connally vs. Samsung SDI Co Ltd 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Timely Bring the Action to Trial (Filed by Samsung SDI, Co., LTD) in Department 16D

litigated this case once Samsung SDI was served in March 2023, the Court finds no real factual support for this characterization. As discussed earlier, among other things, the case chronology attached as Exhibit A to the Dalia Declaration in opposition shows that plaintiff did not propound any written discovery to defendant Samsung SDI until 4/12/2024, which is more than one year after Samsung SDI was served in early March 2023, and did not commence any deposition until 2/4/2026, which is nearly two years after Samsung SDI was served and only after this motion was filed in January 2026. (See, Dalia Decl., Ex.

A, p.3, Line 108; p.7, Line 269.) This same Exhibit A indicates plaintiff did not actually notice any deposition in this case until he served a notice for the deposition of defendant Samsung SDI’s person most qualified on 12/23/2025. (Id., at p.7, Line 250.) These facts persuade this Court that plaintiff was not diligent in the prosecution of this case as to defendant Samsung SDI and under existing precedent, he has failed to carry his burden of establishing entitlement to the exclusion of any time from the mandatory five-year period.

This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that despite his increasing duty of diligence as the end of the five-year period approaches and the duty to bring this to the court’s attention beforehand (see, e.g., Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 98; Sanchez, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1273-1274), plaintiff did not file his “Motion for Pre-assignment of Long Cause Jury Trial” until nearly six years after this litigation was commenced and more than four months after Samsung filed this motion to dismiss on 1/5/2026.

Based on Sanchez v. City of Los Angeles, plaintiff’s failure to timely bring any motion to secure a trial date within the mandatory five-year period effectively precludes him from legitimately arguing here that it was impossible and/or impracticable to bring his claims against Samsung SDI to trial within the five-year period. (Sanchez, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1274.) As noted above, even the opposition expressly concedes the “critical question” under California law is whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in bringing the case to trial. (Opp., p.6:12-14.)

Accordingly, this Court holds that plaintiff has failed to carry his burden on establishing a valid basis for excluding from the five-year period pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c) any of the 34- month period it took to serve defendant Samsung SDI and thus, regardless of whether the five-year period expired on 5/19/2025 or on 1/5/2026, plaintiff’s current claims against Samsung SDI are now subject to mandatory dismissal under §583.310, thereby obviating the need to consider the opposition’s additional argument that tolling of the five-year statute would not impose any burden or prejudice on defendant Samsung SDI to the extent it remains subject to various cross-complaints brought by other defendants in this case (see, Opp., p.9:23-p.10:9).

As an alternative ground for avoiding dismissal, the opposition argues that Samsung SDI should be estopped from seeking dismissal here because the latter “actively litigated the case, including producing its person most qualified for deposition and

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278930-CU-PL-GDS: Christopher Connally vs. Samsung SDI Co Ltd 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Timely Bring the Action to Trial (Filed by Samsung SDI, Co., LTD) in Department 16D

setting its own summary judgment motion for hearing beyond the five-year deadline,” thereby reasonably conveyed it “intended to litigate the case on the merits rather than stand on a procedural dismissal,” and also “ignored requests by Plaintiff to coordinate setting a trial date while still within the five-year cutoff as adjusted for the COVID 19 sixmonth extension.” (Opp., p.9:2-22.) The Court is not persuaded that Samsung SDI’s decision to “actively litigate[]” this case and/or to mount a vigorous defense to plaintiff’s claims provides a valid basis for estoppel inasmuch as this would effectively penalize Samsung SDI for engaging in conduct which is permitted under the law and this is particularly true in light of every plaintiff’s own ongoing and increasing duty of diligent prosecution. (See, e.g., Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 98.)

