Zachary Minor et al v. Napa County et al

(Notice of Motion, p. 2; see also Proposed Order.)

B. LEGAL STANDARD

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. ...” (§ 664.6, subd. (a).)

“When addressing a section 664.6 motion, the trial court must determine whether the parties entered into an enforceable settlement. [Citation.] Phrased another way, ‘the court must determine whether the settlement agreement is valid and binding.’ [Citation.] This inquiry is governed by the legal principles applicable to the formation of contracts generally.” (Eagle Fire & Water Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 448, 467-68.) “The purpose of section 664.6 is ‘to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.’ [Citation.] ‘If the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.’” (Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, 1321.)

“[T]he court [is] authorized to enter a judgment pursuant to the settlement regardless of whether [a party’s] nonperformance of her settlement obligations was excused.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.) In fact, where there is no dispute that the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement, and, instead, the dispute is about whether a party’s actions constituted a material breach of the agreement such that the other party is relieved from performing his obligation under the agreement, “[t]hese disputes are not relevant to the entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.6.” (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 796.)

“‘[T]he trial court is under a duty to render a judgment that is in exact conformity with an agreement or stipulation of the parties. ... It is not the province of the court to add to the provisions thereof [citations]; to insert a term not found therein [citations]; or to make a new stipulation for the parties.’” (Machado, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at 792 [“Disputes regarding the ... compliance with the settlement agreement may be relevant to the enforcement of the judgment, once entered ....”] [Emphasis in original].) “Thus, after entry of judgment, the trial court may, in accordance with applicable rules of procedure, exercise its inherent and statutory authority to enforce the judgment, including making determinations, as appropriate, regarding breach, materiality, and excuse from performance.” (Id., at 801.)

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C. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The parties entered into a settlement agreement on November 24, 2025. (Declaration of Zachary Minor (“Minor Decl.”), ¶ 2.)

In consideration of Plaintiffs’ release, Defendants agreed to: (1) pay $4,000 to Plaintiffs, (2) provide “substantive, verified responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One and Requests for Admission, Set One ... by November 25, 2025”; and (3) “not object to Plaintiffs’ efforts, if Plaintiffs choose to engage in such efforts, to obtain data from non-party NC3TF.” (Support Memo, Exh. A, pp. 2-3, §§ 2.1-2.3.) “Upon tender of the settlement draft identified in Section 2.1 above, Plaintiffs will file dismissals of their Complaints with prejudice and enter them as a matter of record.” (Id., p. 3, § 5.1.)

Plaintiffs deposited the $4,000 settlement payment from Defendants in good faith while expecting Defendants to complete its discovery obligations. (Minor Decl., ¶ 4.) Plaintiffs remain ready and willing to complete dismissal obligations once Defendants complete the discovery obligations contemplated by the settlement agreement. (Minor Decl., ¶ 11.)

Defendants contend that they have complied with all terms of the Agreement, but that Plaintiffs refuse to dismiss their claims. (Opposition, p. 1.)

On March 11, 2026, the Court denied without prejudice Defendants’ motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement because the motion did not request entry of judgment, much less entry of a judgment that reflected the exact settlement terms; therefore, there was no proper judgment before the Court to enforce.

D. DISCUSSION

1. Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Terms of Settlement Agreement

Plaintiffs’ instant motion contains the same deficiency as Defendants’ January 13, 2026 motion; there is no request for entry of judgment, much less entry of a judgment pursuant to the exact material terms of the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs move right to enforcement of the Agreement without anything being entered as judgment. This is procedurally improper. That said, “Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’ motion to enforce insofar as it requests the court to enforce the plain language of the agreement.” (Opposition, pp. 1-2.)

Given that concession and the fact there is no dispute that the parties entered into a valid and binding Agreement, and because it is clear to the Court that both parties are interested in an adjudication of the enforcement of the Agreement, the Court finds it appropriate to enter judgment pursuant to the exact terms of the Agreement so that the Court may reach the enforcement issues raised by the parties.

Thus, the Court hereby enters judgment which mirrors the exact material terms of the Agreement, specifically Paragraphs 2.0 to 5.1 on pages 2 to 3 of the Agreement (which are

expressly included in the Court’s concurrent ruling on Defendants’ motion to enforce settlement agreement).

