In The Matter of Karen K. Carson Revocable Trust

Respondent contends, without discussion or citation to authority, that the period during which a party is granted leave to file an amended pleading provided in Section 472 terminates upon the filing of an opposition to a demurrer. The statute does not, however, provide that the period terminates on the date that an opposition is filed.

However, the statute does explicitly require that any such amendment be filed and served prior to that date. No proof of service of the Amended Petition appears in the Court’s file and Respondent presents evidence that it was not served prior to April 15, 2026. (See Supplemental Declaration of David Balter at ¶ 4 [“To [April 21, 2026], Petitioner has not served Respondent this Amended Petition . . .”].)

Because it wasn’t served prior to the deadline, the condition precedent to Petitioner’s right to amend his pleading once without leave of court was not satisfied. Thus, the Amended Petition was filed without leave of Court.

“The court may . . . at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper . . . [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders the Clerk to STRIKE the Amended Petition for Orders filed by John P. Lowney, III on April 15, 2026.

[2] RESPONDENT SUSANNAH G. CARSON’S DEMURRER TO PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR ORDERS

TENTATIVE RULING: Respondent’s Demurrer to the original Petition for Orders filed by Respondent John P. Lowney, III, on February 19, 2026, is SUSTAINED. Petitioner is granted 10 calendar days from entry of the instant Order to file an amended petition as discussed below. (See Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(g).)

A. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

Respondent Susannah G. Carson demurs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10, subdivision (e) and Probate Code section 16061.8, to each of the purported causes of action asserted through the Petition for Orders on grounds that each is time barred.

By the action Petitioner John P. Lowney, III, challenges the validity of an amended and restated version of the Karen K. Carson Revocable Trust (Trust and Trust Amendment) which amendment was, pursuant to the allegations of the Petition, created some three months prior to the death of the Trustor Karen K. Carson (Decedent), and served to disinherit Petitioner and his sister Katherine K. Sukla, to the advantage of Respondent, who is sister to both Petitioner and Ms. Sukla. Petitioner seeks orders: (1) invalidating the Trust Amendment based on lack of capacity and undue influence; (2) removing Respondent as Trustee; (3) cancellation of the Trust Amendment; and (4) determining title to the Trust assets.

The matter came on originally for hearing on April 28, 2026. Attorneys David Balter and Nicholas Conti appeared on behalf of Respondent, and attorney Kevin Snyder appeared on behalf of Petitioner. At the hearing, Petitioner and Respondent stipulated to the fact that, on April 5, 2025, Attorney Lori Hunt served, by mail, on behalf of Respondent, the letter attached as Exhibit 1 to the Request for Judicial Notice filed in support of the instant demurrer, including the Notification by Trustee Pursuant to Probate Code Section 16061.7 attached thereto, and that, on April 21, 2025, Attorney Lori Hunt served, by mail, on behalf of Respondent, the letter attached as Exhibit 2 to the Request for Judicial Notice filed in support of the instant demurrer, including the Notification by Trustee Pursuant to Probate Code Section 16061.7 attached thereto.1 (See Minute order of April 28, 2026.)

The Court finds that the stipulation constitutes a judicial admission of the fact of the service of the Notices by Trustee Pursuant to Probate Code Section 16061.7. (See Valerio v. Andrew Youngquist Construction (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1271 [held: a judicial admission is “‘a waiver of proof of a fact by conceding its truth, and it has the effect of removing the matter from the issues’”]; see also Barsegian v. Kessler & Kessler (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 451 (Barsegian), [“Judicial admissions may be made in a pleading, by stipulation during trial, or by response to request for admission”].) “Facts established by pleadings as judicial admissions ‘ “are conclusive concessions of the truth of those matters, are effectively removed as issues from the litigation, and may not be contradicted, by the party whose pleadings are used against him or her.” (Ibid.)

B. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A general demurrer will lie “where the complaint has included allegations that clearly disclose some defense or bar to recovery.” (Cryolife, Inc. v. Super. Ct. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1152.) Where a plaintiff has pled facts that appear to demonstrate an affirmative defense to the claims, they must then “plead around” the defense by alleging facts sufficient to avoid the apparent defense. (See Gentry v. eBay Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 825.) However, “‘[a] demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred. [Citation.] In order for the bar ... to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Geneva Towers Ltd. Partnership v. City and County of San Francisco (2003) 29 Cal.4th 769, 781 (Geneva Towers).)

1 Petitioner so-stipulated on the express condition that, if the Court sustains the instant demurrer, it will do so with leave to amend.

C. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Here, Respondent’s argument that the claims are time barred relies on the asserted fact that “co-counsel of record for Respondent, Lori Hunt, served . . . Petitioner John P. Lowney a valid, timely and complete ‘Notification by Trustee’ on April 5, 2025, disclosing a true and complete copy of the Trust.” (Support Memorandum at 7:7-10.) Respondent does not contend that the Petition contains allegations of this fact. As noted above, however, Petitioner has, by stipulation, conceded the fact and it is removed from the litigation. (Barsegian, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th 446, 451.)

“A person upon whom the notification by the trustee is served pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 16061.7 . . . shall not bring an action to contest the trust more than 120 days from the date the notification by the trustee is served upon the person, or 60 days from the date on which a copy of the terms of the trust is delivered pursuant to Section 1215 to the person during that 120-day period, whichever is later.” (Prob. Code, § 16061.8.) “Actions that challenge the validity of a trust are actions that ‘contest the trust’ under section 16061.8. [Citation.] We are ‘not bound by its label’ in deciding whether an action is a trust contest. [Citation.] Rather, we ‘look to the substance of that [action] and its “practical effect.”’ [Citations.]” (Hamilton v. Green (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 417, 424.)

Reviewing the substance of the Petition and its practical effect, the Court concludes that it is an action challenging the validity of a trust, and is therefore subject to the limitations of Probate Code section 16061.8. The Petition was filed February 19, 2026, more than 120 days from and after April 5, 2025, and is therefore barred pursuant to that statute.

Through his Opposition, Petitioner argues that “[e]ven assuming that certain claims may implicate Probate Code section 16061.8, the demurrer must be overruled because it does not defeat the Petition in its entirety. At a minimum, the Petition states valid claims warranting judicial intervention based on serious allegations of misconduct, self-dealing, and abuse of authority by the trustee.” (Id. at 2:3-6.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that, through the Petition, he seeks, pursuant to the authority of Probate Code section 17200, Court orders removing the current trustee and determining title to trust assets based on the misconduct and abuse of fiduciary authority by the Trustee. (See id. at 2:17-21.) He contends that these prayers for relief are not trust contests and are not, therefore, subject to the limitations period of section 16061.8. (See ibid.)

Petitioner fails, however, to cite to specific allegations in the Petition of such “misconduct, self-dealing, and abuse of authority.” A review of the pleading reveals that every specific allegation of fact that supports the prayed-for relief relates to the validity of the Trust Amendment. (See Petition at ¶¶ 5-6, 18-21, 23, 25, and 33.) Moreover, in each “cause of action” section of the Petition, Petitioner expressly ties the relief sought to the validity of the Trust Amendment. (See id. at ¶¶ 22, 25, 33, and 36.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that substance of the action, and its practical effect, is to attack the validity of the Trust Amendment. It is, therefore, a trust contest for purposes of applying the limitations period of section 16061.8. (See Hamilton v. Green, supra,

98 Cal.App.5th at 424.) As such, the Court finds that each of the claims asserted through the Petition are necessarily barred. (See Geneva Towers, supra, 29 Cal.4th at 781.)

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED.

Generally, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that a Plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The Court finds a reasonable possibility that Petitioner can amend the Petition to state claims relating to undue influence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duties, that do not, in substance and/or practical effect, constitute an attack on the validity of the Trust Amendment. For this reason, Petitioner is granted leave to amend.

