Property Investors 2020, LLC VS Spanish Ranch 1 Association

C [invoices fully paid].) Not only does Gill’s moving declaration fail to provide any evidence of an actual post-trial invoice to Gill or of the actual net amount paid by him, making counsel’s arguments unsupported an misleading. (At the hearing, counsel apologized and assured the Court this was an oversight, not an intentional effort to deceive.)

The invoices provided by Tsai show that Rutherford/Monterey Coast incurred and paid a total of $3,150.00 in court reporter appearance fees for trial reporting on 9/30, 10/1, 10/2, and 10/3/2026, plus additional fees paid for transcripts, real time reporting, processing, etc., which the Motion does not separately address or challenge, adding up to the claimed amount of $4,964.60. Thus, these costs were actually "incurred."

Second, PI2020/Gill argue that Rutherford/Monterey Coast submitted no evidence of court reporter fees “established by statute.” PI2020 appear to rely upon Government Code section 68086, subdivisions (a) and (c), which govern fees that must be paid for an official reporter “provided at the expense of the Court,” and thus the fees that are recoverable under those circumstances. Section 68086 also provides that when, due to the unavailability of an official court reporter, the parties arrange for an official pro tempore reporter, “the fees and charges of the certified shorthand reporter shall be recoverable as taxable costs by the prevailing party as otherwise provided by law.” (Gov.

Code, § 68086, subd. (d)(2).) On reply, PI2020/Gill argue for the first time that the rates charged by Combs are excessive, in that they are greater than the amounts statutorily permitted for reporters pro tempore, specifically, in Government Code sections 69950 and 69954. These provisions govern transcription fees, and PI2020/Gill have not provided any calculation or comparison demonstrating that the transcription fees charged by Combs exceed the fees permitted by statute. Further, as to appearance fees, a court may charge “a fee equal to the actual cost of providing that service.” (Gov.

Code, § 68086, subd. (a)(2).) It follows that, as to reporter appearance fees, actual costs are recoverable, provided they satisfy section 1033.5(c)'s other requirements (addressed below).

PI2020/Gill’s Motion does not argue, let alone demonstrate, that the claimed fees were not reasonably necessary rather than merely convenient to the prosecution of the action. In light of the parties’ election to try the matter to the court, rather than a jury, and utilize a private reporter rather than prepare a daily settled statements as ordered by the Court, and to submit written closing arguments citing to the trial evidence, the reporter’s fees were reasonably necessary to the prosecution of the action.

Nor does the Motion demonstrate that the fees were charged were not reasonable for the reporting services that were provided. (The statutory fee limitation on reply is a distinct argument, but in even assuming this is also an argument that the fees were excessive for the services provided, it is particularly unpersuasive in light of Gill’s contention that he arranged for Combs and paid all of the fees.)

Third, PI2020/Gill argues that Rutherford (the sole cross-complainant) did not prevail on cross complaint; thus, any reporter’s fees that are awarded should be reduced by 50% “to reflect a 50% success rate.” PI2020/Gill do not cite any legal authority to guide the Court in making any

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

HG21090336: Property Investors 2020, LLC VS Spanish Ranch 1 Association 07/17/2026 Hearing on Motion to Tax Costs filed by Property Investors 2020, LLC (Plaintiff) CRS# 827722243904 in Department 25 apportionment. PI2020/Gill also fail to adequately address Rutherford’s argument that its crossclaim for trespass arose out of the same operative set of facts as the other claims, including those asserted by PI2020. They simply argue that some of the causes of action in the cross-complaint “did not arise out of trespass.” (Reply Mem., p. 2.) This statement is irrelevant, as it does not address factual issues in play, or the witnesses who testified on those issues.

PI2020’s own affirmative claims required the parties to put on evidence regarding ownership and management of the Mobile Home Park, the circumstances of the underlying tenancy, foreclosure, foreclosure sale and related documentation, notice of warehouse lien and ensuing negotiations, and the parties’ conduct thereafter with respect to Space 231. This evidence encompasses substantially all of the Court’s factual findings in the Statement of Decision. PI2020/Gill do not identify any factual issues or findings that are solely attributable to Rutherford’s trespass action, which could be fairly isolated from the factual issues underlying their Complaint.

Their main defense at trial concerned Rutherford’s standing, which involved foundational testimony that O’Hagan and Lopez were required to give, in any event, to establish the admissibility of critical records and their own observations which were necessary to defend against PI2020/Gill’s claims. PI2020/Gill also argued at trial that Rutherford lacked any right to possess Space 231, which determination turned on the same facts going to the application of the Mobilehome residency law as pertaining to PI2020/Gill’s affirmative claims.

Finally, PI2020/Gill do not address the fact that Monterey Coast was 100% successful in this action, as it was only named as a defendant and prevailed against PI2020 entirely, and is therefore entitled to collect its costs from PI2020.

At the hearing, Gill argued that he prevailed on the cross-complaint, and was not named as a party to the complaint; thus, no costs are awardable against Gill. Rutherford and Monterey Coast stipulated that, under these circumstances, any costs award lies solely against PI2020.

ORDER. For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED IN PART, solely as to crosscomplainant Gill. The costs requested in the memorandum of costs are awarded solely against PI2020. The motion is otherwise DENIED.