2. Enforcement of Settlement Agreement

With judgment entered pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the Court now moves to enforcement of the judgment. (Machado, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at 792, 801.) “Trial courts have the inherent authority to enforce their rulings.” (Id., at 792, fn. 13, citing Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 585, 588 [“It is a well-established principle of law that a court possesses inherent power to enforce its judgments.”]; see §§ 128, subd. (a)(4) [court has inherent power to compel obedience to the court’s judgments, orders, and process in any pending action], 717.010, 1209, subd. (a)(5) [nonmonetary judgments are enforceable by invoking the trial court’s contempt powers].)

Plaintiffs contend that “two categories of evidence contemplated by the settlement remain unresolved: 1. Phone record information relating to Defendant Yeager, and 2. Deletion or activity metadata associated with a recording device central to this case.” (Support Memo, p. 3.)

As to the first category, Plaintiffs contend that “the explanation provided in Yeager’s response conflicts with information obtained through public records requests,” and therefore, Defendants should be ordered to provide the requested information. (Support Memo, p. 6.) As best the Court can tell, Plaintiffs are taking issue with Defendants’ response to the Special Interrogatories, referenced in Section 2.2 of the Agreement (now judgment). The Special Interrogatory “requested information relating to phone communications and records during the following time periods: October 14-16, 2024 [and] February 7-10, 2023.” (Support Memo, pp. 3- 4.) Defendants’ response was “that he had changed phones and phone service providers and therefore did not have access to prior phone records.” (Id., p. 4, citing Minor Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. C.) Subsequently, Plaintiffs obtained records through a Public Records Act request indicating that the County had no record showing a change in telephone provider for the relevant period. (Id., p. 4, citing Minor Decl., ¶ 6, Exhs. F-I.) Plaintiffs argue that this inconsistent information “raises questions regarding whether reasonable efforts were made to obtain the requested records and whether responsive records may exist within county systems or through the relevant carrier.” (Id., p. 4.)

Defendants contend that “Defendant Yeager provided substantive, verified discovery responses in good faith and to the best of his knowledge and memory. Plaintiffs’ attempt to use [Yeager’s] imperfect memory as an avenue to demand additional records and information is misplaced and exceeds the scope of the settlement agreement.” (Opposition, p. 3.) Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs’ suggestion that Yeager’s discovery responses are false “is no more than interpreting Defendant Yeager’s supplemental discovery responses in the least charitable light possible. Defendant Yeager changed his personal cellular phone provider and reviewed those records to supplement his memory.” (Ibid.) In any event, Defendants argue that “[p]roducing [phone call history and providers] records is outside the scope of the written discovery requests which Defendants agreed to respond to on an expedited basis in exchange for Plaintiffs’ dismissal.” (Id.)

The Court does not find support in the record for Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants’ discovery obligation in the first specified respect is “unresolved.” Plaintiffs nowhere assert or show that Defendants failed to provide substantive, verified responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One and Requests for Admission, Set One, by November 25, 2025, in breach of the Agreement (now judgment). Rather, the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ dispute over the response(s) is a concern that the response(s) was/were not accurate, attempting to contradict Yeager’s verification. Even if the response(s) failed to satisfy the Agreement, Plaintiffs are not requesting a supplemental response in compliance with the Agreement. Rather, Plaintiffs are requesting the production of records. However, the Agreement (now judgment) provides no support for Plaintiffs’ requests for Defendants to produce anything, let alone the three categories described in the Notice of Motion, or for Defendants to provide a declaration.

As to the second category, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants have not complied with their cooperation agreement in Section 2.3 of the Agreement (now judgment) and that the Court should issue an order clarifying Defendants’ obligation to cooperate. (Support Memo, p. 6-7.) Plaintiffs provide the following context: Plaintiffs sought access to a recording device and related information (materials Plaintiffs claim to be relevant to the underlying matter) by way of a subpoena to NC3TF task force; NC3TF declined to retrieve or provide the requested data; Plaintiffs later learned that the recording device is in the possession of the Napa County District Attorney’s Office, and therefore, Defendants have the practical ability to obtain the recorder and to facilitate Plaintiffs’ access to the recorder. (Support Memo, pp. 4-5.)

Defendants contend that the Agreement only required Defendants not to object to Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain data from non-party NC3TF. “This term contemplates Plaintiffs may try to obtain information from NC3TF and suggests that Plaintiffs’ attempts to obtain NC3TF data will be separate and apart from Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, as the two are included in separate terms. Additionally, the language of the settlement agreement expressly states that NC3TF ‘is a separate legal entity from the County of Napa.’” (Opposition, p. 3.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ attempt to have Defendants proactively provide them with documents and data from NC3TF is outside of the Agreement.