CIVIL LAW & MOTION CALENDAR – Hon. Cynthia P. Smith, Dept. A (Historic Courthouse) at 8:30 a.m.

Catherine D Holmes et al v. FCA US LLC et al 25CV001211

DEFENDANT FCA US, LLC’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

TENTATIVE RULING: The Motion is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.

The moving party failed to include in the notice of this motion proper notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 2.9. Moving party is directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the missing notice to opposing party/ies forthwith. The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

A. PRELIMINARY MATTERS

Defendant FCA US, LLC (FCA) moves, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 438, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(ii), for judgment on the pleadings in favor of FCA and against Plaintiffs Catherine D. Holmes, David B. Holmes, and Emma Q.H. Singer (Plaintiffs) on grounds that: (1) the Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for fraudulent inducement, based on concealment (Concealment Claim), against FCA; (2) the Concealment Claim is uncertain; and (3) the Concealment Claim is barred by the statute of limitations.

The action arises out of product defect claims relating to a 2021 Jeep Wrangler allegedly manufactured and warranted by FCA and purchased by Plaintiffs from co-defendant Hanlees Chrysler Dodge Jeep Ram of Napa.

B. LEGAL BACKGROUND

“Because a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the functional equivalent of a general demurrer, the same rules apply.” (Hightower v. Farmers Insurance Exchange (1995)

38 Cal.App.4th 853, 858.) A motion for judgment on the pleadings is therefore treated as “admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The Court must “construe the allegations of a complaint liberally in favor of the pleader.” (Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 438.) Court must also accept as true facts that may be inferred from those expressly alleged. (Cundiff v. GTE Cal., Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1405.) The Court may also consider as grounds for granting the motion any matter that is judicially noticeable under Evidence Code sections 451 or 452. (Code. Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) Because the motion tests “only the legal sufficiency of the pleading...the question of plaintiff’s ability to prove the[] allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-14.)

C. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1. The Complaint Fails to Allege that the Subject Vehicle is Defective

FCA first argues that “Plaintiffs’ fraudulent concealment claim fails to allege with sufficient particularity the defect FCA allegedly concealed. The Complaint merely describes a list of ways in which the Jeep Wrangler’s engine may be defective that could result in a variety of problems and hazardous driving conditions due to the purported ‘Engine Defect’. [Citation.] None of these allegations identify the defect, let alone the defect in the subject vehicle at issue in this case.” (Support Memo at 5:18-22.) The Court agrees.

California’s fraudulent concealment statute provides that “[o]ne who willfully deceives another with intent to induce him to alter his position to his injury or risk, is liable for any damage which he thereby suffers.” (Civil Code § 1709.) For purposes of that section, a “deceit” includes, “[t]he suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for want of communication of that fact.” (Civil Code § 1710, subd. (3).)

Plaintiffs allege that “FCA committed fraud by allowing the Subject Vehicle to be sold to Plaintiffs without disclosing that the Subject Vehicle equipped with the 2.0L engine was defective . . ..” (Complaint at ¶ 65.) Plaintiffs do not, however, so far as the Court can find, allege that the specific vehicle that Plaintiffs allegedly purchased (Subject Vehicle) is defective. Rather, Plaintiffs allege, in the abstract, that “Plaintiffs are informed, believe, and thereon alleges [sic] that FCA knew since prior to Plaintiffs purchasing the Subject Vehicle, that the 2021 Jeep Wrangler vehicles equipped with the 2.0L engine have one or more defects that can result loss of power, stalling, engine running rough, engine misfires, failure or replacement of the engine (the ‘Engine Defect’).” (Complaint at ¶ 16.) The Court can find no allegation that the Subject Vehicle suffers from one or more of these “Engine Defects.”

Plaintiffs appear to concede the foregoing by failing to file any opposition to the instant motion.

In the absence of allegations that the Subject Vehicle suffers from any specific defect, the Complaint fails to state a claim for fraudulent concealment of defects.

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