Brandon Roth v. Karma Lounge, LLC et al

CIVIL LAW & MOTION CALENDAR – Hon. Joseph J. Solga, Dept. B (Historic Courthouse) at 8:30 a.m.

Bank of America N.A. v. Jason A Espadilla 25CV000755

MOTION TO VACATE DISMISSAL AND ENTER JUDGMENT UNDER TERMS OF STIPULATED SETTLEMENT

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

The moving party fails to include, in the notice of this motion, the current version of the Tentative Ruling notice required by Local Rule 2.9, effective 1/1/26. The current version allows a party or counsel to request a hearing by calling the Court or emailing the Court, at JudicialReception2@napa.courts.ca.gov and providing specified information set out in Local Rule 2.9. The moving party is therefore directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the current Tentative Ruling notice explicitly required by Local Rule 2.9 to opposing party/ies forthwith. The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

Plaintiff Bank of America, N.A., (“Plaintiff”) moves, pursuant to the California Rules of Court 3.1304(c) and Ensher v. Ensher (1964) Cal.App.2d 318, for an order to vacate the dismissal and for entry of judgment under terms of the stipulated settlement of this case.

Good cause appearing, and no opposition having been filed, the Motion is GRANTED.

Brandon Roth v. Karma Lounge, LLC et al 25CV000801

DEFENDANT RAM GIRI’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

TENTATIVE RULING: The demurrer is SUSTAINED. Plaintiff is granted 10 calendar days’ leave, from Notice of Entry of Order, to amend the Complaint to state good causes of action against Defendant Ram Giri for negligence and negligence in hiring and supervision. Mr. Giri is to serve and file proof of service of Notice of Entry of Order.

A. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

Defendant Ram Giri demurs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.10, subdivisions (e) and (f), to the fourth and fifth causes of action asserted by Plaintiff Brandon Roth through the Complaint filed in this action on grounds that the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state either claim and on further grounds that each claim is uncertain as pled.

Pursuant to the allegations of the Complaint, on June 3, 2023, Plaintiff was a patron at the “Subject Premises,” and was injured when he was physically assaulted by one “JOHN DOE,”

acting within the course and scope of his employment as a bouncer / security officer engaged by Defendants. (See Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8, 13.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he “was grabbed from behind and thrown to the ground after the last call was announced.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) Plaintiff further alleges, on information and belief, that “at all times relevant hereto Defendant JOHN DOE . . ., [was a] direct employee of Defendants KARMA LOUNGE, LLC . . .; WONG PROPERTIE[S] . . .; and DOES TO 100, inclusive.” (Complaint at ¶ 4.) Plaintiff alleges that each defendant is an agent, servant, and employee of their co-defendants. (See id. at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff asserts claims against Doe 1 for general negligence (fourth cause of action), and for negligent hiring, retention and supervision (fifth cause of action).

On December 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended to the Complaint substituting Mr. Giri as “Doe 1.”

B. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A complaint must contain “facts constituting the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) “The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer . . . to the pleading on . . . grounds [that] . . . (e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action . . . [and/or] . . . (f) The pleading is uncertain.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.)

A demurrer on grounds that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim is treated as “admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Such demurrer “‘does not admit . . . facts impossible in law, or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial knowledge.’ [Citation.]” (Kenneth Mebane Ranches v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 276, 291-292.) The Court must “construe the allegations of a complaint liberally in favor of the pleader.” (Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 438.) Court must also accept as true facts that may be inferred from those expressly alleged. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1405.) The Court may also consider as grounds for a demurrer any matter that is judicially noticeable under Evidence Code sections 451 or 452. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) Because, “[a] demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading...the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove the[] allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-14.)

A demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and strictly construed; even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (See Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135 (Lickiss) [held: a demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and strictly construed; even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures])

C. ANALYSIS

Mr. Giri asserts that “Plaintiff's two causes of action against Mr. Giri for (i) negligence and (ii) negligent hiring, retention, and supervision are pled without a modicum of supporting material factual allegations.” (Support Memorandum at 4:5-7.)

The general rule is that a complaint is sufficient if it alleges ultimate, as opposed to evidentiary, facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) However, as Mr. Gigi notes, in order to state a claim sounding in negligence, a plaintiff is required to allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant owed plaintiff a duty of care. (See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 820 (Peter W.).) “‘There is a legal duty on any given set of facts only if the court or the Legislature says there is a duty.’ [Citation.]” (Smith v. City and Co. of San Francisco (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 38, 50.) Thus, “[t]he existence of a duty is a question of law and a complaint lacking facts establishing a duty is fatally defective.” (Ibid.)

A claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision is a claim for negligence, based on a particular duty. (See, e.g., Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 815 [Delfino] [“Liability for negligent supervision and/or retention of an employee is one of direct liability for negligence, not vicarious liability”].) Moreover, an employer is not liable for all injuries caused by its employees. Rather, in order to assert a claim for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, a Plaintiff is required to plead facts that establish that the employer/supervisor owed a duty to the Plaintiff. (See id. at 815-816 [concluding it “doubtful that the record supports a finding of the existence of a legal duty owing to plaintiffs by” employer].)

“The foundation of all negligence liability in this state [is] Code of Civil Procedure Section 1714 . . ..” (Peter W., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at 823.) “Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon himself or herself.” (Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).) “‘A departure from this fundamental principle involves the balancing of a number of considerations; the major ones are the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. [Citations.]’” (Peter W., supra, at p. 823; see also Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at 815.)

There is no suggestion in the allegations of the Complaint that Mr. Giri undertook any act that directly injured Plaintiff. Rather, the allegations suggest that Mr. Giri bears some responsibility for the injuries caused by the alleged acts of JOHN DOE.

The connection, alleged in the Complaint, between Mr. Giri (identified as Doe 1) and Plaintiff is extremely tenuous. Plaintiff alleges that “[o]n or about June 3, 2023, Plaintiff was a patron at the subject premises.” (Complaint at ¶ 8.) He alleges that he was injured when JOHN DOE assaulted him. (Id. at ¶¶ 8 and 13.) He alleges that “JOHN DOE . . . [was a] direct employee of Defendants KARMA LOUNGE, LLC . . .; WONG PROPERTIE[S] . . .; and DOES TO 100, inclusive.” (Id. at ¶ 4.) He alleges that at the time of the alleged assault, “JOHN DOE [was] acting within the course and scope of his employment as a security officer engaged by Defendants, and each of them . . ..” (Id. at ¶ 21.)

The Court can find no other allegations linking Mr. Giri to either JOHN DOE or to Plaintiff. For example, while Plaintiff alleges that he was injured “at or near 902 Enterprise Way D, Napa, CA” the Court finds no allegations linking any Defendant to those premises. There is no allegation relating to the nature of the business that Defendants were (allegedly) employing JOHN DOE in pursuit of. There is no allegation regarding the nature of Plaintiff’s patronage “at the subject premises.” (Complaint at ¶ 8.)

Ultimately, the Court agrees that the Complaint lacks sufficient allegations to permit the Court to conclude that Mr. Giri owed Plaintiff a duty of care relating to his alleged injuries. “The assertion that liability must nevertheless be denied because defendant bears no ‘duty’ to plaintiff ‘begs the essential question – whether the plaintiff’s interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant’s conduct.’” (Peter W., supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at 824.) Taking all of the allegations of the Complaint as true, and indulging all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court is unable to determine precisely what conduct by Mr. Giri, Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to legal protection against.

The negligent hiring and supervision claim fails for an additional reason. “Liability for negligent hiring and supervision is based upon the reasoning that if an enterprise hires individuals with characteristics which might pose a danger to customers or other employees, the enterprise should bear the loss caused by the wrongdoing of its incompetent or unfit employees.” (Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.) Thus, “[n]egligence liability will be imposed upon the employer if it ‘knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materializes.’” (Delfino, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th 815; accord Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139.)

On this element, Plaintiff alleges only that “Defendants KARMA LOUNGE, LLC . . .; WONG PROPERTIE[S] . . .; and DOES 1 TO 100, inclusive, knew or should have known that Defendant JOHN DOE was incompetent and unfit and that his incompetence and unfitness created a particular risk to others, including Plaintiff.” (Complaint at ¶ 41.) The Court finds that this abstract allegation fails to satisfy the element in that it does not establish that Mr. Giri knew or should have known that hiring JOHN DOE created a particular risk of the events alleged in the Complaint.

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Generally, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that a Plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The Court finds such reasonable possibility here. Therefore, the demurrer is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

In The Matter of Viridiana Rivera 26CV000579

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME

TENTATIVE RULING: Notice has been properly published and no written objections have been filed. The petition is GRANTED without need for appearance.

In The Matter of Nicole Abiouness 26CV000625

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME

TENTATIVE RULING: An Order to Show Cause for Change of Name (OSC) was entered in this matter on March 24, 2026. Petitioner is required to publish the OSC in the manner set forth in Code of Civil Procedure, section 1277. However, there is no proof of publication (POP) in the Court’s file. If one is filed before the hearing, the petition will be GRANTED without need for appearance.

If no proof of publication is filed, the matter will be CONTINUED to June 02, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. B to provide any publisher time to file the POP.

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