The Court does not find support in the record for Plaintiffs’ contention that Defendants’ discovery obligation in the second specified respect is “unresolved.” Plaintiffs do not assert or show that Defendants objected to Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain data from non-party NC3TF, in breach of the Agreement. In essence, Plaintiffs argue that, because they were unable to obtain the materials on their own, Section 2.3 of the Agreement requires Defendants to affirmatively assist in Plaintiffs’ efforts. However, the Agreement (now judgment) provides no support for that relief.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendants have not complied with their obligations under the Agreement (now judgment). Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel Defendants to complete discovery obligations by ordering them to produce records as specified in the Notice of Motion and Proposed Order is DENIED.

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[2] DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

TENTATIVE RULING: The Motion is GRANTED. The Court hereby enters judgment pursuant to the exact material terms of the Settlement Agreement, specifically Paragraphs 2.0 to 5.1, on pages 2 to 3, of the Agreement, as follows:

2.0 Payments and Consideration

2.1 In consideration of the release set forth above [in Section 1.0 of the Settlement Agreement], Defendants hereby agree to pay Plaintiff the total sum of four thousand dollars ($4,000.00), to be paid by the County of Napa or a party acting on its behalf, made payable as follows: “Zachary Minor and Angela Minor.” Plaintiffs agree to provide Defendants’ counsel with the fully executed version of this Agreement, their W9 form(s), and any other forms or other information that Defendants request to be able to issue the settlement check.

2.2. Defendant Yaeger will provide substantive, verified responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One, and Requests for Admission, Set One, that Plaintiffs previously served on Defendant Yaeger, by November 25, 2025.

2.3. Defendants will not object to Plaintiffs’ efforts, if Plaintiffs choose to engage in such efforts, to obtain data from non-party NC3TF, which is separate legal entity from the County of Napa.

3.0. No Admission of Liability

3.1. This Agreement shall not be construed as an admission of fault and shall not be used against Releasees in the future for any reason.

4.0 Attorney’s Fees

4.1 Each Party hereto shall bear all attorney’s fees and costs arising from the actions of its own counsel, if any, in connection with this the negotiation and signing of this Settlement Agreement, the matters and documents referred to herein, and all related matters, including any and all attorney’s fees and costs related to the instant litigation and Plaintiffs' complaint.

5.0 Dismissal with Prejudice

5.1 Upon tender of the settlement draft identified in Section 2.1 above, Plaintiffs will file dismissals of their Complaints with prejudice and enter them as matter of record.

(Declaration of Lucas M. Dunn, ¶ 3, Exh. A (“Dunn Decl.”).)

In accordance with Paragraph 5.1, Plaintiffs are ordered to file dismissals of their Complaints with prejudice and enter them as a matter of record. The Court sets the matter for an OSC Re: Dismissal for June 30, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. B.

A. PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Defendants County of Napa, Napa County District Attorney’s Office and Robert Yeager (collectively, “Defendants”) move, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6,3 to enforce the Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs Zachary Minor and Angela Minor (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) and Defendants. The Motion is brought on the grounds that Defendants have complied with all terms of the Settlement Agreement, but Plaintiffs have refused to comply with their obligations under the Settlement Agreement. Therefore, Defendants request this Court enter judgment pursuant to the material terms of the Settlement Agreement. (Notice of Motion, p. 2.)

B. LEGAL STANDARD

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. ...” (§ 664.6, subd. (a).)

“When addressing a section 664.6 motion, the trial court must determine whether the parties entered into an enforceable settlement. [Citation.] Phrased another way, ‘the court must determine whether the settlement agreement is valid and binding.’ [Citation.] This inquiry is governed by the legal principles applicable to the formation of contracts generally.” (Eagle Fire & Water Restoration, Inc. v. City of Dinuba (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 448, 467-68.) “The purpose of section 664.6 is ‘to provide a summary procedure for specifically enforcing a settlement contract without the need for a new lawsuit.’ [Citation.] ‘If the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.’” (Greisman v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1310, 1321.)

“[T]he court [is] authorized to enter a judgment pursuant to the settlement regardless of whether [a party’s] nonperformance of her settlement obligations was excused.” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.) In fact, where there is no dispute that the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement, and, instead, the dispute is about whether a party’s actions constituted a material breach of the agreement such that the other party is relieved from performing his obligation under the agreement, “[t]hese disputes are not relevant to the entry of judgment pursuant to section 664.6.” (Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 796.)