Consequently, the mere fact that Samsung SDI filed a motion for summary judgment in November 2025 and set it for hearing in May 2026 is not fairly construed as affording plaintiff a bona fide ground for estoppel, nor is Samsung SDI’s subsequent voluntary production of a witness in response to plaintiff’s deposition notice. Curiously, the opposition has failed to explain how such conduct could under the circumstances be reasonably construed as conveying that Samsung SDI “intended to litigate the case on the merits rather than stand on a procedural dismissal.” Plaintiff’s claim that Samsung SDI “ignored” his requests to coordinate a trial date fares no better because plaintiff is attempting to attribute a specific meaning to mere inaction and because such a purported failure to respond to an inquiry about a trial date is more likely an indication that Samsung SDI did not intend to litigate the case on its merits rather than rely on a procedural dismissal.

For these reasons, this Court is unable to find that plaintiff’s purported reliance on the aforementioned conduct of Samsung SDI is either reasonable or justified under the circumstances here and/or that Samsung SDI is estopped from pursuing dismissal under the mandatory five-year statute of limitations.

Similarly, the opposition’s suggestion that the removal of this case from the Court’s regular Case Management Program back in 2020 militates against dismissal is similarly infirm. The Court has no obligation to ensure that any or all cases proceed to trial in a timely fashion and as pointed out above, California law is clear that it is the plaintiff in each case who bears the ongoing and increasing duty of diligent prosecution and to obtain a code-compliant trial date or risk dismissal. (See, e.g., Seto, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at 98.)

Indeed, the First District Court of Appeal clarified that a plaintiff actually has a duty to alert the Court to the impending deadline to commence trial (Id.) and the Second District Court of Appeal itself has explained that dismissal of an action is appropriate where a plaintiff could have brought a motion to secure a timely trial date but failed to do so (see, Sanchez, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at 1273-1274.) Thus, plaintiff’s attempt to place blame on this Court, instead of plaintiff himself, for his failure to comply with the five-year statute must be rejected.

In the end, because plaintiff has failed to establish (1) it was impossible, impracticable

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2020-00278930-CU-PL-GDS: Christopher Connally vs. Samsung SDI Co Ltd 07/21/2026 Hearing on Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Timely Bring the Action to Trial (Filed by Samsung SDI, Co., LTD) in Department 16D

or futile to bring his claims against defendant Samsung SDI to trial within the five-year limitations period; (2) entitlement to exclude from the five-year limitations period any amount of time due to the time it took to effect service on defendant Samsung SDI; and/or (3) plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in the prosecution of this action as against defendant Samsung SDI, the Court finds that the latter is entitled to mandatory dismissal of plaintiff’s claims based on his failure to timely commence trial with the mandatory five-year period. In short, given the present evidentiary record, plaintiff has failed to take reasonable steps necessary to ensure this case proceeded to trial on a timely basis.

Disposition

Because the five-year statute expired no later than 1/5/2026 and because plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing entitlement to additional time pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §583.340(c), defendant Samsung SDI’s present motion to dismiss is GRANTED but only without prejudice.

Pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312, defendant Samsung SDI to prepare for the Court’s consideration a proposed order and judgment of dismissal without prejudice consistent with this ruling.

Defendant Samsung SDI to provide notice of this ruling and file proof of service of same within five (5) court days.

This minute order is effective immediately. No formal order or other notice is required. (Code Civ. Proc. §1019.5; CRC Rule 3.1312.) [1] In opposition, plaintiff includes his own chart purporting to show “extensive and ongoing discovery work

since the case was put at issue.” (Opp., p.4:6-20.) This chart appears to depict various written discovery propounded prior to the second quarter of 2024 and more than a dozen depositions having occurred in such time. However, it appears that during this time period, none of such written discovery was propounded by plaintiff to defendant Samsung SDI and none of the depositions that occurred were directed by plaintiff to Samsung SDI. Plaintiff does not contradict defendant Samsung SDI’s statement that plaintiff did not serve any written discovery on Samsung SDI until more than a year after it was served in March 2023 and did not take his first deposition until after this motion was filed in January 2026. This evidence does not demonstrate plaintiff’s own diligence in pursuing discovery and preparing his own case directed to defendant Samsung SDI.