Defendant’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint
20. Lewis v. Trenier, et al, Case No. CIVSB2524508 Defendant’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint 7/17/26, 9:00 a.m., Dept. S-17
Tentative Ruling The Court would SUSTAIN, with thirty (30) days leave to amend, because the First Amended Complaint’s pleadings are at least uncertain and appear to indicate a statute of limitations concern. Separately, the Court would also SUSTAIN, again with leave to amend, as to the fourth cause for Constructive Trust. The Court OVERRULES as to the other arguments for demurrer.
Case Summary
This is a quiet title action. Currently, Defendant Trenier – who is Plaintiff’s sister – is on the property’s title. Plaintiff alleges he is the original purchaser of the property and its rightful owner.
However, in late 2005, Plaintiff was incarcerated, and he alleges that he let Defendant rent the property due to his unavailability. Around April 202, 2006, Plaintiff executed a grant deed on the property in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that the parties agreed that Defendant would transfer the property back to him when he was released and available, but Defendant refuses to make such a transfer now. As such he filed suit on August 29, 2025.
The currently operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) alleges (1) quiet title; (2) declaratory relief; (3) fraud; (4) imposition of constructive trust; and (5) unjust enrichment.
Analysis
Defendant demurs on four separate grounds: (1) the FAC fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (2) the FAC is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible; (3) the FAC is barred by the statute of limitations; (4) the pleading is barred by the statute of frauds.
Statute of Limitations – Code of Civil Procedure section 338(d) sets out that fraud claims have a three-year limitations period; the cause of action does not accrue until the aggrieved party’s discovery of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. Because the remaining claims rely on the same fraud-based facts, the derivative property-related claims share the same three-year period. (Krusi v. S.J. Amoroso Constr. Co. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 995, 1005; Ankoanda v. Walker- Smith (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 610, 615
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It bears repeating here that Plaintiff alleged a grant deed conveying the property to Defendant was recorded on April 24, 2006, when he was incarcerated. (FAC, ¶¶13, 14.) Plaintiff received a power of attorney document in 2015 that was never signed. (FAC, ¶17 & Exh. D.) Defendant argues this triggered a duty of reasonable inquiry including checking public title records. Thus, the fraud claim accrued in August 2015 and is, therefore, time-barred along with the remaining claims.
In opposition, Plaintiff refutes the limitations demurrer by pointing to allegations “that he did not discover the actual transfer of the property until January 2025. [Complaint ¶18-19].” (Plaintiff Oppo. 2:6-7.) It is unclear what Plaintiff means by “actual transfer of the property” and in this regard, the FAC and Plaintiff’s argument are both uncertain (see infra). It is possible that Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts that clarify how and what he discovered in January 2025 and why his discoveries at that time should be the controlling accrual date instead of August 2015 when he received the power of attorney document. At this point, however, the pleadings seem to indicate that the matter is time-barred.
Uncertainty – The analysis about the limitations demurrer dovetails with the uncertainty demurrer because of confusing and unclear allegations about the property. For example, the allegation that Plaintiff’s uncle discovered in January 2025 that the property was in his name instead of Defendant’s name. (FAC, ¶18.) It is unclear to what this allegation pertains or establishes.
Then, paragraph 19 starts: “Uncle, Louis Hollingsworth he showed [sic]. Went to the police department and informed them of the issue. Plaintiff discovered Defendant prepared a grant deed even before Plaintiff signed the deed on April 24, 2006.” (FAC, ¶19.) This disjointed paragraph is uncertain because it appears incomplete and contradicts an allegation that a deed was recorded, not signed, on April 24, 2006. (FAC, ¶14.) Paragraph 19 concludes with a reference to a grant deed recorded on February 15, 2006, purporting to convey the property from Plaintiff and his mother to Defendant. (FAC, Exh. E.) It is uncertain and confusing as to what his uncle showed him, what they told the police, how that is relevant to the property ownership, and how it relates to the February 15th recorded deed. It is possible that Plaintiff may be able to amend his pleading to address these uncertainties.
Constructive Trust (4th Cause) – Constructive trust is not an independent cause of action but a type of remedy for some categories of underlying wrong. (Glue-Fold, Inc. v. Slautterback Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1023, FN.3, citing to 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 796, p. 252.) Civil Code section 2224 provides that “[o]ne who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he or she has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained, for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it.”
Defendant argues demurrer is proper because constructive trust is not an independent cause of action and, to the extent it is pleaded as a cause of action, it fails as time barred just like the underlying fraud claim. If Plaintiff is able to amend his pleading to cure the issues addressed above regarding when he discovered facts supporting the fraud claim, then he would be able to pursue a remedy based on constructive trust.
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