3 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

“‘[T]he trial court is under a duty to render a judgment that is in exact conformity with an agreement or stipulation of the parties. ... It is not the province of the court to add to the provisions thereof [citations]; to insert a term not found therein [citations]; or to make a new stipulation for the parties.’” (Machado, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at 792 [“Disputes regarding the ... compliance with the settlement agreement may be relevant to the enforcement of the judgment, once entered ....”] [Emphasis in original].) “Thus, after entry of judgment, the trial court may, in accordance with applicable rules of procedure, exercise its inherent and statutory authority to enforce the judgment, including making determinations, as appropriate, regarding breach, materiality, and excuse from performance.” (Id., at 801.)

C. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The parties entered into a settlement agreement on November 24, 2025. (Dunn Decl., ¶ 3.)

Defendants agreed to three terms in consideration of Plaintiffs releasing all claims against Defendants: (1) pay Plaintiffs $4,000, (2) provide substantive, verified responses to Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories, Set One and Requests for Admission, Set One served on Defendant Yeager by November 25, 2025, and (3) not object to Plaintiffs’ efforts to obtain data from nonparty NC3TF. (Support Memo, p. 2; Dunn Decl., Exh. A, pp. 2-3, §§ 2.1-2.3.)

Defendants mailed Plaintiffs a check for $4,000 on November 26, 2025. (Declaration of Rebecca L. Craig (“Craig Decl.”), ¶ 3.) On or about December 17, 2025, Plaintiffs deposited the check. (Id., ¶ 4.) On November 25, 2025, Defendants provided substantive, verified responses to the Special Interrogatories, Set One and Requests for Admission, Set One. (Dunn Decl., ¶ 5, Exh. B.) Defendants have not objected nor attempted to interfere with any efforts by Plaintiffs to obtain information from the Northern California Computer Crimes Task Force (“NC3TF”). (Id., ¶ 9.)

Plaintiffs have yet to dismiss their claims against Defendants. (Support Memo, p. 4.) According to Plaintiffs, they remain ready and willing to complete dismissal obligations once the purportedly unresolved discovery obligations are completed by Defendants. (Declaration of Zachary Minor in Support of Motion to Compel Compliance with Settlement Agreement, filed 3/16/26, ¶ 11.)

On March 11, 2026, the Court denied without prejudice Defendants’ previous motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement because the motion did not request entry of judgment, much less entry of a judgment that reflected the exact settlement terms; therefore, there was no proper judgment before the Court to enforce.

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D. DISCUSSION

1. Entry of Judgment Pursuant to Terms of Settlement Agreement

Defendants request entry of judgment according to the material terms of the agreement. There is no dispute that the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement. Thus, entry of judgment is appropriate.

Defendants identify the four terms of the agreement they contend are material for purposes of entering judgment. (Support Memo, p. 4.) The Court finds that Paragraphs 2.0 to 5.1, on pages 1 to 3, of the Settlement Agreement are material.

Thus, the Court hereby enters judgment which mirrors the exact material terms of the Agreement, specifically Paragraphs 2.0 to 5.1 on pages 2 to 3 of the Agreement.

2. Enforcement of Settlement Agreement

With judgment entered pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the Court now moves to enforcement of the judgment. (Machado, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at 792, 801.) “Trial courts have the inherent authority to enforce their rulings.” (Id., at 792, fn. 13, citing Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d 585, 588 [“It is a well-established principle of law that a court possesses inherent power to enforce its judgments.”]; see §§ 128, subd. (a)(4) [court has inherent power to compel obedience to the court’s judgments, orders, and process in any pending action], 717.010, 1209, subd. (a)(5) [nonmonetary judgments are enforceable by invoking the trial court’s contempt powers].)

For the reasons explained in the Court’s concurrent ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion to compel compliance with settlement agreement and complete discovery, and based on Defendants’ showing through its instant motion (see Dunn Decl. and Craig Decl.), the Court finds that Defendants have complied with their obligations under the Agreement (now judgment). As such, Plaintiffs’ obligation under Section 5.1 to dismiss the action is triggered.

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs are ordered to file dismissals of their Complaints with prejudice and enter them as a matter of record.

The Court’s conclusion is further bolstered by a plain reading of the Agreement (now judgment), which indicates that Plaintiffs’ agreement to file a dismissal of the Complaint with prejudice pursuant to Section 5.1 was conditioned only upon Defendants’ tender of the settlement payment identified in Section 2.1, and not upon the terms in Section 2.2-2.3, which are the terms that Plaintiffs dispute in their concurrently heard motion. It is undisputed that Defendants tendered the settlement payment and that Plaintiffs deposited it. While neither party raises this interpretation of the Agreement, it is how the Court perceives the express language therein. Thus, this further supports that Plaintiffs’ obligation file dismissals has been triggered.

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